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clared against the use of plate matter in the city of Newark, as Mr. Barr well knew. The Essex Trades Council then undertook to boycott Mr. Barr's newspaper, by distributing circulars, by issuing an official bulletin, and by undertaking to persuade the public to withhold support from the paper. The defendants denied that they had made any threats, or attempted to intimidate or coerce any of the advertisers or patrons of the Times, and claimed that everything was done in a peaceable and orderly manner, but the court said: "It is true, there was no public disturb ance, no physical injury, no direct threat of personal violence, or of actual attack on or destruction of tangible property, as a means of intimidation or coercion. Force and violence, however, while they may enter largely into the question in a criminal prosecution, are not necessarily factors in the right to a civil remedy. But, even in criminal law, I do not understand that intimidation, even when a statutory ingredient of crime, necessarily presupposes personal injury or the fear thereof. The clear weight of authority undoubtedly is that a man may be intimidated into doing or refraining from doing, by fear of loss of business, property, or reputation, as well as by dread of loss of life or injury to health or limb; and the extent of this fear need not be abject, but only such as to overcome his judgment, or induce him not to do or to do that which otherwise he would have done or left undone. There can be no reasonable dispute that the whole proceeding or boycott in this controversy is to force Mr. Barr, by fear of loss of business, to conduct that business, not according to his own judg ment, but in accordance with the determination of the typographical union, and so far as he is concerned, it is an attempt to intimidate and coerce." The court then proceeded to a review of the cases, and the discussion of the jurisdiction in equity, and awarded an injunction as prayed. The case of Sherry v. Perkins, 147 Mass. 212, 17 N. E. Rep. 307, was decided in June, 1888. It was there held that banners displayed in front of a manufacturer's premises, with inscriptions calculated to injure his business and to deter workingmen from entering into and continuing in his employ, constituted a nuisance, which equity would restrain by injunction. The court said that the plaintiffs were not restricted to their remedy at law, but were entitled to relief by injunction; that the scheme in pursuance of which the banners were displayed and maintained was to injure the plaintiff's business, by intimidating workingmen, so as to deter them from keeping and making engagements with the plaintiff. The banners were a standing menace to all who were or wished to be in the employment of the plaintiffs, to deter them from entering his premises, and maintaining them was a continuous unlawful act, injurious to his business and property, and a nuisance such as a court of equity would grant relief against. The latest case in Massachusetts is Vegelahn v. Guntner, decided October, 1896, and reported in 44 N. E. Rep. 1077. The defendants in that case conspired to prevent plaintiff from getting workingmen, and thereby to prevent him from carrying on his business, unless and until he would adopt a certain schedule of prices. The means adopted were persuasion and social pressure, threats of personal injury or unlawful harm conveyed to persons employed or seeking employ. ment, and a patrol of two men in front of plaintiff's factory, maintained from half past 6 in the morning until half past 5 in the afternoon, on one of the busiest streets of Boston. The court said that intimidation was not limited to threats of violence or of physical injury to person or property; that it had a

broader signification, and there might be a moral intimidation, which was illegal, including patrolling or picketing, under the circumstances stated in the case. The court further said that the patrol was an unlaw ful interference both with the plaintiff and with the workmen, within the principle of many cases, and, when instituted for the purpose of interfering with his business, it became a private nuisance. The defendants in that case contended that the acts com plained of were justifiable, "because they were only seeking to secure better wages for themselves, by compelling the plaintiff to accept their schedule of wages." The court was of opinion that that motive or purpose did not justify maintaining a patrol in front of the plaintiff's preises, as a means of carry. ing out their conspiracy, and added: "A combina tion among persons merely to regulate their own conduct is within allowable competition, and is lawful, although others may be indirectly affected thereby. But a combination to do injurious acts, expressly directed to another, by way of intimidation or constraint, either of himself or of persons employed or seeking to be employed by him, is outside of allow able competition, and is unlawful." In support of this proposition the court cited a long list of cases. Upon the point, urged, also, in argument in this case, that the defendants' act might subject them to an indictment, the court said that that fact did not prevent a court of equity from issuing an injunction. "It is true that, ordinarily, a court of equity will decline to issue an injunction to restrain the commission of a crime; but a continuing injury to property or busi ness may be enjoined, although it may also be pun ishable as a nuisance or other crime." In support of this proposition the court cited a long list of cases, including the following: Sherry v. Perkins, 147 Mass. 212, 17 N. E. Rep. 307; Cranford v. Tyrrell, 128 N. Y. 341, 28 N. E. Rep. 514; Gilbert v. Mickle, 4 Sandf. Ch. 357; Port of Mobile v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 84 Ala. 115, 4 South. Rep. 106; and the following English cases: Emperor of Austria v. Day, 3 De Gex, F. & J. 217; Loog v. Bean, 26 Ch. Div. 306; Monson v. Tus saud (1894), 1 Q. B. 671. The court further held that such a conspiracy, in order either to prevent persons from entering plaintiff's employment or to prevent persons in his employment from continuing therein, was unlawful, even though such persons were not bound by contract to enter into or continue in his em ployment. Moores & Co. v. Bricklayers' Union No. 1, 23 Wkly. Law Bul. 48, decided by the superior court of Cincinnati in general term, is a case much quoted, in which it was held that a combination by a trade union and others to coerce an employer to con duct his business with reference to apprentices and the employment of delinquent members of the union, according to the demand of the union, by injuring his business through notices sent to his customers and material-men, stating that any dealings with him will be followed by similar measures against such cas tomers and material-men, is an unlawful conspiracy. Judge Taft, in delivering the opinion of the court. said: "We are of the opinion that, even if acts of the character and with the intent shown in this case are not actionable when done by individuals, they become so when they are the result of combination, because it is clear that the terrorizing of the community by threats of exclusive dealing in order to deprive one obnoxious member of means of sustenance will be come both dangerous and oppressive."

