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peared that the telephone company was going out of business in that city as the furnisher of such exchange facilities, and was only keeping them up until its existing contracts with particular customers should expire, and intended thereafter to do only such business as could be done by means of public telephone stations.24

§ 8. To Admit a Qualified Person to Membership in an Incorporated Medical Society. The writ of mandamus has also been held a proper remedy by one of the most authoritative courts in the country, to compel an incorporated medical society to admit to its membership one qualified under its by-laws to become a member thereof. 25 It does not appear from the report of this case that the society was anything more than an incorporated private society; but from an earlier case it appears that there was a public statute which entitled the relator to be admitted to its membership.26

$ 9. To Compel Corporations to Perform Public Duties to Individuals Without Discrimination.—A charter power to perform, for private gain, duties affected with a pub

24 Central Union Teleph. Co. v. State, 118 Ind. 194, 206, 207. The doctrine of this case was reaffirmed in Central Union Teleph. Co. v. State, 123 Ind. 113. The doctrine that a writ of mandamus is the proper remedy to compel telephone companies to furnish equal facilities to all persons and corporations under like conditions has been asserted in many other cases both under statutes and at common law. Central Union Teleph. Co. v. Bradbury, 106 Ind. 1; Bell Teleph. Co., v. Com. (Pa.), 3 Atl. Rep. 825; State v. Delaware, etc. Tel. Co., 47 Fed. Rep. 633; State v. Bell Teleph. Co. St. Louis Cir. Ct., Judge Thayer, 22 Alb. L. J. 663, 44 Am. Rep. 241, note, 10 Cent. L. J. 437; Chesapeake, etc. Teleph. Co. v. Baltimore, etc. Tel. Co., 66 Md. 399. State v. Bell Teleph. Co., 23 Fed. Rep. 539. See also Hockett v. State, 105 Ind. 250; and compare American Rapid Tel. Co. v. Connecticut Teleph. Co., 49 Conn. 352, 44 Am. Rep. 237; Commercial Tel. Co. v. New England Teleph. Co., 61 Vt. 241, 5 L. R. A. 161. So, under a statute which required telegraph companies to transmit dispatches with impartiality and in good faith, in connection with another statute extending the provisions of a former statute to telephone companies. State v. Telephone Co., 36 Ohio St. 296, 309.

25 People v. Medical Society, 32 N. Y. 187; affirming 25 How. Prac. (N. Y.) 333. But it was held that such relief would not be granted where the status of the relator was such that if admitted to membership he would have been liable to immediate expulsion from the society. Ex parte Paine, 1 Hill (N. Y.), 665.

26 Ex parte Paine, supra. Mandamus is also the ancient remedy to restore an officer of a corporation unlawfully removed. 1 Thomp. Corp. § 829, et seq. Or to restore a member of an incorporated society unlawfully expelled. 1 Thomp. Corp. § 905, et. seq.; People v. Medical Society, 24 Barb. (N. Y.) 570.

lic interest, compels the performance of those duties without partiality or discrimination, and all engagements not to do so are void. This proposition has been judicially enforced. with and without the aid of statutes, in many situations. Thus, an agreement by a rail

way company to carry goods for certain persons at a cheaper rate than they are carrying under the same conditions for other persons. is void as creating an illegal preference. The State cannot be supposed to have granted such a franchise to enable the grantee to destroy one person and build up another. So. in England a contract which admitted to the door of a railway station, within the com pany's yard, a certain omnibus and excluded others, was held to be a breach of a statutory prohibition against the granting of undue and unreasonable preferences, and was bence void. So, a power given to a railway com pany by its charter to regulate the transportation of goods over its road, did not give i the right to grant exclusive privileges to particular express company. The court said: "If the company possessed this power, it might build up one set of men and destro others; advance one kind of business and break down another; and make even religion and politics the tests in the distribution of its favors. The rights of the people are not subject to any such corporate con trol." 30 So it has been reasoned that ral road companies are common carriers, and a such, owe duties to the public from which they cannot release themselves except with call the consent of every person who may upon them to perform such duties. Among these duties is the obligation to receive and carry goods for all persons alike, without jurious discrimination as to terms, and to deliver them in safety to the consignee, unles prevented by the act of Gcd or the publ enemy. Hence where a railway company set up, as a defense to a proceeding by damus to compel it to deliver to the elevator or grain warehouse of the relator, whatever grain in bulk might be consigned to su elevator, that said company had entere! 27 Messenger v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 36 N. J. L

407.

