rule thus expressed may be almost indefinitely cited. Thus, in Richards v. Collins, 45 N. J. Eq. 283, 17 Atl. Rep. 831, it is said: "In resolving the general question, what will best subserve the interest and happiness of the child? its own wish and choice may be consulted and given weight, if it be of an age and capacity to form a rational judgment. There is no fixed age which capacitates such choice. It depends upon the extent of the mental development. The wishes of children of sufficient capacity to form these are given especial consideration, when parents have for a long time voluntarily allowed their children to live in the family of others, and thus form home associations and ties of affection for those having their care and nurture, and when it would mar the happiness of the children to sever such ties. The relation of parent and child is regarded as not fully characterized by the relative duties of service and support. Nature's provision of mutual affection commonly exists as the incentive to parental and filial duty and the bond of family union. It is the instinct of childhood to attach itself and cling to those who perform towards it the parental office, and they become endeared to it by ministering to its dependence. A parent, by transplanting his offspring into another family, and surrendering all care of it for so long a time that its interests and affections all attach to the adopted home, may thereby seriously impair his right to have back its custody by judicial decree. In a controversy over its possession, its welfare will be the paramount consideration in controlling the discretion of the court. The strict right of the parent will be passed by, if a judgment in observance of such rights would substitute a worse for a better condition." In Re O'Neal, 3 Am. Law Rev. 578, Judge Hoar gave this opinion: "Suppose, by a pure misfortune, as insanity, or being cast away, a father has left his child destitute and dependent on charity, does this give the child the right to form new relations, such as to take from the father the right to the custody of the child? Upon the best reflection, I am satisfied that it does. When the father, by misfortune, is compelled to leave the child utterly helpless, the child ought to be considered as emancipated by the father. If the child has made new relations in life, so deep and strong as to change its whole nature and character, the father has no right to reclaim it. I am satisfied that this is a sound proposition. The child is not the father's property. It is a human being, and has rights of its own. The father has a right to the custody of his child, because from general experience, the natural and trained affections of the child to attach to the father, and those of the father to the child. If the father has left the child at an age too early for it to remember him, and it is placed in circumstances so that it must perish unless cared for, and other persons have expended money and become attached to the child, and the child has formed such associations as cannot be severed without injury to it, then the father has no right to sunder these ties. It is within the judicial duty of the court to determine that the assent of the father has been given to the arrangement, which cannot be terminated without injury to the child. This principle would apply under the same circumstances if the father became insane. A human being cannot be treated like a piece of property." "The father's right to the custody of his infant child is not absolute or unqualified. He may relinquish or forfeit it by contract, by his bad conduct, or by his misfortune in not being able to give it proper care and support. When a father has, through his fault or misfortune, lost or forfeited his right, and subsequently, by reformation or otherwise, reinstated himself in a position to properly care for and maintain his child, his right does not necessarily revive; but a court, upon habeas corpus, will exercise a sound discretion, in view of all the circumstances, with reference to the welfare of the child itself." State v. Bratton, 15 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) 359. On a hearing of a habeas corpus relative to the possession of a child, the question is one of discretion, and the further question whether the