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TRADE SECRET_DISCLOSURE BY SERVANT-- uncertain character, instead of being asked to enforce INJUNCTION CONTRACT.-The case of C. &
a definite agreement not to do an act. As to the other
cases, if they tend to sustain the contention of the des W. Thum Co. v. Tloczynski, recently de- fendant, they are contrary to the great weight of au• cided by the Supreme Court of Michigan, in- thority. Is it not true that, if one discovers a proces volves a question of somewhat rare interest,
of manufacture or an invention which is of use to tr
dividuals and the community, he has a property right viz: whether an employee when his employ- in it, and that an agreement which must be respected ment terminates may make use of secrets may be made in relation to keeping the process of confided to him by his employer necessary to
manufacture or the invention a secret between the be confided to him in the conduct of the
discoverer or owner and an employee, which agtet
ment is made one of the conditions of the emplorbusiness, when it is understood and agreed ment? It has been said by a very able justice: that he shall not make use of the secret
one invents or discovers and keeps secret a process of
manufacture, whether a proper subject for a patent knowledge so imparted to the detriment of
or not, he has not, indeed, an exclusive right to itu the employer, and if he attempts so to do against the public, or against those wbo, in good faith may be restrained by writ of injunction. The acquire knowledge of it; but he has a property in 11
which a court of chancery will protect against ocê exact holding of the court on the subject, is
who, in violation of contract and breach of confidence, that after his employment bas terminated, a undertakes to apply it to his owo use, or to disclose it servant cannot make use of or divulge a trade
to third persons. Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 462." secret necessarily confided to him by the
And, again, Mr. Justice Gray, who delivers the opir
ion, says: “In this court it is settled that a secret art master in the conduct of the business, where is a legal subject of property, and that a bond for the it was agreed, as a condition of the employ- conveyance of the exclusive right to it is not open to ment, that he should not use the secret to
the objection of being in restraint of trade, bat may
be enforced by action at law, and requires the obligor the master's detriment, or disclose it. This not to divulge the secret to any other person. Vickery is so, although the contract did not, in terms, v. Welch, 19 Pick. 523; Taylor v. Blanchard, 13 Allen
, so provide, where such a condition is clearly
373, 374. In Jarvis v. Peck, 10 Paige, 118, such a boud
was held valid in equity.” In Salomon v. Hertz, # implied by the oral statements of the parties, N. J. Eq. 400, 2 Ati. Rep. 379, the court adopts the taken in connection with the surrounding language of Justice Gray, and hold that there is facts and circumstances. It is also held that
property in a secret process of manufacture. Hart
ware Co. v. Waibel (S. D.), 47 V. W. Rep. 814. a condition of a contract of employment that A recent and instructive case is that of Eastman Ca the servant will never make use of or divulge v. Reichenbach (Sup.), 20 N. Y. Supp. 110. "To trade secrets necessarily confided to him by
briefly summarize, then, the established facts of this
case, it appears that the plaintiff is the owner of val. the m ter in the conduct of the business is
uable trade secrets, which were either discovered by not invalid as being in restraint of trade. one or more of the defendants, or necessarily discloed And that when one discovers and keeps
to them, while occupying a confidential relations
toward the plaintiff; that as to such trade secret # secret a process of manufacture, whether or
were discovered by either Reichenbach or Passavant
, not a proper subject for a patent, he has a they have undertaken and agreed to give plaintif the property therein that equity will protect by
exclusive property in and control over the same; sal
that, in violation of this agreement, they are now pro injunction against one who, in violation of
posing to make use of them, or some of them, in such contract, and in breach of confidence, under- a manner as to materially injure the plaintiff's bust takes to apply the secret to his own use, or
With these facts established, the application et to disclose it to a third person.
