man a judge in his own case, is void in itself. The later cases do not question the supremacy of parliament. (1) In America, however, there has been a disposition to adhere to the earlier English cases.(2) The reason of the difference is manifest. In England the encroachments upon private right were made by the executive, often supported by pliant judges; the great battle for private right and individual liberty was fought by the house of commons, and when these were placed upon a firm foundation, every Englishman in

As there is no exception to the report of the commissioner of the District Court-to whom the question of damages was referred - based on this view, the decree of the Circuit Court is reversed, with instructions to render a decree on the basis of that report for half the damages which he found the libellant to have suffered.

NATURE OF THE POWER OF TAXATION.*

CHAPTER II.

LIMITATIONS ON TAXING POWER, WHERE NO EXPRESS CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTIONS.

SECTIO

ECTION 10. Power of courts. The power of the courts to declare void an act of the legislature, in the absence of express constitutional limitations, is an exceedingly delicate one, and should be exercised with the greatest caution; but of its existence there can be no doubt. It is a conceded principle as to the States of the American Union, that all sovereignty resides in the people. This sovereignty is distributed among the different departments of government - legislative, executive and judicial. It results from the nature of this government that the power of the legislature is not unlimited. It cannot exercise executive or judicial powers. (1) Each department, in the absence of express limitations, is supreme while exercising its proper functions; neither can exercise the powers of the other. So strongly is this principle impressed upon the American people, that one of the new States has embodied it in express terms in its fundamental law. The constitution of Minnesota distributes the powers of government into legislative, executive and judicial, and declares "that no person belonging to or constituting one of these departments shall exercise any of the powers properly belonging to either of the others, except in the instances provided for in the constitution."(2)

§ 11. English and American courts. At an early day the English courts undertook to declare void acts of parliament, on the sole ground that they were repugnant to natural justice or morality. In Day v. Savage, Hob. 85, where a custom of the city of London was pleaded, and it was claimed by the defendant that the custom was, in such cases, to refer the issue taken upon such plea to the mayor, etc., of the city of London to certify the custom, the court held, that although the custom was confirmed by parliament, yet that an act of parliament made against "natural equity," as to make a

*From advanced sheets of a treatise on "Taxation," by the Hon. W. H. Burroughs, of Norfolk.

(1) Sedgwick's Stat. and Const. Law, 2d ed., 132–137, 151, 152, and authorities cited. (2) Sanborn v. Rice, 9 Minn. 273. 4

against oppression. But, in this country, the danger to private right and individual liberty has been that legislatures, influenced by popular passion or prejudice, or controlled by combinations of vicious men, should disregard every thing that opposed their wills. And the courts have been looked to by the people as a protection from arbitrary acts of the legislature. While this is true, it will be found that the cases which are referred to do not sustain so broad a proposition as laid down in Hobart. Where the act is clearly a judicial act, where it appropriates private property for public use without compensation, or appropriates private property for a private purpose in any manner, where it assesses taxes for a private purpose, the courts do not hesitate to hold the act void. (3)

§ 12. Opinions of Marshall and Ruggles, JJ. Taxes can only be imposed for a public purpose; they cannot be imposed for a private purpose. There are strong expressions to be found in many cases which seem to favor the idea that the taxing power is without limit, so far as the control of the courts is concerned. The authority quoted is the opinion of Judge Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland,(4) and of Judge Ruggles in People v. Mayor of Brooklyn.(5) "The only security against the abuse of this power is found in the structure of the government itself. In imposing a tax, the government acts upon its constituents. This is, in general, sufficient security against erroneous and oppressive taxation. The people of a State, therefore, give to their government a right of taxing themselves and their property; and as the exigencies of the gov ernment cannot be limited, they prescribe no limits to the exercise of this right, resting confidently on the interest of the legislature and the influence of the constituents over their representatives to guard them against its abuse.:'(6) In the case in which this language is used a tax law was declared void, not because of any conflict with the express provisions of the constitution of the State or of the United States, but because of an implied conflict between the powers conferred upon the federal government and the tax law. It was decided that a bank was a necessary and proper instrumentality to be used in conducting the financial affairs of the federal government, and that the sovereignty of the State did not extend to instrumentalities of the federal government, as, by the compact between the States, that government was to be supreme. (7) An attentive consideration of the language, in connection with the facts of the case itself, will show that Judge

(1) Sedgwick's Const. and Stat. Law, 2d ed., 125, 127. (2) Id. 128-130.