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28 See also State v. Republican Valley R. Co., Neb. 647, 659, where the same doctrine is strongly forced.

29 Marriott v. London, etc. R. Co., 1 Com. Be N. S., 499, 87 Eng. Com. Law, 498.

30 Sanford v. Railroad Co., 24 Pa. St. 378, 383.

into contracts with the owners of certain other elevators at the same point for the exclusive delivery to the latter, to the extent of their capacity, of all such grain in bulk as the company should receive at that point, it was held that said contracts could have no effect when set up as against a person not a party to them, as an excuse for not perform ing toward such person, those duties of a common carrier which are prescribed by law.31 So, a railroad company was held bound to deliver grain at the warehouse of the plaintiff, the same being on its line, and at a rate not higher than that charged to others for the like service.32 So, it has been held that, although a railroad company chartered as a carrier of passengers and freight, is under no obligation to establish commutation rates for a particular locality,-yet, if it has established such rates, and if commutation tickets are sold by it at such rates to the public generally, the refusal of such a ticket to a particular individual, under the same circumstances and upon the same conditions as such tickets are sold to the rest of the public, is an unjust discrimination against him, and in violation of the principles of equality which the common carrier is bound to observe in the conduct of its business; and that for such an illegal refusal, the remedy is by mandamus. 33 So, a mandamus has been awarded at the relation of a private person, to compel a railroad company to establish a depot and to maintain a regular service in connection with the same at a particular place on its line, on proof that a depot at said place was necessary for the public accommodation, and particularly for the accommodation of the relator, and for the proper discharge by the railroad company of its duties towards the public as a common carrier, possessing important franchises received from the State, although there was no statute requiring it to establish a depot at that place. So, where a municipal corporation

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31 Chicago etc. R. Co. v. People, 56 Ill. 365.

22 Vincent v. Chicago etc. R. Co., 49 Ill. 33; Compare People v. Chicago etc. R. Co., 55 Ill. 95, where it was held, by a divided court, that a railroad company could not be compelled to receive grain to deliver at an elevator on a side or spur track beyond its terminus.

33 State v. Deleware etc. R. Co., 48 N. J. L. 55. 34 State v. Republican Valley R. Co., 17 Neb. 647. So held in People v. Chicago etc. R. Co., 130 Ill. 175.

has, by ordinance, granted a license or franchise to a street railroad company to construct and operate a street railroad on a certain route within the city, the railroad corporation can be compelled by mandamus, at the suit of the city, to operate it, after having constructed it, and this although neither the charter of the railroad corporation nor the city ordinance in terms requires it so to operate it. The making on the one part and the accepting on the other of the grant of the license or franchise implies an obligation on the part of the grantee to operate the road which it is so licensed to build and operate, which obligation is enforcible by mandamus.35

St. Louis, Mo.

SEYMOUR D. THOMPSON.

See also Railroad Commissioners v. Portland etc. R. Co., 63 Me. 269, where similar relief was granted under similar circumstances in a proceeding instituted by the railroad commissioners, under a statute, at the request of interested individuals. Contra, People v. New York etc. R. Co., 104 N. Y. 58.

35 Potwin Place v. Topeka R. Co., 51 Kan. 609, 37 Am. St. Rep. 312.

BILLS AND NOTES-CORPORATION-SIGNING
BY OFFICERS-PERSONAL LIABILITY.
ALBANY FURNITURE COMPANY v. MER-
CHANTS' NATIONAL BANK.

Appellate Court of Indiana, May 19, 1897.

1. Where a complaint alleges that the defendant company, and S and Z, by their joint note, promised to pay, and make the note part of the complaint, reciting "we promise to pay," and signed "Albany Furniture Co., Stafford, Pres., and Zapf, Man.," a good cause of action is stated against the president and manager as individuals.

2. The court cites many cases where the officers, and not the corporation, were held responsible, by reason of the peculiar signature.