father is the proper person to have the care of it is legitimate. Johnson v. Terry, 34 Conn. 262; Wood v. Chapsky, 26 Kan. 650; Mercein v. People, 25 Wend. 64; Verser v. Ford, 37 Ark. 27; 9 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 243; Prime v. Foot, 63 N. H. 52; In re Goldsworthy, 2 Q. B. Div. 75. The court of probate in Thompson had jurisdiction to appoint a guardian to Clarence Ward. His actual stated residence was in that district. The statute (Gen. St. §§ 458, 459) uses the word "resides" in this sense, rather than in the sense of strict technical domicile. Denslow v. Gunn, 67 Conn. 361, 35 Atl. Rep. 264. In other sections of our statutes, generally the word "reside" is used in a sense which includes all who are the actual, stated dwellers, in any given place, even though they may have a technical domicile else. where. Yale v. School Dist., 59 Conn. 489, 22 Atl. Rep. 295; Connecticut Hospital for Insane v. Town of Bridgewater, 68 Conn. 36 Atl. Rep. 1017. There is no error. The other judges con cur. NOTE. In the choosing of a guardian the paramount question is, what are the child's best interests? This question should have more weight with a court than any other. It may mean the separation of par ent and child. If the parent cannot for various res sons care for the child in a proper manner the seps ration should be made. In determining what are the child's best interests, questions of social position, moral training, and educational advantages are to be considered. A father cannot emancipate or give his child away so that he will be free from providing for its wants. Bennet v. Byrne, 2 Barb. Ch. 216; Comp ton v. Compton, 2 Gill, 241. If by misfortune the child has made new relations in life so deep and strong as to change its whole nature and character, the father has no right to claim it. 3 Am. Law. Rev. 578. The father is prima facie entitled to the custody of his children, and where he is of good character and able and willing to maintain them, his right is para mount. But the father's right is not absolute or un qualified. 15 Am. Law Reg. 359. Where a person has left his domicile with no intention of returning and is killed before he establishes another, the legal character of the old domicile does not necessarily control in matters of policy, and determine the place where a guardian for the decedent's infant child should be appointed. 42 Mich. 528. Courts will recognize the father as the child's natural guardian, and commit to him the eustody of the child. But if it be shown that he is immoral, incompetent, intemperate or otherwise unfit, the court will exercise its discretion on habeas corpus in awarding the custody where it belongs. Taylor v. Jeter, 33 Ga. 105; People v. Mercein, 3 Hill (N. Y.), 399, 38 Am. Dec. 644; State v. Libbey, 44 N. H. 321, 82 Am. Dec. 223; Verser v. Ford, 37 Ark. 27; U. S. v. Green, 3 Mason (U. S.), 482; Bennet v. Bennet, 2 Beas. (N. J.) Eq. 114; Johnson v. Terry, 34 Conn. 259; Brinster v. Compton, 68 Ala. 299; State v. Richardson, 40 N. H. 272. Where a child has been committed to a public institution as prescribed by statute, the court will not on habeas corpus inquire into the proceedings resulting in such commitment. People v. N. Y. Juv. Asylum, 12 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 92. The father cannot divest himself of custody by an agreement with the mother (Johnson v. Terry, 34 Conn. 259; Hunt v. Hunt, 4 Greene [Iowa], 216; Cook v. Cook, 1 Barb. Ch. [N. Y.] 639; State v. Smith, 6 Greenl. [Me.] 462); nor can he, by any contract, deprive the mother of the custody of their child after the father's death. State v. Reuff, 29 W. Va. 751. A parent may relinquish or forfeit his right of custody to his child by desertion or abandonment, bad conduct, or being unable to afford it proper care and support. State v. Bratton, 15 Am. L. Reg. 359; Clark v. Bayer, 32 Ohio St. 299; Young v. State, 15 Ind. 480. Courts of law and courts of equity possess exactly the same power and discretion in respect to jurisdiction under the writ of habeas corpus. People v. Wilcox, 22 Barb. (N. Y.) 178; State v. Baird, 21 N. J. Eq. 384; People v. Mercein, 8 Paige (N. Y.), 46; People v. Porter, 1 Duer (N. Y.), 709. Chancery has a wide jurisdiction respecting the care and custody of infants which is not open