of a state to attend the public schools maintained at the expense of the state is not a privilege or immunity appertaining to the child as a citizen of the United States within the provision of the federal constitution, and, therefore, no person can demand admission as a pupil in any school because merely of his being a citizen of the United States.8 The line which is drawn between different school districts seems to apply only where the schools of each district are supported by local taxation. Where, however, neither the district. in which the pupil resides nor the district in which he attends school has adopted the provisions of the school law as to local taxation, there appears to be nothing to prevent the county board of education from allowing such pupil to attend school in the adjoining district. Children of Indian parents who are not members of any Indian tribe, and who conform to the customs and habits of civilization. have the right to attend the public schools of the district in which they reside.10 83. What Constitutes School Residence.-Although there is some conflict among the decisions as to what constitutes a residence which will entitle a child to school privileges, statutes providing for a free public school system are, by the weight of authority, construed as evidencing an intention on the part of the state that all the children within its borders shall enjoy the opportunity of a free education,11 and in determining whether a person is or is not a resident in a school district within the meaning of such a rule, the usual and ordinary indicia of residence or the absence thereof should be the proper guide.12 In line with this construction of the statutes, residence entitling an infant to school privileges is distinguished from domicil, or the technical and narrow use of the term "residence," for the purpose of suffrage or other like purposes, and it is construed in a liberal sense as meaning to live in, or be an inhabitant of, a school district,13 the purpose being not to debar from school privileges any child of school age found within the district under the care, custody, or control of a resident thereof.14 Such rule does not usually require that

Ky. 93, 140 S. W. 67, Ann. Cas. 9. Note: Ann. Cas. 1913B 1019. 1913B 1016 and note, 36 L.R.A. (N.S.) 311; Lake Farm v. District Board of School Dist. No. 2. 179 Mich. 171, 146 N. W. 115, 51 L.R.A. (N.S.) 234 and note; Black v. Graham, 233 Pa. 381. 86 Atl. 266, 44 L.R.A. (N.S.) 693 State v. Joint School Dist. No. 1, 65 Wis. 631, 27 N. W. 829, 56 Am. Ren 653.

10. Crawford v. Klamath County School Dist. No. 7, 68 Ore. 388, 137 Pac. 217, Ann. Cas. 1915C 477 and note, 50 L.R.A.(N.S.) 147 and note.

Note: Ann. Cas. 19150 791.

8. Lebew v. Brummell, 103 Mo. 546, 15 S. W. 675, 23 A. S. R. 895, 11 L.R.A. 829

Notes: 14 L.R.A. 581; 3 Ann. Cas. 693.

11. Notes: 36 L.R.A. (N.S.) 341; Ann. Cas. 1915C 791.

12. Stanford Graded Common School Dist. v. Powell, 145 Ky. 93, 140 S. W. 67, Ann. Cas. 1913B 1016, 36 L.R.A. (N.S.) 341.

Note: 3 Ann. Cas. 694.

13. Notes: 34 L.R.A. (N.S.) 341; Ann. Cas. 1915C 791.

14. Notes: 36 L.R.A.(N.S.) 341; 51 L.R.A.(N.S.) 234.

there shall be a legal domicil,15 but it is sufficient if the child and its parent, or the person in loco parentis, are actually resident in the district, with apparently no present purpose of removal.16 But other cases have held the term "residence" as used in school statutes

to be equivalent to the word "domicil." 17 For school purposes a child's residence is not necessarily the residence of its parent or parents, 18 though generally a child will be held to reside where its parents reside.19 If it has assumed a permanent home with some. other person, the school residence is with such person. 20 But in some cases, it has been held that a child living in a district apart from its parents is not a resident thereof for educational purposes unless legally adopted by the person with whom it lives, even though the arrangement has every appearance of permanence,1 and in some cases it is expressly provided by statute that the residence of children for school purposes shall be deemed to be the residence of the parents or guardian. A parent going temporarily into a district to reside during the scholastic year, for the purpose of sending his children to the school of that district, is not a bona fide resident of the district, entitled to school privileges for his children without payment of tuition. On the other hand a child may be considered a resident of the district, no matter how recently he has come in, if he has come with the bona fide intention of remaining permanently. Children gathered into a poorhouse or other institution from various places are, in contemplation of law, residents of the places from which they came and are generally not entitled to free admission to the schools of the district in which the institution is located. In some cases this has been

