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AS ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES.

By CHARLES FISK BEACH.
The most complete treatise on the subject ever written.
No previous work extant has ever gone so deeply into the subject of the law of

TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES.

The author has in this work treated the whole subject of TRUSTs, express and implied, public and private. No topic of Importance in connection with this important subject has been omitted.

More than 16,500 cases have been cited. The citations are not merely barren references to cases. They com. pactly digest the points involved, so that a lawyer may use them with confidence when the reports are not at hand, and they are complete to date. The statements of equitable principles and the citations by which they are supported Include all phases of the subject, and the

LATEST CASES REPORTED. The numerous expositions of equitable doctrines by the Lord Chancellors of England, and by the most emi. Dent American Judges are intelligently reviewed.

Mr. Beach, in this treatise, when conflicts between different courts have been found, has not hesitated to ex. press his opinion as to which conclusion seem to be the most sourd.

Special care has been taken with the Index and Table of Cases to enable the busy lawyer readily to find what he wants. Beach on Trusts and Trustees gives the law as it is to-day.

CONDENSED TABLE OF CONTENTS:
VOLUME I.

VOLUME II.
INTRODUCTION.-The rise and progress of trusts. CHAPTER XVIII.-Appointment, substitution, resig.

pation and removal of trustees. CHAPTER 1.- What is a trust?

CHAPTER XIX.-The relation of trustees to the trust CHAPTER II.-The constitution of trusts-the settlor

estate. the trustee-the property-the beneficiary. Who CHAPTER XX.-The relation of trustees to the trust may be a settlor?

estate continued. CHAPTER III.-The constitution of trusts continued.

CHAPTER XXI.-Concerning the powers of trustees.

CHAPTER XXII.-The power to sell the trust estate. Who may be a trustee?

CHAPTER XXIII.-The general duties and obligations HAPTER IV.-The constitution of trusts continued. of trustees. The subject matter of a trust.

CHAPTER XXIV.-The Investment of trust funds.

CHAPTER XXV.-The liabilities of trustees. CHAPTER V.-The constitution of trusts continued.

CHAPTER XXVI.-Simple, passive or dry trusts. Who may be a cestui que trust?

CHAPTER XXVII.-Trusts for spendthrifty. CHAPTER VI.-Express trusts.

CHAPTER XXVIII.-Trust for payment of debts and CHAPTER VII.-Express trusts continued.

legacies. CHAPTER VIII.-Implied trusts. Implied trusts in

CHAPTER XXIX.—Trusts under assignment for cred.

itors. general-resulting trusts-constructive trusts. Im. CHAPTER XXX.--Trustee for tenant for life and re. plied trusts in general.

mainder-man. CHAPTER IX.-Implied trusts continued. Resulting

CHAPTER XXXI.-Trusts under power of sale mort.

gages and deeds of trust. trusts-division first. Trusts resulting to grantor.

CHAPTER XXXII.- Perpetuities and accumulations. CHAPTER X.-Implied trusts continued. Resulting CHAPTER XXXIII.- Equitable and statutory limitatrusts-division second. Trusts resulting to payor.

tions. CHAPTER XI.-Implied trusts continued. Construct

CHAPTER XXXIV.-Trust companies as trustees.

CHAPTER XXXV.-The cestui que trust. Rights and Ive trusts-division first. Trusts from constructive remedies-division first. Rights and remedies in fraud.

relation to the trustee. CHAPTER XII.-Implied trusts continued. Construct. CHAPTER XXXVI.-The cestui que trust continued.

Ive trusts-division second. Trusts from actual Rights and remedies-division second. Rights and fraud.

remedies in relation to third persons. CHAPTER XIII.-Trusts from equitable llens.

CHAPTER XXXVII.-Application of the purchase CHAPTER XIV.-Trusts arielag from powers.

money.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.- Costs and attorney's fees, CHAPTER XV.--Trusts for married women.

CHAPTER XXXIX.-The compensation of trustees. CHAPTER XVI.-Truste for charitable purposes.

CHAPTER XL.-Pleading and practice in trust cases, CHAPTER XVII.-Trusts for infants.

CHAPTER XLI.-The determination of the trust. Beach on Trusts and Trustees is in two volumes, 8vo., law sheep, containing over 2,100 large law book pages. Price $13.00, sent prepaid on receipt of price. Published and for sale by

CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL COMPANY,

919 Olive Street, ST. LOUIS, MO. TWO NEW LAW BOOKS.

A TIMELY BOOK ON AN IMPORTANT SUBJECT.

State Control of Trade and Commerce

By National or State Authority.

By ALFRED STICKNEY,

of the New York Bar.

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The subject of this treatise, just at the present time, is one of absorbing interest. It deals with the lonz series of attempts, by government, under both the English and American law, through legislatures and the courts, to control trade and commerce, especially in the matter of prices. The subject is treated bistorically, as well as from a purely legal standpoint.

