equity by the reformation of the deed. 2 Washb. Real Prop. (5th Ed.) 319; Collins v. Prentice, 15 Conn. 39; Brigham v. Smith, 4 Gray, 297; Parker v. Bennett, 11 Allen, 389-392; Seymour v. Lewis, 13 N. J. Eq. 439, 444; Pinnington v. Galland, 9 Exch. 1. In the case of Collins v. Prentice, it is said: "It is well settled as a part of the common law of England that if a man having a close, to which he has no access except over his other lands, sells that close, the grantee shall have a way to it, as incident to the grant; for without it he cannot derive any benefit from the grant. This rule has been established for two centuries, and seems not to have been questioned on the trial," citing authorities. "And although doubts have formerly been expressed upon the subject, it seems now to be well settled that, if the grantor had reserved that close to himself, and sold his other lands, a right of way would have been reserved,"-citing authorities. The court then observes: "The way, in the one case, in contemplation of law, is granted by the deed, and in the other case, reserved. And although it is called a way of necessity, yet in strictness the necessity does not create the way, but merely furnishes evidence as to the real intention of the parties, for the law will not presume that it was the intention of the parties that one should convey land to the other in such manner that the grantee could derive no benefit from the conveyance; nor that he should so convey a portion as to deprive himself of the enjoyment of the remainder. The law, under such circumstances, will give effect to the grant according to the presumed intention of the parties." In Brigham v. Smith-a case like this one-the court said: "If the way were expressly reserved in the deed, the covenants must apply to the premises granted; that is, an estate with a right of way reserved or carved out of the fee. In the present case the law does for the parties the same thing, and the covenants apply to an estate with this way of necessity reserved." It is, then, a question of intention, and the mode of determining it by reference to the necessity of the way may be regarded as a rule of property, and, in this view, no more permits a grantor to derogate from his grant than does any similar rule; for, under the rule, a way over the land granted is reserved to the grantor, under a legal construction given the deed in connection with the circumstances creating the necessity.

of

It is plain from the facts found that the way in question was one of strict necessity to the land retained by Samuel Meredith on his conveyance to his son William of the tract on the National road, and the plaintiffs below have succeeded to his rights. At the time this conveyance, which was in 1872, he owned 300 acres, in the form of a parallelogram, with one of its short sides on the road. His home was at the opposite end. From his home to the highway was a well-defined way then in use, which afforded his only means of access to

his home. He then sold and conveyed to his son the 135 acres lying on the highway, the private way of his father to the remainder of his lands being apparent, and well known to his son. But it is said that Samuel Meredith had a way over his remaining lands to a highway. This, however, according to the finding, was simply by "sufferance." It constituted at most a license, and could have been revoked at any time. A way that defeats the implication of one by necessity must be a way of right, and not a mere license. Besides, this supposed way was abandoned in 1867, and has not since been used; so that, whatever right the grantor may have had has long since been lost by abandonment. It had not ripened into a way by prescription when abandoned. It is also claimed that under the power given township trustees, on application, to establish township roads, a way could have been obtained; and therefore there is no ground in any case on which a way by necessity can be claimed in this State. This does not, as we think, alter the case. Whether a road can be obtained in that way will depend upon the opinion of the trustees and of the viewers whether it is necessary, and should be established. It cannot be had for the asking, and in no case without making compensation for the land taken. The necessity for a way cannot be removed by the fact that one may be purchased from some third person. Collins v. Prentice, 15 Conn. 39. It is the fact that no way then exists that can be had without purchase by which the grantor can have access to his remaining lands, that raises the implication of a right reserved to an existing way over the land granted.

There is another finding in the case, not, however, probably material to its disposition, and that is, that from the making of the deed, in 1872. Samuel Meredith and his subsequent grantees of part of the land, continued to use the way as he had done before the grant, without let or hindrance, until the time of his death, and that the same use was made of it until the death of his widow, which occurred in 1888, whereby both parties indicated, for some 16 years, that their understanding of the deed was in accordance with the construction the law places on it. We see no error in the record, and the judgment is therefore affirmed.

