stances fairly considered and deliberately weighed; in the suitableness to the circumstances which excite it; in the suitableness to our means of gratifying. Smith therefore justly gives it the epithet proper. 2. The exercise of the social passions, when it can be done without the interference of any other principle is always agreeable to us under any circumstance. We like to see the messenger of good news, the immediate cause of a joyful feeling in us, rewarded, although we are conscious he had no merit in it. But far different would be the case if some principle were to come in our way in exercising the agreeable feeling towards the messenger. It is only suitable to the bounty of kings. Could we imagine a man of ordinary fortune bestowing a sum out of the stock which would support his family, to a man because he has been the passive instrument in making him acquainted with a piece of good fortune, our judgments would be far otherwise. We should call him foolish and imprudent. In the unsocial passions, on the contrary, we cannot at all sympathize with them unless there be a proper motive. In the case of good news it is always agreeable to indulge our delightful feeling. But no such thing can happen in the case of bad news. It is true we are unfavourably inclined towards the man who makes us acquainted with things we like not but to pursue it therefore to action, nay even to show any signs of it would be the very height of folly and crime. And why? because we know that no man would approve of it were we to do so. 3. There are two occasions in which we judge of the propriety or impropriety of our conduct. The first is when we are about to act, the second after we have acted. In both these cases we are apt to arrive at wrong conclusions in consequence of the interference of prejudice or passions. Hence the necessity of some standard by which we may regulate our conduct at all times and on all occasions. This is the origin of general rules of conduct. They are founded on experience. We have observed that a certain line of conduct always excite in the impartial spectator a feeling of approbation, and a different line a feeling of disapprobation. We therefore conclude that they ought always to do so in us. We refer to them as a standard in all cases, and we approve whatever comes up to it, and disappove whatever falls short of it. The use we make of the general rules of morality is different under different circumstances. In the Court of Judicature after the general rules are formed we make no reference at all to the sentiment of the impartial spectator. We appeal only to these rules. It is otherwise in the general rules of morality in those actions that fall under the judgments of mankind. The rules do not admit the same degree of precision. They are very general. We have recourse here to the judgments of the impartial spectator. 4. The virtuous affections always tend to our advantage. Their practical effects on our own welfare are always very great. What manifold advantage for instance is reputation and credit to a merchant! what are the blessings of a life given to temperance and charity! But the best way of gaining these ends, is to attain those virtues. Hence it was that Epicurus concluded that virtue consists in prudence. The system of Epicurus besides derives its plausibility from its too great simplicity. Nature we know always produces the most different and varying phenomena from the same cause. Hence it appeared probable that the system which ascribed all our actions to this one qualtiy, might be a true one. 5. The system of Epicurus differs from the systems of Plato, Aristotle and Zeno, both on account of the manner in which it explained the origin of our moral sentiments, the sentiment of the heart wherein consisted virtue, and the reasons or ends for which they were pursued. Plato considered virtue to consist in propriety, in the harmony of all the passions. Epicurus in prudence, in the proper pursuit of the means of our own welfare. Plato considered virtue as worthy of pursuit for its natural beauty, for its effects on the mind. Epicurus as instruments of our welfare. Aristotle and Zeno made also virtue consist in propriety, the one in a habit of mediocrity, the other in acting according to nature. These therefore also differed from Epicurus. CHOONEELAUL GUPTO, 2nd Class, Hindu College. MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 1. The epithet 'strict' is not correctly applicable to benevolence, for the general rules which determine what actions proceed from this amiable sentiment are vague, loose and indeterminate; but those of justice are destinct, definite and accurate. Smith compares the rules of the latter to those of Grammar, which are strict and indispensible, and those of the former to the precepts or principles to be observed in the attainment of elegance and sublimity in composition, and those, he justly says, are not distinct and strict. He uses proper instead of perfect benevolence, for in the exercise of benevolence perfect propriety is not so indispensibly necessary as it is in that of prudence. By proper benevolence he means that it corresponds with the sympathetic sentiment of the impartial spectator. 2. The answer to this is that any sort of reason is sufficient to lead us to the exercise of the benevolent affections or feelings: Whereas the most solid motive is required to raise the unsocial passions in the human breast. Smith very justly observes that we cannot be too slow and tardy in giving vent to these harsh sentiments. We 3. The general rules of morality are formed from experience and observation. We see in particular instances what pleases or displeases our moral faculties; and we also observe the coincidence of these sentiments with that of other men, which confirms and strengthens our own. approve of those actions or affections, which are agreeable to our moral powers and disapprove of others, which are disagreeable to us; and we rise by induction from various instances, or facts concerning these different actions or sentiments to the general rules, which point out to us in the one case what actions we ought to perform and what sentiments we ought to cherish, and which restrain us from the performance of certain actions, and the indulgence of certain passions. The judgements of mankind with regard to right and wrong, and the decisions of a Court of Judicatory by the use made of the general rules of morality in arriving at those judgements and dicisions, differ in this, that in the former case not only the immediate action is taken into account, but also the propriety or impropriety of the affection from which the action proceeds; but in the latter the immediate action is considered. 4. The particular view or aspect from which the system of Epicurus derives its probability, is that virtue is the most safe way of procuring ease and tranquillity of mind, which are the principal and sole objects of our desire, and in which, according to him, consists the perfection of human happiness. And certainly, as Smith says, that notwithstanding the disorders of the world, the practice of virtue is the best wisdom, for by it true happiness is most effectually secured. 