(3) Id. 151, 152; see four rules on the subject. Robertson, J., in Lexington v. McQuillan's Heirs, 9 Dana, 513; Black, J., in Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadelphia, 21 Penn. St. 168, 169; People v. Batchelor, 53 N. Y. 128; Mayor and Council of New ark v. State, July No., Am. Law Reg.

(4) 4 Wheaton (Curtis' Cond. U. S.) 434. (5) 4 N. Y. 426, 427.

(6) 4 Wheaton (Curtis' Cond. U. S.) 434. (7) Id. 426, 435.

Marshall intended to assert no such proposition as is attributed to him. It is undoubtedly true "that the exigencies of the government cannot be limited," and, as a general rule, the people prescribe no limits to the exercise of this right. I suppose by exigencies is meant the necessity of the government for revenue for the purposes of government; to this there is no limit, and the abuse of this must be corrected by the influence of the constituents on the legislature. But I cannot suppose that this able jurist meant to say that the legislature could impose taxes for a private purpose, and that there was no remedy in such case but the one named; it seems to me that the true meaning to be attached to the language is, that when taxes are imposed for a proper governmental purpose, the amount, the subjects and mode of imposition are vested in the legislature alone.

Judge Ruggles, after quoting from Judge Marshall's opinion just cited, proceeds: "It must be conceded that the power of taxation and of apportioning taxation, or of assigning to each individual his share of the burden, is vested exclusively in the legislature, unless this power is limited or restrained by some constitutional provision. The power of taxing and the power of apportioning taxation are identical and inseparable. Taxes cannot be laid without apportionment; and the power of apportionment is therefore unlimited, unless it be restrained as a part of the power of taxation."(1) This was a case of local assessment for grading and paving a street, and it was claimed that taxation should be general, and embrace all persons within the State, or some district or territorial division of the State. In the connection in which it was used, and as a general proposition, the doctrine laid down is sound, but it does not support the cases which claim unlimited power for the legislature as to taxation.

$13. Public purpose a question for the courts. Whether the purpose is a public one is a question for the courts, (2) and is precisely similar to the question of public use in the exercise of the right of eminent domain. This must be so from the nature of the case. If the legislature can determine whether the use is a public one, then the safeguards in the bill of rights and constitution of the States and United States for the protection of private property are valueless. (3) The legislature cannot, by declaring the use to be public, when it is within the constitution a private use, authorize the property of one citizen to be taken from him and given to another; but when the use for which the property is desired is in its nature public, the legislature are the supreme and final judges, whether the public necessity or benefit is such as to call for the exercise of the power; whether the time is a fitting one; what particular property may be taken, and in what manner, in respect to instrumentalities, to be employed for the purpose, whether State officers, individuals or corporations. (4)

(1) People v. Mayor of Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 426, 427. (2) Cite cases when use declared private. Hammett v. Philadelphia, 65 Penn. St. 146. (3) Sedgwick's Stat. and Const. Law, 2d ed., 443, note a. It is strange that any respectable judge should have expressed such an opinion, because it emasculates the constitutional safeguard and places private property at the mercy of the legislature. If this opinion were correct, the conceded doctrine that the legislature cannot authorize private property to be taken for a private use would be overthrown. Tyler v. Beecher, 44 Vt. 651; Spring v. Russell, 7 Greenl. 273; Williams v. School District, 33 Vt. 271.

(4) In the matter of Peter Townsend, 39 N. Y. 174; Costar v. Tide-water Co., 3 C. E. Green (N. J.), 63; Bankhead v. Brown, 25 Iowa, 540; Sadler v. Langham, 33 Ala. 386-828; Loughbridge

The acquisition of lands for the purpose of speculation or sale by a railroad, or to prevent interference by competing lines or methods of transportation, or in aid of collateral enterprises remotely connected with the running or operating of the road, are not such purposes as authorize the condemnation of property.(1) A railroad having lease of land may, when the proper running and operating of its road, and the interests of the public require permanent structures for its depots, acquire the fee in the land under power of eminent domain.(2)

§ 14. What is public purpose? While it seems to be a concession, in the majority of cases, that the purpose for which taxes are imposed must be public as opposed to a private purpose, there is great diversity of opinion as to what constitutes a public purpose. The classes of cases in which the question principally arises are donations or subscriptions by municipal corporations to railroads and agricultural colleges, the extension of city boundaries to include lands used for agricultural purposes and subject them to city taxes, and bounties paid to soldiers to avoid a draft. An examination of the principles on which these cases are based will aid us in ascertaining the limits of the public purpose.