The entire treatise concerns one of the most important questions of legal and economic science, and will be found to hægt o deep interest, not only for lawyers but for laymen as well, and especially for legislators and the students of political economic science.

STICKNEY on STATE CONTROL of TRADE and COMMERCE is a bandsomely printed octavo volume, finely bound in art canvas. Price, $2.25 pet, but sent express prepaid on receipt of the amount.

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In this third edition much fresh matter has been embodied in the original text, many new sections have beer written, and several tbousand additional cases cited. Over one hundred and eighty pages of entirely neno matter ist embodied in this edition.

The multitude of recent cases involving fraudulent alienations and covinous schemes devised to defeat the claims of creditors demonstrates how important and far reaching the subject of Fraudulent Conveyances ÞE become. Sometimes a creditor's entire fortune is dependent upon a correct exposition of the statute of Elz beth. Special efforts have been put forth to utilize the latest authorities upon the topics discussed.

WAIT on FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES and CREDITORS' BILLS IS large octavo volume of 900 pages. In best law book style.

Price, $6.00 neto or $6.30 delivered, on receipt of the amount.

BAKER, VOORHIS & CO., Law Publishers,

66 NASSAU STREET, NEW YORK.

cases :

Central Law Journal. case. He announced that, in his opinion,

the rule does not apply in two classes of

First. Where a person willfully inST. LOUIS, MO., OCTOBER 29, 1897.

flicts an injury upon a woman with child, knowing her to be such, and for the purpose

of inflicting an injury upon her unborn child, The Chicago Legal News calls attention to

whereby such child suffers permanent injuries ; a novel case which recently came before the

and second, where a mother or other person Superior Court of Cook County. The peti

The peti- | contracts, upon a valuable consideration for, tion alleged, in substance, that the mother of

in reference to, or on behalf of the child en plaintiff, several days before his birth in reg- ventre sa mere, for care and attention, or ular course of nature, contracted with the de- otherwise for the benefit or safety of the fendant hospital that the latter would, for a child, or of both the mother and child, where compensation then and there agreed on, the duty arises out of contract and from the shelter, attend, treat, during confinement and

relative situation and circumstances of the care for her and her child, then en ventre sa

parties at the time of the occurrence of the mere, during the period of childbirth and

acts of negligence. The fact, says the court, convalescence thereafter; that in pursuance that the plaintiff en ventre sa mere was in the of said agreement the mother of plaintiff elevator, and known to be by the defendant, paid said compensation and was received and

in itself might not be sufficient to cast a duty accepted by said defendant at its hospital,

upon the defendant to use due care and diliby reason whereof it became the duty of

gence toward the plaintiff, but where, in adsaid defendant to use due care and diligence dition, such duty is imposed upon defendant for the safety and welfare of the plaintiff ; by its own contract, based upon a valuable that the defendant, by its agents and serv- consideration, should not the plaintiff after ants, placed the mother of plaintiff in an ele- his birth be permitted to maintain this action vator for the purpose of carrying her and the

for the breach of the duty? The court was plaintiff en ventre sa mere to an upper floor

of the opinion that it should, and that the of the hospital for shelter, care and treat- plaintiff in his declaration bas stated a good ment, and so negligently and unskillfully con- cause of action, and was entitled to maintain ducted and operated eaid elevator as to per- it. manently injure the plaintiff in the manner therein more fully described. The case was

At the time of its rendition we neglected to heard on demurrer to the declaration, the call attention to an important Connecticut case, question raised being as to whether a child, wherein was involved the question of the power after it is born, has a right of action for in- of a State legislature to provide for the dejuries sustained by it while en ventre sa mere;

struction of trees affected by a distemper or or, in other words, whether a child unborn is contagious disease.

The case

is State y. a person in being, so as to be entitled after Main, 37 Atl. Rep. 80, in which the court held its birth to maintain such an action. Only valid a statute of Connecticut authorizing a two cases on the subject were brought to the public official, after inspection of trees alattention of the court: Dietrich v. Inhabit- leged to be diseased, to order their destrucants, 138 Mass. 14, and Walker v. Great tion by the owner and to make the latter liaNorthern Ry. Co., 23 L. R. (Irelanıl) 69,

ble for disobedience of such order. The 32 Cent. L. J. 197. In both of these court very sensibly held that the owner was cases it was substantially held that a child entitled to a jury trial as to the existence of unborn

not

a person in esseso the distemper or disease in his trees, but that as to enable it to sue for injuries received the question of the constitutionality of the while en ventre sa mere, and that a contrary law permitting destruction of diseased trees rule, from the difficulties of proof and other was one for a court and not for a jury. The considerations, would be attended with dan- court also upheld the power of a court to ger. It seems, however, that the Illinois take judicial notice of the nature of an infecjudge while approving of this doctrine held tion or disease upon which a legislature has that it does not apply to the facts of this

assumed to base an exercise of police power.

