private advantage of the municipality, but peculiarly in the interest of the public, for the public good, and as a part of the governmental machinery of the State. The precise question as to the liability of a municipal corporation for injury to the person or health of prisoners, resulting from the condition of the city jail, or the tortious acts of those in charge thereof, has frequently been the subject of judicial determination, and, as far as we are aware, the North Carolina case stands solitary and alone, in holding that an action may be maintained against the corporation in such case, in the absence of a statute authorizing it. There is a Louisiana case so holding, but that probably rests upon the peculiar doctrines of the civil law; certainly it has not been followed in the other States. Johnson

v. Municipality, 5 La. Ann. 100. The following cases are directly opposed: Blake v. Pontiac, 49 Ill. App. 543; Attaway v. Cartersville, 68 Ga. 740; Lindley v. Polk County (Iowa), 50 N. W. Rep. 975; Commissioners v. Boswell (Ind.), 30 N. E. Rep. 534; New Kiowa v. Craven (Kan.), 26 Pac. Rep. 426; La Clef v. Concordia (Kan.), 13 Am. St. Rep. 285. And the authorities make no distinction between cases where the charge upon which the prisoner is confined is one involving a breach of the criminal laws of the State and where the charge consists in a breach of the local city ordinances.

See further 2 Dillon Munic. Corp. 961-980. In City of Richmond v. Long, 17 Gratt. 375, it was held that the City of Richmond was not responsible for the death of a slave, due to the negligence of the employees of a small-pox hospital, conducte 1 by the city. The decision is based on the ground that the hospital was conducted as a governmental function. So a city is not liable for personal injuries sustained by one prisoner at the hands of another, through the negli gence of the officials in charge. (Doster v. Atlanta, 72 Ga. 233; Davis v. Knoxville [Tenn.], 18 S. W. Rep. 254); nor for the death of a prisoner by the burning of the jail, though the fire was caused by the negligence of the city officers (Bryan v. Guyandotte [W. Va.], 12 S. E. Rep. 707); nor for assault or wrongful arrest by its police officers. Harris v. Atlanta, 62 Ga. 290; Pollock v. Louisville, 13 Bush, 221, 26 Am. Rep. 260; Corsicana v. White, 57 Tex. 382; 2 Dillon Munic. Corp. (4th Ed.) 975. A full collection of authorities on the general subject of the liability of municipal corporations for the torts of their officers and agents, will be found in an admirable note by Mr. H. Camp. bell Black, in 14 C. C. A. 534-547, and in a still more elaborate note to Goddard v. Inhabitants, etc. (Me.), 30 Am. St. Rep. 376-413.- Virginia Law Register. EVIDENCE OF OTHER CRIMES THAN THE ONE CHARGED. The case of People v. Zucker, 46 N. Y. Supp. 766, recently decided by the Supreme Court of New York, suggests, if it does not actually raise, an interesting and difficult point in the law of evidence. At the trial of the defendant for arson, consisting in the burning of a building in New York, the judge allowed the government, for the purpose of corroborating its principal witness, to put in evidence tending to prove that the defendant was guilty of previously willfully setting fire to a building in Newark, N. J. The supreme court, by a vote of three to two, held that this was not reversible error. The material facts were as follows: The furniture in the New York building had been removed to that in Newark, the fires took place within three days of each other, and the motive in both cases was to defraud the insurance companies. Relying on these facts the majority held that the two crimes were part of one and the same scheme, each

being the supplement of the other, and neither being complete alone. The minority, in the able opinion of Ingraham, J., deny that the two crimes were connected otherwise than as crimes of a similar nature committed for a similar purpose.