COMMISSION OF APPEALS ABSTRACT.

PASSENGER.

Injuries received on railroad: injured party acting under advice of physician.-This action was brought to recover damages for injuries received by plaintiff while a passenger on defendant's road. The defendant gave evidence, tending to show that exercise taken by plaintiff might have tended to retard his recovery, and that quiet would have been better. The plaintiff was allowed to prove, under objection, that he was advised by his physician that it was right and proper to exercise. Held, no error; that plaintiff was bound to use ordinary care to effect his cure and restoration to health, and having acted in good faith and under the advice of a competent physician, even if it was erroneous the error would not shield defendant. Lyons v. Erie R. Co. Opinion by Earl, C.

SUBSCRIPTION.

When subscriber not bound: effect of chapter 84, Laws of 1869.-This action was brought to recover a subscription of $200, alleged to have been made by defendant to plaintiff's stock. Plaintiff was a corporation organized under the general railroad act (chap. 140, Laws of 1850). Defendant claimed that the subscription was not valid or binding, because ten per cent of it had not been paid, although the subscription paper declared that he had paid down ten per cent at the time of subscribing. Held, that the subscription was invalid, and that plaintiff was not estopped from denying the statement in the subscription paper that ten per cent had been paid.

Also held, that the provision of chapter 84, Laws of 1869 (an act to facilitate the construction of plaintiff's road), which provides (§ 2) that no subscription to the stock of the company shall be invalidated or affected by reason of the non-payment of ten per cent thereof at the time of the subscription, did not apply to prior subscriptions, but operated prospectively only; and that if a retroactive effect were given it would be void.

v. Harris, 42 Ga. 500; Talbot v. Hudson, 18 Gray, 421; Concord Railroad v. Greely, 17 N. H. 47.

(1) Andrews, J., in Rensselaer and Saratoga Railroad v. Davis, 43 N. Y. 137.

(2) N. Y. & H. R. R. Co. v. Kip et al., 46 N. Y. 546.

N. Y. & O. M. R. R. Co. v. Van Horn. Opinion by Earl, C.

TOWN BONDS.

THE LAW TELEGRAPH.

This action was brought to restrain the negotiation of certain bonds issued by defendant J., as railroad commissioner for plaintiff, to pay for a subscription for stock of A. & S. R. R. Co. Defendant J. had been appointed a commissioner for plaintiff under the statute authorizing certain towns to subscribe to the capital stock of the A. & S. R. R. Co. (chap. 64, Laws of 1856) and the acts amendatory thereof (chap. 401, Laws of 1857, chap. 384, Laws of 1859), with authority to issue bonds and subscribe for stock, provided certain consents of the tax payers should be obtained and proofs filed. Consents were obtained and the proofs made and filed, and J. subscribed for stock, executed bonds and delivered them to the company to pay for the subscription, complying with the requirements of the statutes in all respects, provided the consents and proofs were in conformity therewith, which was questioned. Chapter 402, Laws of 1864, was afterward passed by the legislature, which act declared that where bonds have been issued by a commissioner of any town, and the railroad shall have been constructed through such town, the bonds shall be valid and binding upon the town without reference to the sufficiency of the proofs, and that the amount thereof shall be levied, raised and paid as provided in the original act. Held, that the legislature had authority to release the prior condition and to declare the assent of the commissioner binding upon the town; that said act.was constitutional, and the bonds valid and binding.

Also held, that the method in which the assent of a town to a subscription for stock and the issuing of its bonds to aid in the construction of a railroad may be given is in the discretion of the legislature. Town of Duanesburgh v. Jenkins, com., etc., et al. Opinion by Johnson, C.

TREASURY NOTE.

