See Adverse Possession, &62; Partition, 74. II. TRANSFER OR INCUMBRANCE. $119 (Tex.Civ.App.) In view of Const. art. 16, § 50, providing that a married man shall not sell the homestead without his wife's consent, given in the manner prescribed by law, title to the homestead could only pass by deed ac- knowledged by the wife apart from her husband, Rev. St. 1911, art. 1115, so requiring.-Harle v. Harle, 166 S. W. 674.
§ 125 (Tex.Civ.App.) The homestead exemp- tion being limited to 200 acres, the owner of 320 acres cannot claim the whole tract, hence his conveyance of 160 acres passes good title though his wife did not join, where his home- stead was upon the other half of the tract, and he had not claimed as part of his homestead any particular 40 acres out of the quarter sec- tion conveyed.-Johnson v. Conger, 166 S. W.
III. RIGHTS OF SURVIVING HUS- BAND, WIFE, CHILDREN, OR HEIRS.
upon removing from the land to another resi- dence intended to make his second residence his home, is not erroneous, in using the word home instead of homestead, for the jury must so have understood it.-Johnson v. Conger, 166 S. W. 405.
See Criminal Law, §§ 14, 364, 366, 369, 575, 730, 815, 822, 823, 1206.
III. MANSLAUGHTER.
§ 42 (Tex.Cr.App.) A letter received by de- fendant from his wife just before a homicide stating that she was corresponding with deceas- ed, etc., held not in itself statutory adequate cause for provocation, unless it led defendant to believe that deceased had committed adultery with his wife.-Willis v. State, 166 S. W. 1172.
§ 45 (Tex.Cr.App.) The statement of dece- dent that if accused did not leave, decedent would go for an officer to have accused arrested was not adequate cause to reduce a homicide to manslaughter.-Tores v. State, 166 S. W. 523.
§ 52 (Tex.Cr.App.) A love letter, written by deceased to defendant's wife, which unexpected- byly came into defendant's possession a few days before the homicide, was not statutory adequate cause for provocation, where defendant, after receiving the letter, was with deceased on sev- State, 166 S. W. 1172.
§ 134 (Tex.) The exemption provided for Const. art. 16, § 50, applies to the homestead while the head of the family is living, but fur- nishes no rule for its distribution after his death.-American Bonding Co. of Baltimore v. Logan, 166 S. W. 1132.
8142 (Tex.) Const. art. 16, § 52, determines the disposition of a homestead after the death of the owner, and determines who shall take it and their respective interests, but not the condi- tions which may be imposed on the inheritance. -American Bonding Co. of Baltimore v. Logan,
Under Const. art. 16, §§ 50, 52, and Rev. St. 1911, arts. 3235, 3422, 3427, 3785, 3786, a homestead, on the death of the owner, vests in his heirs free from debts, and the proceeds of a voluntary sale are also free from debts, though the probate court failed to set aside the home- stead under article 3413, notwithstanding arti- cle 3787, declaring that the proceeds of a vol- untary sale shall not be subject to forced sale within six months after such sale.-Id.
§ 145 (Tex. Civ.App.) A widow's offer to sell the property was not an abandonment of her homestead rights therein.-Perkins v. Perkins, 166 S. W. 915.
The fact that a widow was not living on the property was not an abandonment of her home- stead rights, where she had not acquired anoth- er home.-Id.
IV. ABANDONMENT, WAIVER, OR
§ 154 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where complainant on one portion of lot erected a house in which he and his family resided, the subsequent construc- tion of another house on another portion of the lot and the building of a division fence did not constitute an abandonment of the homestead character of that portion of the property so as to render it subject to execution.-Turnpaugh v. Dickey, 166 S. W. 1194.
§ 162 (Tex. Civ. App.) Where the owner of a homestead sold part of the tract and removed to another locality, his mere intention to re- turn at some indefinite time and take up his homestead upon the unimproved quarter sec- tion which he retained will not sustain a claim of a homestead exemption.-Johnson v. Con- ger, 166 S. W. 405.
V. PROTECTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF RIGHTS.
§ 216 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where the charge on defendant's claim that because the land was the grantor's homestead and his wife did not join, the conveyance to plaintiff did not pass title, di-
eral occasions before the homicide.-Willis v.
with another in the unlawful act of trying to $62 (Tex.Cr.App.) Where accused engaged take the wife away from the home of her hus- band by force or stealth, at night, and accus- ed in furtherance of the unlawful purpose, while trying to force himself into the house, killed decedent, and accused claimed that his gun was accidentally discharged, he was guilty of negligent homicide, within Pen. Code 1911, arts. 1113-1127.-Chant v. State, 166 S. W.
V. EXCUSABLE OR JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE.
$118 (Tex.Cr.App.) A landlord who let farm land for crop rent, the tenant agreeing to work the crops, may, upon the tenant's failure, enter and work the crop for the benefit of both, and, where he peacefully acquired possession, he is not a trespasser, and, if the tenant attempts by display of force to drive him from the land, may defend himself.-Hillis v. State, 166 S. W. 1154.
VI. INDICTMENT AND INFORMA-
§ 142 (Ark.) It is sufficient that the evidence show that accused committed the murder in the vicinity of the place where it is claimed to have been committed, that being the county of the venue.-Tillman v. State, 166 S. W. 582.
(B) Admissibility in General. 158 (Tex.Cr.App.) Declarations by defend- ant's wife that he had made threats against her, and testimony that she had called upon a dep- uty sheriff for protection, were admissible, in a prosecution for the killing of another at the same time that defendant killed his wife, pro- vided such statements were made in defendant's hearing or brought to his knowledge before the killing.-Robbins v. State, 166 S. W. 528.
Where defendant killed his wife and another at the same time, evidence that on the same evening a witness heard defendant cursing his wife was admissible, in a prosecution for the killing of the other.-Id.
$169 (Tex.Cr.App.) On a trial for homicide following a dispute and scuffle at a dance, aft- er accused had cursed ladies who had declined to dance with him, evidence that he went upon
to take liberties with a lady who was dancing with him, held admissible.-Muldrew v. State, 166 S. W. 156.
§ 178 (Ark.) Accused, in a homicide case, could introduce evidence that the crime was
committed by some other person, for the pur- pose of showing that he was not guilty.-Till- man v. State, 166 S. W. 582.
Evidence that the murdered girl's father stat- ed, shortly before her body was found, in a well with a bullet hole in her forehead, that when the girl was found she would be south of a certain road, with a bullet hole in her fore- head, and a rock tied around her neck, and in a well, was not admissible in evidence, as tend- ing to show that the father committed the crime. -Id. In a prosecution for murdering a girl with whom accused and others were shown to have had sexual intercourse, evidence as to state- ments by another as to his criminal intimacy with the girl held not admissible as substantive evidence of such other's intercourse with her, and of his guilt of the crime.—Id.
Accused, in a homicide case, could prove any fact tending to show another's guilt of the crime, except statements by such other amount- ing to confession.-Id.
In a homicide case, in which it appears that about two years before the death of the mur- dered girl she had become pregnant, evidence was not admissible as to acts of intercourse be- tween the girl and another before the time of her pregnancy; such evidence being too remote.
§ 181 (Tex.Cr.App.) Though a letter written by deceased to defendant's wife a few days be- fore a homicide was not statutory adequate cause for provocation, yet it could be consider- ed by the jury in passing upon defendant's state of mind at the time of the killing.-Willis v. State, 166 S. W. 1172.
§ 182 (Tex.Cr.App.) Where accused, who leas- ed his land for crop rent, killed deceased when he and the tenant attempted to drive accused from the land, upon which he entered to work the crop claiming that the tenant had abandoned it, evidence of the condition of the crop is admis- sible on the question of abandonment.-Hillis v. State, 166 S. W. 1154.