ROBINSON, J.: Appellee sued appellants upon the following instrument: "Chicago, Ill., Aug. 15. 1894. One hundred and eighty days after date, for value received, we promise to pay, at the office of Frank T. Gilpin, Muncie, Indiana, to the order of E. A. Shanklin & Co., the sum of one hundred and fifty and no-100 dollars, with interest at the rate of per cent. per annum, payable annually, and attorney's fees. The makers and indorsers of this note hereby severally waive presentment for payment, protest, and non-payment, and also waive relief from all valuation and appraisement laws. (Signed) Albany Furniture Co. Jas. E. Stafford, Pres., J. Zapf, Man." The note was indorsed, "E. A. Shanklin & Co., per Frank T. Gilpin." The

complaint alleges: "The plaintiff complains of the defendants and alleges that on the 15th day of August, 1894, the defendants, the Albany Furniture Company, James E. Stafford, and Jacob Zapf, by their joint promissory note, a copy of which is filed herewith, marked 'Exhibit A,' and made a part of this complaint, promised to pay to the order of," etc., etc. The summons issued directed the sheriff to summon "The Albany Furniture Company, James E. Stafford, Jacob Zapf, E. A. Shanklin & Co., and Frank T. Gilpin." The summons was served on Stafford and Gilpin by reading, on the furniture company "by reading the same to and in the hearing of James E. Stafford, president of said company, and by giving him a true copy of this writ," and on Jacob Zapf by leaving a copy at his residence. None of the defendants appeared, and judgment was rendered in appellee's favor on default. Without objection to the proceedings in the trial court, appellants question the sufficiency of the complaint. The error assigned is that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and it cannot be available for the reversal of a judgment upon default, unless some fact essential to the existence of the cause of action has been wholly omitted from the complaint. Laverty v. State, 109 Ind. 217, 9 N. E. Rep. 774; Assurance Co. v. Koontz (Ind. App.), 46 N. E. Rep. 95.

The judgment having been taken by default, we cannot assume that anything was proved beyond what is alleged in the complaint; so that the sufficiency of the complaint comes before us exactly as if there had been an unsuccessful demurrer in the court below. Old v. Mohler, 122 Ind. 594, 23 N. E. Rep. 967; Albany Furniture Co. v. Merchants' Nat. Bank (Ind. App.), 46 N. E. Rep. 479. The failure of the appellants to demur or answer the complaint was a confession that the complaint was true as to the facts stated. Fisk v. Baker, 47 Ind. 534. It is alleged in the complaint that the note sued on is the joint promissory note of the furniture company, Stafford and Zapf, and we must assume that that fact was proven. The case of Albany Furniture Co. v. Merchants' Nat. Bank (Ind. App.), 46 N. E. Rep. 479, cited by counsel for appellee, is not controlling in this case, for the reason that the complaint in that case was essentially different from the complaint in the case at bar. In Means v. Swormstedt, 32 Ind. 87, the note read: "We promise to pay," etc., and was signed, "Wm. B. Swormstedt, Secy." On the lower left-hand corner of the note was an impression of a seal, embossed upon the paper of the note, bearing the words, "Neal Manufacturing Co., Madison, Ind." In holding this to be the note of the corporation only, the court said: "The seal of the company is in the hands of the secretary. It is his duty to affix it to papers executed by the corporation. The presumption is, then, that he did, after signing his name and adding his office, affixed the seal of the corporation, which, containing upon its face the