When ceases to be negotiable: purchase of stolen note. -This action was brought for the alleged conversion of a United States treasury seven-thirty note. Upon the back of the note there was printed a statement, in substance, that it was convertible at maturity, at the holder's option, into government bonds. The holder had indorsed the note, “Pay secretary of the treasury for redemption," and sent it by express to the secretary. It was stolen from the express company and the thief erased the indorsement so that no evidence of it remained, and then sold it to a banking house in Liverpool, who purchased it for value in the regular course of business. Held, that the note was negotiable prior to its indorsement by the owner; that the printed statement was a part of the instrument; that the holder was not prevented from making his election to take bonds prior to the maturity of the note; that he exercised this option by the indorsement and delivery to the express company and so destroyed the negotiability of the note, he, after that, having only a claim against the United States for the proper amount of bonds; that even if the owner could withdraw this election the purchaser or transferee could not maintain that the transaction was incomplete; that the erasure of the owner's indorsement by the thief was an act of spoliation merely and did not affect the instrument or the rights of the owner in any way; and that the purchaser acquired no title. Dinsmore, pres't, etc., v. Duncan et al. Opinion by Dwight, C.

formed in New York city, has its executive office at No. 261 Broadway, and its central office at 145 Fulton street. We observe by its circular that this company has inaugurated and put in operation a novel, ingenious and valuable service intended for the use and benefit of the members of the bar. It consists in the introduction of the telegraph as a means of inter-communication privately between themselves, and also between the various courts of record, the public offices and their own offices.

The method of accomplishing this difficult and valuable feature, now for the first time applied to these purposes, is simple, effective, and easily comprehended. It is the result of laborious study and ingenious inventions. The instruments used are the dial instruments, so improved by new inventions that they are now the only rapid and reliable instruments suited for private use, in all kinds of weather and under all circumstances. The use of their printing instruments, first contemplated, was abandoned by this company, after many tests and experiments, as being wholly incapable of being employed for this complex service. An instrument is placed in the office of each subscriber and easily operated, even by an office boy. A similar instrument is also placed in the various courts and public offices, such as the offices of the sheriff, register, county clerk, etc., and all the wires converge at a central office of the company, where connections are made between the various wires, as they may be required, by means of signals made by the party wishing to transmit a message. Each subscriber or point connected has a number placed on a card near the instrument, and is called by striking the number wanted on a key, and messages are then sent by simply spelling or abbreviating them on alphabetical keys.

The main object and some of the distinctive features of this enterprise we are told are the following:

1. Lawyers can communicate instantly and privately with each other, and to and with the courts and public offices at all times. 2. They can likewise instantly and privately communicate with their own offices from all the courts and public offices at all times. 3. They can also send telegrams from their own offices, or from the courts, etc., to any part of the country, through these iustruments, over other telegraph lines, at the usual rates. 4. Lawyers can, by special arrangement, be put into private telegraphic communication with important clients. 5. By means of operators and reporters in and about the courts, furnished by the company, and included in the price of subscription, lawyers can receive notice of their cases as they appear on the calendars, the instant the calendars are made up each day, and timely notice of the approach of their cases on the day calendars for trial, as well as all other facts desired, and thus save the hours and even days that are frequently wasted in the attendance upon the courts. 6. Lawyers can, either from their own offices, the courts, or public offices, communicate with referees and others; send for persons, papers or books; obtain all kinds of information, etc., and in short accomplish instantly, by telegraph, what has heretofore been done through the slow and uncertain agency of a messenger, not always at hand, thereby saving vexation and delay, frequently expensive, and often disastrous, as for instance, when such services are required, perhaps, in the midst of the trial of a cause. 7. Requisitions for

searches or information in any of the public offices can be made by telegraph, and conveyancers can sit in their offices and continue their searches down to the very moment of passing title. 8. Among the subscribers will be found various officers and firms with whom lawyers have necessary business to transact at all times, such as the printer, the stenographer, the lithographer, and even the detective, all of whom are in instant communication. 9. Messengers can be called at once to go anywhere or do any thing required, a low charge being made only for the time they are employed.

The plan embraces other features, benefits and advantages, many of which will ripen with use and time. Already, over seventy of the leading lawyers and law firms in the city of New York have subscribed for, and are now using, these instruments. And it is said that nothing but commendation has come from them. The extension to Brooklyn and its courts is now under way. The terms are two hundred and fifty dollars per annum.

CORRESPONDENCE.

VALIDITY OF LEGISLATIVE ACTS UNDER THE RECENT AMENDMENTS TO THE NEW YORK CONSTITUTION.

