A. D. 1615. ESTIUS.

At the same time with Gillius lived the learned Estius, who delivered his sentiments of the present question in the manner here following. n" As there are, among lo

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gicians, two kinds of demonstration, one demonstrating "the effect from the causes, and the other, the cause "from the effects; it is manifest, that the existence of a "Deity cannot be proved in the former way of demon"stration, since no cause in any kind can be assigned ei"ther of God, or of his existing. But it may be demon"strated in the latter way, as St. Thomas [Aquinas] મંદ "rightly judges, (I. q. 2. art. 2, 3.) and as the School"men upon this distinction do universally teach."

A. D. 1627. JOHANNES PUTEANUS.

This writer expresses his judgment in the terms here following.

■ Cum duplex sit apud dialecticos demonstratio, alia quæ ex causis effectum, alia quæ contra ex effectis causam monstrat; manifestum est, priori demonstrationis modo non posse doceri Deum esse, cum nec Dei nec ejus existentiæ possit in ullo genere causa proferri. Potest autem demonstrari posteriori modo, quemadmodum recte S. Thom. I. qu. 2. art. 2. et 3. Et in universum scholastici circa hanc distinctionem tradunt. Estius in Libr. Sentent. Comm. tom. i. p. 4.

So Cardinal Lugo also, a little later in the same age. Dico tertio, Deum esse, non est demonstrabile a priori. Sic cum Sancto Thoma, cæteri fere doctores, et latissime Gillius. Lug. lib. i. disp. 14. c. 2. s. 8.

• Licet existentia Deitatis nequeat demonstrari a priori, concedendum tamen est de quibusdam attributis divinis, quod possint demonstrari a priori. 1. Prima pars conclusionis ex eo innotescit, quod demonstratio quælibet a priori consurgat ex causis vel veris, vel certe virtualibus, aut, quod idem est, ex ratione aliqua priori. Existentiæ autem divinæ nullæ sunt causæ, nec verà, nec virtuales, nec ratio prior: hæc enim includitur in conceptu formali essentiæ divinæ, et quidem ita, ut impossibile sit concipere essentiam divinam quin concipiatur existens. Est enim essentia divina ens simpliciter necessurium; repugnat autem enti simpliciter necessario, non habere existentiam: definitur enim hoc communiter, id quod ita est ut non esse nequeat.

2. Posterior vero pars constat ex eo, quod æternitas demonstretur per immutabilitatem, hoc modo: Omné immutabile est æternum; Deus est immutubilis: ergo, Deus est æternus. Ubiquitas etiam divina demonstratur com

"Though the existence of a Deity cannot be demon"strated a priori, yet it must be allowed, that as to some "of the Divine attributes, they may be demonstrated a "priori.

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"1. As to the first particular, it is plain from hence; "that every proof a priori proceeds by causes either real

or virtual, or, which comes to the same, by some prior 66 reason; but of the Divine existence there are no causes real "or virtual, nor any prior reason: for existence is included "in the formal conception of the Divine essence, insomuch "that it is impossible to conceive the Divine essence but as existing. The Divine essence is being simply necessary: now it is contradictory to the notion of being "simply necessary, not to have existence; for it is usually "defined, as that which so exists that it cannot but exist.

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"2. As to the second particular, it is manifest from "hence, that eternity is demonstrated from immutability “in this manner: Every thing immutable is eternal: God "is immutable: therefore God is eternal. In like manner, the Divine ubiquity is commonly proved from the "immensity. And so in many other cases."

Some

The author here well distinguishes between arguing a priori from existence and attributes already proved, to other attributes, and arguing a priori from attributes, or from any thing else, to the existence itself. The one he allows as just and rational, the other he rejects as manifestly absurd and so far he is certainly right. indeed may scruple to call it arguing a priori, when a man argues from attribute to attribute; conceiving that it should rather be styled arguing ex absurdo, and that nothing short of a real (as opposed to notional) priority is sufficient to denominate or constitute an argument a priori. But that I take to be a fruitless nicety, and such is not worth the insisting upon; for at last it will terminate in a dispute about words. It is sufficient, that there is nothing prior to the existence, no not so much as in order muniter per immensitatem; et sic in aliis multis. Joan. Putean. Opp. tom. i. part. 1. qu. 3. p. 24.

of nature, or notion, or conception; and so all arguing a priori, as to that case, is for ever excluded. But as to the other case, the manner of arguing is undoubtedly right, whatever name we give to it: and there seems to be no just objection against calling it a priori, so long as the existence is looked upon as always first in conception, and that the most natural order of conception be followed in arguing from attribute to attribute, and the process be not made too arbitrary P.