The decision of the majority, on their interpretation of the facts, would seem to be sound. Evidence of a previous crime connected with the actual commission of the one charged, in the sense of making the latter easier, safer, or more effective, was admitted in Commonwealth v. Robinson, 146 Mass. 571, and the principle is recognized in People v. Sharp, 107 N. Y. 427, 466. And in this connection may be repeated the example often given, that where one com. mits larceny of a weapon with which to do murder, evidence of the larceny may come in during the murder trial. The point raised by the minority opinion, however, presents a more difficult question. May evidence of crimes other than the one charged and unconnected with it, but of a precisely similar nature and done for a precisely similar purpose, be admitted to prove the crime charged, if not unreasonably sep. arated in time? It is necessary to understand exactly the limits of the problem. Acts such as are suggested in the question certainly come under the general description of acts done for a common purpose. It is to be noted, however, that the ultimate purpose or result is not the final crime, the one for which the defendant is being tried, but a fixed and constant quantity outside of all the crimes, and having an equal influence on each. In People v. Zucker, supra, for instance, the constant quantity is the scheme to obtain insurance money generally; the similar acts are willfully setting fire to buildings insured. Evidence of the sort under consideration has been admitted to show intent where it determines the nature of the specific act; as whether false representations were made knowingly or not (Reg. v. Francis, L. R. 2 C. C. R. 128); or whether a building was fired by design or accident. Commonwealth v. McCarty, 119 Mass. 354. Should it ever come in as tending to prove the crime itself by means of bringing out more strongly the probable motive when there is no question as to the character of the act? The rule that what merely tends to show the defendant to be a bad man, likely to commit crime, is inadmissible, rests on obvious considerations of justice, and is not to be questioned. Whether evidence of similar acts, near in point of time, unconnected with each other, but all traceable to the one fixed purpose, must be always rejected as falling under this general rule, is in the present state of the authorities worthy the serious consideration of those who try criminal cases.-Harvard Law Review.

ELIGIBILITY OF WOMEN TO OFFICE.

The advocates of equal political rights for women will find encouragement in the recent decision of the Supreme Court of Missouri in State ex rel. Crow v. Hostetter (Mo.), 37 L. R. A. This court held that a woman is eligible to election as county clerk, although the State constitution and statutes use masculine pronouns when referring to such officers, where the constitution has dropped the word "male" from the statement of qualifications for such officers, but retained it in the case of some higher officers. The decision was rendered by the first division of the supreme court, all the members of which concur in the opinion by Chief Justice Barclay. While the decision is doubtless more liberal toward the rights of women than decisions of some other courts have been, it is to be noticed that one important element in the interpre

tation of the constitution on the subject was the fact that the word "male" had been dropped from the constitutional provision respecting this office, but retained in reference to some other offices.

The court refers to the fact that the office is a ministerial one which admits of the use of a deputy, and that its duties "are not of such a nature as to be incompatible of discharge by a woman," and then says: "In view of the condition of the positive law of Missouri above described, we do not consider it neces sary to enter into a discussion of the eligibility of women to office at common law or in other States of the Union."

The common law of the subject presents a paradox. The accepted common law doctrine is against the eligi bility of women and the common law decisions are all in favor of it. In every reported case prior to the present generation in which a woman's right to hold a particular office was questioned the right was sus tained. The theory that women are incompetent at common law to hold office must be based on the fact that they did not actually take office except in rare instances, and that these instances were usually treated by the judges and law writers as exceptional. But there is quite an array of cases in which the incumbents of offices were women, and their competency was invariably sustained.

A list of the offices that women have held in England includes quite a variety. Aside from the notable fact that some of the greatest rulers of the nation have been women, it appears from Campbell's Lives of the Lord Chancellors that Queen Eleanor was appointed lady keeper of the great seal, and performed the judicial as well as the ministerial duties of the office, so that Lord Campbell says: "I am thus bound to include her in the list of the chancellors and keepers of the great seal." The Countess of Pembroke, Dorset, and Montgomery sat with other judges on the bench in the exercise of the duties of her office of hereditary sheriff. Lady Suffolk is shown in the year books (8 Edw. IV. 1) to have rendered an award as arbitrator, and it does not appear that any question was raised as to her competency or that this was deemed to be unusual. Other offices held by women are described in various cases as those of keeper of prison, keeper of workhouse, governor of workhouse, custodian of castle, overseer of the poor, sexton of the parish, forester, commissioner of sewers, constable of England, marshal of England, great chamberlain of England, and marshal of the Court of King's Bench. Some of these offices were hereditary, but not all of them, and sometimes the women who held them exercised their functions by deputy. It is also doubtless true that some of these offices were obscure, and were exercised, in the words of an English judge, “in a remote part of the country where nobody else could have been found who could exercise them." But the fact remains that in all this variety of offices that were held by women whenever a contest of the right of the women to the office was made her right was sustained, although in some of the cases the judges based their decisions on the fact that the office was hereditary or its functions exercisable by deputy, and in general they seem to regard the holding of office by women as exceptional. From these facts has come the curious result that all the common-law decisions on contests of the right of women to office were in favor of their right, while the accepted common-law doctrine is against their right.