§ 192 (Tex.Cr.App.) Where accused, who had rented his land for crop rent, entered and com- menced cultivation when the tenant abandoned the crop, and, upon the tenant and deceased at- tempting to drive him therefrom by display of force, killed deceased, evidence of the advice giv- en by a justice of the peace whom accused con- sulted before he entered on the land is admissi-
ble to show that he had no intention of pro- voking any difficulty.-Hillis v. State, 166 S. W.
(E) Weight and Sufficiency. $231 (Tex.Cr.App.) The state can show, by either direct or circumstantial evidence, that the defendant had heard, prior to the time of the killing, statements made by his wife which were offered in evidence against him.-Robbins v. State, 166 S. W. 528.
§ 234 (Ark.) Evidence in a homicide case held to sustain a finding that deceased was murdered by accused, who secreted her body in a well. Tillman v. State, 166 S. W. 582.
§ 239 (Tex.Cr.App.) Though a letter from de- fendant's wife received by defendant just be- fore a homicide stating that she was correspond- ing with deceased, etc., was not in itself statu- tory adequate cause for provocation, yet it might be when considered with all the antece- dent conduct and acts of deceased.-Willis v. State, 166 S. W. 1172.
255 (Ky.) Evidence held not to support a conviction of voluntary manslaughter.-Saylor v. Commonwealth, 166 S. W. 254.
VIII. TRIAL.
(B) Questions for Jury.
8276 (Tex. Cr.App.) Where accused claimed that he had entered upon his land to work the crop for the benefit of himself and his tenant who had abandoned it, and that, upon the ten- ant's attempting to drive him therefrom by dis- play of force, he killed deceased in defending himself, he is entitled to have his theory of the case submitted.-Hillis v. State, 166 S. W. 1154. (C) Instructions.
§ 295 (Tex. Cr. App.) While the provocation must arise at the time of the commission of the offense, yet antecedent matters should be consid- ered in passing upon the state of defendant's mind; but the court should not enumerate them, but tell the jury that they must look to all the facts and circumstances in the case.-Willis v. State, 166 S. W. 1172.
$300 (Ky.) An instruction directing acquittal if the jury believed that accused was in immi- nent danger and it was necessary for him to kill deceased to save himself is erroneous be- cause permitting the jury instead of accused to judge of his peril.-Hacker v. Common- wealth, 166 S. W. 235.
An instruction on self-defense, which re- quired the jury to find that accused did not seek or bring on the difficulty, is erroneous without further explanation, for the jury might have understood that accused provoked the dif- ficulty, merely by going to the place where de- ceased was or opening a conversation with him.-Id.
§ 300 (Ky.) An instruction on self-defense held erroneous for want of evidence to support it.- Barker v. Commonwealth, 166 S. W. 981.
An instruction on self-defense should permit accused to kill decedent and not merely shoot and wound him, where accused at the time be- lieved and had reasonable grounds to believe that he was in danger of death or some great bodily harm and that it was necessary in the exercise of reasonable judgment to avert the danger real or apparent.-Id.
$300 (Tex.Cr.App.) Where accused testified that he stabbed deceased in self-defense, not in- tending to kill him, and there was evidence that the pocketknife used would not necessarily in- flict a fatal wound, a charge on aggravated as- sault is necessary.-Bolden v. State, 166 S. W. 503.
$300 (Tex.Cr.App.) An instruction held to unduly limit the right of self-defense, in view of the facts.-Williams v. State, 166 S. W. 1170.
$305 (Tex.Cr.App.) The court in submitting the issue of negligent homicide, held, in view of the facts, to properly charge on conspiracy.— Chant v. State, 166 S. W. 513.
$309 (Tex.Cr.App.) Evidence held not to raise the issue of manslaughter, but merely to raise the issues of murder in the first or sec- ond degree, or accidental or negligent homicide. -Chant v. State, 166 S. W. 513.