the legal principles which must govern the dispost The follow
tion of the case does not appear to be a very fornid ing from the exhaustive opinion of the court able undertaking. It may be safely assumed at tbe discloses the grounds upon which the court outset, I think, that whatever remedy plaintif bir proceeded and cites the authorities :
have does not reside in a court of law. The very fi
ture of the case, the peculiar character of the injort It is said by counsel that the remedy by injunction liable to be inflicted, and the incalculable damata will not be granted in such a case as this, where, from which may possibly result, all show most conclusively the nature of the subject, there could be no decree for that legal relief is totally inadequate for plaiatify a specific performance; citing Newberry v. James, 2 protection, and that its only resort mnst be to a court Mer. 446; Williams v. Williams, 3 Mer, 157; Kimber.
of equity. The learned counsel for defendants bas ley y. Jennings, 6 Sim. 340.
contended, with all the adroitness and skill at bis It is also said that a decree for a specific perform. command, which is but another way of saying that ance will not be granted where the court has not the
such contention bas been put forth with all possible means of seeing that its decree shall be carried out; adroitness and skill, that this case is not one of which citing Voorbies y. Frisbie, 25 Mich. 482; Blanchard v. a court of equity can take jurisdiction; and several Railway Co., 31 Mich. 43; Bumpus v. Bumpus, 53 authorities of both English and American courts are Mich. 346, 19 N. W. Rep. 29. An examination of the cited in support of this claim. I am constrained, bor Michigan cases cited shows that in those cases the court
ever, to hold that the weight of authority is oppoest was asked to decree the performance of an affirmative
to his view of the law. The question preseoted is a act, where the agreement was of an indefinite and interesting one, and would justify a somewhat azalyt
ical review of the cases which bear upon either aspect of it did time permit; but, for the purposes of this adjudication, it will be necessary to advert to such only as are deemed conclusive upon this court. In Morison v. Moat, 9 Hare, 241, which is an English case, it was held that an injunction would issue to restrain the use of a secret in the compounding of a medicine not being the subject of a patent, and to restrain the sale of such medicine by a party who acquired knowledge of the secret in violation of the contract of the party by whom it was communicated, and in breach of trust and confidence. An appeal was taken from the decision of the vice-chancellor, and in 1852 the case was affirmed by the court of chancery, and it was there held that 'there is no doubt whatever that where a party who has a secret in trade employs persons under contract, ther express or implied, or noder duty, express or implied, those persons cannot gain knowledge of that secret, and then set it up against their employers.' Morison v. Moat, 21 Law J. Ch. 248. In 1868 the Supreme Court of Massachusetts recognized and followed the authority of Morison v. Moat, and in the opinion of Gray, J., tbe law is thus stated: If a party 'invents or discovers and keeps secret a process of manufacture, whether a proper subject for a patent or not, he has not indeed an ex. clusive right to it as against the public, or against those who in good faith acquire knowledge of it, but he has property in it which a court of chancery will protect against one who, in violation of contract and breach of confidence, undertakes to apply it to his own use, or to disclose it to a third person. The ju. risdiction in equity to interfere by injunction to pre. vent such a breach of trust when the injury would be irreparable, and the remedy at law inadequate, is well established by authority.' Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452. The language above quoted was cited with approval in Salomon v. Hertz, 40 N. J. Eq. 400, 2 Ati. Rep. 379, and it is almost identical with that employed by elementary writers of recognized standing in discussing the same question. Judge Story says: 'Courts of equity will restrain a party from making a disclosure of secrets communicated to him in the course of a confidential employment, and it matters not in such cases whether the secrets are secrets of trade or secrets of title, or any other secrets of the party important to its interest.' 2 Story, Eq. Jur. 952. See, also, 1 High. Inj. (2d Ed.) p. 15. The same doctrine has obtained in this State for at least half a century, and has been enunciated by a line of decisions which, with a single exception, is unbroken. Jarvis v. Peck, 10 Paige, 118; Hammer v. Barnes, 26 How. Prac. 174; Champlain v. Stoddart, 30 Hun, 300; Tabor v. Hoffman, 118 N, Y. 30, 22 N. E. Rep. 12. The Cbamplin Case was decided by the general term of this department. Smith, P.J., writing the opinion, in the course of which he takes occasion to say that 'a secret in trade is fully recognized as property in equity, the disclosure of which will be restrained by injunction.' By a careful reading of the various decisions upon this subject, it will be seen that some are made to depend upon a breach of an express contract between the parties, wbile others proceed upon the theory that where a confidential relation exists between two or more parties engaged in a business venture, the law raises an implied contract between them that the employee shall not divulge any trade secret imparte i to him or discovered by him in the course of his employment, and that a disclosure of such secrets, thus acquired, is a breach of trust, and a violation of good morals, to prevent which a court of equity should intervene. It should also be