Some actual decisions against the rights of women have been rendered in recent years. But the recent

authorities are not all against them, as appears in a note to the Missouri case above referred to. It may be fairly said to be the prevailing doctrine, both in England and America, that women are ineligible to any important office except when made so by ensetment. Such an enactment is to be found in the Mis souri case, in broadening the provision as to qualifi cations by dropping the word "male." Some of the statutes expressly provide that words of the mascu· line gender shall include women. It is unquestionably the tendency both of the statutes and the decisions to extend the rights of women in this respect. -Case and Comment.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

Century Edition of the American Digest. A Com plete Digest of all Reported American Cases from the Earliest Times to 1896. Vol. 1, AbandonmentAdvocate. St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 18%. Commentaries on the Law of Trusts and Trustees,

Administered in England and in the United States of America. By Charles Fisk Beach, Counsello at Law. In Two Volumes. St. Louis: Central Law Journal Company, 1897.

A Manual for Notaries Public, General Conveyancers. Commissioners, Justices, Mayors, Consuls, etc., as to Acknowledgments, Affidavits, Depositions, Oaths, Proofs, Protests, etc., for each State and Territory, with Forms and Instructions. Second Revised Edition, by Florien Giauque, A. M. of the Cincinnati, Ohio, Bar. Cincinnati: The Robert Clarke Company, 1897.

HUMORS OF THE LAW.

"Won't you try the chicken soup, judge?" asked Mrs. Small of her boarder, not noticing that he had gone beyond the soup stage in his dinner. "I have tried it, madam," replied the judge. "The chicken has proved an alibi."-Truth.

During the days of duelling in the South of a cer tain distinguished lawyer, who was a rapid shot and successful duelist, was said by his friends to have "shot into" celebrity. He evidently was also quite s wit, for, being a small man, he was engaged for a da with a very large man, whereupon he insisted that, t make the match even, the size of his own figure should be chalked on the body of his adversary, that any shots striking outside the chalked lines should not count.

Counselor ¡Quibble: "Law, my boy? Why, th whole universe is an example of the reign of law." Young Gibby: "Maybe; but there is no fool legie latures assembled every now and then in the resis

of nature!"

A Kentucky court in a late case says: "While a who marries a widow with eight infant children sumes a great responsibility, yet we think the hose! moon at least, should be over before he qualifes the guardian of the wife's infant children and se the aid of a court to seal their home for their maint nance and education."

In an Irish provincial paper is the following notice this is to give notice that if he does not return "Whereas, Patrick O'Connor lately left his lodgings mediately and pay for the same he will be advertise"

1. ACCIDENT INSURANCE-Voluntary Exposure.-It is voluntary exposure to unnecessary danger, within the prohibition of an accident policy, for one to attempt to cross a railroad track between the cars of a freight train standing on it, when he saw that its crew were in their places, merely on his own assumption that he would have time enough before it was started.-WIL LARD V. MASONIC EQUITABLE ACC. ASSN., Mass., 47 N. E. Rep. 1006.

2. ACCOUNT CURRENT-Evidence

Balance Due.-In

an action of contract, on an account annexed, a finding that there was an open and mutual account cur rent is sustained by evidence that a horse which plaintiff had bought from defendant's testator was to be charged to plaintiff's account, that "that was the agreement and understanding," that the price was to be $20, and that "it was to be applied on the account." -KINGSLEY V. DELANO, Mass., 47 N. E. Rep. 1013.

