NINTH EDITION. Hints on Advocacy. INTENDED FOR PRACTICE IN ANY OF THE COURTS, CIVIL AND CRIMIÑAL, WITH SUGGESTIONS AS TO OPENING A CASE, By RICHARD HARRIS, Barrister at Law, London, England. The present edition of this remarkable book, the work of a distinguished English Barrister, will be found very valuable, even to those who Jave one of the former eight editions, as there is much in this edition which was not in former ones. The whole work is unique; there is noth ing like it in print. There is no school of advocacy, there are no lectures on advocacy, and there is no other work on advocacy. It seems lamentable that no instruction should ever be given in an art that requires an almost infinite amount of knowledge. Tact cannot be taught, but it will follow from experience, and a good deal of experience may be condensed into the form of rules. THE STANDARD AMERICAN WORK ON THE SUBJECT. "Extensively Cited by Counsel and Judges in every State." An invaluable work for every lawyer in actual practice. THIRD EDITION, REVISED AND ENLARGED OF WAIT ON FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES By FREDERICK S. WAIT, Esq., of the New York Bar. Author of "A Treatise on Insolvent Corporations," and one of the Authors of "Trial of Title to Land." This work treats fully of the REMEDIES of CREDITORS INSTITUTED to ANNUL FRAUDU. LENT CONVEYANCES and RECOVER EQUITABLE ASSETS. The modern procedure regulating CREDITORS' BILLS, under both Code and Chancery Practicethe Interests in Property Available to Creditors—the forms of procedure both at law and in equity-The Creditor's status-questions of Parties, Complainant and Defendant—the form and effect of the Judgmentand Rules concerning Provisional Relief, Reimbursement, and Subrogation, have been considered. Important Chapters have been devoted to the discussion of the subjects of Intention, Consideration and Indicia of Fraud; to the important questions relating to Change of Possession, and generally to Evidence and Defences as appertaining to these suits. The rules applicable to Frauds upon Creditors springing out of the relationship of Husband and Wife, and relative to Covinous General Assignments and Fraudulent Chattel Mortgages, have been examined, and the Doctrine of Spendthrift Trusts discussed. Special pains have been taken in the treatment of the Law of Notice, Actual and Constructive, relating to Fraudulent Conveyances. The multitude of recent cases involving fraudulent alienations and covinous schemes devised to defeat the claims of creditors, demonstrates how important and far reaching the subject of this book has become. Sometimes a creditor's entire fortune is dependent upon a correct exposition of the statute of Elizabeth. In this NEW, THIRD, EDITION numerous additions have been embodied in the original text, many new sections have been written, and the citations increased several thousand cases over the number contained in the previous edition. Over one hundred and eighty pages of entirely new matter will be found embodied in this edition. Special efforts have been put forth to utilize the latest important authorities bearing upon the topics discussed. WAIT ON FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES is the Leading American Work on the Subject. It is not only the latest, but is in every respect the most complete, able and satisfactory work published on this important topic. IN ONE LARGE OCTAVO VOLUME OF 900 PAGES. In best law book style. Pride $6.00 net, or $6.30 delivered upon receipt of the price. BAKER, VOORHIS & CO., Law Publishers, 66 NASSAU STREET, NEW YORK. Central Law Journal. ST. LOUIS, MO., OCTOBER 8, 1897. Reversals of cases by appellate courts, on the ground of too restricted cross examination of a witness by the trial court, are not frequent, as the limits of the right of cross-examination are, as a rule, within the discretion of the trial judge. But such a case is Taggart v. Bosch, 48 Pac. Rep. 1092, recently decided by the Supreme Court of California. The contest there was over a forged note, and the evidence as to its genuineness or falsity was evenly balanced between the parties. No impeachment of the parties was attempted and the veracity of the parties had to be determined by the jury. Yet the burden of proof was upon the plaintiff, and, to enable him to recover, the evidence must preponderate in his favor. Under such circumstances the conduct or declaration of the plaintiff, as to all matters or circumstances which tended to weaken or destroy his direct testimony that the defendant did execute and deliver the note, was competent and proper subjects upon which to cross-examine him, and a full and unrestricted cross-examination, within the limits herein before stated, was, under the circumstances, of the utmost importance to the defendant. "It was held in Jackson v. Water Co., 14 Cal. 18," says the court, "that a cross-examination cannot go beyond the subject-matter of the evidence in chief, but should be allowed a very free range within it; that, where the defendant on crossexamination simply aims to disprove by the witness the very cause the witness himself has made, the rule excluding such evidence until defendant opens his case has no application. See, also, Harper v. Lamping, 33 Cal. 647, 648; People v. Lee Ah Chuck, 66 Cal. 667, 6 Pac. Rep. 859; Wixom v. Goodcell, 90 Cal. 623, 27 Pac. Rep. 419; McFadden v. Railway Co., 87 Cal. 464, 25 Pac. Rep. 681. A witness may be asked any question upon cross-examination which tends to test his accuracy, veracity, or credibility, and the court should be especially liberal where the witness is a party to the suit. Neal v. Neal, 58 Cal. 287; Greenl. Ev. sec. 446. That the court erred in the above rulings is apparent; and it is equally well settled 'that every error is prima facie an injury to the party against whom it is made, and it rests with the other party clearly to show, not that probably no hurt was done, but that none could have been or was done, by the error.' Jackson v. Water Co., 14 Cal. 25; Carpentier v. Williamson, 25 Cal. 167; Cal. 167, 