observed in this connection tbat the word 'property,' as applied to trade secrets and trade inventions, has its limitations; for it is undoubtedly true that when an article manufactured by some secret process, which is not the subject of a patent, is thrown upon the market, the whole world is at liberty to discover, if it can by any fair means, wbat the process is, and, when the discovery is thus made, to employ it in the manufacture of similar articles. In such a case the manufacturer's or inventor's property in his process is gone, but the authorities all hold that, while knowl. edge obtained in this manner is perfectly legitimate, that which is obtained by any breach of confidence cannot be sanctioned; and this distinction is quite forcibly presented in a recent decision of the court of appeals, to which the attention of this court bas been directed by the supplemental brief of defendant's counsel. Judge Landon, in his opinion, speaking of the plaintiff's claim, says: "His case is unlike those in which the injunctive process of the court is sought to restrain the disclosure of a secret or the publication of a letter which may prove injurious to busi.
or character.' Bristol V. Society, 132 N. Y. 264-267, 30 N. E. Rep. 506. But without multi. plying citations or prolonging consideration of the legal aspect of this case, it may be said, by way of conclusion, that the principle contended for by the plaintiff is not only abundantly sup. ported by authority, but is likewise founded in good common sense, and is peculiarly applicable to the case in hand. Here is a party, which, by the ex. penditure of large sums of money, and the exercise of much skill and ingenuity, has built a large and prosperous business, the capital of which consists largely in certain inventions and discoveries made by its officers, servants and agents. The world at large knows nothing of these inventions and discoveries, because they are locked within the brains of those who conceived them. The defendants, who have been largely instrumental in perfecting them, while under both an express and implied contract to give plaintiff the benefit of their inventive genius, propose now to disregard their legal and moral obligations by creat. ing a new establishment, where these inventions and discoveries may be employed to plaintiff's serious injury. This is not legitimate competition, which it is always the policy of the law to foster and encourage, but it is contra bonos mores, and constitutes a breach of trust, which a court of equity, should not tolerate." Fralich v. Despar (Pa. Sup.), 30 Atl. Rep. 521.
It is argued in this case that there is no express contract shown, and that an implied contract is not such a one as will be enforced. We think the testimony discloses very clearly an express agreement ve. tween the employer and the employed, but, if it may be stated that the only agreement is an implied one, growing out of oral statements taken in connection with the facts and circumstances surrounding the business, the parties, and their acts, still, if it is clearly established by all that was said and done that the secrets confided to the defendant were not to be disclosed by him to others, and were not to be used by him except when he was in the employment of those who imparted to him the secret, or their legal representatives, and that was one of the conditions of his employment, we do not think it would make any difference in the principle involved. The knowledge came to him in the course of a confidential employ. ment, relying upon his using the knowledge only for the benefit of the employer. It is said by an eminent writer: "On the whole, the doctrine may be gen. erally stated that wherever confidence is reposed, and employer will not divulge any trade secrets im parted to him or discovered by him in the course of his employment; and we do not see why the defendants, Gallus and Bostwick, are not 18 der just as strong an obligation to observe and keep sacred the trust reposed in them as they would be had they reduced the contract which the law im. plies to writing. Nor does the fact that they entered the plaintiff's service while minors, and at first per formed duties comparatively unimportant in their character, relieve them from a faithful observance of their obligation, Gallus, at least, was ultimately alvanced to a position of great responsibility, and both of them had attained their majority before attempt ing to take improper advantage of the knowledge trparted to them while in the plaintiff's emplos, and their present experiments are not in the direction of legitimate competition, but involve a breach of trast which we think the court should prevent." Taber F. Hoffman, 118 N. Y. 31, 28 N. E. Rep. 12; Tuek r. Priester, 19 Q. B. Div. 629; Pollard v. Photographie Co., 40 Ch. Div. 345.