PORT RICHMOND, May 6, 1875.

Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

SIR-In glancing over some of the acts which have become laws at the present session of our legislature, it has occurred to me that grave questions will arise as to the constitutionality of several of such laws. It is not necessary to point out the laws wherein these questions may arise, but I have thought that a short letter, calling attention to the section of the Constitution to which I refer, the necessity of its adoption, and a few words as to its scope and effect, might not at this time be out of place.

Section 17 of article 3 of the Constitution, as amended, reads as follows:

"No act shall be passed which shall provide that any existing law, or any part thereof, shall be made or deemed a part of said act, or which shall enact that any existing law, or any part thereof, shall be applicable, except by inserting it in such act."

This is the language of the amendment. I have not the minutes of the convention before me, and hence cannot say what the debates, if any, were had upon the subject indicated as the idea of the convention, regarding the scope of this provision, or as to what class of legislation the convention had in view; but the generality of lawyers will not have to stop long to think of cases, almost without number, where they have been called upon to construe some law which had been passed, and which, after making certain general provisions regarding the working under the law, which were applicable only to the particular case for which the law was enacted, then closed with a clause whereby a certain other law, enacted for a different locality, with some provisions like the later one, the details of which served to work well, was "made applicable so far as not inconsistent with this act." In fact, it has been for years the habit of framers of laws to draw simple acts, referring to other acts for details, adding, as a sort of saving clause, the "not inconsistent" part, or an equally obnoxious clause applying a former law "so far as applicable."

The excise laws afford a noteworthy sample of this kind of legislation, and the questions which can arise and be litigated thereunder. Indeed, the books which are full of discussions upon local laws, where the courts have been obliged to construe statutes. adjust seeming differences, and give, in many instances, a meaning to incongruous and inconsistent phrases, clauses and sections.

It was intended then, evidently, to prevent this kind of legislation - the kind that compels the examination of several laws to find out what one law means. In other words, was it not intended, and do not the words of the section indicate, that EVERY law passed by the legislature shall be, in so far as it goes, a complete law in itself? It seems to me, and every lawyer that I have talked with upon the subject is impressed in the same way, that any law which, by implication or by words, requires a reference to some other law, in order to make clear what may or may not be done under it, is clearly unconstitutional.

I notice an act, but recently passed, containing this clause: * * ** "Subject to all provisions of law applicable to railroad corporations organized under the said general laws, so far as not inconsistent with this act."

Now the questions arise: Is not such legislation obnoxious to the constitutional provision under consideration? Is not the making of the general laws applicable, so far as not inconsistent, precisely the evil designed to be remedied? Is not this in effect passing a law which in substance provides that existing laws shall be a part thereof and applicable thereto, without inserting such laws in the act?

These questions are new, and will undoubtedly receive judicial construction; but calling of the attention of the profession to them through your journal can do no harm, and may lead to more care in the framing of laws. Yours, etc.,

A

NOTES. CONTEMPORARY states that women can practice law in Illinois, Wisconsin, Missouri and Maine. "We know that a lady has been admitted to the bar in Missouri, but we believe she has never had a case in court, although her talents are unquestioned. Again, we take occasion to call upon some of our lady lawyers to vindicate their title to a position at the bar, by writing a book. Mrs. Bradwell is doing her part by conducting successfully an excellent legal journal. And we may here add that the charge which has been frequently made by men, that the female character cannot brook rivalry, does not hold good in her case; for she has kind words to say concerning her nearest neighbors, whenever occasion offers. But the work of editing a legal newspaper, though requiring unremitting industry and good judgment, is of an inferior character to the writing of a treatise. We, therefore, call upon some of our lady counselors to convince their skeptical 'brethren' of the bar by writing a book, that the female mind is capable of grasping and marshaling legal principles." The Central Law Journal says that the committee of the New York Bar Association, on the codification of the municipal ordinances, sent to various cities for copies of their charters and ordinances, and encountered rather a ludicrous response to their efforts to obtain the charter and ordinances of the city of London, in the request for information whether they would send all the horses and carts necessary to draw the multitudinous tomes to the place of shipment. Not having been appointed to engage in the haulage business, the committee contented themselves with Luffman's Charters of the City of London, published in 1793, and with believing the declaration of their English friends, that nobody knew what were the charter and ordinances of that metropolis of the world, and that there is one other place on the globe as badly off as New York in respect to the incongruity and obscurity of municipal legislation.