NOTE.-Recent Decisions on Implied Grant or Reservation of Easement.-On a grant of land to which there is no access except by a private road laid out and used by the grantor over his other lands, a right to use the road passes as a way of necessity. Barnard v. Lloyd (Cal.), 24 Pac. Rep. 658, 85 Cal. 131. The public, leaving a highway to avoid impassable obstructions, are not warranted in the use of adjacent lands to a greater extent than is absolutely necessary for the purposes of travel. White v. Wiley, 13 N. Y. S. 205, 59 Hun, 618. Though the owner of the fee in the premises condemned for depot grounds owns an adjacent lot, he has no right of passage over the rail. road grounds, except at public crossings. Lyon v. McDonald (Tex.), 14 S. W. Rep. 261, 78 Tex. 71. The owner of land opened and maintained a private way from one part of his land over another part to the

highway, and the way was necessary for access to the land. After his death, on partition, the part of the land on the highway was allotted to his widow, and the balance was sold by order of the court. Held, that the purchaser took an easement in the road. Ellis v. Bassett (Ind.), 27 N. E. Rep. 344. Where one conveys premises inaccessible except by passing over those of the grantor, he conveys by implication a right of way over his own premises; and, where a conveyance under such circumstances is recorded, the assigns of the grantor and of the grantee take with notice, and succeed to the rights of their grantors. Chase v. Hall, 41 Mo. App. 15. The owner of land sold it in three parcels. There was a schoolhouse lot in one corner. The first parcel sold was next to a highway, but did not include a strip back of the schoolhouse lot. The second parcel sold was next to the plaintiff, and was the one farthest from the highway. It was bounded on one side by the middle parcel, and on the others by the land of strangers, over which no right of way is shown. The middle parcel includes the strip back of the schoolhouse lot, and was sold to the defendant. For some years before and after the defendant's purchase there was a traveled way over the defendant's parcel from the plaintiffs to the schoolhouse lot, and over that to the highway. Held, that there was a way of necessity over the defendant's land to the schoolhouse lot, though no right of way over that lot was shown. Whitehouse v. Cummings (Me.), 21 Atl. Rep. 743. Plaintiff led a drain through land owned by him from his cellar to the line of the street in order to carry off water which always, in wet weather, oozed through the ground into the cellar. There was no other way of draining the cellar. Afterwards plaintiff conveyed part of the land in which the drain was laid to defendant, but there was no mention of the drain or reservation of the right thereto in the deed. There was evidence that defendant knew of the drain at the time of the conveyance. Held, that plaintiff's right to the drain existed as a necessity. Christian Moerlein Brewing Co. v. Fasse (Ohio Com. Pl.), 24 Wkly. Law Bull. 132. A deed conveying land expressly bounded by the side of a highway, the fee of which is in the grantor, impliedly grants an easement of light, air, and access in the adjoining half of the highway, of which the grantor cannot, after the road is discontinued, deprive the grantee. Holloway v. Delano (Sup.), 18 N. Y. S. 704, 26 Abb. N. C. 190. A conveyance of land, which was accessible from the public highway, provided that the grantee might have the right to use in common with others as a pass-way a strip of land 11 feet wide, lying between the land conveyed and the grantor's land, so long as the same was used by the grantor for the same purpose. Held, that no easement was created by implication, and the pass-way might be closed as such, at the pleasure of the grantor of the land conveyed. Batchelder v. National State Capital Bank (N. H.), 22 Atl. Rep. 592. The rule that, where land is conveyed by a deed describing it as bounded on a road, the fee of which is in the grantor, the grantee acquires a right of way over such road, is not limited to city and village lots. Baker v. Mott, 28 N. Y. S. 968, 78 Hun, 141. When a deed bounds the land conveyed by an existing highway, the fee of which is in the grantor, there is an implied grant of private easements therein, of which the grantor cannot, after the discontinuance of the highway by act of law, deprive the grantee. Holloway v. Southmayd (N. Y. App.), 34 N. E. Kep. 1047, 139 N. Y. 390. Where land of cotenants is allotted in partition, there is an implied grant of a