DAMAGE SUITS BY STEVEDORES.
one party bas it in his power, in a secret manner, for his own advantage, to sacrifice those interests which he is bound to protect, he will not be permitted to hold any such advantage.” Story, Eq. Jur. $ 328. The same authority, when discussing the subject of what cases injunction will be issued in, says: "Upon similar grounds of irreparable mischief, courts of equity will restrain a party from making a disclosure of secrets communicated to him in the course of a confidential employment; and it matters not, in such cases, whether the secrets be secrets of trade, or secrets of title, or any other secrets of the party important to his interests. Thus a party has been restrained from using the secret of compounding a medicine not protected by patent, when it appeared that the secret was imparted to him, to his own knowledge, in breach of faith or contract on the part of the persons com. municating it.” Story, Eq. Jur. § 952, and many cases there cited; 10 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 949; High, Inj. $ 19; Davies v. Clough, 8 Sim. 262; Williams y. Assurance Co., 23 Beav. 338; Morison v. Moat, 9 Hare, 241; Yovatt v. Winyard, 1 Jac. & W. 394; Tipping v. Clarke, 2 Hare, 393; Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452; Champlin v. Stoddart, 30 Hun, 309; Salo. mon v. Hertz, 40 N. J. Eq. 400, 2 Atl. Rep. 379.
The case of Little v. Gallus (Sup.), 38 N. Y. Supp. 487, is against the contention of the defendant. In that case the plaintiff was a maker of type.writer ribbons by secret processes and formulæ. The defend. ants entered his employ when they were minors. The court says: “It seems, therefore, too plain for controversy that the plaintiff was the owner of a process or invention which possessed great value, and which he had secured at the cost of much time, trouble, and expense; that the defendants, Gallus and Bostwick, occupying a confidential relation toward the plaint iff, gained a knowledge of the process and formulæ employed by him in conducting his business; that they well understood the nature of his business, their relations to it, and the care which was used to keep the same secret; and that, notwithstanding the knowl. edge thus obtained, and in violation of the faith and confidence reposed in them, they surreptitiously made memoranda of these formulæ, and are now using the same, as well as all the other knowledge obtained while in the plaintiff's service, to start and operate a rival establishment. The only question therefore, to be determined upon this state of facts, is whether or not they shall be permitted to carry out their inten. tions. It is contended by the plaintiff that his case is brought directly within the rule laid down in that of Kodak Co. v. Reichenbach, 79 Hun, 183, 29 N. Y. Supp. 1143, recently decided by the general term in the fifth department; and the defendants, while con. ceding that the law of the case is there correctly stated, insist that the facts do not warrant its appli. cation here. We find ourselves unable to concur in the view thus taken, and which was carefully elabo. rated upon the argument by the learned counsel for the defendants. Tbe facts of this case differ some. what from those of the Reichenbach Case, in that there was no written agreement entered into between these parties by which the employees undertook to give to their employers exclusive right in, or control over, any inventions discovered by, or disclosed to, the former; but we are unable to see how this strengthens the defendant's contention. In the case cited there happens to be an express contract, but, nevertheless, it is asserted, in the opinion of the court, and such is unquestionably the correct rule, that the law raises an implied contract that an employee wbo occupies a confidential relation toward his
Admiralty jurisdiction in matters of coutract, depends upon nature of contract, but in torts locality goveros. In admiralty ibe vessel is deemed an offending thing. And the locus of the damage, not the locus of the origin of the tort determines the questio. The application of this test sometimes gire rise to exceedingly nice distinctions. For : curious illustration see the Manhasset," where the injury was inflicted upon a passenger in the act of steppiog from the ferry boat to the landing, the court holding that the bost caused the injury, and that the injury is inflicted upon a part of the body of the mar which had not yet landed. Generally spesia ing the vessel is bound to furnish tackle, rigging, appliances and machinery, ably safe for the use of those employed in receiving or discharging cargo. This duts includes a reasonably safe place to stand ad
1 Phil., etc. Co. v. Phil., etc. Co., 23 flow. 215; $. I. Co. v. Cbase, 16 Wall. 53; Kate Cann, 2 Fed. Rep. 8 Fed. Rep. 719; Harmon y. Port Blakeley Mill Cuts 69 Fed. Rep. 646, 71 Fed. Rep. 853.