X. APPEAL AND ERROR.
§ 338 (Ark.) The admission in evidence, in a homicide case, of pictures of the murdered girl, and the place where her body was found, and where, according to the state's theory, she was murdered, was not prejudicial to accused, where she was fully described in the evidence, and her age and size, as well as the condition of the well in which she was found, were given.-Till- man v. State, 166 S. W. 582.
homicide case as to statements by the murdered § 339 (Ark.) The exclusion of evidence in a girl's father that when she was found, her body would be found at a certain location, with a bullet hole in her head, etc., in which situation she actually was found, held not prejudicial to accused, when the evidence was considered as impeachment evidence; the father's evidence
having no substantive force.-Tillman v. State, 166 S. W. 582.
§ 340 (Tex.Cr.App.) Where accused was con- victed of manslaughter, the error in a charge on murder in the second degree was immate- rial.-Lopez v. State, 166 S. W. 154.
§ 340 (Tex.Cr.App.) Where accused was con- victed of murder in the second degree, objec- tions to charges of murder in the first degree will not be considered.-Chant v. State, 166 S. W. 513.
HUMANITARIAN DOCTRINE.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
See Acknowledgment, § 62; Adverse Posses- sion, § 43; Bigamy; Bills and Notes, § 453; Damages, 88 100, 216; Death, §§ 83, 99, 104; Descent and Distribution, § 156; Divorce; Dower; Frauds, Statute of, §§ 129, 144; Homestead, §§ 119, 134-145; Homicide, § 158; Insurance, 8813; Libel and Slander, § 80; Marriage; Specific Performance, §§ 35, 106, 121; Tenancy in Common, § 3; Trespass, 46; Wills, §§ 100, 108; Witnesses, § 414. I. MUTUAL RIGHTS, DUTIES, AND LIABILITIES.
§ 14 (Mo.App.) A husband could grant a li- cense to lay a sewer on land owned by him and his wife by the entireties, which was good as against both during their joint lives, and ab- solute as against the husband if he survived.- Ewen v. Hart, 166 S. W. 315.
II. MARRIAGE SETTLEMENTS. $31 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where a joint and mu- tual will executed by husband and wife was probated by the husband surviving and he took possession of the property given him for life, with remainder to their daughters, a woman subsequently marrying him, under an agreement by him to convey to her his interest, was chargeable with notice of the will, and not an innocent purchaser for value.-Larrabee Porter, 166 S. W. 395.
§ 235 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where the jury, in re- sponse to the question whether a husband gave to his wife a note as a gift or to reimburse her for money of hers that had been used, found that it was to reimburse her for her money and land used, the finding was a direct finding that the entire note was turned over to her to re- imburse her, and not that she was to have only the amount needed to pay her for her property used.-Larrabee v. Porter, 166 S. W. 395.
§ 239 (Ky.) Where the purchaser's wife was made a defendant to the vendor's suit to enforce his lien, and judgment was rendered against the defendants for the balance of the purchase price, but the record failed to show that the wife signed the notes or was in any way liable, the judgment was erroneous as to her.-Baird v. Prewitt, 166 S. W. 771.
VIII. SEPARATION AND SEPARATE
made a valid separation agreement, subsequently § 279 (Ark.) Where husband and wife, who reassumed the marital relation, the agreement was annulled, and their marital rights must be determined by statute.-Carter v. Younger, 166 S. W. 547.
§ 281 (Ark.) Where a widow, petitioning for allotment of dower, admitted the execution of a separation agreement adjusting her property rights, but alleged that the same had been ab- rogated by subsequent reassumption of marital relations, the burden of proof rested on her.- Carter v. Younger, 166 S. W. 547.
IX. ABANDONMENT.
$ 304 (Tex.Cr.App.) The statute making pun- ishable the abandonment of a wife and minor child by a husband and father does not impose a penalty for temporary separation, but implies a purpose not to support his family, where there is no excuse for his failure to do so.-Irving v. State, 166 S. W. 1166.
§ 312 (Tex.Cr.App.) An indictment which charged that the defendant abandoned his wife, but did not directly allege that he had a wife, or give her name, was insufficient.-Irving v.