to the courts of law. In England all guardians are appointed by a court of chancery, in the exercise of inferior or appellate powers. In the appointment of a guardian, two very important elements enter into the jurisdiction-possessing property and actual residence within judicial limits. In chancery practice property in the infant has usually been deemed essential. Glascott v. Warner, 20 Wis. 654; Herring v. Goodson, 43 Miss. 392. Where the ward is a non-resident the court in such cases, where property is situated, appoints some friend of minor, requiring property security. Clarke v. Cordes, 4 Allen, 466; Rice's Case, 42 Mich. 528; Neal v. Bartleson, 65 Tex. 478. Where courts of two or more counties have concurrent jurisdiction, the court where proceedings are first commenced retains jurisdiction. 67 Cal. 643. The infant's place of residence at the time when a guardian is to be appointed determines the jurisdiction of the court. Harding v. Weld, 128 Mass. 587; Brown v. Lynch, 2 Bradf. 214. The infant's place of residence at the time when a guardian is to be appointed determines the jurisdiction of the court. Harding v. Weld, 128 Mass. 587; Brown v. Lynch, 2 Bradf. 214. Statute jurisdiction is taken where minors are residents of the State at the time, even if the legal domicile be elsewhere. Ross v. Southwestern R. R., 53 Ga. 514; Schouler's Domestic Relations, par. 303, p. 482. The bringing of an infant into the State by stratagem for the purpose of securing jurisdiction in such is illegal. 82 N. Y. 20. In the appointment of .28, 111, 118, 141 ..60, 114, 134 .12, 45, 52, 72, 90, 93, 117, 149, 168, 179 ..73 ...29, 125 .......87, 119 NEW HAMPSHIRE. .6, 13, 34, 37, 80, 133, 135, 148, 163 UNITED STATES C. C. OF APP........... 1. ADMIRALTY .......32, 81, 101, 106, 169 .20,82, 99, 124, 138, 159, 177 .25, 36, 43, 54, 65, 92, 180 ........3, 150, 166 ..1, 103, 122, 148, 152, 182 .44 ...... .8, 31, 58, 86, 88, 164 ..11, 42, 95, 137, 139 .171 .98, 109, 123, 127 Liens.-A JURISDICTION-Statutory State statute giving a right of suit in rem against a vessel wrongfully or negligently causing the death of any person (Code Va. § 2902) creates a lien, and may be en. forced by a libel in rem in the federal courts, when the accident occurs in waters of the State navigable from the sea.-THE GLENDALE V. EVICH, U. S. C. C. of App., Fourth Circuit, 81 Fed. Rep. 633. 2. ADVERSE POSSESSION Notice of Claim.-Where by mistake the line fence between two lots is put about four feet over the line on one lot, and the lots are thereafter occupied up to said fence by the respective parties, the statute of limitations will not begin to run to bar a recovery of said strip until the occupant makes some claim of ownership thereto beyond the naked possession, and notice of said claim is brought to the knowledge of the owner of the legal title thereto. -RASDELL V. SHUMWAY, Kan., 49 Pac. Rep. 631. - 3. ADVERSE POSSESSION - Tacking.-In ejectment to recover certain land included in defendant's inclosure, it appeared that at the time defendant purchased her lot it was verbally agreed between her and her vendor that whatever right of possession vendor had in such strip should go with such lot, and that they had been successive occupants thereof continuously for more than seven years, though defendant alone had been in possession less than such period: Held, that such verbal contract established such a privity of possession between defendant and her vendor as to entitle her to tack her predecessor's possession to her own so as to make a continuous adverse possession.-RAMBERT V. EDMONDSON, Tenn., 41 S. W. Rep. 935. 4. ASSIGNMENTS FOR CREDITORS.-A deed of assign. ment cannot be declared void by reason of matters dehors the instrument in a proceeding to which neither the assignee nor the beneficiaries are parties.-STATE V. WITHROW, Mo., 41 8. W. Rep. 980. 5. ASSOCIATIONS-Fund Reserved for Expenses.-Defendant employed L as agent to promote the sale of certain State bonds, agreeing to pay him one-third of any commission he might obtain. L formed with plaintiffs and others, a syndicate to purchase the bonds at par flat; it being agreed that two-thirds of six months' interest accrued should be set aside for syndi. cate expenses. L concealed his agency, and repre. sented that he had no interest in the fund so reserved except as a member of the syndicate: Held that, the whole fund thus set aside belonging to the syndicate, on the failure of some of the members of the syndicate to claim an interest in such fund, defendant did not become entitled to what would have been theirs had they claimed it.