3. ACTION OF TORT-Venue.-It is a general rule of law that for the purpose of redress it is immaterial where a tort was committed, and, where the wrong is personal, the action is transitory, and may be brought in the jurisdiction where the wrongdoer may be found. -MYERS V. CHICAGO, ST. P., ETC. RY. Co., Minn., 72 N. W. Rep. 694.

4. APPEAL.-Where appellant has availed himself of so much of the decree as was in his favor, he cannot appeal from so much of it as was against him, under Rev. St. 1894, § 644 (Rev. St. 1881, § 632), providing that a party obtaining a judgment shall not take an appeal after receiving any money thereon.-SONNTAG V. KLEE, Ind., 47 N. E. Rep. 962.

5. APPEAL - Necessary Parties.-Where a person is made party defendant, but after the cause is put in issue no account is taken of him as a party, and judg. ment is rendered only against the other defendant, he is not a necessary party to an appeal.-ANDErson GLASS CO. v. BRAKEMAN, Ind., 47 N. E. Rep. 937.

6. ASSUMPSIT - Violation of Trust — Money Had and Received.-Action for money had and received is proper remedy where the maker of notes, knowing they are in the hands of a third person, pays the amount thereof to the payee, at his solicitation, and on his representation that he is still the owner thereof, and will in a few days obtain and deliver them to the maker, and the payee fails to pay the notes, and obtain them from the person holding them as security, and refuses to return the money, but converts it to his own use.-GILLESPIE V. EVANS, S. Dak., 72 N. W. Rep. 576.

7. ATTACHMENT - Dissolution.-One made defendant to an attachment proceeding may move to discharge the same from the whole or any part of the property, notwithstanding the fact that he had disposed of his entire interest in such property prior to its seizure.KOUNTZE V. SCOTT, Neb., 72 N. W. Rep. 585.

8. ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-Compensation.-Although an attorney has made a bargain with his client which is void for champerty, he may recover a reasonable compensation for his services on a quantum meruit.— GAMMONS V. JOHNSON, Minn., 72 N. W. Rep. 563. 9. BANKS AND BANKING-Bills of Lading-Transfer.Where a consignor transfers to a bank a bill of lading and a draft drawn by him upon the consignee for the price, and the bank gives him credit therefor, the bank acquires title to the goods, as against the consignor's creditor attaching them in transitu, though the bank had not advanced any money to the consignor before such attachment.-FIRST NAT. BANK OF KANSAS CITY, Mo., v. MT. PLEASANT MILLING CO., Iowa, 72 N. W. Rep. 689.

10. BENEVOLENT SOCIETY-Mutual Benefit Insurance. -An insurance association whose rules provide that a member shall forfeit his rights on failure to pay an assessment within a special time after notice thereof, subject to reinstatement on payment of arrearages, etc., does not waive the forfeiture by making a new assessment, and sending the member notice thereof, while he is in default for failing to pay the previous one within the time limited.-TOELLE V. CENTRAL VEREIN, Wis., 72 N. W. Rep. 630.

11. BENEVOLENT SOCIETY Mutual Benefit Societies. -A certificate of membership in a mutual benefit company, which accepts a named person as a member, "subject to all the conditions hereinafter named," and which contains a condition on the back, stating that it is issued under a statute "under which the benefits herein provided for are derived from payments by policy holders as ordered by the board of directors," is not a promise of absolute indemnity in case of death, but merely a promise of indemnity according to the articles of incorporation and the by-laws of the company-MOORE V. UNION FRATERNAL ACC. ASSN., Iowa, 72 N. W. Rep. 645.

liver the goods shipped with reasonable dispatch, defendant is liable for such damages as are the natural results of its conduct, and which might have been expected to be within the contemplation of the parties as the probable result of a breach of the contract of carriage.-SWIFT RIVER Co. v. FITCHBURG R. Co., Mass., 47 N. E. Rep. 1015.

15. CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS Sleeping Car Companies-Loss of Baggage.-The porter of a sleeping car, half an hour before starting time, and after put ting a passenger's traveling bag in the car on a seat opposite the side on which passengers were received, opened the window opposite the seat, without request, in violation of a rule of the company. The passenger was about to sit in the seat when the window was opened, and the porter had no reason to believe that he would leave it, but the passenger did so, and the baggage was stolen: Held a question for the jury whether the opening of the window was negligence.DAWLEY V. WAGNER PALACE CAR CO., Mass., 47 N. E. Rep. 1024.

16. CHATTEL MORTGAGE-Sale of Mortgaged Property. -Where a chattel mortgage provides that the mortgagor must sell the property in the name of the mort. gagee, and that the lien shall follow the property, the mortgagee can recover the price of the buyer under the common counts in assumpsit.-FLOOD V. BUTZBACH, Mich., 72 N. W. Rep. 603.

17. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Delegation of Taxing Power.-Under Const. art. 3, § 1, vesting the power of taxation in the legislature without express limitation, the legislature may, for proper purposes, delegate such power to municipalities, but not to municipal officers or boards not elected by the people; and hence Acts 26th Gen. Assem. ch. 50, empowering boards of library trustees (appointed by the mayor and council in cities accepting the provisions of Code 1873, § 461, relating to the establishment of public libraries) to fix a rate of taxation annually, within a specified limit, for the maintenance of a library and a library building, and requiring the council to levy and collect the tax so fixed, is unauthorized and void.-STATE V. MAYOR, ETC., OF CITY OF DES MOINES, Iowa, 72 N. W. Rep. 639. Indictment 18. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Number of Grand Jury.-Section 13, art. 1, Const., which provides that the offenses formerly prosecuted by indictment shall, under the State government, be prosecuted by information or by indictment found by a grand jury of seven, five of whom must concur therein, is not ex post facto, and is not in conflict with the constitution of the United States. Nor is section 10 of the same article ex post facto or in conflict with the constitution of the United States.-STATE V. CARRINGTON, Utah, 50 Pac. Rep. 526.

19. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Statutes Special Acts.P. L. 1897, p. 43 (providing that in cities of the first class, which comprises all cities having a population exceeding 100,000, and in those cities only, municipal officers shall be elected on the first Tuesday after the first Monday of November, and upon the same official ballots required by law for the election of State and county officers), does not affect the machinery, powers, or structure of city government; and population is not a proper basis for classification for the purpose of the act, and hence the act is repugnant to Const. art. 4, § 7, par. 11 (prohibiting special laws regulating the internal affairs of towns and counties).-WANSER V. Hoos, N. J., 38 Atl. Rep. 449.

expire on January 31, 1889, provided that on February 1, 1899, L, one of the partners, should sell his interest to the others, who agreed to make a copartnership to commence on the latter date, for five years, under the old firm name of L, W & Co. On February 1, 1889, the new copartnership was formed, and L, in writing, sold to his former partners, "at this date constituting the firm of L, W & Co., all my right, title, and interest to and in any and all things and property of whatsoever name or nature in which I have an undivided interest with" said former associates "as a member of the late firm," etc.: Held, that the instrument did not carry by implication the right to use the old firm name after the expiration of the five years.-LAWRENCE V. HULL, Mass., 47 N. E. Rep. 1001.

22. CONTRACTS Right to Rescind - Waiver.-A con tract contained a covenant that plaintiff would pay for goods furnished by defendant within 60 days from their delivery, the goods to be furnished from time to time, and provided that, on breach of the covenant by either party, the other might rescind: Held that, by waiving one breach, defendant did not waive a sabse quent breach. - WILKINSON V. BLOUNT MANUFG. CO., Mass., 47 N. E. Rep. 1020,

23. CONTRACTS - Unlawful Purpose.-A non-resident brewing company made a contract with its agent for the sale of beer in the State in original packages. The agent having sold some beer by the glass, the beer was seized, and the agent, in replevin by the principal to recover the beer, became a surety on the bond, and was compelled, on judgment against the company, to pay the amount of the damages. In an action by the agent to recover the same, defendant demurred, setting up that the contract for the sale of beer was unlawful Held, that the contract, being for the sale in original packages, was valid, so that any claim that the seizure and replevin of the beer grew out of any unlawful pur pose in the original contract was unfounded. - GREEN V. P. SCHOENHOFEN BREWING CO., Iowa, 72 N. W. Rep.

