stallments, the machines are to be considered as leased, and the purchasers are to forfeit all the money paid upon a failure to pay any installment when due. The plaintiff in the case was a widow who brought suit to recover $65 that she had paid on account of a sewing machine which was valued at $70, but which was taken from her because the last installment of $5 was not paid when due. When the machine was taken from her she offered to pay the $5 which was overdue, but this was refused. The plaintiff also denied that the signature to the contract of sale, including the forfeiture, was hers. The judge, in deciding the case, said, that sales of this character, with the right to take the machines back by force, when nearly the full value has been paid, without refunding what has been paid or any part thereof, are contrary to public policy, and unjust and oppressive to a deserving class of people. Judgment was, therefore, given for the plaintiff, and the $65 was paid over.

In the case of Ann Eliza Young v. Brigham Young, Chief Justice Lowe, of Utah, has rendered a decision denying an attachment against the defendant to compel payment of $500 per month alimony, pendente lite, as awarded by ex-Chief Justice McKean. The decision proceeds on the ground that, in cases of divorce, alimony cannot be allowed unless a valid marriage is either first admitted or proved. The defendant had alleged in his answer that the marriage in question was a polygamous one, and the allegations, not being denied, must be taken as true. The Chief Justice said it would be strange, if, under these circumstances, it could be imposed upon a court of equity to direct or enforce payment of alimony, and thus bestow apparent, if not, indeed, real, sanction of the law upon a practice which is hostile to the civilization of the age, and which the penal statutes of the land visit with punishment. It was obvious, at the outset, that Judge McKean's allowance of alimony could not be sustained.

The Law Magazine and Review, in speaking of Sir Henry Thring, the author of the pamphlet on the 'Simplification of the Law," says, that no one has had greater experience in the drafting of bills in parliament than Mr. Thring. It is stated, in Mr. Thring's pamphlet, that the statute law of England is comprised in about 100 octavo volumes, containing more than 18,000 acts of parliament, a considerable portion of which is obsolete, and another portion of which relates to local and private matters, The "reports" contain the judicial decisions through a period of more than 550 years. In 1866 they consisted of 1,308 volumes, and they increase with great rapidity. In 1866 the number of reported common-law cases was 60,000; and the number of

equity cases was 28,000. Sir Henry Thring is of the opinion, that in order to properly simplify the law a code is essential; that a code is the most complete form in which the law of a country can be presented and the ultimate aim of all law reform; but that the bulk of English law is so vast that it does not admit of being codified, as a whole, until it has previously been collected, sifted and put in form adapted to codification. He then proposes a scheme the object of which is to consolidate the existing statute and adjudicated law; and urges upon all classes the policy of the simplification of the law.

The Court of Commissioners of Alabama Claims, which is now in session in Washington, is transMr. acting its business with much rapidity. Creswell, of counsel for the United States, is reported as saying that the majority of claims filed involve large sums of money, but that the aggregate of awards will not be so great as to consume the whole $15,000,000 paid by Great Britain. The surplus, if any, will remain as a fund from which congress may direct payment of other claims arising under the treaty of Washington. But if the sum awarded to the claimants should exceed the amount of the Geneva award, the amounts will be distributed ratably among those in whose favor particular awards shall have been made. The court has decided several cases in which damages for injuries to the person were claimed. These injuries were received in consequence of the capture by the confederate vessels of the ships on which the claimants were. The court held that it had no jurisdiction of claims for damages of this character, it could only entertain claims for injuries to property.

The Court of Commissioners of Alabama Claims has also decided several other important questions. Among these is a question relating to "prospective profits," which arose in the case of the whaleship "Splendid." She was chased off the fishing grounds by the Alabama and prevented from returning in time for the "season's catch." The claimant estimated that if the voyage had not been interrupted a profit of $50,000 would have been realized; and a judgment was claimed for that amount, with interest. The court held that the damages were not such as "directly resulted" from the acts of the Alabama, and that the claim could not be entertained, The existence of this court terminates by limitation of the statute creating it, on July 22, 1875, but the President has power to extend the term of its existence six months longer in case the business before the court cannot be thoroughly disposed of. It is thought that it will be found necessary so to continue the term on account of the large number of claims and the importance of the questions involved.

ness.