172; Rice v. Cleary v. Railroad Co., Rep. 269." People v. Ybarra, 17 Heath, 39 Cal. 609; 76 Cal. 240, 18 Pac. Upon the subject of this case the New York Law Journal makes these pertinent remarks: "The general consideration is suggested by this case that every error is prima facie an injury to the party against whom it is made, and that the burden is on the other party to show that no actual harm could have occurred. This principle does not prevent the affirmance of any judgment as to which a technical error against the defeated party appears in the record. Every lawyer of experience knows that a record in a case of considerable length, which discloses no ground of technical criticism, is a comparatively rare thing. Even in jury cases appellate courts frequently follow the dictates of justice and affirm judgments, in the obtaining of which slight and obviously immaterial errors occurred. At the same time this California case is a salutary illustration of the disposition of courts to reverse a judgment, where it is not apparent that substantial justice was done, although it would have been quite easy to dispose of the matter the other way by holding-as is undoubtedly the general rule-that the limits of cross-examination are within the discretion of the trial judge. The California case furnishes an example of the same judicial spirit which led an appellate court of one of the States, a few months ago, to set aside a criminal conviction and order a new trial, solely and expressly on the ground that the defendant had been represented by incompetent counsel, and that therefore his substantial rights had not been adequately guarded on his trial." The case of Lamond v. Richard, 1 Q. B. 541, recently decided by the Court of Appeals of England, involves a novel question as to the liability of hotel to guests, which is worthy of notice. The facts were as follows: Plaintiff came in November, 1895, to the Hotel Metropole, at Brighton, of which the defendant was the manager, and stayed there until August, 1896, paying her board regularly. Her condition and conduct were not such as to justify the defendant in refusing her accommodations. On August 25, 1896, by order of the directors of the corporation which owned the inn, the undermanager had an interview with her, in which he asked her when she was going to leave the hotel; and on her replying that she should stay there as long as she liked, he gave her verbal notice that her room must be at the manager's disposal by noon on the 27th. She did not leave on that day; and on the 31st she was told that she must leave, and that if she declined to do so, her luggage would be packed up by the hotel servants. In the afternoon she went out for a walk, and on her return was refused admission. Her things had been packed by servants and brought down into the hall, whence they were subsequently removed by the plaintiff. There were vacant rooms in the hotel at the time, and the plaintiff's room was not required for the accommodation of other guests. On these facts the court held, that the common law liability of an innkeeper to receive and lodge a guest attaches only so long as the guest is a traveler, and a person who has been received at an inn as a traveler, does not necessarily continue to reside there in that character; that it is a question of fact whether the guest is still a traveler at any given time during his residence at the inn, and one of the ingredients for determining this fact is the length of time that has elapsed since his arrival; and that if the guest has lost the character of traveler, the innkeeper is not bound to supply him with lodging; but is entitled on giving reasonable notice to require him to leave, and affirmed the judgment of the county court for the defendant, on the ground that the hotel was a "common inn." NOTES OF RECENT DECISIONS. POWER OF CONGRESS--POSTAL REGULATIONS -FRAUD ORDERS' -RIGHT OF CITIZEN TO USE MAILS.-The United States Circuit Court for the District of Kentucky holds, in Hoover v. McChesney, 81 Fed. Rep. 472, that the Act of Congress March 2d, 1895, extending the powers of the postmaster general, conferred by Rev. St. § 3929, as amended by Act Sept. 19, 1890 (26 Stat. ch. 908), § 2, by authorizing him, on a determination upon evidence satisfactory to him that a person or company is using the mails for the purpose of conducting a lottery or other fraudulent scheme, to order a postmaster to return all mail received at his office directed to such person or company, or his or its agents or representatives, is within the power of con gress to prescribe what matter shall be excluded from the mails, so far as applied to a corporation whose business has been so de termined to be in violation of the postal laws, or to its officers, such order being but a mode of excluding matter which may be presumed to be non-mailable. A citizen of the United States, they say, has a property right in the use of the mails for lawful purposes, of which he cannot be deprived without due process of law; hence congress has no power to confer authority on the head of the postal depart ment, upon a determination on evidence satisfactory to him that a citizen is using the mails for the purpose of conducting a lottery or other fraudulent scheme, to issue an order instructing a postmaster to return or send to the dead-letter office all mail matter coming to his office directed to such person, without regard to whether such matter is or is not non-mailable. It is also held that the refusal by a postmaster to deliver mail matter addressed to a private person, who is a citizen of the United States, and the return of such mail to the senders, or to the dead-letter office, without regard to whether it is nonmailable, though done in pursuance of an exécutive order of the postmaster general, on a determination by him that the person to whom such mail is addressed is using the mails for unlawful purposes, is a violation of the fourth amendment to the constitution, securing the people against unreasonable seizures of their papers and effects, and that the circuit court has jurisdiction to grant an injunction re straining a postmaster from withholding mail matter from a citizen to whom it is directed, under an order of the postmaster general which was beyond the scope of his constitutional authority. STRIKES AND STRIKERS-DAMAGES FOR INDUCING EMPLOYEES TO STRIKE.