A. D. 1642. RODERICUS DE ARRIAGA.

This acute metaphysician and divine delivers his sentiments as follows: "The being or existence of God cannot "be demonstrated a priori. So St. Thomas, Albertus, "Durandus; and of our order (of Jesuits) Valentia, Mo"lina, Suarez, and Vasquez, whom Tanner mentions and "follows 9." After this, he enters minutely into the merits of the question, assigning his reasons why the existence cannot be proved a priori: which being much the same with those before mentioned, I choose, for brevity sake, to omit them, and proceed. Only, I may observe, that here are three authors, Durandus, Molina, and Tanner, beyond what I have quoted upon the question: and it is further observable, that he takes in Suarez amongst

P Richardus de Media Villa, in a chapter before referred to, observes well to this purpose, that the order of the attributes ought not to be settled in an arbitrary manner, but as reason requires.

Nec loquor hic de ordine qui tantum est ex parte voluntatis (quia tali ordine posset, in nostra ratione intelligendi, quandoque unum esse prius, quandoque posterius, sicut placeret nobis) sed loquor de ordine qui est in conceptionibus nostri intellectus intelligentis divina attributa secundum illum ordinem secundum quem magis sunt apta nata intelligi: et sic intelligendo divinas perfectiones, est talis ordo ex parte nostra. Prius enim, secundum rationem intelligendi, intelligimus divinum esse, quam aliquam ejus perfectionem; secundo, suum intelligere; tertio, suum velle. Ricard. de Med. Vill. lib. i. p. 32.

Prima conclusio, Deum esse, seu existere, non potest demonstrari a priori. Ita D. Thomas, Albertus, Durandus: et e nostris, Valentia, Molina, Suarez, et Vasquez, quos refert et sequitur Tannerus loco citato. Roderic. de Arriag. tom. i. p. 30.

them, as one that had declared against the argument a priori; as indeed he really had, though verbally he might seem to differ, as I have before hinted. So universal hitherto had been the agreement of metaphysicians and divines in this article.

A. D. 1644. DIONYSIUS PETAVIUS.

The very learned Petavius is but short upon this question, mentioning it transiently, as it came in his way: but he is too considerable a person to be omitted in this recital. He takes notice, that the existence of a Deity is not to be proved from any thing prior or antecedent, but from effects only, and a posteriori; and from the absurdities which lie against the contrary persuasion 1.

A. D. 1652. NATHANAEL CULVERWell.

I shall now mention a Protestant writer of our own, of some note in his time. He was Fellow of Emanuel College in Cambridge. In his book, entitled, An Elegant and Learned Discourse of the Light of Nature, he occasionally drops a few words to our purpose: "There can "be no demonstration of him [God] a priore; for he is "the first Cause: and all demonstrations fetched from "such effects as flow from him, they do only show you "that he is; they do not open and display the Divine essence s," &c.

A. D. 1658. BISHOP BARLOW.

A more considerable writer of our own, so far as concerns the present question, was Thomas Barlow, then Fellow of Queen's College, Oxon. and afterwards (A. D.

• Verum hæc iisque similia tum nos commoverent, si probationum id genus ageretur quod ex antecedentibus et prioribus ducitur, ac demonstrationem et scientiam parit: ejusmodi enim locum in Deo non habent.-Nihilominus ex effectis et iis quæ posteriora sunt, atque etiam iis ex incommodis et absurdis quæ in contradicentium altera parte cernuntur, argumenta licet colligere, quibus Deus esse monstretur. Petav. Dogm. Theolog. tom. i. lib. 1. c. 1. p. 2, 3.

Culverwell, p. 212.

1675.) Bishop of Lincoln. He published some Metaphysical Exercises, wherein he discovers great learning, and no less acuteness. The edition of 1658, which I follow, is the second edition. I shall produce his sentiments at large, because he entered deep into the question, viewed it on every side, and withal passed his censure (though rather too severe) upon the learned Suarez.

He writes thus: "Our knowledge of God, arising "from the light of nature, is not a priori, and di' T. "The reason is, because then God could not be eternal, "if there were any principle prior to God: for eternity, "in the very notion of it, excludes any prior principle.

Consequently, if God be eternal, there cannot be any "prior principle whereby he may be known a priori.— "Were there any principle by which God might be "known a priori, then, 1. God would not be the first Original and first Cause, as having by the supposition "another cause prior to him.-2. That supposed antece"dent principle, by which the existence of God should "be proved, must be either external, (of the final or effi"cient kind,) or else internal, of the material or formal "kind. Now it cannot be of the final kind, because "God is the chief end, and there cannot be any higher "final cause, whereby to demonstrate a priori the exist"ence of God. It cannot be of the efficient kind; be

cause if God had any antecedent efficient cause, then "God would be an effect, &c.-Neither can it be said, "that such prior cause is either material or formal: for "the perfect simplicity of the Divine nature admits not of such causes, as is self-evident: consequently there "is no room for any cause whereby to demonstrate a pri"ori the existence of a Deity t."

any

t Hæc nostra de Deo cognitio, a lumine naturali orta, non est a priori et dr. Ratio est, quia sic Deus non esset æternus, modo esset aliquod principium Deo prius: ipsa enim æternitas intrinseca dicit negationem principii; et per consequens, si Deus sit æternus, non potest esse aliquod principium prius, per quod a priori cognoscetur.-Si esset aliquod principium quo Deum a priori cognosceremus; tum, 1. Deus non esset principium primum