was

The view of the court as to the validity of the Association, 52 Ark. 201, 12 $. W. Rep. statute was undoubtedly correct. The de- 447; Johnson v. Hall, 55 Ark. 210, 17 S. W. struction of a tree affected by a contagious Rep. 874; Weissert v. Muehl, 81 Ky. 336; disease, without compensation to the owner, Van Bibber's Admr. v. Van Bibber, 82 Ky. and against his will, is as fully within the 347; Manning v. United Workmen, 86 Kg. police power of a State as the destruction of 136. In Lone v. Clune, 50 Pac. Rep. 34

, a house threatened by a spreading conflagra- | recently decided by the Supreme Court of tion, or the clothes of a person who has fallen Colorado, it appeared that the Brotherhood of a victim to smallpox. Such property is not Locomotive Engineers made it compulsory en taken for publie use. It is destroyed be- every member to carry one or more policies cause, in the judgment of those to whom the in its insurance association for the purpose of law has confided the power of decision, it is furthering the object for which the brother. of no use, and is a source of public danger. hood was organized, as declared in its conIt has been directly held that such destruc- stitution and a by-law to be to benefit the tion of infected trees by order of a public families and heirs of deceased members. In official, after due inspection, is a remedy, 1894 the association was compelled by the which, however severe, is one appropriate to laws of Ohio, where it had its headquarters, to the end in view, and may properly be enforced be incorporated, and in its charter and by-lava without any preliminary judicial inquiry, as changed said by-law by using the language of well as without any compensation to the owner the Ohio statutes making insurance payable for resulting loss. State v. Wordin, 56

to the "assigos" of deceased members is Conn. 216, 226; Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 well as to members of their families, but serU. S. 678, 685, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 992, 1257. eral other articles of the association's by-lats

referring to the insurance as payable to de

ceased's "heirs" or "widow," and pot menNOTES OF RECENT DECISIONS.

tioning “assigns,” were retained intact after

its incorporation. It was held that after in BENEVOLENT SOCIETIES—MUTUAL LIFE IN

corporation the association did not enlarge SURANCE-CHANGE OF BENEFICIARY.-Upon

its class of beneficiaries so that an heir or the question whether the member insured in

member of deceased's family could be pru a mutual benefit association may at his pleas

cluded from its benefits, and hence a member ure change the beneficiary designated in the

of the brotherhood, who had taken out a polpolicy where the laws of the association are

icy for the benefit of his mother, could not, silent upon the subject there exists much

after its incorporation, designate one diversity of opinion among the decided cases,

was not an heir or member of his family as a some holding that in the absence of an beneficiary, to the exclusion of his mother

, press or implied restriction the insured may

surviving him. revoke the designation of the beneficiary and LANDLORD AND TENANT appoint whom he chooses as the recipient of TO USE APPURTENANCES. – In Cummings r. the benefit. To this effect, among others, are Perry, 47 N. E. Rep. 618, decided by the Association v. Bunch, 109 Mo. 560, 19 S.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, it W. Rep. 25; Society v. Burkhart, 110 Ind.

appeared that the basement of a building 189, 10 N. E. Rep. 79; Martin v. Stubbings, divided by a brick partition into a salesrosa 126 Ill. 387, 18 N. E. Rep. 657. On the

and an engine room, in the latter of which contrary it has been held that unless the

the freight elevator was situated. A lease of power to change the beneficiary is expressly the salesroom provided that the lessees shoull given either by the policy itselt or by the be allowed the use of the elevator to bring articles of the association or by-laws of the

goods from an upper floor in an adjoining society there is no difference in this regard

estate, which connected with the elevator, to between a policy issued by such association the basement, and that openings in the pas and one issued by an ordinary life insurance tition in the basement should be made company; and the beneficiary upon the is- connect the elevator and the salesroom. suance and delivery of the policy acquires a Subsequent leases were made, letting rooms vested interest that is irrevocable. Block v.

in an upper part of the building to the same

ex

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lessees, "with one horse power only,” which meant the right to use the elevator. A flight of steps provided a means of connection between the sidewalk and the salesroom, and do lease gave the express right to use the elevator to carry goods from the basement to the sidewalk, or vice versa. It was held that there was no evidence from which the right to such use could be implied, although the lessor permitted such use. The following is from the opinion of the court:

The principal question in the case is whether the plaintiffs bad any right to use the elevator for hoist. ing goods from the basement room up to the sidewalk, or for lowering them from the sidewalk to the basement room, as incidental or appurtenant to their estate in the basement room under the last lease. This claim of the plaintiffs is stated in the charge of the presiding justice as follows: "In the first place, with reference to the right of the plaintiffs to make this use of the elevator and the approach to it from the basement, in connection with the business of the basement-that is, to take goods from the sidewalk into the basement, and from the basement out onto the sidewalk-this right is not given by any express words in the lease. The lease is silent with reference to that. It merely leases the rooms-the basement and the two rooms above-so that the plaintiffs do not claim to have acquired this right to this approach and to the elevator by any express words in the lease; but they claim that it is given in the lease by virtue of the situation of the premises, and the use that had been and was made of them, the construction of the premises, and the design as to the use of the elevator in connection with the basement by the owner of the building. That, by reason of the circumstance, the situation and adaptation of the building, and the use that is made of it, this right to use the elevator passed to them as an incident to the use of the basement for their purposes, or, to use a technical word, as an ap. purtenance-tbat is, something incidental to, and connected with, the principal thing, which was the use of the basement-one of the conveniences for enjoy. ment of the basement which he had hired." The presiding justice instructed the jury, among other things, as follows: "Now, having considered the facts with reference to these different matters that I have called your attention to, I will instruct you that if the elevator and approach thereto were constructed and designed by the owner of said building to be used in connection with said basement and the other parts of said building for the purposes claimed by the plaint. iffs, and the elevator and approach were used by the plaintiffs for the purposes claimed by them, in connection with the basement, in carrying on business therein, with the knowledge of the lessors, at the time of their leage to the plaintiffs, commencing January 1, 1888, and if from the date of said lease to the time of its assignment to the defendant the elevator and approach were used by the plaintiffs for the purposes pow claimed by the plaintiffs in carrying on their business in said basement, with the knowledge and consent of said lessors, as a privilege belonging to the plaintiffs as the lessees of the basement, then the defendant would not have the right, upon becoming the assignee of lease, to prevent the use and enjoy. ment of that privilege, the use of the approach, and the use of the elevator; and, if he did prevent the use

of it by the plaintiffs, he would be liable to pay any damage which they sustained by reason of that prevention."

This court has held the doctrine of implied grants with a good deal of strictness. Buss v. Dyer, 125 Mass. 287; Randall v. McLaughlin, 10 Allen, 366; Lowell v. Strahan, 145 Mass. 1, 12 N. E. Rep. 401; Johnson v. Knapp, 150 Mass. 267, 23 N. E. Rep. 40; Case v. Minot, 158 Mass. 577, 33 N. E. Rep. 700. It true that when a person hires a room in a building, a right to use the apparent means of access and exit often passes as appurtenant to the premises hired. In modern buildings of great height this doctrine we a-gume may be applied to elevators. Whether an active duty to maintain an elevator for the use of ten. ants can be implied may be open to question, but, if an elevator is in fact maintained by the landlord, the duty to permit tenants to use it, we assume, may be implied, if this is reasonably necessary for the benefi. cial occupation of the rooms let, and if, from the construction of the elevator and of the passageways, it is apparent that the elevator way intended for the use of the tenants. But in the present case it is apparent that the elevator was not intended originally to be used by the occupants of the basement room; that, although it might bave been convenient for them to use it in copneetion with the sidewalk, yet suitable means of ingress and egress were furnished by means of the steps and doors from the basement room into the street; that at no time was there any access to the ele vator directly from the basement room; that the ele. vator did not adjoin the basement room, and the way through the engine and boiler room to the elevator from the basement room was not a common passageway, but that, for the purpose of connecting the base. ment room with certain rooms in the upper part of the building, or of the adjoining building, access to the elevator from the basement room by a way through the engine and boiler room bad been provided; that this was originally done "for the purpose of bringing their finished goods from the two upper chambers of the adjoining estate, which they are ex. pecting to occupy for manufacturing purposes, to said basement;" and that the only reference to the elevator contained in the last lease is in connection with the tenancy of the rooms 29 and 30 in the building. Under these circumstances, a majority of the court think that an implied grant of a right to use the elevator for the purpose of hoisting goods from the basement room to the sidewalk, and of lowering them from the sidewalk to the basement room, cannot be implied. The fact, if it be one, that the de. fendant or his predecessors in title permitted the plaintiffs to make such a use of the elevator, under the circumstances stated, cannot establish the right. The express agreements concerning the elevator con. tained in the leases tend to negative the right to such a use of it, and the bistory of the opening into the en. gine room and the use of a way across it to the ele. vator repel any implication of the right to use the ele. vator for all purposes for which fit might be convenient to use it in connection with the basement room. In the opinion of a majority of the court, upon all the evidence recited in the exceptions, which purports to be all the evidence material to this issue, the presiding justice should have ruled, as requested by the defendant, that the plaintiffs showed no right to use the elevator after its tenancy of rooms 29 and 30 had been terminated, and no right to use it at any time for the purpose of hoisting goods to the side. walk from the basement room, or of lowering them from the sidewalk to the basement room.

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