-In connection with the recent strikes the case of O'Neill v. Behama, 37 Atl. Rep. 843, lately decided by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, is of special value. It was held that where persons are going to a place of employment, either under contract to work or in search of work, others have no right to stop them and occupy their time without their consent, or that of their employer if they are actually employed, in order to urge or prevail upon them, even by peaceable means, not to go to work; and that persons so doing may be liable to the employer in damages. The bill was originally filed for an injunction and damages, and the point of special interest is suggested by the following language with which the opinion of the court concludes: "Not the least notable feature is the expression of surprise by the counsel, and even by the court, that the case was pushed after the strike was over. It appears to be a fact that the strike was less violent and disorderly than others which had preceded it, and a sentiment seems to have pervaded the community-even the court not being entirely exempt that, the strike being over, the subject had better be dropped. This is not law nor justice. A plaintiff who might have been hurt worse than he was may be inclined not to push his claim for compensation for the injury actually received; but it is for him, and not for others, and especially not for courts, to make the choice, and there should be no judicial surprise if he insists on his rights, though other men may think discretion the better part of valor." The right to injunctive relief against boycotts and some of the incidental oppressive measures resorted to both by boycotters and strikers is now quite well settled. The case of Vegelahn v. Guntner, in the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, 44 N. E. Rep. 1077, will be remembered, in which it was held that the maintenance of a patrol in front of a plaintiff's premises, in furtherance of a conspiracy to prevent, either by threats and intimidation or by persuasion and social pressure, any workmen from entering into, or continuing in his employment, will be enjoired. This recent Pennsylvania case goes further and expressly upholds the power to recover damages sustained by reason of the illegal acts. peals of Kentucky has recently decided in the case of Waller's Adm. v. Marks, that an agreement by the legatees under a will to pay to one of several persons proposing to contest the will a certain sum of money in consideration of his agreement to withdraw his opposition to the probate of the will, and to assist in its probate, is enforcible, not being against public policy or in violation of the laws against champerty and maintenance. The court said in part: It seems to us to be well settled that a compromise or surrender of an apparently equitable claim is a sufficient consideration to support a promise to pay. In the case at bar the pleadings of appellant show a clear case of an equitable claim if not a legal claim. The appellee's interest, it seems, was to some extent antagonistic to that of the intestate, and also opposed to the supposed interest or claims of some others. Now, to avoid litigation or to lessen or narrow the same, the contract in question is entered into by which, if appellees succeed in obtaining the amounts which they were contending for, they would pay to the intestate the sum he was claiming; otherwise he would and did surrender his claim, and also agreed to assist appellees in the common object, viz., to secure that which they all believed was justly due them. Moreover, the presumption of law was that the will then in contest was the true will of the testatrix, and that presumption is fortified by the fact that two courts sustained the will. Suppose that A and B were both claiming an interest in a tract of land, and had reasonable grounds to so claim, and that C and others were claiming the same land, no one being in possession, would not A have a right to contract with B to relinquish his claim and aid B in his contest with C and others upon the condition that if B succeed that B would convey fifty acres of the land to him (A)? It seems clear to us that the contract in question is not in violation of public policy, and does not tend to obstruct justice or hinder the proper enforcement of the law. The second contention of appellees is that the contract is in violation of the laws against champerty and maintenance. In support of that contention some decisions of this court are cited. Lucas v. Allen, 80 Ky. 681, is not applicable to this case. Lucas was an officer of the city of Louisville, and agreed to furnish information, etc., by which the payees could recover taxes illegally collected by the city, for which he was to have a certain portion of the money so recovered. It was properly held that he could not enforce such a contract. In Young v. Evans, 8 Ky. Law Rep. 353, a superior court decision, it appeared that a party had contracted with the administratrix to cancel a debt he had on her if she would not file exemp tions to a claim he had filed against her as administratrix of her daughter. It was properly held in that case that the contract could not be enforced. The reason is obvious. It was an attempt by the creditors to hire the administratrix to omit a judicial duty. Brown v. Beachamp, 5 Monroe, 413, is also cited by appellee. It will be seen from the opinion cited that Richardson had no interest in the suit, but agreed with one of the parties to aid them in the litigation and if successful, was to have part of the land in contest. The court held that such a contract was illegal and could not be enforced. The court said that "maintenance signifies an unlawful taking in hand and |