2 Sherlock v. Aalling, 93 U. S. 108. 3 19 Fed. Rep. 435.
4 Steel v. McNeill, 60 Fed. Rep. 105; The l'hoes, 34 Fed. Rep. 760; The Carolina, 30 Fed. Rep. 18, Fed. Rep. 112; The Eddystone, 33 Fed. Rep. 933; 11 Allianca, 44 Fed. Rep. 97; The Frank and Wille
, si Fed. Rep. 494; The Nebo, 40 Fed. Rep. 31; Ashebrva 44 Fed. Rep. 124; The William Branfoot, 48 Fed. Bep
. 914, 52 Fed. Rep. 390; The Rheola, 19 Fed. Rep. ** The Kate Cann, 2 Fed. Rep. 243, 8 Fed. Rep. Die The Serapis, 51 Fed. Rep. 91; The Servix, # Fil Rep. 943; The Mabarajah, 40 Fed. Rep. 784, +9 Yel Rep. 111; The Islands, 28 Fed. Rep. 478; The Harse. 21 Fed. Rep. 428.
work. The machinery and appliances need low-servant with the man at the winch and not be the safest and best or of the newest cited The Harold, 14 as authority. The same pattern. But it is not sufficient that the ap- court by the same judge in the subsequent pliances when furnished were safe, for they case of The Victoria, 15 held directly contrary must be repaired and kept in proper condi- to this ruling and cited Johnson v. Navigation. The vessel is responsible if her master tion Company, 16 but made no reference knew, or had the means of knowing, or if the to the Furnessia. The same court by a difcircumstances are such as to put him on in- ferent judge holds them to be fellow-servquiry so that he could know that the tackle ants.17 With regard to the gangwayman or appliances were unsafe.? If however the whose duty is to give warning to the laborinstrument be new and the defect latent and ers at work in the hold the decisions are more imperceptible so as to avoid a close scrutiny, barmonious. The weight of authority seems no liability attaches. But where the acci- to be that they are fellow-servants. 18 It is dent is an unusual and unexpected one, and difficult to gather from the cases what effect, the thing causing the accident is in the exclu- if any, the fact that the vessel is under charsive management, possession, or control of the ter party, and that loading is done by charvessel, the vessel is responsible notwithstand- terers stevedore, has upon the liability of the ing the defect is not apparent to the eye.' vessel for torts to the stevedores or their emIn such cases the doctrine res ipsa loquitur ployees. The language of the “Stevedore applies and the onus probandi rests upon the clause” in charter parties in the different vessel. In admiralty contributory negligence cases is seldom the same, consequently the does not bar recovery but entitles libellant to construction and effect thereof varies with divided damages. The conflict in the decis- the particular case. Where the charter party ions in the lower courts of the United States is silent as to the matter of the employment upon this point was finally decided in the of the stevedore and the custom of the port Max Morris Case, 10 in 1890. Negligence of
does not otherwise provide the presumption fellow servants is one of the risks assumed would be that the stevedore is the agent of with the employment which will exonerate
the ship. 19 the vessel.11 But if negligence of the vessel
Where the charter party is not simply an in the appliances furnished combines with the affreightment but amounts to a demise of the negligence of the fellow laborers, the vessel ship it seems that charterers would be liable will still be held responsible. There is some in personam. This would bardly relieve the conflict in the application of the doctrine of
vessel however in rem for charterers would fellow-servants. In the Furnessia, 18 the court then be owners pro hac vice. Where the held the stevedore working in the hold a fel
charter party is only a contract of affreight
ment and the stevedore is employed by * The Terrier, 73 Fed. Rep. 265; Hermann v. The
charterer but is injured by defective appliPort Blakeley Mill Co., 71 Fed. Rep. 853; Keily v. Al. ance furnished by the vessel the vessel is lianca, 44 Fed. Rep. 97; The Frank and Willie, 45 Fed.