proper designation of the corporation, was a signing of their name." In the case of Pearse v. Welborn, 42 Ind. 331, “the makers of the note no: only added to their names letters which indicated the offices they held, and the characters in whic they acted, but in the body of the note the prom ise is made by them as master wardens and trustees of said lodge." In Armstrong v. Kirk patrick, 79 Ind. 527, the note on its face says tha it is the note of the Howard County Agricultur Association, and that it executes the note by the directors of the association. In that case the no was held to be the note of the association. In th case of Mears v. Graham, 8 Blackf. 144, the note was: 331.15. Ten days after date, we t trustees of the Methodist E. Church in Rockpo promise to pay to the order of I. and J. Mea three hundred and thirty-three dollars and t teen cents, for value received. Rockport, In July 25, 1842. John W. Graham, Wm. Druc John E. Cotton, Alexander Britton, Oliver Mor gan, Trustees of the M. E. Church." This held to be the note of the individuals signing although the face of the note would seem to in cate that the intention was to bind the chu only. See School Tp. v. Farlow, 75 Ind. Hobbs v. Cowden, 20 Ind. 310; Inhabitants Congressional Tp. No. 11 v. Weir, 9 Ind. Prather v. Ross, 17 Ind. 495. It has been held a number of cases in this State that when & is signed by one or more individual makers, the signatures followed by the words "truste of," etc., "president," or "secretary," such word are generally considered as descriptive of t person of the maker, and the note is the oblig tion of the person or persons so signing it. M Clellan v. Robe, 93 Ind. 298; Williams v. B 83 Ind. 237; Hayes v. Brubaker, 65 Ind. 27; Hap v. Matthews, 63 Ind. 412; Hays v. Crutcher, Ind. 260. In Heffner v. Brownell, 75 Iowa. 34. 39 N, W. Rep. 640, suit was brought on a note substance as follows: We promise pay Daniel Heffner, or bearer, two hundred d lars. * Indianapolis Mfg. Co. B. I. Brow nell, Pres.; D. B. Sanford, Secy." The co held this to be the joint note of the corpora and of the other persons signing it, and that the was no ambiguity appearing upon the face of th note, and that extrinsic evidence was not adn sible to show the intention of the parties. Matthews v. Mattress Co. (Iowa), 54 N. W. Re 225; Lee v. Percival (Iowa), 52 N. W. Rep. 4 Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co. V. Bo (Minn.), 47 N. W. Rep. 261. In the case of Sma v. Cohen, 11 Ind. App. 20, 38 N. E. Rep. 536, L note read:

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We promise to pay to the orde National Forge & Iron Co. M. Swarts, President." "We are of the opin said the court, "that the note in suit is amb uous. It was upon that theory that the case p”-ceeded, was tried, and determined in the c below. The appellee declared in his compl that the appellant executed the note. If Jo.

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It is readily conceivable that the note in suit might have been executed by both the corporation and by Swarts, and be their joint obligation. In such a case, affixing the word 'president' to his name does not make it the note of the corporation only, but, under proper averments, it may be shown to be the obligation of the individual as well, and this may be made to appear by extrinsic evidence." Although the fact is not disclosed by the pleading, it is admitted in the briefs of counsel for appellants and appellee that the Albany Furniture Company is a corporation. It is true, the name of the corporation was signed to the note by some officer or agent of the corporation. But the corporate name could not have been signed by both Stafford and Zapf. It might have been signed by neither, and still be binding on the corporation. The presumption that would arise, where the corporate name is followed by an officer's name, that he signed the corporate name, does not arise where the corporate name is followed by the names of two persons. In the very nature of things, the name was signed by one person, and we cannot presume that it was one to the exclusion of the other; nor can we, from the face of the instrument, presume that the name was signed by either. The appellants Stafford and Zapf were notified to appear and answer as individuals, and not as officers of the corporation. The cause of action stated was against them as individuals. Construing the complaint and the exhibit together, we see no ambiguity. It is alleged to be the joint note of the parties signing it, and the exhibit is not inconsistent with that allegation. Had there been an appearance and answer, the question of the admissibility of parol evidence might have been presented, but as the record comes to us it is not necessary to decide anything upon that question. As the cause was dismissed as to the defendants E. A. Shanklin & Co., it necessarily follows that the judgment against F. T. Gilpin was erroneous. Judgment reversed as to the appellant Gilpin, and affirmed as to the appellants Stafford and Zapf.

NOTE. In 36 Cent. L. J. 261, will be found a collection of cases up to that date, on the subject of the principal case, appended to the case of Matthews v. Dubuque Mattress Co., wherein the Supreme Court of Iowa held that where a note reads "we promise to pay," etc., and is signed "D. M. Co. J. K. President," the note binds the president personally; parol evidence being inadmissible to show that the company was the only promisor, and that the payee knew this fact when taking it. Shortly afterwards appeared the case of Keidan v. Winegar (Mich.), 54 N. W. Rep. 901, 37 Cent. L. J. 2, wherein the strict doctrine of the Iowa court was repudiated, and the Michigan court held that where the maker of a note affixes to his signature the word "agent," parol evidence is admissible as between the immediate parties to the instru