"way of necessity" over other land allotted to the county road, if that is the only way to reach the highway. Blum v. Weston (Cal.), 36 Pac. Rep. 778. Plaintiff's only outlet through the mountains was by a passway down a creek bed on defendant's land, allotted ber in partition by deed reserving the right of way up and down the branch, "with the run of the branch; the holder having the right to put gates across." Some of the other heirs, who had land above, testified that the reservation was only for them, but other disinterested neighbors swore to a public user as of right for from 19 to 36 years. Held. that the right of way was not merely permissive, and defendant must be enjoined from obstructing it. May v. Blackburn (Ky.), 25 S. W. Rep. 112. The mere fact that a strip of land, if used as an alley, would be a great convenience to property, does not make it a way of necessity. Field v. Mark (Mo. Sup.), 28 S. W. Rep. 1004. No right of way from necessity exists across the remaining land of the grantor where the land to which such right of way is claimed is surrounded on three sides by the sea. Kingsley v. Gouldsborough Land Imp. Co., 29 Atl. Rep. 1074, 86 Me. 279. Plaintiff purchased part of a city lot on which was a house with a bay window on the first floor and another window on the second floor, overlooking the remain ing portion of said lot, and five feet distant from the boundary line thereof. The windows were the only means of admitting light to their respective rooms. Afterwards defendant purchased the remaining por tion of said lot, and intended to erect a building on the line of his lot, which would diminish the light admitted to plaintiff's windows. Held, that plaintif could not restrain the construction of such building. Robinson v. Clapp, 32 Atl. Rep. 939, 65 Conn. 365. The owner of a double dwelling house, the division wall of which was only of plank and plaster, about 214 inches thick, and through which the joists of the building extended, being supported by partition walls of the two houses, which were about 6 feet from the division wall, conveyed one-half of the house and then the other, the deed to each grantee descrieing the land conveyed as bounded by the center af the division wall. Held, that the first grantee did not take, as against the second grantee, an easement, by implied grant, for the support of the joists by the partition wall on the land of the second grantee, s as to render the second grantee liable, irrespective of negligence, for injuries caused to the house of the first grantee by the removal of the wall, no damag to the division wall being done. Whiting v. Gaylord, 34 Atl. Rep. 85, 66 Conn. 337. Where, by agreement between tenants in common, the land was divided!! commissioners, and a tract deeded to each tenant. and it was the intention of the commissioners and al the parties that the grantee of a certain tract shoul have a right of way over another tract, though the deeds were silent as to such right of way, but it w shown on the commissioner's plat, and was used for two years after the deeds were made, and was the only outlet to the turnpike from the tract to which ran, a purchaser of the tract on which the rightway was located, who bought with notice of the cumstances under which the land was divided, w be adjudged to have bought subject to the right way. Burress v. Barbee (Ky.), 33 S. W. Rep. The plaintiff and defendant, owners in severalty adjoining lots, pursuant to a mutual agreement erected thereon buildings corresponding in size, ing the stairs, hallways, skylights and heating apps ratus in common. Held, a grant to each of an ment in so much of the stairs, halls, and skylight as i

situated upon the lot of the other; that the easement of each in the property of the other is owned in severalty. Barr v. Lamster (Neb.), 66 N. W. Rep. 1110. When a parcel of land held in common is severed into two tracts by quitclaim deeds simultaneously interchanged by the tenants in common, and there is a store on one of the two lots, with a window through which light and air is received across the other lot, such window cannot be closed by the owner of the latter lot if the influx of light and air is reasonably necessary to the beneficial enjoyment of the store. Greer v. Van Meter (N. J. Ch.), 33 Atl. Rep. 794. Where defendants, owning lands on all sides of a strip of land dedicated in the deeds to them, and in maps referred to in the deeds, as a street, though not accepted as such by the public, conveyed a lot abutting on the strip with reference to the strip as a boundary, referred to it as P street, the grantee secured an easement in the strip, the obstruction of which by his grantors he was entitled to have enjoined, though at the time of the conveyance defendants were using the strip in a manner inconsistent with the existence of the right of way, with the grantee's knowledge. Haight v. Littlefield (N. Y. App.), 41 N. E. Rep. 696, 147 N. Y. 338.