-HAMBLETON V. RHIND, Md., 38 Atl. Rep. 40. 6. ASSUMPSIT Necessary Parties.-Judgment for plaintiff cannot be sustained in an action by an admin. istrator for the amount of intestate's life insurance in excess of what he owed defendant, it being agreed that it was assigned to defendant's wife; that, to the amount of the debt, it was collateral security therefor; and that the money was paid her by the insurance company, and no claim being made to the balance by defendant, but it being claimed by him that intestate gave the balance to defendant's wife, and that he was merely holding it for her; she being a necessary party for the determination of the question of her right to retain it.-UEBERROTH V. UNANGST, Penn., 37 Atl. Rep. 935. 7. ATTACHMENT-Change of Residence.-A residence once shown to have been established is presumed to continue until it is clearly shown to have been abandoned. The residence of a man having a family, which he maintains, is prima facie where that family dwells. A man's acts and conduct are more to be considered, in determining the question of a change of residence, than any mere declaration of intent; and when the question of residence or non-residence is doubtful the question should be so determined as will best secure the rights of creditors and others having dealings with such party.-HATCH V. SMITH, Kan., 49 Pac. Rep. 698. 8. ATTACHMENT Liability of Attaching Creditors.Attaching creditors are not liable for the acts of a sheriff unless by interference in some way they make themselves Itable. They are presumed to have intended that no action should be taken by the officer not authorized by the terms of the writ. And it is not error to grant a norsuit, as to creditors who have been joined in a suit with the sheriff, when the record furnishes no evidence tending to show that the officer was authorized or directed by his codefendants, or either of them, to levy upon the particular goods in question, or any goods except such as belonged to the debtor. The receiving of the proceeds of the sale in satisfaction of their claims implies no consent to any irregularities or proceedings of the officer, and they are not joint wrongdoers with the sheriff.-MUNNS V. LOVELAND, Utah, 49 Pac. Rep. 743. 9. ATTACHMENT OF MORTGAGED PROPERTY.-A mortgagee in possession is the owner of the personal prop. erty described in the mortgage, as against an officer who takes the property under an attachment as the property of the mortgagor.-WILLIAMS V. MILLER, Kan., 49 Pac. Rep. 703. 10. BANKS AND BANKING - Special Deposits-Insolv ency.-Money deposited in one bank to the account of another, with directions to the latter to pay the amount thereof by telegram to a third bank, is a specific deposit, which may be recovered in full, as against general creditors, where the bank to whose credit the money is deposited receives the same, but suspends before making payment as directed.MONTAGU V. PACIFIC BANK, U. S. C. C., N. D. (Cal.), 81 Fed. Rep. 602. 11. BILLS AND NOTES-Consideration.-Mutual promises are no consideration for a note, where, when the maker gives it, the payee agrees, in consideration of receiving the amount thereof, to pay the maker an nually for life a sum equal to 6 per cent. thereof, but no payments are made by either party.-IN RE SMITH'S ESTATE, Vt., 38 Atl. Rep. 66. 12. BILLS AND NOTES-Note of Married Woman.-A mortgage on the lands of the husband is held against husband and wife, and they unite in a note that pays off such incumbrance: Held, that such a contract was within the capacity a feme covert, as it was a benefit to her dower right, and that it was not affected by the fact that her husband acted as her agent, and that she signed the note, and gave it to him without further knowledge or inquiry.-CREVIER V. BEBERDICK, N. J., 37 Atl. Rep. 959. 13. BILLS AND NOTES-Variance by Parol.-Where a note given by husband to wife, and payable one day after date, did not bear interest on its face, parol evidence was admissible to show whether the parties intended it to bear interest during the wife's life.