another when we reached camp. On Monday we went eight miles further and then camped, where we remained until Thursday. It was during these three days that the object of this hard marching was accomplished—the evacuation of Chattanooga. As soon as the main army had been transferred to Lookout Valley, Crittenden on the left was instructed to advance over the mountain, Thomas to penetrate and hold the gaps in the centre (Cooper's and Stevens' Gaps), while McCook was to push for Broomtown Valley, his outpost being at Alpine. These movements revealed the real plan of Rosecrans, and Bragg at once commenced to evacuate, as his line of supplies and reinforcements were falling into our hands. Besides, the lull of operations, both east and west, was allowing reinforcements to be sent him from Virginia and beyond the Mississippi; Buckner was on the way from East Tennessee with fifteen thousand men, and time was needed to concentrate these forces. His evacuation was evident to our troops on the north side of the river, on Tuesday evening, September 8th, and on the 9th our men entered. This success, as the result of strategy alone, gave great joy to the army and gratification to the whole country, and all thought now not of battle, so much as pursuit and capture of the retreating forces. Orders were therefore given for Crittenden to occupy Chattanooga, and push towards Ringgold and Dalton; Thomas to penetrate the gaps on his front and reach Lafayette; McCook to enter Broomtown Valley and communicate with Thomas, while cavalry was sent out towards Rome. Accordingly we marched from our camp in Nill's Valley, September 10th, and moved fast up to Valley Head, where a spur of Lookout juts across the valley. Here we joined Davis' and Johnson's Division, which had come over the mountain from Stevenson, and our corps was now together again for the first time since leaving Murfreesboro. ON LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN. 451 After resting two hours, we began to scale the mountain through Winston's Gap, which was very steep, and both men and horses were exhausted with our previous march. After reaching the top (Lookout is 2,200 feet above tide), we went on about two miles and camped beyond Davis about four o'clock. These mountain tops were a great curiosity, this being, as a writer has said: "Some dozen miles wide, so level and gently rolling that one laughs at his preconceived ideas of the tops of mountains, if he does not forget that he has left a valley. No peaks from which to unfurl a flag, if any one should be geographically poetic; no sugar loaves where one can clamber, and feel like a giddy explorer standing on a heavenward land's end. There are groves, fields, and smooth flowing streams, where the imagination pictures verdant crags and cascades."" We camped that night in a most picturesque spot, named very appropriately" Falling Waters," where the water poured over the rocks, two hundred feet high, into a deep basin. Next day we went forward until we reached the opposite brow of the mountain, where we were halted for a while by some obstruction in front, but had a most glorious view of the country, its succession of hills and valleys extending as far as the eye could reach. We then descended into the Broomtown valley, and went into camp about two miles beyond. Here we remained until Sunday, the 13, the reports from the cavalry making any further advance unwise. Indeed, the real position of affairs was only now beginning to be understood. If Rosecrans had succeeded in misleading Bragg enough to compel him to evacuate Chattanooga, he was himself mislead in his belief that Bragg was in full retreat. He had, in fact, been all the time concentrating his army near Lafayette, with the purpose of striking ours in detail, as we sought to penetrate the gaps at various points stretching from Chatta nooga to Alpine. At this time our situation was all that he could desire. Negley found as he advanced to the gaps in his front that he was in the presence of a heavy force that was able to attack him through gaps on either flank, and Bragg made immediate dispositions for doing so, but by some unaccountable delay was hindered long enough to give time to Negley to withdraw his division to a safe point. Crittenden's reconnoisance toward Ringgold revealed the fact that Bragg was not retreating, and compelled Crittenden to draw his corps together. As soon as the movement against Negley failed, an attempt was made to overwhelm Crittenden, which also came to naught by the latter sending Van Cleve with one brigade on a reconnoisance toward Lafayette, who, meeting the enemy with cavalry and artillery not far from Gordon's Mills, drove him three miles, disconcerting Gen. Polk, who, instead of attacking as ordered, halted in defense, and called for reinforcements. This failure saved our left. McCook also found from the reports of his cavalry that the enemy were not retreating but concentrating, and as we were so far away and isolated from the centre and open to attack from Lafayette, our position, too, became quite critical. Indeed, the whole army was in danger, for Bragg was nearer to either of our wings than it was to the other. Crittenden could not hold the road to Chattanooga until Thomas could close up on him, and Thomas could not do this until McCook joined him. For four days, while we were crossing the mountain to join Thomas, the fate of the army hung in the balance, and as we now look back and see the advantage Bragg had, we are amazed that with opportunities so vast his achievements were so meagre. It was at midnight on Saturday, the 12th, that Gen. McCook received the first intimation that he was to join Gen. Thomas. MARCHING TO MEET THE ENEMY. 453 At first, he prepared to send his trains under the protection of three brigades, Gen. Lytle commanding, back on the route of advance, and with the remainder of his corps to move along the eastern base of Lookout to Dougherty's Gap. But this was soon abandoned and another route was sought on the mountain to Stevens' Gap. As the citizens concurred in denying the existence of such a road, and having no guide, he determined to move by way of Valley Head. This necessitated a march of forty-six miles instead of seventeen, and the loss of four days and a-half, instead of one and a-half. It was on Sunday we received orders to march on this return, but our brigade being rear guard to the trains, we lay round all day until five o'clock, when we marched back two miles to the foot of the gap by which we had descended from Lookout two days before. Here we lay exposed to the cold, which was very severe, while the trains continued to ascend the hill; huge fires being kept up all night to facilitate the movement. At daylight, the teams were all up, and we followed, accompanied by about fifty prisoners who had been captured, and who all united in declaring that their generals were preparing for battle. We marched back to Falling Waters, where we remained until Wednesday, Sept. 16th, and returned to Dougherty's Gap. Here we had a magnificent view of the Alpine Valley. The cavalry marched past us most of the night. Next day we started early, moving north to Stevens' Gap and keeping in sight of the valley all day. We then descended a hill two miles long, the worst we had yet found, and entered McLemores' Cove, where Negley had first found the enemy and where we were for the first time in supporting distance of Thomas, who proceeded at once to close up on Crittenden. As soon as we entered the cove, the proximity of the enemy was evident, and the troops were thrown into line of battle. We lay down, expecting to be called at any moment, but notwithstanding this and a threatened rain, we slept soundly, for our day's march had been one of the hardest we had known, over twenty miles of a mountain road, for the greater part without water and almost insufferable from dust. Next morning we were up at three o'clock, and at daylight began our march up the valley, toward a gap held by the enemy. enemy. After going about four miles, we halted and formed line of battle, and in about two hours moved a mile or so further, then went into camp with the expectation of staying all night. Just before dark the "general" sounded, and immediately we prepared to march, but hindered, probably by the teams, we waited and waited, and at half past eleven we had moved but a few rods, while the men built huge fires of rails for warmth and light. After we got started our progress was extremely tedious, many of the men lying down by the roadside to sleep, and officers in danger of falling from their horses through sleep; but on we went, lighted by burning fences, until we bivouacked at Pond Spring about three o'clock, and in a few minutes were fast asleep. We were up next morning, 19th, about six o'clock, and immediately began to speculate as to what all this marching and counter-marching, this turning night into day, could mean-for though it is all plain now, then it was mere conjecture. We could see, however, that our army was concentrating, and that we were in constant danger of being attacked by the enemy. As the morning advanced, a muttering sound as of distant thunder was heard to the north-east, and every ear was turned, listening for it again. Before long it was repeated again and again, and we took in the situation at once, for "Nearer, clearer, deadlier than before, |