violation of the internal revenue laws. The defendant was originally arrested on a warrant issued by a United States commissioner upon a complaint under oath. The information was afterward filed by the district attorney, by leave of the court, and the defendant, after pleading guilty, moved in arrest of judgment. The fifth amendment to the Federal Constitution provides, that "no person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime unless upon presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia when in actual service in time of war or public danger." Judge Dillon, who delivered the opinion, said: "The offense charged against the defendant is not a 'capital or infamous crime.' The words 'infamous crime' have a fixed and settled meaning. In a legal sense they are descriptive of an offense that subjects a person to infamous punishment or prevents his being a witThe fact that an offense may be, or must be, punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary does not, necessarily, make it, in law, infamous. 1 Bish. Cr. Law, sections 70, 644; Rex v. Hickman, 1 Moody, 34; Commonwealth v. Shaver, 3 Watts and Serg. 838; Russel on Crimes, 126, 1 Greenl. Ev., sections 372, 373; People v. Whipple, 8 Cow. 707; United States v. Shephard, 1 Abb. U. S. Rep. 431, 439." "The constitutional provision leaves all offenses open to prosecution by information, except those which are capital or infamous, and there is no enactment of congress preventing a resort to this mode of procedure. On the contrary, there are provisions in several acts of congress which imply that informations may be filed for criminal offenses. 1 Stats. at Large, p. 98, sections 7, 32; 2 id. p. 290, section 3; 3 id. p. 305, section 179; 14 id. p. 145, section 179." "And it has been several times expressly adjudged that offenses not capital, or otherwise infamous, may be prosecuted in the federal courts by information. United States v. Waller, 1 Sawyer's C. C. 701 (Field and Sawyer, JJ.); United States v. Shephard, Abb. U. S. Rep. 431 (Withey, J.); United States v. Ebert, 1 Cent. Law Jour. 205 (Krekel, J.). And such seems to have been the opinion of Justice Story. United States v. Mann, 1 Gall. C. C. 3; 1 id. 542, 554, and see Walsh v. United States, 3. W. & M. 341; Bish. Crim. Prac., sections 604, 611; Contra, United States v. Joe, 4 Ch. Leg. News, 105. In The United States v. Isham, 17 Wall. 496, the United States v. Buzzo, 18 id. 125, the proceeding by criminal information does not seem to have been

questioned in either court. See, also, Territory of Nebraska ex rel., etc. v. Lockwood, 3 Wall. 296, 532; Stockwell v. United States, 17 id."

In Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Godfrey, 14 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) 290, the Supreme Court of Illinois considered the liability of a railroad company for injuries done by a locomotive to a person walking along the track. The plaintiff was traveling on the track, not for any purpose or business connected with the railroad, but for his own convenience as a footway. It appeared that citizens had been in the habit of passing over the railroad, but the company had not seen fit to enforce its right to put people off its premises. The court held that no right of way had thus been acquired by persons using the track for their own convenience. A mere naked license or permission to enter or pass over an estate will not create a duty or impose an obligation on the part of the owner to provide against the danger of accident. Sweeney v. Old Colony & Newport R. R. Co., 10 Allen, 373; Hickey v. Boston & Lowell R. R. Co., 14 id. 429; Phil. & C. R. R. Co. v. Hummell, 44 Penn. St. 375; Gillis v. Penn. R. R. Co., 59 id. 129. In the present case it was held that the company is only liable for wanton or willful injury. But where the negligence complained of consists in not ringing a bell, or blowing a whistle, or in not slackening speed-the attention of those in charge of the engine being directed to a train on another road near by, instead of forward on the track—this will not be sufficient to warrant a recovery by plaintiff. See The Aurora Branch R. R. Co. v. Grimes, 13 Ill. 585; Cal. & Chi. R. R. Co. v. Jacobs, 20 id. 478; St. L. A. & T. H. R. R. Co. v. Todd, 36 id. 409; Chi. & Alton R. R. Co. v. Getzner, 46 id. 74; Shearm. & Redf. on Negligence, §§ 25-36; 1 Redf. Law of Railways, 464-568; Tonawanda R. R. Co. v. Munger, 5 Denio, 255.

In Washington Life Ins. Co. v. Schaible, 1 Weekly Not. Cas. 369, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania considered the admissibility of photographs in evidence. The action was on a life insurance policy issued October 16, 1871. The application contained the question "has the party consumption," etc.? The answer was "No." The insured, a female, died October 24, and the defense sought to show that she died of consumption, the post-mortem examination revealing the fact that her lungs were filled with tubercules. Plaintiff rebutted by evidence that the death of the insured was very sudden, and that she was attending to work with every external appearance of health until within two or three days of her death. The plaintiff also offered in evidence a colored photograph of the insured, taken a short time before her death, which, several witnesses testified, was a good likeness. This evidence was admitted under objection, and the court on appeal sustained the ruling.

for the quantity delivered, he should return it, or notify the vendor of such intention.