655.

24. CONTRACT OF AGENT Liability of Principal. Where the owner of land employs another to cultivate the same, specifying the manner of payment for the work to be done, and providing that the owner is to be at no other expense for labor done on said land, if the owner afterwards directs the employee to do ad ditional work, and to get some one to help him, the owner is liable for the reasonable value of labor done by a third person, hired by the party employed to enl tivate the land. - BARNES V. HOGATE, Iowa, 7 N. W. Rep. 688.

25. CORPORATION - Foreign Corporations.- Where foreign corporation sells goods within the State, there is no presumption that the sales are interstate com mercial transactions so as to render inapplicable Act March 8, 1893, requiring such corporations to do cer tain acts as a condition precedent to the right to do business in the State.-KENT & STANLEY CO. V. TUTTLS, Mont., 50 Pac. Rep. 559.

26. CORPORATIONS-Paid-Up Stock-Assessments.-By plaintiff's articles of incorporation, and by indorse ment on its certificates of stock, provision was made that the stock should be subject to assessment for the payment of a mortgage on real estate conveyed to the company by its shareholders in exchange for share, and constituting the capital stock of the corporation. which was expressed as paid in full, though the mort gage was outstanding: Held that, though expressed at paid in full, the stock was not paid for, except in so far as liability to assessment was payment, and the shareholders were bound by the condition making the shares subject to assessment. WESTERN IMP.CO.T DES MOINES NAT. BANK, Iowa, 72 N. W. Rep. 657. 27. CORPORATIONS - Stock - Transfer.-A transfer of shares of stock is invalid as to creditors, even thougt they have notice, when made in any other way tha that provided by Code 1873, § 1078, which declares that a transfer of shares is not valid, except as between the parties thereto, until it is regularly entered on the

books of the company. OTTUMWA SCREEN Co. v. STODGHILL, Iowa, 72 N. W. Rep. 669.

28. CORPORATIONS-Usurpation of Powers-Quo Warranto. A corporation composed of dealers in plumb. ers' supplies, incorporated under Pub. St. ch. 115, relating to "associations for charitable, educational and other purposes,”—for the avowed purpose of “promoting pleasant relations among its members; discussing, arbitrating, and settling all matters pertaining to the prosperity and promotion of the jobbing plumbers' supply business; and establishing and maintaining a place for social meetings,"-usurps privileges not con. ferred by law when it attempts to enforce collection of an account alleged to be due a member, by notify. ing the other members of its non-payment, and preventing the alleged debtor from obtaining credit till it is paid. HARTNETT V. PLUMBERS' SUPPLY ASSN. of NEW ENGLAND, Mass., 47 N. E. Rep. 1002.

29. COUNTY BRIDGES-Highways Crossed by Stream. -Act June 13, 1836, § 35, providing that when a stream over which it may be necessary to erect a bridge crosses a public road or highway, and the expense of erection is too great for one or two adjoining townships, it may be at the expense of the county, applies only to a case where a highway, in the shape of a ferry or otherwise, has actually existed across the stream, and not where a township street terminates at a river bank, and its extension across the stream has merely been projected. IN RE BRIDGE BETWEEN BOROUGHS OF CONNELLSVILLE AND NEW HAVEN, Penn., 38 Atl. Rep. 478.

30. CREDITORS' BILL Money in Hands of Clerk of Court.-An action in equity will not lie to subject to the payment of the claims of the creditor money held by the clerk of the court in his official capacity. - ANHEUSER-BUSCH BREWING ASSN. V. HIER, Neb., 72 N. W. Rep. 588.