JETSAM AND FLOTSAM.

LIABILITY OF ELECTRIC LIGHT COMPANY FOR DEATH OF TELEGRAPHIC LINEMAN COMING IN CONTACT WITH WIRE NOT INSULATED.

In the case of Newark Electric Light, etc. Co. v. Garden, the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the third circuit had before it a close question, according to the syllabus, which fairly represents the decision. What the court ruled was that an electric light company, which maintains wires carrying an electric current of high power on poles used, in common with it, by other companies for the support of their wires, owes to an employee of one of such other companies, who is unlawfully upon the pole, in pursuance of the common right, the duty of exercising ordinary care to keep its wires so safely insulated as to prevent injury to such employee, though, in the performance of his work, he may enter upon a sep. arate cross arm of the electric light company, or accidentally touch its wires. The court, in his opinion, written by Dallas, Circuit Judge, while conceding that the deceased may have been technically a trespasser upon the cross-arm of the defendant's pole, yet nevertheless held that the circumstances were such that the defendant was bound to anticipate that the linemen of other companies using the pole might have occasion to support themselves upon its crossarm, and was bound to exercise reasonable care to the end that such place of support should not, by the failure to keep its wire insulated, become a death trap to such lineman. The court repelled the idea that because one is technically a trespasser upon the property of another, the latter owes him no duty of taking care to prevent killing or injuring him. The true question was, was the deceased a trespasser in any such sense as would excuse the defendant for the negligence resulting in his death. On the question the court cited Schilling v. Abernethy, 112 Pa. St. 437, 3 Atl. Rep. 792; Ry. Co. v. McDonald, 152 U. S. 262, 14 S. C. Rep. 619. Acheson, Circuit Judge, dissented, on the ground that it did not appear that the defendant had violated any duty which it owed to the deceased in not taking care that this wire be kept

insulated, and that the deceased, being an experienced lineman, met his death in consequence of a danger of which he had knowledge and of which he had been frequently warned. Being a volunteer, he assumed the risk of the calamity that overtook him.-American Law Review.

THE RIGHT TO THROW STEREOPTICON VIEWS ON

BUILDING.

The Western Law Journal says: "A very interesting case is before one of the western courts for determination, and the result is awaited with much anxiety. A party owns a building having a large plain wall, painted so as to make a splendid surface for stereopticon views. A stereopticon company secures the right of locating its instruments upon an adjoining building, and throws its views advertising soap, tooth powder, etc., upon this wall, to the owner's annoyance. He seeks an injunction restraining the stereopticon company from such use of his premises, claiming that it is similar to the posting of bills thereon, and if he cannot secure relief, it is equivalent to granting the defendant company an easement in his property. It presents a novel question, and the decision will be a step in a new direction."

We suppose the complainant will claim that the wall of the building comes to the full line of the vacant lot and that the owner of the vacant lot could build his wall so as to touch the building and not trespass upon the rights of the owner of that building; if so, that the artist could throw his views upon the wall of that building and that the view would be upon the land of the man who owns the vacant lot, and that by throwing the view of a proper subject upon the wall no injury was done to any one.

The counsel, waxing eloquent, will probably say, "Could the Lord be enjoined from throwing a shadow upon the wall? If not, can one of his children?" And the counsel for the owner of the building will claim, and perhaps correctly, that the complainant cannot throw views upon the side of his building and thereby use his wall for the purpose of an exhibition, draw crowds of people around his building, and thereby injure his business, with impunity.

We have no doubt the complainant would be liable if he should carry the exhibition of these views to such an extent as to create a nuisance. If the building comes flush to the land of the owner of the vacant lot, could not the owner throw views upon the wall? We doubt if any court would enjoin an artist for occasionally throwing proper views upon a side wall, which did not interfere with the occupancy of the premises or injure anyone.—J. B. B. in Chicago Legal News.