III. CONVEYANCES, CONTRACTS, AND State, 166 S. W. 1166.
OTHER TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
§ 43 (Ky.) A husband cannot recover from his wife, in a divorce action by her, for sums paid during marriage for the maintenance of the wife's small children by her first husband, and for medical attention and funeral expenses for one of them, and for the maintenance of the wife's live stock, in the absence of a con- tract by the wife to pay for such services.- Allen v. Allen, 166 S. W. 211.
V. WIFE'S SEPARATE ESTATE. (A) What Constitutes.
§ 119 (Tex. Civ.App.) A conveyance by a hus- band to his wife by a deed reciting a valuable consideration and duly recorded vested title in the wife as her separate property.-Bird v. Lester, 166 S. W. 112.
(B) Rights and Liabilities of Husband.
§ 313 (Tex.Cr.App.) In a prosecution under an indictment charging in separate counts the abandonment by defendant of his wife and of his minor child, evidence held to show that de- fendant had merely left his family temporarily to secure work and make a new home for them. Irving v. State, 166 S. W. 1166.
See Municipal Corporations, § 822. ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN.
IMPEACHMENT.
See Witnesses, §§ 317-414.
IMPLIED CONTRACTS.
See Assumpsit, Action of; Work and Labor. IMPRISONMENT.
§ 138 (Ky.) A verbal agreement by a husband to keep in force a mortgage executed by his wife as security for a debt due from him is not binding on the wife, who may rely on limi- See Bail; False Imprisonment; Habeas Cor- tations in defense of a suit to foreclose the mortgage.-Bradley v. Bradley's Adm'r, 166 S. W. 773.
See Frauds, Statute of, § 129; Municipal Cor- porations, §§ 284-486; Partition, § 85; Street Railroads, § 37.
INCOMPETENT PERSONS.
INCORPORATION.
See Corporations, §§ 18, 28.
INDEMNITY.
See Guaranty; Receivers, § 101.
INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION.
See Criminal Law, § 1091; Grand Jury; Hus- band and Wife, & 312; Infants, § 16; Lar- ceny, 29; Parent and Child, 8 17; Per- jury, 26; Threats, § 5; Vagrancy, § 3. IV. FILING AND FORMAL REQUI- SITES OF INFORMATION OR COMPLAINT.
§ 42 (Tex.Cr.App.) While it would be too late to file the information, after announcement of ready for trial and the parties had gone before the jury, if it had been placed with the pa- pers prior to the calling of the case, and the court's attention had been called thereto, it would be deemed filed as of the date on which it was placed with the clerk.-Landreth v. State, 166 S. W. 503.
V. REQUISITES AND SUFFICIENCY OF ACCUSATION.
§ 72 (Tex.Cr.App.) The indictment, in prosecution for unlawfully carrying a pistol, which alleged that accused did unlawfully car ry a pistol on "or" about his person was fatal- ly defective for using the disjunctive.-Hunter v. State, 166 S. W. 164.
§ 81 (Tex.Cr.App.) A complaint and informa- tion, alleging that the Christian name of accus- ed is unknown, support a conviction, if other wise good, where accused does not, during the trial, suggest his name, and no motion in regard thereto is made.-Sugarman v. State, 166 S. W. 732.
§ 110 (Mo.App.) Indictment in the language of Rev. St. 1909, § 8315, forbidding the practice of medicine or surgery without a license, held sufficient, though it omitted the negative aver ment that defendant was not within a proviso that physicians registered on a certain date should be regarded as licentiates.-State v. Humfeld, 166 S. W. 331.
§111 (Mo.App.) When a statute creating and defining an offense contains an exception or proviso constituting part of its description, it is essential to negative such proviso in the information, since the offense may not be de- scribed without so doing.-State v. Humfeld, 166 S. W. 331.
VI. JOINDER OF PARTIES, OFFENSES, AND COUNTS, DUPLICITY, AND ELECTION.
§ 125 (Tex.Cr.App.) A complaint and informa- tion which charge conjunctively the offense de- nounced by Pen. Code 1911, art. 755, do not charge separate and distinct offenses.-Herring- ton v. State, 166 S. W. 721.