31. CRIMINAL LAW-Burglary.-The lifting of a hook, with which a door is fastened, or the opening of a closed door in order to enter a building, is a "breaking," within the accepted definition of burglary, although the entry might have been effected through a door already open. - FERGUSON V. STATE, Neb., 72 N. W. Rep. 590.

32. CRIMINAL LAW - Invalidity of Sentence. — In the courts of the United States the rule is that a judgment in a criminal case must conform strictly to the statute, and that any variation from its provisions, either in the character or extent of the punishment inflicted, renders the judgment void.-IN RE CHRISTIAN, U. S. C. C., W. D. (Ark.), 82 Fed. Rep. 199.

33. CRIMINAL LAW-Larceny-Indictment.-An indictment for larceny need not state the aggregate value of the several articles alleged to have been stolen, where the mention of each specific article is followed by an allegation of its value. - STATE V. KELLIHER, Öreg., 50 Pac. Rep. 532.

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34. DEEDS Ambiguities Easements. Plaintiff claimed a right of way to the east of his property under an ambiguous deed from defendant's grantor, who then owned the land east of plaintiff. Defendant, on cross-examination of plaintiff, asked him whether his grantor declined furnishing fence posts for the east line, after executing the deed to plaintiff, without in terms excluding a conversation: Held, not error to permit plaintiff, on redirect examination, to give the entire conversation with his grantor relative to his declining to furnish fence posts, giving his reasons therefor. QUIGLEY V. BAKER, Mass., 47 N. E. Rep.

1007.

39. DIVORCE - Alimony. Gen. St. 1894, § 4799, which provides that "in every action brought either for a divorce or separation" alimony pendente lite may, in the discretion of the court, be awarded to the wife, must be construed as requiring the court to exercise a sound judicial discretion. While the fact that a wife has separate property of her own in a circumstance to be considered in determining her application for temporary alimony, it is not necessarily controlling.STIEHM V. STIEHM, Minn., 72 N. W. Rep. 708.

Ballots

40. ELECTIONS Making Cross.-Pub. Acts 1893, No. 202, § 26, provides that, if an elector wishes to vote for a candidate not on any ticket, he must write or paste the name of such candidate on his ballot, opposite the name of the office, and make a cross in the circle under the party name, and, if no cross is placed in such circle, a cross in the square before any candidate's name shall be deemed a vote for such candidate, except where the elector votes for more candidates for the same office than are to be elected: Held, that the pasting of respondent's name over the name of relator, without putting a cross under any party name or opposite the name of respondent, or erasing the name of a third candidate on the ballot, was not a compliance with the law. PEOPLE V. Fox, Mich., 72 N. W. Rep. 611.

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41. ESTOPPEL-Laches.-A guardian of an insane per. son sold his land by order of the court, but for an inadequate price, to a third person, for his own benefit, and on the subsequent death of the ward accounted for the price to his administrator: Held, not to estop the heirs of the insane ward from setting aside the sale as fraudulent.-HEYL V. GOELZ, Wis., 72 N. W. Rep. 626. 42. EXECUTION Confirmation of Sale.-Where the judgment defendant paid to the clerk of the district court the entire amount necessary to satisfy a judg ment which had been rendered by such court, and such payment was so received by said clerk, by whom, however, no discharge of judgment was entered, held that, upon the sheriff's sale subsequently made to the judg ment plaintiff by virtue of said judgment as though unpaid, confirmation was properly refused - MOORE V. BOYER, Neb., 72 N. W. Rep. 586.

43. FIXTURES - What Constitute-Equity.-A tenant, having no contract with or consent from the landlord, constructed a back building, and permanently attached the same to the rear end of a house on the demised premises, in such manner that its removal will leave the original structure without any inclosure at the rear end. The original building and the added structure have, since the latter was built, been used together for a hardware store, neither being usable for that purpose without the other. At the time the back building was constructed, the tenant had no formed intention either to make a permanent addition to the premises, or to remove the structure: Held, the back building has become part of the freehold.-FORTESCUE V. BOWLER, N. J., 38 Atl. Rep. 445.