-BEAVER V. SLEAR, Penn., 37 Atl. Rep. 991. 14. BONDS-Refunding Bonds-Bona Fide Purchasers. -Refunding bonds issued in compliance with the stat ute authorizing them, and which recite a compliance with its provisions, are valid in the hands of bona fide purchasers, though the original bonds were vold and the funding transaction was a mere subterfuge to avoid that objection.-BROWN V. INGALLS TP., U. S. C. C., D. (Kan.), 81 Fed. Rep. 485. 15. BUILDING ASSOCIATIONS-Insolvency-Stockhold ers.-A by-law of a building and loan association provided that any member paying in full the face value of the shares at the time of subscription should be en titled to receive in cash, semi-annually, the full amount of all dividends declared thereon, and that such stock should be governed by the same rules, and be subject to the same liabilities, as other stock, except that no monthly installments were to be paid on account thereof: Held, that one who invested in such stock did not thereby become a creditor of the association, and entitled to a preference over holders of other stock.-HOHENSHELL V. HOME SAVINGS & LOAN ASSN., Mo., 41 S. W. Rep. 948. 16. CARRIERS - Passenger Carrying Passenger be yond Station.-In an action to recover for carrying plaintiff's wife a short distance beyond the regular st tion in the nighttime, plaintiff can recover only for the inconvenience his wife suffered beyond that which ste would have experienced in arriving at the station at that point.-HOUSTON, ETC. RY. Co. v. MCKENZIE, Tex, 41 S. W. Rep. 831. 17. CARRIERS-Passengers Disorderly Conduct.Where defendant railroad company permitted decent and disorderly conduct on the part of passen gers in a car in which plaintiff's wife was traveling. and failed to provide her with better accommodations, and she was thereby frightened, shocked, and made sick, defendant was liable in damages.-TEXAS & P RY. CO. V. HUGHES, Tex., 41 S. W. Rep. 821. 18. CARRIERS-Passengers-Negligence.--In a suit for personal injuries suffered while plaintiff was attemp ing to alight from defendant's train, an instructies that if the jury believe "the employees in charge of the train negligen ly and carelessly failed to stop si train a suffi ient ength of time to allow plaintif to leave the same in safety, and that by reason of said negligence, if any, the plaintiff was injured," they shall find for plaintiff, does not make the defendant com. pany an insurer of the safety of the passenger in attempting to alight.-MISSOURI, K. & T. RY. Co. OF TEXAS V. MCELREE, Tex., 41 8. W. Rep. 843. Negligence. 19. CARRIERS OF GOODS-Delivery Where a bill of lading unconditionally directs the carrier to deliver the goods to the consignee named, the carrier is not guilty of negligence by doing so, without requiring the production of the bill of lading, so as to render it liable to the consignor for the goods, because he attached to the bill of lading a sight draft on the consignee, and sent it to a bank for collection, in the absence of notice to the carrier of such draft.NEBRASKA MEAL MILLS V. ST. LOUIS S. W. RY. Co., Ark., 41 S. W. Rep. 810. 20. CARRIERS OF GOODS-Failure to Deliver FreightLiability of Warehousemen.-Where cotton was received by a railway company for transportation, and a portion thereof was not delivered at the place of destination, any error in allowing witnesses to testify, in an action for the value of the portion not delivered, as to the highest price of cotton between the date of the delivery the remainder thereof and the time of trial, was cured by charging that, if plaintiffs were entitled to recover, their damages would be the value of the cotton lost, at the time it should have been deliv. ered.-HIPP v. SOUTHERN RY. Co., S. Car., 27 S. E. Rep. 623. 21. CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS-Selling Tickets to Wrong Place.-Plaintiff, in an action against a carrier for selling a ticket to his wife to the wrong station, whereby she was compelled to wait among strangers for a week for money from him with which to continue her journey, cannot recover for mental suffering, where she was not mistreated in any way, received no personal injury, was not made sick, nor her health in any manner impaired, and there was no direct proof of such suffering.