5. The systems of Plato, Aristotle and Zeno agree with that of Epicurus in the account which they give of virtue, which consists in acting in the most proper manner in obtaining the primary objects of natural desire. The system of Epicurus differed in two respects from those of Plato, Aristotle and Zeno, namely, about the primary objects of desire and the excellency of virtue or the quality which recommends virtue to us. Epicurus maintained that bodily pain and pleasure were the sole ultimate objects of desire; but the others considered the desire of knowledge, which has no reference to the body, as a primary object of desire; and they also gave many other instances of similar things. Again, Epicurus supposed that virtue was not desirable for its own sake, but that it was eligible for the ease and tranquillity of mind, which it procures to the possessor. All the others maintained that virtue is desirable for its own sake and not for its utility, or its tendency to produce pleasure, and that we ought to love virtue on account of its original loveliness and divine beauty. RAJKISHORE GHOSE, Hindu College. MORAL PHILOSOPHY-SMITH. 66 1. Smith says, that the man who acts according to the rules of perfect prudence, of strict justice, and of proper benevolence, may be said to be perfectly virtuous." He uses very properly the epithet, proper benevolence, instead of the terms, strict benevolence, or perfect benevolence. Benevolence is so laudable and so magnanimous virtue, that we can assign to it no limit, to which we may refer, as the perfect standard of this virtue. It may extend to all the creatures, that inhabit this universe, to the lunar inhabitants, as well as to those that occupy the unnumbered worlds, which Astronomy unfolds to our eye. But to exercise a degree of benevolence like this, is entirely beyond the power of a creature so frail as man. He must walk in a much humbler sphere, in a sphere to which he has been destined by the Author of all things. He must not be presumptuous and vain enough to aim at the performance of things, which is utterly impossible. It is therefore proper benevolence only-benevolence, which can be practiced by a being like him, by a being possessed of finite conceptions and powers, that he is required to exercise. He must not be so much elevated with benevolent feelings, as to neglect the inferior virtues of prudence and propriety. Let him know, that he has other duties to attend to, the smallest neglect of one of which can never be compensated by the most strict observance of the rest. It is obvious, therefore, that Smith is right in speaking, of proper benevolence as one of the characters of a perfectly virtuous man. Besides, it is impossible, that we should act, according to the rules of strict benevolence, when we have no accurate and definite standard of it. 2. It is extremely barbarous and inhuman to punish the author of bad tidings, but to reward the messenger of good news is not disagreeable to us. But whence arises this difference, since there is no demerit in the one case, neither is there any merit in other? It is, because, joy is an agreeable emotion, so that we heartily sympathize with it. Any sort of reason whatever can reconcile us to the conduct of a man, who confers k on any one some extraordinary degree of favour. But as pain is a disagreeable emotion: we can have no approbation of the conduct of him, who injures his brother without any sufficient cause. The strongest and the most weighty reasons are, in this case necessary, in order to reconcile us to his conduct. 3. According to Smith, we arrive at a knowledge of the general rules of morality by the induction of reason. It is by observing an extensive collection of facts, which relate to moral perceptions, that we deduce the general rules of morality. Thus we observe, that the murder of a human being is always followed by remorse and pity in the murderer. We find that he is always tormented by grief and a thousand other dreadful thoughts, which always haunt his imagination and contribute to darken his mind. All peace and tranquillity is for ever banished from his mind. Neither society, nor solitude can give him the least ray of comfort. Such is unfailingly in all times and occasions, the state of the mind of him, who commits an inhuman murder; and we hence conclude, that murder is one of the most atrocious crimes that can be committed by a human being. Exactly in the same manner all the other general rules of morality are formed. 4. Virtuous actions, according to Smith, are recommended to our approbation for two reasons :-First, on account of their being as something right, just and accurate, independent of all other considerations; Secondly, on account of their tendency to procure certain objects, which are agreeable to us. Vice in the same manner is disagreeable to us, first, for its being as something very abominable in its nature, and secondly, for its having a tendency to procure misery and pain. It is probable, says Smith, that Epicurus attended to the latter of these reasons, that is, the tendency of virtue and vice to procure certain objects, which are agreeable in the one and disagreeable in the other case. It is from this particular view or aspect of nature, that the system of Epicurus derive its probability. The system of Epicurus agrees with those of Plato, Aristotle and Zeno, in making virtue consist in pursuing the ultimate objects of desire. The two respects in which it differed from the rest, were, first, in the ultimate objects of desire; and secondly, in the cause which renders virtue the object of our approbation. According to Epicurus bodily pleasure and bodily pain were the ultimate objects of our desire and aversion, while according to Plato, Zeno, and Aristotle, there were other things, such as friendship, generosity, humanity, &c., which are also the proper objects of desire. Epicurus also maintained that we approve of virtue, only on account of its tendency to procure certain objects. But the other philosophers were of opinion that, independent of this consideration, virtue is originally recommended to us only for its being just and accurate. Its tendency to procure utility, is an after thought, which bestows upon it an additional beauty and charm. HURROGOBIND SEN, Hindu College. Appendix B. Senior Mathematics. Arithmetic and Algebra. 1846. 1. A person bought 125 125 yards of cloth at the rate of 7 yards for a gold mohur; and afterwards sold 92-05 yards at the rate of 5 yards for a gold mohur, and the remainder at the rate of 9 yards for a gold mohur. Did he gain or lose? and how much? 2. What is the present value of Co's. Rs. 1155-12 due 3 years hence, at 4 per cent. per annum, and at what rate will the same sum amount to Co's. Rs. 1926-4, at compound interest in 4 years. 3. Exhibit the square root of 29 in the form of a continued fraction:-and show that √8+3√7- √ 4+ √7 = + √ 2 4. Find the number of combinations of n things taken 3 and 3 together (without reference to the general formula). A B and C are all p years of age; and it appears that out of m persons of that age n of them arrive at the age of p + 3; what is the probability that 2 of them at least will be alive at the end of 3 years. 5. Investigate the relation between the co-efficients and the roots of the general equation |