Where a complaint and information distinctly charge the offense of treating or offering to treat any disease by any method in violation of Pen. Code 1911, art. 755, subd. 2, the allegations at- tempting to charge a violation of subdivision 1 will be treated as surplusage.-Id.
VII. MOTION TO QUASH OR DISMISS, AND DEMURRER.
$ 137 (Tex.Cr.App.) The character of testi- mony or the quantum of proof had before the grand jury cannot be inquired into on motion to quash the indictment.-Edwards v. State, 166 S. W. 517.
INDORSEMENT.
See Bills and Notes, §§ 243-378.
See Carriers, § 304; Constitutional Law, 274; Criminal Law, § 1022; Evidence, 237; Guardian and Ward; Husband and Wife, 43; Limitation of Actions, §§ 73, 103; Master and Servant, § 185; Negligence, §§ 23, 24, 32, 56; Parent and Child; Stat- utes, §§ 93, 118; Wills, § 221.
II. CUSTODY AND PROTECTION. § 12 (Mo.) A state as parens patriæ may pro- mote the well-being of persons of defective un- derstanding, or delinquents, or others burdened with misfortunes or infirmities so as to be un- able to care for themselves, and the constitu- tional limitations will be so construed, if pos- sible, to permit such supervision by the state.- State ex rel. Cave v. Tincher, 166 S. W. 1028. Laws 1913, pp. 148-154, giving the probate court in counties of less than 50,000 population jurisdiction to provide for the care and control of children under 17 years of age who are de- linquent, held not an invasion of personal right in that it interferes with the parental right of control of children.-Id.
Laws 1913, pp. 148-154, §§ 2, 4, 5, 6, et seq., permitting one having information of a delin- quent child to file with the probate clerk a veri- fied petition stating the facts and providing for the commitment of such child, held invalid as attempting to give the probate court criminal jurisdiction without requiring the constitution- al procedure in criminal cases, such as an infor- mation or indictment as required by Const. art. 2, § 12.-Id.
Laws 1913, pp. 148-154, defining a delinquent child as one who violates any law of this state" not punishable by death or imprisonment in the penitentiary, and authorizing the pro- bate court, in proceedings to commit a delin- quent child, to hear the case in a summary man- ner and examine witnesses without the assist- ance of counsel, violates Const. art. 2, § 22. Id.
§ 16 (Mo.) The indictment or information re- quired by Const. art. 2, § 12, must be such as is contemplated by the common law, viz., an in- dictment found and presented by a grand jury or an information filed by a public officer au- thorized to prosecute criminals.-State ex rel. Cave v. Tincher, 166 S. W. 1028.
III. PROPERTY AND CONVEYANCES. § 24 (Tex.Civ.App.) A minor who, with the consent of his father claimed and occupied, as his own, land adjoining that of his father, the father at no time asserting any claim thereto, could not be regarded as holding under his fa- ther, and hence his minority did not prevent him from acquiring title by limitation.-Hous- ton Oil Co. of Texas v. Griffin, 166 S. W. 902.
§ 37 (Ky.) Where a will gave a life interest to testator's wife in one-third of his realty, of which she then owned an undivided one-fourth interest, and devised the remainder in trust for testator's seven children, to pay one-seventh thereof to the sons at a certain age and the income from one-seventh to the daughters, the widow and trustees being in possession, and the land not being divisible, there was such a vested estate and joint ownership as to au- thorize the sale of an interest of four infant children under Civ. Code Prac. § 490.-Eldridge v. Embry, 166 S. W. 223.
§ 66 (Mo.) A child over 7 and under 14 years of age is prima facie incapable of crime.-State ex rel. Cave v. Tincher, 166 S. W. 1028.
INFERIOR COURTS.
See Courts, &$ 169, 170.
See Bankruptcy; Estates, § 10; Principal and Surety, 194.