-TEXAS & P. RY. Co. V. ARMSTRONG, Tex., 41 8. W. Rep. 833. 22. CERTIORARI Remedy by Appeal. When the court the proceedings of which are sought to be reviewed has jurisdiction of the controversy, and there is a remedy by appeal from its judgment, there is no basis for the writs of certiorari or prohibition.-STATE V. WILDER, La., 22 South. Rep. 661. 23. CHATTEL MORTGAGE-Discharge of Lien.-When a creditor seeks to subject the property of his debtor to the payment of his claim, upon which property there exists a chattel mortgage, and the creditor to avail himself of the remedy provided by section 3389, Rev. St., pays to the mortgagee the amount of such mortgage, such payment by the creditor discharges the mortgage and the lien thereunder, and the creditor cannot thereafter enforce the mortgage lien.-BAUM. GARTNER V. VOLLMER, Idaho, 49 Pac. Rep. 729. 24. CHATTEL MORTGAGE-Law of Place-Comity.-A chattel mortgage made in Missouri by a person domi. ciled there to a citizen of this State, upou property situated in this State, is governed by the law of Kansas, and not by the law of Missouri, as the place of the contract.-MACKEY V. PETTYJOHN, Kan., 49 Pac. Rep. 636. 25. CONSTITUTION-Proposed Amendment.-A propo sition for an amendment to the constitution, entered in full upon the journal of the senate, and by title only upon the journal of the house, is entered upon the journals of the two houses, within the meaning of Const., art. 23, § 1, providing that a "proposed amendment or amendments shall be entered on their journals."-STATE V. HERRIED, S. Dak., 72 N. W. Rep. 93. 26. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Distribution of Powers of Government.-Under Const. 1818, art. 2, § 1, providing that the powers of government shall be divided into three distinct departments, and each of them confided to separate magistracies, the general assembly has no judicial power, and it cannot confer such power on a court, or on a judge thereof.-APPEAL OF NORWALK ST. RY. CO., Conn., 37 Atl. Rep. 1080. 27. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Fires Set by Locomotives. -Section 2 of chapter 165 of the Laws of 1885, which authorizes the allowance of an attorney's fee in actions against railroad companies to recover damages caused by fire in the operation of the railroads, does not violate the first and eighteenth sections of the bill of rights of the constitution of this State, or section 1 of article 14 of the constitution of the United States, but is a valid law. -ATCHISON, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. MATHEws, Kan., 49 Pac. Rep. 602. 29. CONTRACT-Building Contract-Substantial Performance.-The general rule is that one who seeks to recover on a contract must show substantial performance on his part, and this rule applies to a "building contract" as to any other. But slight omissions and inadvertences should be disregarded. Where there has been an honest effort by the contractor to perform, and not a willful omission, substantial performance is all that is required.-ASHLEY V. HENAHAN, Ohio, 47 N. E. Rep. 573. 30. CONTRACTS-Public Policy-Transfer of Stock.Where a stockholder of a corporation transferred to its president shares of stock to be used to influence certain persons high in authority and influence in certain governments in obtaining renewals of certain leases from such governments held by the corpsration, and such shares were not so used, in an action by the stockholder against the president to have it declared that defendant hold such shares in trust for plaintiff, the question whether such contract was void as against public policy is immaterial.- WASSERMANN V. SLOSS, Cal., 49 Pac. Rep. 566. Assessment.-Where 31. CORPORATION - Directors an assessment on the capital stock of a corporation has been made by a board of directors de jure, and there is no question as to any irregularity in the levy, or any want of authority on the part of the law. ful board to make it, the assessment will be held valid, and an injunction to restrain its collection denied.CHANDLER V. SHEEP ROCK MINING & MILLING Co., Utah, 49 Pac. Rep. 535. 32. CORPORATION-Foreign Corporations-Validity of Contracts.-A non-resident corporation may recover on a contract made in the State, though it has not complied with Gen. Laws, ch. 253, §§ 36, 41, requiring the appointment of a resident as its attorney.