liable.20 It was said in Steel v. McNeil, 21 Rep. 494; The Protos, 48 Ped. Rep. 919; The Helios, 12 Fed. Rep. 732; The Dago, 31 Fed. Rep. 574; The
that the law is too well settled to reHarold, 21 Fed. Rep. 428; The Kate Cann, 2 Fed. Rep. quire argument, that an action in 243.
will lie for damages arising from defective or 6 The Serapis, 51 Fed. Rep. 91; The Maharajah, 40 Fed. Rep. 784, 49 Fed. Rep. 111; The Servia, 44 Fed. imperfect appliances furnished those emRep. 943; The Benbrack, 33 Fed. Rep. 687.
ployed in receiving or discharging cargo al-. + Steel v. McNeil, 60 Fed. Rep. 105; The Phoenix, 34 Fed. Rep. 760; The Nebo, 40 Fed. Rep. 31.
14 21 Fed. Rep. 420. 8 The Benbrack, 33 Fed. Rep. 687.
15 69 Fed. Rep. 160. 9 The William Branfoot, 52 Fed. Rep. 390, 48 Fed. 16 132 N. Y. 576. Rep. 914; The Eddystone, 33 Fed. Rep. 925.
17 The Servia, 44 Fed. Rep. 913. 10 S. C. Rep. 29, 137 U. S. 1.
18 Hermann v. The Port Blakely Mill Co., 71 Fed. 11 The Furnesia. 30 Fed. Rep. 878; Hermann v. The Rep. 853; The Servia, 44 Fed. Rep. 943; The Islands, Port Blakeley Mill Co., 71 Fed. Rep. 853; The Walla- 28 Fed. Rep. 478; The Victoria, 13 Fed. Rep. 43; The walla, 46 Fed. Rep. 198; The Servia, 44 Fed. Rep. 943; Phoenix, 34 Fed. Rep. 760. The Islands, 28 Fed. Rep. 478; The Harold, 21 Fed. 19 George W. Bush & Sons Co.y. Thompson, 65 Fed. Rep. 428; The Victoria, 13 Fed. Rep. 43.
Rep. 812. 12 The Phoenix, 34 Fed. Rep. 760; Anderson v. 20 34 Fed. Rep. 760; 44 Fed. Rep. 124; 19 Fed. Rep. Ashebrook, 44 Fed. Rep. 124,
926; 2 Fed. Rep. 241. 13 30 Fed. Rep. 878.
21 60 Fed. Rep. 105.