The New York Tribune states that a curious case was decided in the Marine Court, Part I, yesterday, before Judge Gross and a jury. It was that of Maurice Galvin against the Oceanic Steam Navigation Company, and affects the question of assigning passage tickets on ocean steamships. The plaintiff states that he purchased, in December last, from a runner of the White Star Line at Queenstown, a passage ticket, which was sold to him at a reduced rate because it had been previously issued to one Timothy McCarthy. Galvin sailed on the steamship Baltic, putting his baggage (a trunk and valise) in charge of the ship's officer. On the arrival of the vessel at this port, the valise was missing. The present action was thereupon brought to recover its value, stated at $148.25. The defendants sought to put in evidence the ticket on which they alleged that the plaintiff had traveled, in order to take advantage of the "non-transferable" clause in it, but the evidence was excluded on the ground that the ticket was not sufficiently identified. Defendant's counsel then moved for a dismissal of the complaint on the following grounds: first, the want of jurisdiction of the court, the action not being founded upon a contract "made, executed, or delivered within this State " (Session Laws of 1872, Vol. 2, Chap. 629); second, that an action of this nature could not under the decisions be sustained against a foreign corporation on the evidence of the plaintiff alone. The court, however,

denied the motion, holding as to the first point that the breach of contract being upon the arrival of the vessel here the court acquired jurisdiction. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff for the full amount claimed.

We learn by a round-about way, through an English law journal, that a member of the legislature of Idaho, overwhelmed by the numerous and pressing applications for the legal separation of married couples, has introduced a bill divorcing all the married people in the territory. This modern Solon gives as his reason for this singular proposition that it will save time, and time is money. He sagaciously remarks that all who wish to do so can get re-married.—A deputation of authors waited on Mr. Disraeli on Monday to make representations and obtain his views in regard to international copyright. The deputation consisted of Messrs. Blanchard Jerrold, Tom Taylor, Charles Reade, Charles Dickens, G. A. Sala, and Charles Mackay, and Miss Braddon and Mrs. Wood, and many other well-known literary persons. Mr. Edward Jenkins, member of Parliament for Dundee, and author of "Ginx's Baby," addressed Mr. Disraeli on the part of the deputation. He pointed to the appropriation and mutilation of the works of British authors by the book publishers of the United States, and asked if some remedy could not be found for the grievances. Mr. Disraeli replied that the subject had already come before the government on the question whether a revision of the copyright would give the matter full attention, and strive to remove the annoyances and vexations now existing, but it must have time to cousider what method to adopt. He was of opinion that a royal commission would be better than a committee of the House of Commons, because it would be more likely to be well acquainted with the subject.

A writer in the Gentlemen's Magazine speaks of the fact that Boccaccio intended to be a lawyer at one time. The writer enumerates a large number of poets and authors who have been in some way connected with the law: "Petrarch was a law student - and an idle one- at Bologna. Goldini, till he turned strolling player, was an advocate at Venice. Metastasio was for many years a diligent law student. Tasso and Ariosto both studied law at Padua. Politian was a doctor of law. Schiller was a law student for two years before taking to medicine. Goethe was sent to Leipsic, and Heine to Bonn, to study jurisprudence. Uhland was a practicing advocate, and held a post in the Ministry of Justice at Stuttgart. Ruckert was a law student at Jena. Mickiewicz, the greatest of Polish poets, belonged to a family of lawyers; Kaoinczy, the Hungarian poet and creator of his country's literature, studied law at Kaschau. Corneille was an advocate, and the son of an advocate. Voltaire was, for a time, in the office of a procureur. Chaucer was a student of the Inner Temple. Gower is thought to have studied law; it has been alleged that he was Chief-Justice of the Common Pleas. Nicholas Rowe studied for the bar. Cowper was articled to an attorney, called to the bar, and appointed a commissioner of bankrupts. Butler was clerk to a justice of the peace The profession of Scott need not be stated. Moore was a student of the Middle Temple. Gray, until he graduated, intended himself for the bar. Campbell was in the office of a lawyer at Edinburgh. Longfellow, a lawyer's son, spent some years in the office of