-GARRATT FORD CO. V. VERMONT MANUFG. Co., R. I., 37 Atl. Rep. 948. 33. CORPORATIONS- Franchise Fee-Itinerant Salesmen.-Public Acts 1893, No. 79, requiring a franchise fee to be paid by every foreign corporation permitted to transact business in the State, does not apply to a foreign corporation selling goods through its itinerant salesmen.-M. I. WILCOX CORDAGE & SUPPLY CO. v. MOSHER, Mich., 72 N. W. Rep. 117. 34. CORPORATION-Gas Companies - Ultra Vires.-A corporation organized for the purpose of "manufacturing and supplying illuminating and heating gas" may deal in appliances for the consumption of gas as well as for its manufacture and distribution.-MALONE V. LANCASTER GAS LIGHT & FUEL Co., Penn., 37 Atl. Rep. 932. 35. CORPORATIONS-Lease of Plant.-It is competent for the directors and majority of stockholders of a joint-stock manufacturing corporation against the will of the minority of the stockholders to lease its entire plant for 10 years, where the lessee is to carry 36. CORPORATION-Officers-Liability as Partners.Plaintiff furnished lumber to a bridge company, and testified that he dealt with the individuals connected with the company as with a copartnership, and he did not know it was incorporated until he signed the complaint in the suit: Held, that the issue of partnership should be submitted to the jury, for though there was a corporation, its officers and agents might, by their conduct, bind themselves individually as copartners.RUST-OWEN LUMBER Co. v. WELLMAN, S. Dak., 72 N. W. Rep. 89. - 37. CORPORATIONS Partnership Accounting. Though a corporation cannot legally enter into a partnership, yet, it having done so, it must account to the other partner, who has fully performed all the obligations of his contract.-BOYD V. AMERICAN CARBONBLACK CO., Penn., 37 Atl. Rep. 937. 38. CORPORATIONS-Powers of President.-A president and general manager of a corporation governed by a by-law giving him entire charge of the affairs of the business, subject to the approval of the board of directors, has not the power, without the assent of the board of directors, when the corporation becomes insolvent, to transfer all the assets within his control to satisfy debts to one of its creditors, as against another creditor attaching a part of the goods sought to be transferred.-HADDEN V. LINVILLE, Md., 38 Atl. Rep. 37. 39. CORPORATIONS-Reclamation Districts-Liability for Negligence.-A reclamation district, being, under the law of Californía, a corporation of a quasi public character, is not liable to a private action for negli gence in the performance of its duties, or for a nuisance. -SELS V. GREENE, U. S. C. C., N. D. (Cal.), 81 Fed. Rep. 555. 40. CORPORATIONS - Sale of Stock by President.Where the stockholders of a corporation, being ignorant of the selling value of their stock, authorize the president of the company to find a purchaser and effect a sale of their shares at par, and such president, at and before such time, was in secret correspondence and negotiation for the sale of the stock, with a view to a large profit to himself, and, by affirmative acts and misrepresentations, concealed his transactions from the stockholders, and effected a sale of their stock for a sum largely in excess of par, he cannot retain such excess, but must account to the stockholders for the profits made, notwithstanding he had stated to them that he would retain for his services as agent any sum realized above that for which he was authorized to sell.-MULVANE V. O'BRIEN, Kan., 49 Pac. Rep. 607. 41. CORPORATIONS-Stockholders' Meeting-Election of Directors.-Under Const. § 207, providing that in all elections for directors of any corporation the system of cumulative voting shall be adopted, and that directors shall not be elected in any other manner, it is no objection to the validity of an election that stock. holders did not vote their stock cumulatively, it not appearing that any stockholder claimed the right to do so.-SCHMIDT V. MITCHELL, Ky., 41 8. W. Rep. 929. 42. CRIMINAL LAW-Adultery-"Maiden."-The word "maiden" in an indictment of a man for adultery did not mean a virgin necessarily, but merely a young unmarried woman.-STATE V. SHEDRICK, Vt., 38 Atl. Rep. 75. 43. CRIMINAL LAW-Assault.