ment to prove that the maker executed the note in a representative capacity, and that it was so understood by the payee. The following are the more recent cases on the subject: A note which recites that "we promise to pay," and is signed, "M. N., President World's Pastime Exposition Co. A. D. Treas.," is prima facie the individual note of M. N. and A. D. McNeill v. Shober & Carqueville Lithographing Co. (Ill. Sup.), 33 N. E. Rep. 31. Where defendants sign a note with their individual names, adding thereto "president" and "secretary," respectively, in which note they promise to pay plaintiff bank a certain amount, and there is nothing on the face of the note to indicate a principal back of them, they are personally bound, and cannot set up a defense that they executed the note as officers of a corporation, that the loan which the note was given to secure was made to such corporation, and that the intention of both parties was that it should bind the corporation, and not defendants. San Bernardino Nat. Bank v. Andreson (Cal.), 32 Pac. Rep. 168. The fact that a resolution of the corporation, with the corporate seal thereon, authorizing defendants to make the loan and execute the note in the name of, and as the note of, the corporation, was attached to the note, was without effect, as such attachment did not make there solution a part of the note. San Bernardino Nat. Bank v. Andreson (Cal.), 32 Pac. Rep. 168. A note reciting that "we, the T. P. Company, promise to pay," etc., and signed by each of defendants, as president and secretary, respectively, purports to be the personal obligation of defendants, and will be so held on demurrer to a petition alleging the execution of it by defendants, and seeking to charge them personally. Day v. Ramsdell (Iowa), 57 N. W. Rep. 630; Tama Water Power Co. v. Ramsdell (Iowa), 57 N. W. Rep. 631. A note in form as follows, "We promise to pay," etc., and signed "C., Treas." and "C., Prest.," and with the words "Ridgewood Ice Company" printed across the end, is the personal and individual obligation of the signers. Casco Nat. Bank v. Clark, 34 N. E. Rep. 908, 139 N. Y. 307. A note signed by individuals, and reading, "We, the trustees of the H cemetery, promise to pay," is the personal obligation of those who signed it, and not of the H, cemetery. Moffett v. Hampton (Ky.), 31 S. W. Rep. 881. Where a note, with the name of a corporation in the margin, signed by two persons designated as "president" and "treasurer," respectively, is discounted for the payee without inquiry as to whether it was the note of the corporation or of the individual makers, the holder may treat it as a personal obligation of the makers. First Nat. Bank v. Stuetzer (Sup.), 30 N. Y. S. 83, 80 Hun, 435. A note given for furniture, signed by the deacons of an unincorporated church, in their official capacity, binds them individually, and not the church. Burton v. Grand Rapids School Furniture Co. (Tex. Civ. App.), 31 S. W. Rep. 91. A note signed, "Nat. F. & I. Co., M. S. President," is ambiguous, and extrinsic evidence is admissible, under proper averments, to show that it is the note of M. S. Swarts v. Cohen (Ind. App.), 38 N. E. Rep. 536. In an action on a note purporting to have been executed by corporate officers, extrinsic evidence is admissible to show that they executed the same in their official capacity, as the note of the corporation. Kraninger v. People's Bldg. Soc. (Minn.), 61 N. W. Rep. 904. A note made by a corporation, payable to "P, president" (P being president of the corporation), must be regarded as payable to P, the word "president" being merely descriptive; and an indorsement by "P, president," is an indorsement by P, individually. Hately v. Pike

(Ill. Sup.), 44 N. E. Rep. 441, 162 Ill. 241. The following note is a corporate, and not an individual, obligation: "$493.92, Chicago, July 22, 1893. Sixty days after date for, we promise to pay, to the order of Richey, Miniter & McDonald Co., four hundred ninety-three 92-100 dollars, at our office, 711 Unity Bldg. Value received. Columbian Athletic Club, Dominick C. O. Maley, President C. A. Club, Chas. J. Meirs, Treas." Miers v. Coates, 57 Ill. App. 216. In the following promissory note: "Sixty days after date, I, or we, promise to pay to the order of Geo. P. Harris & Bro., one thousand dollars, with interest at seven per cent. per annum from date. C. & A. W. L. Co., per C. I. W. Sec. G. J. W., General Manager," "I or we" does not mean that "I" will pay if "we" do not; but "we" is used as the pronoun meaning the corporation, while "I" means Williams, and "or" is to be construed as "and." Harris v. Coleman-Ames White Lead Co., 58 Ill. App. 366. Unsubscribed stock of a bank was issued to T, its president, as trustee for the bank, and a note was given by the president, payable to the bank, signed "T., Trustee for Bank." The proceeds from any such stock, when sold, as well as all dividends thereon, were credited to the bank. Held that, on the insoly. ency of the bank, T was not personally liable on the note. Neptune v. Paxton (Ind. App.), 43 N. E. Rep. 276.

