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of Lookout, to the mouth of Citico Creek, north of the town. After the work had progressed some hours, heavy cannonading was heard in front, as the enemy felt his way towards our position, and the brigade fell in, the 36th being put in reserve. Probably it was here that occurred that honorable mention of the regiment which the boys were glad to repeat. It having been suggested to Gen. Sheridan that an additional battery was needed to strengthen a certain point, “No," said the General, “the 36th Illinois is stationed there ; no battery is needed.” But no attack was made, the enemy being content with skirmishing and finding out our position.

It is worthy of mention that even in these critical circumstances, our mail came in, bringing a good supply of Atlantics and Harpers', besides the usual letters, so long looked for and so welcome. Towards evening, things having quieted down—the wounded having been all transferred to the field hospital-Surgeon Lytle and the Chaplain determined to ride down to the river crossing, below the town, and ascertain for themselves the the prospect of an evacuation, which it was supposed would be made that night, if at all. It was a beautiful moonlight night, and as they rode by the foot of Cameron Hill and looked upon the placid river, with the pontoon bridge sleeping quietly on its bosom, the contrast with the stir, confusion and agitation of the camp was most marked. It was evident that there was no present intention on the part of our commander to evacuate the town, which had already cost us so much. As they continued their trip through the principal streets of the town, saw its public buildings, railroad facilities, hospitals, &c., they thought it ought not to be evacuated, but held at all hazards. On their return to camp, voices were heard on all sides, asking for the

- Are we going to evacuate ?" No," was the reply, a great battle.”


no evacuation ; we must hold Chattanooga.” We had a splendid night's rest, and a marked improvement in the spirits of the men was visible next morning.

Digging entrenchments and felling trees was the order of the day on the 23rd, quickened by the report that the enemy was advancing upon us. After dinner there was heavy firing to the left, and all was excitement, as we looked for a general attack along the lines. As the afternoon wore away, Gen. Rosecrans passed along from left to right, encouraging the men and receiving hearty cheers wherever he went. “ We started for Chattanooga;" said he,

we are in Chattanooga, and we will stay in Chattanooga.” The same day he telegraphed to Washington more confidently than on the 21st, saying: “We hold this point, , and cannot be dislodged, except by very superior forces and after

Another good night's rest helped the spirits of the men wonderfully.

We were up at three o'clock on the 24th, and that day the enemy took possession of Lookout Mountain. An attack in force was still looked for and every preparation made to meet it. Our brigade was the extreme right of the army, resting upon the Tennessee River, and, when on the front line near Chattanooga Creek, was in the vicinity of a huge foundry and tannery, which had done good service to the Southern army. In these buildings the 36th was set to pile up combustibles, so that they might be destroyed if we had to abandon them. The enemy, without making a general attack, succeeded in lodging his batteries so near that a shell exploded in our brigade and wounded one man in the 88th. The ambulances were ordered back out of range, and at eight o'clock P. M., the left wing went to work on entrenchments, working till one o'clock A. M. The right wing went out later and worked until morning. At ten o'clock, P. M. there was



mail being

heavy skirmishing and cannonading near the centre of the line, lasting about two hours. Next morning the brigade was moved back on to a hill, in preparation for a permanent camp, and a detail was sent out to work on a fort being erected at our right, which overlooked the river.

The day was quiet along the lines until about sundown, when cannonading was resumed for a while, but it did us no damage. The nights were now growing intensely cold. Next day (Saturday) was spent in felling trees and working on rifle pits, which was continued till late at night.

On the 27th, just one week after the fight, we began to make our regular camp and resume something like regular habits. The

once more allowed to go out, lists of the killed and wounded were sent north for publication, and for the first time since we left Bridgeport, we were able to have service.

A large congregation assembled, and the Chaplain preached. About eleven o'clock P. M., we were roused by a fierce attack of musketry in front, and the regiment went into the rifle pits, remaining about an hour, and then returned to camp.

It was now evident that Bragg had no intention of driving us from Chattanooga by assaulting our lines, but had determined to compel our retreat by cutting off our supplies. The bitter lessons he had learned at Stone River and Chickamauga, about assaulting our men when only partially entrenched, were not lost upon him. After the last battle Gen. Johnston thus accosted him: “ Having beaten the enemy, why didn't you pursue the advantage ?” “Well,” replied Bragg, “my losses were heavy, you see, my line was pretty long, and by the time I could get under motion the Yankees would have been ten feet under ground!

From Van Horne's history we now learn that “Longstreet insisted on a flank movement instead of a siege. He suggested to his chief to cross the river above Chattanooga, and make him

self so felt in the rear as to force Rosecrans to evacuate the position and fall back to Nashville, then, if not able to continue the northern movement from inadequate transportation, to follow the railroad to Knoxville, destroy Burnside, and from there threaten Rosecrans' communications in the rear of Nashville. Bragg, however, did not deem this suggestion feasible. His transportation was not considered adequate, and in his view purely military considerations forbade the step. He thought that the interruption of Rosecrans' communications with Bridgeport, south of the river, promised better results, and he disposed his army to accomplish this object. He confided the holding of this important route to Gen. Longstreet, and threw his cavalry across the river to operate against the transportation of supplies by wagons over the mountains to Bridgeport. He judged wisely that his superiority in cavalry and the length and condition of the roads, rendered wagon transportation a precarious means of supply for the army shut

up in Chattanooga. His success was assured if he could maintain his hold upon the river and the shorter roads to Bridgeport. The situation of the beleaguered army was critical from the first,” for though immediate steps were taken to transfer two corps under Gen. Hooker from the army of the Potomac, and bring assistance from Gens. Hurlbut and Sherman, yet “the movement of troops from points so remote, gave no promise of immediate relief, and as the enemy was on the direct line of approach, their passage from Bridgeport to Chattanooga was itself an intricate problem.” The maintenance of our position against such fearful odds, the ultimate raising of the siege, and the successful defeat of the investing army, will ever furnish one of the most thrilling chapters in the history of our


On Monday, September 28th, one hundred ambulances were sent out to the battle-field to bring in our wounded, and in two



days a similar train went on the same errand. At the picket line our drivers were compelled to give way to Rebel drivers, who took charge of the ambulances until they were brought back with their sad loads. The tender mercies of these drivers will be perpetuated in the narratives of some of our men.

Among the first to be brought in was Capt. Hobbs, of Co. E, reported among the killed, but who proved to have been wounded in the knee. Capt. Hobbs had been identified with the regiment from the first, had participated in all its marches and battles, had everywhere proved himself a worthy and efficient officer, and was highly esteemed by both officers and men in the command. At the battle of Stone River he was wounded in the breast captured, and shared with other officers in the five months captivity and wretchedness in Southern prisons. He and Lieut. Turnbull, Company C, were selected by choice of their comrades, on account of gallant conduct in battle, to represent the regiment on the “roll of honor,” which was made up by order of Gen. Rosecrans. After his arrival in Chattanooga, he remained in one of our hospitals in town, receiving every attention until he was able to be moved, when he was sent North. The situation of the ball in the knee was such that it was not safe to remove it, and as it would not hinder his walking when aided by a cane, it was concluded to allow it to remain. It brought, however, his army life to a close. He returned to Kendall County, where the people showed their appreciation of his services by electing him Circuit Clerk, an office which he retained until his death. In time, the presence of the ball in his knee gave him much trouble, and seemed to threaten his life; he therefore submitted to an operation for its removal, which, instead of benefitting him, hastened his death, which took place a few days later, on January 4th, 1872, over eight years after the battle in which he was wounded.

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