15. Stanford Graded Common School Dist v. Powell, 145 Ky. 93, 140 S. W. 67, Ann. Cas. 1913B 1016, 36 L.R.A.(N.S.) 341 and note.

Note: Ann. Cas. 1915C 791.

16. Stanford Graded Common School Dist. v. Powell, 145 Ky. 93, 140 S. W. 67, Ann. Cas. 1913B 1016, 36 L.R.A.(N.S.) 341.

School Dist. v. Powell, 145 Ky. 93, 140 S. W. 67, Ann. Cas. 1913B 1016, 36 L.R.A. (N.S.) 341.

Note: 51 L.R.A. (N.S.) 234.

1. Board of Education v. Foster, 116 Ky. 484, 76 S. W. 354, 3 Ann. Cas. 692 and note.

2. Black v. Graham, 238 Pa. St. 381, 86 Atl. 266, 44 L.R.A. (N.S.)

Notes: 3 Ann. Cas. 694; Ann. Cas. 693. 1915C 791.

17. Note: Ann. Cas. 1915C 791. 18. Stanford Graded Common School Dist. v. Powell, 145 Ky. 93, 14 S. W. 67, Ann. Cas. 1913B 1016, 36 L.R.A. (N.S.) 341.

3. Notes: 36 L.R.A. (N.S.) 343; 3 Ann. Cas. 694.

4. Note: 3 Ann. Cas. 694.

5. Lake Farm v. District Board of Dist. School No. 2, 179 Mich. 171, 146 N. W. 115, 51 L.R.A. (N.S.) 234

Notes: 51 L.R.A. (N.S.) 234; 3 and note; Com. v. Brookville Borough Ann. Cas. 694.

School Dist., 164 Pa. St. 607, 30 Atl. 509, 26 L.R.A. 584.

Notes: 36 L.R.A. (N.S.) 344; 3 Ann. Cas. 694.

based on the ground that such institutions do not pay any taxes and so do not contribute to the support of the schools. Similarly children committed by a court on probation to citizens of a district do not become residents of the district so as to be entitled to free schooling, but remain residents of the district wherein their parents or guardians reside, even though the act under which they are committed makes them wards of those in whose care they are placed, because they are in effect prisoners and are residing only temporarily in the district.8 84. Rights of Nonresidents.-Even where the cost of maintaining schools in a particular district is defrayed by local taxation, there is statutory authority in many jurisdictions for the transfer of pupils from the district in which they reside to an adjoining district. Usually these statutes are limited to cases in which attendance in another district would be more convenient for the pupils, or where there is no high school in the district in which they reside.10 In some cases it is provided that children living within a fixed distance of the boundaries of one district may attend the schools of that district.11 There are statutes which provide that a nonresident taxpayer may send his children to school in the district in which he pays taxes if the school in the district of his residence is not easily accessible.12 In some cases the legislature has left it to the discretion of the district authorities as to whether they shall admit nonresident children to the district schools. Such statutes confer no rights whatever on a nonresident child. The district may admit him or reject him as it chooses.13 The courts, recognizing the necessity of allowing school authorities large discretionary powers, have in numerous cases upheld the action of school boards in requiring pupils to attend a certain school although outside of the district of their residence or at a greater distance than the school nearest their residence; but such regulations, like all other regulations of the school authorities, must be reasonable.14 Statutes providing for the educa

6. Lake Farm v. District Board of School Dist. No. 2, 179 Mich. 171, 146 N. W. 115, 51 L.R.A. (N.S.) 234. 7. Oppegaard v. County Commissioners, 120 Minn. 443, 139 N. W. 949, 43 L.R.A. (N.S.) 936.