JETSAM AND FLOTSAM.

A NEW CAUSE OF ACTION FOR LOSS OF CONSORTIUM. Ever since the diligence of the clerk in chancery was quickened by the statute of Westminster 2, in consimili casu, it has been recognized that the new. ness of the facts presented in a case, provided the case proceeds upon a recognized principle, is no reason for denying a remedy. As was said by Justice Ashhurst in Pasley v. Freeman, 3 T. R. 51: "Where cases are new in their principle, then I admit that it is necessary to have recourse to legislative interposition in order to remedy the grievance; but where the case is only new in the instance, and the only question is upon the application of a principle recognized in the law, to such new case, it will be just as competent to courts of justice to apply the principle to any case which may arise two centuries hence as it was two centuries ago."

It is not often, at this day, however, that courts are called upon to decide cases of first impression depending upon elementary principles regulating the relation between individuals. Recently the Supreme Court of North Carolina had substantially such a case before it in Holleman v. Harward, 119 N. Car. 150. It is there held that a druggist who, regardless of the husband's warnings and protests, persists in selling intoxicating drugs, in this instance laulanum, to a married woman, knowing that she uses them as a beverage, is liable to the husband for the loss of the wife's services and companionship resulting from her indulgence in the drug; the court declaring that "whoever willfully joins with a married woman in doing an act which deprives her husband of her services and of her companionship, is liable to the busband in damages."

The court points out that their researches have only brought to light one case of a like character, that of Hoard v. Peck, 56 Barb. (N. Y.) 202, where, upon somewhat similar facts, a like conclusion was reached.

These cases are interesting because decided on com mon-law principles without reference to the so-called Civil Damage Acts existing in many of our States.

The right of action in all cases of tort is to be tested by the concurrence of loss (damnum) and injury (injuria), and it is well established that damnum absque injuria gives no right of action.

In this case, there is no difficulty in finding an element of legal loss. From the earliest times it has been recognized that the husband has such a property in the companionship and services of the wife that he may maintain an action for an injury result ing in a loss to him of such companionship and serv ices. An action may be maintained, not only for the complete loss of the wife's consortium, as in the case of a seduction of the wife, but also in the case of temporary loss of the wife's services and society by reason of an injury inflicted upon her. Thus, in Guy v. Livesey, Cro. Jac. 501, a husband brought an action for assault and battery upon the wife, "per quod con sortium uxoris suæ for three days amisit," and it wa held that the action was well brought, "and a precedent was shown in 28 Eliz. Rot. in this court (King' Bench), where one Cholmley brought an action for the battery of his feme, per quod negotio sua infects remanserunt, and had judgment to recover."

In the North Carolina case, which was decided upon demurrer, the plaintiff alleged that, by the use of the drug furnished by the defendant, his wife had become unfitted and disqualified to attend to her household duties and the care and nurture and direc tion of her children, whereby he was deprived of the society of his wife and of her services in his home, and his children had suffered from neglect, etc. There can be no doubt that this is a loss, a damnum, within the meaning of the authorities.

The real difficulty in this case arises as to the exist ence of a legal injury. Undoubtedly, the sale of laud anum by the defendant was in itself a lawful act, and in making the sale he was but following the vocation upon which he was dependent for his means of liveli hood. The injury could only grow out of a duty net to furnish the wife with means which he knew s would use in such a way as to deprive the husband of his consortium.-Law Notes.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

The Law of Sales of Personal Property by Francis M. Burdick. Dwight Professor of Law in Columb University School of Law. Boston. Little, Brow & Company, 1897.

A Treatise on the Law of Indirect and Collateral Er dence. By John H. Gillett, Judge Thirty-First Judicial Circuit of Indiana. Indianapolis Kansas City. The Bowen-Merrill Company, 18%. American Electrical Cases (cited Am. Electl. Cas being a Collection of all the Important (excepti Patent cases) decided in the State and Federa Courts of the United States from 1873 on Subject Relating to the Telegraph, the Telephone, Elec tric Light and Power, Electric Railway, and other Practical Uses of Electricity with Annota tions. Edited by William W. Morrill, Author of "Competency and Privilege of Witnesses," "CHE Negligence," etc. Vol. VI. 1895 1897. Alban N. Y. Mathew Bender, Law Publisher, 511, 51%

Broadway, 1897.

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