BOOK REVIEWS.

AMERICAN STATE REPORTS, VOL. 55.

As each volume of this sterling series of reporters made its appearance, the examiner cannot fail to be impressed with the care and discrimination of the editor in the selection of cases for publication, and the great value of the many exhaustive annotations. In this volume are to be found some of exceptional merit. We call particular attention to the exhaustive note on "the place of the contract" appended to the case of McGarry v. Nicklin (Ala.), also reported in 110 Ala. 559. The same might also be said of the note on "contracts between mortgagor and mortgagee to waive or release equity of redemption," following the

case of Bradbury v. Davenport (Cal.), 114 Cal. 593. In connection with the Indiana case of Commissioners v. Heaston, 144 Ind. 583, is a valuable note on "the ef fect of the allowance or rejection of claims against counties and other municipal corporations." A good criminal law case is Klock v. State (La.), 48 La. Ann. 67. It has a long note on subject of "validity of sentences differing from those authorized by law." Alabama & Vicksburg Railway Co v. Jones (Miss.), 73 Miss. 110, is an important case on subject of validity of a release and discharge made by one in ignorance of his rights. It has an exhaustive note on the "ignorance of one's rights as a ground of relief." Powell v. Wade, 109 Ala. 95, has also a note on the subject of "suits by undisclosed principals upon contracts made with their agents." The American State Reports is published by Bancroft-Whitney Co., San Francisco. GENERAL DIGESTS, VOLS. 1, 2 AND 3.

These volumes belong to what is known as the "new series" of general digests published by the Lawyers' Co-operative Publishing Co., Rochester. Volume 1 which made its appearance some time ago contained all the published decisions between September 1st, 1895, and July 1, 1896. Volume 2, before us, contains all the reported decisions between July 1, 1896, and January 1, 1897. Volume 3 contains such decisions from January 1, 1897, and July 1, 1897. These volumes cover all the reported decisions of all the courts in the United States, of the higher courts of England and the Supreme Court of Canada with many important cases from other Canadian courts. It has references to all reports including State reports, law journals and law newspapers. It will thus be seen that each volume embraces a period of six months. A special feature of these volumes is the citation in connection with the digested opinions of authorities from other jurisdictions which the court relied upon or the cases which it criticised, distinguished, limited or overruled, and also a compilation of the authorities on important points raised by the decisions. The great value of this feature to the searcher for precedents will be readily understood. The manner in which these digests have been prepared is manifestly first class in every regard. In fullness of statement and accuracy, the syllabi are especially to be commended. The liberal references to all reports renders the volume of especial value, as every examiner will doubtless find in his library some reports to which references are made. In point of typographical appearance and arragnement, no criticism can be offered and we predict for this series of digests great popularity.

PROBATE REPORTS ANNOTATED.

The series of which this is the initial volume is, in a sense, a successor to the "American Probate Reports, which has been published for the past sixteen years and is recognized by the profession as of undoubted merit. This new series as stated by its editor "aims at the retention of every element that has given stability and popularity to its predecessors but will seek to further augment their usefulness by extending the annotation along all the lines of contract that in any way contribute to the proper evolution of our probate law." The student of probate law and particularly the practitioner in probate courts will find this series of reports of inestimable value. The evident care with which which the leading cases are selected and the many and exhaustive annotations with which the volume abounds, are guarantees of its usefulness and merit in the peculiar domain of law which it is intended to illuminate. The

volume has nearly eight hundred pages, has an excellent index and is beautifully printed. Published by Baker, Voorhis & Co., New York.

HOCHHEIMER'S CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. This volume of nearly six hundred pages treats in an admirably concise and clear manner of the law of crimes and criminal procedure as established in the United States and administered in the State and national tribunals. The author is a Baltimore practitioner, who is well known to readers of the CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL as a law writer of ability. Though not so large as some works upon the subject of crimes the author of this has managed by conciseness of statement and absence of repetition to exhaust the subject. One of Mr. Hochheimer's valuable traits, as noticed heretofore by the editor of this journal, is condensation of statement and clearness of expres sion, a style which might well be imitated by many of the law writers of the day. There seems to be an exhaustive citation of authorities. The book is ad mirably prepared in point of mechanical work both as to printing and binding. It is published by Har old B. Scrimger, Baltimore.