8. Black v. Graham, 238 Pa. St. 381, 86 Atl. 266, 44 L.R.A. (N.S.) 693.

9. Kent v. Town of Kentland, 62 Ind. 291, 30 Am. Rep. 182; Havelock High School Dist. No. 137 v. Lancaster County, 60 Neb. 147, 82 N. W. 380, 83 A. S. R. 525, 49 L.R.A. 343. Note: Ann. Cas. 1913B 1019. 10. Havelock High School Dist. No.

137 v. Lancaster County, 60 Neb. 147, 82 N. W. 380, 83 A. S. R. 525, 49 L.R. A. 343; Wilkinson v. Lord, 85 Neb. 136, 122 N. W. 699, 24 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1104.

Note: Ann. Cas. 1913B 1019.

11. Edmondson v. Board of Education, 108 Tenn. 557, 69 S. W. 274, 58 L.R.A. 170.

12. Note: Ann. Cas. 1913B 1021. 13. State v. Joint School Dist. No. 1, 65 Wis. 631, 27 N. W. 829, 56 Am. Rep. 653.

14. Note: 22 L.R.A. (N.S.) 584 et

seq.

tion in one district of children residing in another generally require the cost of tuition to be paid by the district in which the pupils reside, 15 or taxes to be paid by the parents to the district in which their children attend school.16 But it has been said that it is not necessary to provide compensation, because the school district is subject to the absolute will of the legislature, and its obligations may be changed at the mandate of the legislature, especially where the state itself contributes to the school fund of the district.17 On the other hand it has been held that if such a statute imposes an undue burden of taxation on either district, it is void.18

85. Disciplinary Rights of Parents and Teachers.-School directors and teachers have no concern with the individual conduct of the pupils wholly outside of the schoolroom and school grounds and while they are presumed to be under the control of their parents.19 Generally speaking when the schoolroom is entered by the pupil, the authority of the parent ceases, and that of the teacher begins; when sent to his home, the authority of the teacher ends, and that of the parent is resumed.20 On the other hand it has been held that this authority of a teacher over his pupils is not necessarily limited to the time when the pupils are at the schoolroom, or under the actual control of the teacher. The view has been taken that this authority extends to the enforcement of reasonable rules and requirements even while the pupils are at their homes. The conduct of pupils outside of schools hours and school property which directly relates to and affects the management of the school and its efficiency is within the proper regulation of the school authorities. Thus it has been

15. Havelock High School Dist. No. 137 v. Lancaster County, 60 Neb. 147, 82 N. W. 380, 83 A. S. R. 525, 49 L.R.A. 343; Wilkinson v. Lord, 85 Neb. 136, 122 N. W. 699, 24 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1104.

Notes: Ann. Cas. 1913B 1019; Ann. Cas. 1917C 922.

496 and note; Hobbs v. Germany, 94 Miss. 469, 49 So. 515, 22 L.R.A. (N.S.) 983.

Note: 12 Ann. Cas. 356.

20. Hobbs v. Germany, 94 Miss. 469, 49 So. 515, 22 L.R.A.(N.S.) 983.

1. Jones v. Cody, 132 Mich. 13, 92 N. W. 495, 62 L.R.A. 160 and note; 16. Kent v. Town of Kentland, 62 Deskins v. Gose, 85 Mo. 485, 55 Am. Ind. 291, 30 Am. Rep. 182.

17. Edmondson v. Board of Education, 108 Tenn. 557, 69 S. W. 274, 58 L.R.A. 170.

18. Havelock High School Dist. No. 137 v. Lancaster County, 60 Neb. 147, 82 N. W. 380, 83 A. S. R. 525, 49 L.R.A. 343; Wilkinson v. Lord, 85 Neb. 136, 122 N. W. 699, 24 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1104 and note.

Rep. 387.

Notes: 102 A. S. R. 540; 3 L.R.A. (N.S.) 497; 12 Ann. Cas. 356; 15 Ann. Cas. 406.