The latest case in any State court--Charles Curran against Louis Galen, as president (known under the title of "Master Workman") of Brewery Working

H

men's Local Asembly 1796, Knights of Labor, was decided March 2, 1897, by the court of appeals of the State of New York, and will appear in 152 N. Y., at page 33, 46 N. E. Rep. 297. The court there heldFirst, that the organization or co-operation of workingmen is not of itself against any public policy, and must be regarded as having the sanction of law, when it is for such legitimate purposes as that of obtaining an advance in the rate of wages or compensation, or of maintaining such rate; second, if the purpose of an organization or combination of workingmen is to hamper or restrict the freedom of the citizen in pursuing his lawful trade or calling, and through contracts or arrangements with employers to cover other workingmen to become members of the organization, and to come under its rules and conditions, under the penalty of the loss of their positions and of deprivation of employment, such purpose is against public policy, and unlawful; third, the fact that a contract between the workingmen's organization and an employer's association was entered into on the part of the employers, with the object of avoiding disputes and conflicts with the workingmen's organization, does not legalize a plan of compelling workingmen not in affiliation with the organization to join it, at the peril of being deprived of their employment. With reference to organizations of workingmen the court said:

"The social principle which justifies such organizations is departed from when they are so extended in their operation as either to intend or accomplish injury to others. Public policy and the interests of society favor the utmost freedom in the citizen to pursue his lawful trade or calling, and if the purpose of an organization or combination of workingmen be to hamper or to restrict that freedom, and through contracts or arrangements with employers, to coerce other workingmen to become members of the organization, or to come under its rules and conditions, under the penalty of the loss of their positions, and of deprivation of employment, then that purpose seems clearly unlawful, and militates against the spirit of our government and the nature of our institutions. The effectuation of such a purpose would conflict with that principle of public policy which prohibits monopolies an 1 exclusive privileges. It would tend to deprive the public of the services of men in useful employments and capacities." The court, further along in the course of the opinion, said: "The sympathies or the fellow feeling which, as a social principle, underlies the association of workingmen for their common benefit, is not consistent with a purpose to oppress the individual who prefers by single effort to gain his livelihood. If organization of workingmen is in line with good government, it is because it is intended as a legitimate instrumentality to promote the common good of its members." The English cases are in accord with the American cases above cited. Lord Campbell, C. J., in charging the jury in Reg. v. Hewitt, 5 Cox, Cr. Cas. 162, said: "By law every man's labor is his own property, and he may make what bargain he pleases for his own employment. Not only so; masters or men may associate together. But they must not, by their association, violate the law. They must not injure their neighbor. They must not do that which may prejudice another man. The men may take care not to enter into engagements of which they do not approve, but they must not prevent another from doing so. If this were permitted, not only would the manufacturers of the land be injured, but it would lead to the most melancholy consequences to the working classes." In Reg. v. Druitt,

10 Cox, Cr. Cas. 592, Bramwell, B., said: "No right
of property or capital, about which there has been so
much declamation, is so sacred or so carefully
guarded by the law of this land as that of personal
liberty. But that liberty is not liberty of the
body only. It is also a liberty of the mind and will;
and the liberty of a man's mind and will-to say how
he should betsow himself and his means, his talents,
and his industry-is as much a subject of the law's
protection as is that of his body.
And if any

set of men agree among themselves to coerce that lib-
erty of mind and thought by compulsion and restraint,
they would be guilty of a criminal offense, namely,
that of conspiring against the liberty of mind and
freedom of will of those toward whom they so con-
duct themselves.
The public has an interest

in the way in which a man disposes of his industry
and his capital; and if two or more persons conspired,
by threats, intimidation, or molestation, to deter or
influence him in the way in which he should employ
his industry, his talents, or his capital, they would be
guilty of a criminal offense." In Steamship Co. v.
McGregor, 23 Q. B. Div. 598, Lord Justice Bowen said:
"Of the general proposition that certain kinds of con-
duct, not criminal in any one individual, may become
criminal if done by combination among several, there
can be no doubt. The distinction is based on sound
reason, for a combination may make oppressive or
dangerous that which, if it proceeded only from a
single person, would be otherwise; and the very fact
of the combination may show that the object is sim-
ply to do harm, and not to exercise one's own just
rights."