The doctrine which we advocate is the only one that does equal justice. It compels the vendee to pay for what he receives, and the vendor to indemnify him for his failure to deliver the balance. Indeed, we do not know that it is at all inconsistent with the doctrine of Champlin v. Rowley, that the vendee may not only refuse to pay for what he has received, but may also maintain an action of damages for failure to deliver the rest. This would be | dealing more harshly with the failings of human nature than would be convenient or appropriate, except in an utopia.

The law is always struggling against its own inconsistencies and inequalities. So the result of the New York doctrine on this subject is, that the courts will always strain a point to make such contracts severable, so as to authorize a recovery for a part performance; and here again our courts, and those of England, are amusingly at variance. In Champion v. Short, 1 Camp. 53, where the contract was for "half a chest of French plums, two hogsheads of raw sugar and six hundred lumps of white sugar, to be all sent down without delay," Lord Ellenborough said: "Where several articles are ordered at the same time, it does not follow, although there be a separate price fixed for each, that they do not form one gross contract. I may wish to have articles A, B, C and D, all of different | sorts and of different values; but, without having every one of them, as I direct, the rest may be useless to me." Still, the defendant was held for the plums and raw sugar, although the white sugar was not delivered. Now Judge Denio, in Tipton v. Feitner, 20 N. Y. 423, the case to which we alluded above, practically holds the contrary. There the. plaintiff, in one agreement, contracted to deliver forthwith a quantity of dressed pork to the defendant, for a certain price, and also to sell him, at a different price, upon arrival, a number of live hogs then on the way and expected in a few days, no stipulation being made as to the price of payment for either. The pork was delivered, but the hogs were not. A recovery for the price of the pork, subject to recoupment for damages for the nondelivery of the hogs, was sustained; the court saying it is a question of intention whether a contract is severable or entire. Inasmuch as this intention can be derived only from the character of the contract, we do not see why the contract in Tipton v. Feitner is any more severable than that in Champion v. Short. Plums and sugar naturally go together, but no more naturally than dressed pork and live hogs. Judge Denio saw the harshness of the old cases and distinguished them. In speaking of the case in which Judge Spencer gave the opinion to which we have before alluded, he says: "This dictum, taken broadly, would always preclude a party

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from recovery for any thing done under a contract where he had himself violated any of its provisions; " but, he continues, this was the case "of a vendee in an executory contract for the purchase of land, who had paid a part of the price, and refused, without cause, to make the final payment and receive a deed." He distinguishes Champlin v. Rowley by saying that, by the very terms of the contract, the delivery of the whole was a condition precedent to the final payment - a feeble distinction, for, with rare exceptions, delivery is always a condition precedent to payment. In this same case Judge Selden, while he recognizes, seems to lament the doctrine under discussion, and says; "It is not surprising that we find it so frequently said that constructions, productive of such conditions, are not to be encouraged," and that "courts are to see that such was the intention of the parties before they are held to so rigid a rule."

It seems to us, therefore, that while the case of Tipton v. Feitner is a sound decision, it is also indicative of the internal and unconscious protest of the judicial mind against the rigidity of the case of Champlin v. Rowley and kindred decisions. The latter case is a curious instance of the way in which much of our law was established, even when contrary to the law of England, and other of our States. It must be admitted, that in several important points, our State stands alone, and this is due to the blind reverence with which the dicta of a few of our great early judges have been received and followed without much examination.

PROFESSIONAL FAITH.

TWO events of unusual importance relating to professional fidelity have recently occurred — the one in England and the other in the United States. It is considered one of the sacred principles of the legal profession that matters which come under the cognizance of its members, while acting in the professional capacity, are not to be divulged or made use of in any but a professional way. A violation of this principle seems to have occurred in the case of Sir Henry James who, as member of the House of Commons, has initiated an inquiry into the manner in which foreign loans are introduced into England. There were undoubted abuses in the foreign loan system, but the previous professional connection of Mr. James with it rendered it exceedingly unfortunate that he should institute an attack upon it as a member of parliament. And the question has been largely discussed in English legal circles whether Mr. James has not only acted in bad taste but also in bad faith. The circumstances which suggested that he was availing himself of information received as counsel to institute a public and legislative inquiry, were these: In May, 1874, he was engaged as counsel in a suit brought against