1. ADMINISTRATION- Widow's Property Rights-49 against general creditors and heirs of a decedent, bis widow is entitled, where part of his land is sold to pay his debt secured by mortgage thereon, to be reim bursed out of his personalty and other real estate, so that she may obtain the value of her statutory third of the real estate of which he died seised.-SHOBE V. BRINSON, Ind., 47 N. E. Rep. 625.

2. ADVERSE POSSESSION-Duration.-Ten years' ad. verse possession of land is sufficient to confer a title capable of being actively asserted, if facts are proved

from which it may be inferred that the State has parted with its title.-DUREN V. KEE, S. Car., 27 S. E. Rep. 875. 3. APPEAL-Assignments of Error.-When the only rulings assigned as error by a plaintiff are the sustain. ing of defendants' demurrers to the complaint, and no such rulings were in fact made, as shown by the record, a ruling actually made, but not assigned as error, carrying back plaintiff's demurrer to the answer, and sustaining it against the complaint, will not be re. viewed.-BALDWIN V. SUTTON, Ind., 47 N. E. Rep. 629.

4. APPEAL-Finality of Decision.-An order overrul. ing a demurrer to a petition seeking to vacate a decree entered by default is not a final decision subject to review on appeal or error.-THOMAS V. THOMAS, Colo., 5 50 Pac. Rep. 211.

5. APPEAL-Revival of Right.-Where judgment was formally entered, and an appeal was not prayed within the time prescribed, a subsequent order denying a new trial on condition of partial remittitur, which was complied with, did not revive the right of appeal.BURCHINELL V. BENNETT, Colo., 50 Pac. Rep. 206.

6. ARREST-Necessity for Warrant.-A police officer, upon seeing the agent of a beer company make a gift of a bottle of beer to a third person, upon the agent's premises, during the time when gifts of intoxicating liquors were prohibited by law, is empowered to arrest the agent, without a warrant under Rev. St. 1894, § 1771 (Horner's Rev. St. 1896, § 1702), providing that a police officer is a peace officer authorized to arrest any person violating a State law, until a legal warrant can be had.-WESER V. WELTER, Ind., 47 N. E. Rep. 639.

7. ASSIGNMENT-Construction.-After a bank had assigned part of the notes executed to it by a firm, the firm assigned to the bank a note to secure "the indebtedness" of the firm "to said bank," with provision that, if any amount remained after payment of the firm's notes, it should be applied on the note of a third person: Held, that the notes assigned by the bank, as well as those still held by it, which were less than the security, were entitled to share in the security, though the amount of all the notes exceeded the security.-GERMAN NAT. BANK V. FIRST NAT. BANK, Tenn., 41 S. W. Rep. 1070.

8. ATTACHMENT-Appeal-Review.-Where it is sought to sustain an attachment on the ground that the debtor had made, or was making a transfer of his property with intent to cheat, hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors, and an issue is made by a traverse of the attachment affidavit, and proof by affidavit and oral testimony is offered, and the trial court dissolves the attachment, this court will not reverse the determination of the trial court if there is evidence to support the decision rendered.-CITIZENS' BANK OF ENID V. GILROY, Okla., 50 Pac. Rep. 122.

9. ATTACHMENT-Election of Remedies.-The owner of property unlawfully seized under attachment against another person may either intervene in the attachment suit or sue in replevin or in trover for conversion.-HANNAN V. CONNETT, Colo., 50 Pac. Rep. 214. 10. ATTACHMENT-Exemptions-Waiver.-A petition in an action for damages for the unlawful taking by attachment of certain chattels of plaintiff alleged that plaintiff was a resident of the State of Kansas, and defendant a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Missouri; that the property was taken in an action brought in the State of Arkansas, where plaintiff was temporarily staying, for a debt contracted wholly in Kansas, where the defendant was conducting a mercantile business; that said property was exempt in Kansas, but not exempt where seized; that plaintiff notified defendant at the time of the levy, and also the sheriff who made the levy, that he claimed the property as his exempt property; and that he did not interpose any defense whatever in the attachment action, allowing it to proceed to a judgment, and the attached property to be sold, without any further protest or effort on his part: Held, that a demurrer to the petition was properly sustained.-WILLIAMSON V. KANSAS & T. COAL CO., Kan., 50 Pac. Rep. 106.