2. Notes: 62 L.R.A. 160; 12 Ann. Cas. 356.

3. Kinzer v. Independent School Dist., 129 Ia. 441, 105 N. W. 686, 6 Ann. Cas. 996, 3 L.R.A. (N.S.) 496 and note; Jones v. Cody, 132 Mich. 19. Kinzer v. Independent School 13, 92 N. W. 495, 62 L.R.A. 160 and Dist., 129 Ia. 441, 105 N. W. 686, note; Hobbs v. Germany, 94 Miss. 6 Ann. Cas. 996, 3 L.R.A. (N.S.) 469, 49 So. 515, 22 L.R.A. (N.S.) 983;

held that rules as to absence and tardiness of pupils are proper. The better rule seems to be that after a child has returned to his home or to his parent's control, then the parental authority is resumed and the control of the teacher ceases, and that for all ordinary acts of misbehavior thereafter the parent alone has the power to punish, but where an offense committed at home has a direct and immediate tendency to injure the school and bring the schoolmaster's authority into contempt, he has the right to punish the scholar for such acts when he comes to school again. So it has been held that a rule of a school board forbidding pupils to play football under the auspices of the school is not unreasonable or in excess of the authority of the board, although applied to conduct on holidays and away from the school grounds. The authority of school officials assuredly extends into the twilight zone between the school and the home. The misconduct of pupils on the way to school, or on going home from school, is properly within the scope of the power of school officers. So a school board may properly make and enforce a rule that scholars shall go directly to their homes after school hours. The liberty of neither the children nor parent is at all unlawfully restrained by this rule and its reasonable enforcement.10 A person teaching a private school may say on what terms he or she will accept scholars, and may demand, before receiving a scholar to be taught, that the parents shall surrender so much of his or her parental authority as not to allow the scholar during the term to attend social parties, balls, theaters, etc., except on pain of expulsion. This would be a matter of contract, and no one has a right to send a scholar to such a school except on the terms prescribed by those who teach it. A letter sent to school authorities by the father of a pupil containing charges of impropriety by another pupil on the school grounds is qualifiedly privileged. Actual malice must be proved before there can be a recovery in libel,12

Deskins v. Gose, 85 Mo. 485, 55 Am. Deskins v. Gose, 85 Mo. 485, 55 Am. Rep. 387.

Note: 15 Ann. Cas. 406.

4. Kinzer v. Independent School Dist., 129 Ia. 441, 105 N. W. 686, 6 Ann. Cas. 996, 3 L.R.A.(N.S.) 496.

5. Notes: 62 L.R.A. 160, 162; 12 Ann. Cas. 356.

Rep. 387.

Note: 51 L.R.A. (N.S.) 18.

8. Kinzer

v. Independent School Dist., 129 Ia. 441, 105 N. W. 686, 6 Ann. Cas. 996, 3 L.R.A. (N.S.) 496; Deskins v. Gose, 85 Mo. 485, 55 Am. Rep. 387.

N. W. 495, 62 L.R.A. 160 and note. 9. Jones v. Cody, 132 Mich. 13, 92

Note: 51 L.R.A. (N.S.) 18. 10. Jones v. Cody, 132 Mich. 13, 92 N. W. 495, 62 L.R.A. 160.

6. Kinzer v. Independent School Dist., 129 Ia. 441, 105 N. W. 686, 6 Ann. Cas. 996, 3 L.R.A. (N.S.) 496. 7. Kinzer v. Independent School Dist., 129 Ia. 441, 105 N. W. 686, 6 11. Hobbs v. Germany, 94 Miss. Ann. Cas. 996, 3 L.R.A. (N.S.) 496; 469, 49 So. 515, 22 L.R.A. (N.S.) 983. Jones v. Cody, 132 Mich. 13, 92 N. 12. See LIBEL AND SLANDER, VOL W. 495, 62 L.R.A. 160 and note; 17, pp. 362–363.