though they may be in the immediate employ highway, and such way is bis only means of ingress and pay of the stevedore.? But the decis
and egress to bis home, sells and conveys to another a
portion of it lying on the public highway, and is ions in some cases under such circumstances thereby deprived of all access to the highway except hold that the vessel is not liable upon the by the way he had previously constructed and mainground that the stevedore is an independent tained, and which passes through the granted part
and the facts were well understood by both parties contractor. 23
As between shipper or owner at the time in such case, the way is reserved to the of goods, and the vessel, the vessel has been lands of the grantor by implication, although the deed held liable for negligence of the stevedore,
contains a covenant against incumbrances. although the ship was under charter party by
2. It is a general rule that one cannot derogate from
his grant; so that, to warrant the interference of 1 which charterer named the stevedore.24 This
way reserved by implication, it must be one of strict case it is true was reversed,
other necessity to the remaining lands of the grantor. It is grounds. Indeed the point appears con
not merely a matter of convenience, and, if the
grantor bas another mode of access to his land, how ceded on appeal to the circuit court, that the ever inconvenient, he cannot claim a way by implicastevedore was the agent of the ship, and tion in the land conveyed, though he may bave been his negligence the ship's negligence, al
in the use of a way over it to a public highway at and
a long time before the conveyance, and of which the though he was selected by the charterer. 26
grantee had notice at the time. And when the clause reads "under direc
MINSHALL, J.: This case was argued and subtion of the master," the stevedore is an mitted with the case of Baker v. Rice, reported agent of the ship though appointed by the 47 N. E. Rep. 657, on the assumption that each charterer.27 But the better and stronger presented the same question, so that the affirmreason for holding the vessel responsible in
ance of one would involve the reversal of the other, and e converso. But, in our judgment
, cases of tort, even when the vessel is under
there is a difference between the reservation of a charter, is given by Judge Benedict in the
way and the grant of a way by implication. The oft quoted case of The Kate Cann,28 where he reservation of a way by the grantor in apparent says "to be sure the libellant was not di- derogation of his deed and its covenants stands rectly employed by the ship owner, and it upon a much narrower ground than does the case may be truly said that no relation by con
of a grant. In the latter case, as held in Baker v. tract existed between the ship owner and the
Rice, a way passes by implication where it had
been attached to the part granted by the grantor, libellant but the libellant was trimming the
and is apparent, and necessary to the reasonable ship owner's ship. He was doing what was enjoyment of the premises granted. It is not necessary to be done to enable the ship to necessarily a way of strict necessity. But in the carry the cargo in safety and the only reason
reservation of a way by implication tbe
case is different. Ordinarily a deed is taken why he was so employed was because the
most strongly against the grantor. He may inship owner bad by a contract with the char
sert in it such exceptions and reservations as he ter indirectly provided for the performance desires, and the grantee, by accepting the deed. of the service.” W. HcgER FITZSIMONS. is held to assent to them; and therefore the Charleston, S. C.
grantor is not generally permitted to derogate
from his grant, or disregard the covenants of his 22 60 Fed. Rep. 105.
deed. But there seems to be a well-recognized 23 31 Fed. Rep. 574; 33 Fed. Rep. 687; 31 Fed. exception, and that is where a grantor, by the Rep. 418; 28 Fed. Rep. 478; 4 Fed. Rep. 493; 8 Gray,
sale and conveyance of a part of his land, is 147; 3 Gray, 349.
thereby deprived of all access to any public high24 22 Fed. Rep. 662. 25 40 Fed. Rep. 91.
way from the part retained, and this is known to 26 See The Keystone, 31 Fed. Rep. 412.
the grantee. In such case it is a fair inference 27 Gerard v. Lovespring, 42 Fed. Rep. 853.
that the grantor did not intend to subject him. 28 2 Fed. Rep. 241. See, also, The Joseph B. Thomas, self to the necessity of buying a way out; nor car 81 Fed. Rep. 578; Bramble v. Culmer, 78 Fed. Rep. it be inferred that the grantee, with knowledge 497; The Alijandro, 56 Fed. Rep. on p. 624; The of the facts, supposed that he did, particularly Conde Wifredo, 77 Fed. Rep. 324.
where the grantor had a well-defined way over the part granted to the highway in use at the
time of the conveyance. In such case the cirEASEMENT-IMPLIED RESERVATION. cumstances are such as to indicate that the deed
does not express the real understanding of the MEREDITH V. FRANK.
parties as to the way over the land granted, and Supreme Court of Ohio, June 8, 1897.
might have been reformed in equits. But the
courts in such cases bave pursued a more liberal 1. Where an owner of a tract of land has made and practice, and done at law by the implication of a maintained a private way over his land to a public grant what could have been accomplished in