-A defendant indicted for an assault with a dangerous weapon with intent to do bodily harm may be found guilty of a simple assault, in view of Comp. Laws, § 7429, providing that "the jury may find the defendant guilty of any offense the commission of which is necessarily included in that with which he is charged in the indictment."STATE V. FINDER, S. Dak., 72 N. W. Rep. 97. 44. CRIMINAL LAW - Forgery - Notary Public The making by a notary public of a jurat or certificate con taining false statements, to an affidavit in support of a pension claim, does not constitute an offense under Rev. St. § 5421, providing for the punishment of "every person who falsely makes, alters, forges or counterfeits any deed, power of attorney, order, certificate, receipt or other writing for the purpose of obtaining or receiving, or enabling any other person, directly or indirectly, to obtain or receive from the United States, or any of their officers or agents, any sum of money;" the offense defined by said section being the false making or forgery of the writings enumerated. UNITED STATES V. GLASENER, U. S. D. C., S. D. (Cal), 81 Fed. Rep. 566. 45. CRIMINAL LAW-Homicide-Provocation.-Where the provocation consists only in words, and a weapon is used which will probably produce death, words are not an adequate provocation to reduce the offense of murder to manslaughter. - CLIFFORD V. STATE, N. J., 37 Atl. Rep. 1101. 46. CRIMINAL LAW-Rape-Evidence-Corroboration. -Though defendant testifies, and denies a rape, be may be convicted thereof on the uncorroborated evidence of prosecutrix.-STATE V. MARCKS, Mo., 41 S. W. Rep. 973. 47. CRIMINAL LAW-Rape of Feeble Minded Woman.The fact that defendant did not know that the woman was too feeble-minded to give consent is no defense to a charge of rape, which, by Pen. Code, § 261, subd. 2, is defined as intercourse with a female incapable of giv ing consent through mental unsoundness.-PEOPLE V. GRIFFIN, Cal., 49 Pac. Rep. 711. 48. CRIMINAL PRACTICE-Indictment.-Sand. & H. Dig § 3428, makes it unlawful for any person, with intent to kill or paralyze any fish, to deposit in any water any explosive material or any stupefying liquid, "or" take from any water any fish so stupefied or killed: Held, that an indictment was not duplicitous which charged that defendant put dynamite in a certain lake, with intent to kill fish therein, "and" took from said waters fish that had been so killed, etc. - KEOUN V. STATE, Ark., 41 S. W. Rep. 808. 49. DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT- Action.-An action for personal injuries not resulting in death survives to the personal representatives under section 420 of the Civil Code, where the injured person dies from other causes. If death results from the injuries, an action cannot be maintained by the personal representative of the deceased for the benefit of the estate, but may be brought, under section 422 of the Civil Code, for the benefit of the next of kin. MARTIN V. MISSOURI PAC. RY. Co., Kan., 49 Pac. Rep. 605. 50. DEEDS Grantees - Acknowledgment. - Where there are several grantees named in a deed, each re ceiving a separate and defined interest, and the grant or's acknowledgment is taken by one of them, the deed must be treated as if executed separately to each of such grantees, and good as to each of them except the one taking the acknowledgment. - MURRAY V. IT LARE IRRIGATION CO., Cal., 49 Pac. Rep. 563. 51. DEED- Reservation of Power to Mortgage. - A deed conveyed a fee, subject to a life estate in the grantor, and "reserving the right to occupy and f the premises as fully and freely as I might do if there and title was to remain in myself, with full power mortgage said premises to raise money for my o personal benefit at any time I may desire for and d ing my natural life." The grantor warranted the t against all demands "except any claim that may ars under the reservation aforesaid:" Held, that t grantor retained the right to mortgage the fee, not merely his life estate. BOUTON V. DOTY, Conn. Atl. Rep. 1064. 52. DIVORCE Desertion.- Belief that a wife is g¤.1^~~ of adultery, though justified by gravely suspicious cumstances, is no defense to her suit for divorce vinculo matrimonii, on the ground of his willful, tinued, and obstinate desertion, where adultery is proved. - DRAYTON V. DRAYTON, N. J., 38 Atl. Rep. |