(A) Actions and Other Legal Proceedings. § 26 (Tex.Civ.App.) Equity will enjoin the prosecution of numerous suits at law where all of them arise from a common source, in- volve similar facts, and are governed by the same legal rules, so that the whole litigation may be settled in a single suit, and it appears that the maintenance of separate suits will See Levees, § 2. materially injure the parties.-Supreme Lodge of Fraternal Union of America v. Ray, 166 S. W. 46.
Where separate actions in justice's court by 39 members of a fraternal benefit association were all brought solely to determine the right of the association to put in force an increased rate of assessment, equity will take jurisdic- tion to restrain the maintenance of the sepa- rate actions and to determine the whole mat- ter in one suit.-Id.
One entitled to maintain a suit in equity to restrain the maintenance of 39 separate ac- tions, brought against it in justice's court, in- volving the same question, will be required, as a condition to the assumption of jurisdiction by equity, to pay all costs accrued in the jus- tice's court, but defendants may assert such right against complainant in their answer.-Id. III. ACTIONS FOR INJUNCTIONS.
§ 118 (Mo.App.) A petition in an action by a company erecting a Masonic lodge building and the members of the lodge to restrain defendant from issuing a publication which alleges that defendant was about to issue a publication pur- porting to be an official publication authorized by the company, to be sold as a souvenir of the dedication of the building, and that defendant solicited subscriptions by false representations, held to state a cause of action for injunctive relief.-Kansas City Masonic Temple Co. v. Young, 166 S. W. 838.
See Libel and Slander, § 86.
INSANE PERSONS. See Contracts, & 99; Damages, § 163; Evi- dence, $$ 132, 545; Insurance, § 819;' Judg- ment, § 334.
I. DISABILITIES IN GENERAL.
§ 2 (Mo.App.) On an application for a writ of error coram nobis to set aside a judgment against an alleged insane defendant, not repre- sented by guardian in the action resulting in the judgment, evidence held to sustain a find ing that defendant was insane at the time of the trial.-Gibson v. Pollock, 166 S. W. 874. V. PROPERTY AND CONVEYANCES.
§ 61 (Tex.Civ.App.) Though H., when assign-
To jury, see Criminal Law, §§ 14, 761-841, 1091, 1173; Trial, §§ 139, 191–296.
See Appeal and Error, § 1068; Corporations, $$ 90, 99; Frauds, Statute of, § 52; Limita- tion of Actions, §§ 37, 100; New Trial, 103, 104; Trial, 88 25, 1082; Witnesses, 177.
III. INSURANCE AGENTS AND
(A) Agency for Insurer.
§ 87 (Tex. Civ.App.) An insurance company is responsible for the acts and declarations of their local agents within the scope of their em- ployment.-Amarillo Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 166 S. W. 658.
$93 (Tex.Civ.App.) Though insurance agents violate the instructions of the company in tak- ing policies, the company is liable if the act is within the apparent scope of the agent's author- ity.-Amarillo Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 166 S. W. 658.
(B) Agency for Applicant or Insured.
§ 109 (Tex.Civ.App.) The local agent of a life insurance company could become the custodian of the policy for insured, notwithstanding his agency for the company.-Amarillo Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 166 S. W. 658.
V. THE CONTRACT IN GENERAL. (A) Nature, Requisites, and Validity. § 136 (Tex.Civ.App.) The retention of the pol- icy by the local agent receiving it for delivery at insured's request was some evidence on the question of delivery to insured.-Amarillo Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 166 S. W. 658.
§ 141 (Ark.) Where the soliciting agent of a life insurance company surrendered the notes given for the payment of the first premium by the insured, and took in exchange another note. which he forwarded to the general agents of the company, their acceptance of such note con- stituted a waiver of the right to forfeit the policy for nonpayment of the premium in money.-Pioneer Life Ins. Co. v. Cox, 166 S. W. 951.
§ 141 (Tex.Civ.App.) A life insurance compa- ny held estopped to claim that no application was made for the policy sued on, so that it was not a binding contract.-Amarillo Nat. Life
« PreviousContinue » |