11. BANKS Insolvency Title to Certificate Deposited. An insolvent bank took a certificate on a second bank on a deposit to the credit of the holder thereof, when its officers knew it was in. solvent, and a few hours thereafter it was closed. Next day a third bank received said certificate, and collected it from the second bank, and applied the amount on a pre-existing debt due from the insolvent bank to it: Held, that the third bank was not a bona fide holder, and hence it was liable to the depositor for the amount of the certificate.-HARRIS V. FIRST NAT. BANK OF JOHNSON CITY, Tenn., 41 S. W. Rep. 1084.

12. BILLS AND NOTES-Promissory Note-Sureties.— Where the holder of a promissory note agreed with the maker thereof, for a valuable consideration, to extend the time of payment of such note for a period of 90 days if the sureties consented to such extension, held, that the contract of extension was made conditional upon the assent of the sureties, and that under such a contract the sureties were not released.-KUHLMAN V. LEAVANS, Okla., 50 Pac. Rep. 171.

13. CARRIERS-Delivery of Freight-Bill of Lading.Where one ships goods consigned to the order of himself, with direction to notify B, who was the purchaser and ultimate consignee, and sends the bill of lading, requiring delivery of the goods on production of the bill of lading properly indorsed, together with a draft on B, to a bank, the bill of lading to be delivered to B on payment of the draft, the carrier is not liable for delivering the goods to B, who paid the draft to the bank, though the bill of lading was not produced, and though part of the draft was not paid till after delivery of part of the goods; and it is immaterial that the bank subsequently became insolvent, and failed to remit proceeds of the draft.-WITT V. EAST TENNESSEE & W. N. C. R. Co., Tenn., 41 S. W. Rep. 1064.

14. CHATTEL MORTGAGE-Failure to Record.-Under the laws of this territory, providing that a mortgage of personal property is void as against creditors of a mortgagor unless the original or an authenticated copy thereof be filed by depositing the same in the office of register of deeds of the county where the property mortgaged, or any part thereof, is at such time situated, if the mortgagor makes an assignment for the benefit of creditors prior to the filing provided for In the statute, and before the mortgagee has taken possession of the property under his mortgage, the assignee will take the property exclusively for the benefit of the creditors, and free from any preference in behalf of the mortgagee.-FIRST NAT. BANK OF EL RENO V. SALYER, Okla., 50 Pac. Rep. 76.

15. CHATTEL MORTGAGES-Illegal Preferences-Estop. pel.-Where an insolvent debtor makes conveyance of the whole of his property by chattel mortgage to one or more of his creditors in good faith for the security of a bona fide indebtedness, although in exclusion of other creditors, the transaction lacks the essential elements of a trust for the benefit of creditors, and cannot be brought within the range of the statutes relating to voluntary assignments. The statute regulating and permitting voluntary assignments by insolv. ent debtors for the benefit of creditors was not intended to, and does not, affect or qualify the rights of such debtors to make preference among their creditors, under section 4, ch. 27, St. 1893.-SMITH MCCORD DRY GOODS Co. v. JOHN B. FARWELL CO., Okla., 50 Pac. Rep. 149.

17. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - Legislative Control of Cities. Acts 1891, p. 47, § 1, empowering cities of a certain population to exclude the institution or maintenance of any business avocation on the property fronting on a boulevard, violates Const. art. 2, § 30, declaring that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law, as the "use" of property is "prop. erty" itself, within the meaning of the constitution.CITY OF ST. LOUIS V. DORR, Mo., 41 S. W. Rep. 1095.