Coltman, J., in Gregory v. Duke of Brunswick, 6 Man. & G. 953, illustrates the proposition by the act of Lissing in a public theater, which is prima facie a lawful act, and, "even if it should be conceded that such an act, though done without concert with others, if done from a malicious motive, might furnish a ground of action, yet it would be difficult to infer such a motive from the isolated action of one person, unconnected with others." In Reg. v. Rowlands, 17 Adol. & E. (N. S.) 671, where there was a combination to prevent certain workingmen from continuing in the service of their employer, and thereby to compel the employers to change the mode of conducting their business, the court of queen's bench approved of the charge given to the jury by Mr. Justice Erle. that: "A combination for the purpose of injuring another is a combination of a different nature, directed personally against the party to be injured; and the law allowing them to combine for the purpose of obtaining a lawful benefit to themselves gives no sanction to combinations which have for their immediate purpose the hurt of another. The rights of workmen are conceded; but the exercise of free will and freedom of action, within the limits of the law, is also secured equally to the masters. The intention of the law is, at present, to allow either of them to follow the dictates of their own will, with respect to their own actions, and their own property, and either, I believe, has a right to study to promote his own advantage, or to combine with others to promote their mutual advantage." All these and many other English authorities will be found among the citations in the American cases referred to in this opinion, and ' they fully support those cases. Without referring to

a single federal case, there is ample authority upon all the questions involved in the consideration of the motion which has been argued and submitted to this court. Nevertheless, it will be instructive, and I trust beneficial, to review, briefly as possible, some of the

decisions of the federal courts. In Casey v. Typographical Union, 45 Fed. Rep. 135, decided January 31, 1891, it was held that a combination or a conspiracy, by a trades union, to boycott a newspaper for refusing to unionize its office, was illegal, and would be enjoined by a court of equity. The court, in consid. ering the contention, for defendants, that no threats were used and there was no intimidation, only courteous requests, and "fair, although sharp and bitter competition," ,"cited In re Wabash R. Co., 24 Fed. Rep. 217, where, during a strike organized to resist a reduction of wages, a printed notice was sent to the several foremen of the shops of the railway company as follows: "You are requested to stay away from the shop until the present difficulty is settled. Your compliance with this will command the protection of the Wabash employees. But in no case are you to consider this an intimidation." The court in holding that that was an unlawful interference with the management of the road by the receiver, and a contempt of court, said that: "The statement in all these no. tices that they are not to be taken as intimidations goes to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the writer knew he was violating the law, and by this subterfuge sought to escape its penalty."

The court, in Casey v. Typographical Union, also cited U. S. v. Kane, 23 Fed. Rep. 748, where Judge (now Justice) Brewer, by way of illustrating what a threat, supposes that one of two workmen is discharged. The other is satisfied with his employment, and wishes to remain. The discharged workman comes, with a party of his friends, armed with revolvers and muskets, and says: "Now, my friends are here. You had better leave. I request you to leave." In terms there was no threat, only a request; but it was backed by a demonstration of force intended and calculated to intimidate, and the man leaves really because he is intimidated. "Again," said the judge, "armed robbers stop a coach. One of their number politely requests the passengers to step out and hand over their valuables. To the charge of robbery the defense is made that there was no violence; there were no threats; there was only a polite request, which was complied with." Judge Brewer properly said that any judge who would recognize such a defense deserved to be despised. In Pettibone v. U. S., 148 U. S. 197, 13 S. C. Rep. 542, it was held that a combination of two or more persons to accomplish, by concerted action, either a criminal or unlawful purpose, or some purpose not in itself criminal or unlawful by criminal or unlawful means, is a conspiracy. It was held in Thomas v. Railway Co. (the Phelan Case), 62 Fed. Rep. 803, that a combination to incite the employees of all the railways in the country to suddenly quit their service without any dissatisfaction with the terms of their employment, thus paralyzing all railway traffic in order to coerce the railroad companies and the public into compel ling an owner of cars used in operating the roads to pay his employees more wages, they having no lawful right so to compel him, is an unlawful conspiracy, by reason of its purpose, whether such purpose is ef fected by means usually lawful of otherwise. That the employees of the receiver of the road had the right to organize into or to join a labor union, which should take joint action as to their terms of employment, was conceded; the court stating that, as they had labor to sell, if they should stand together they would be often able to command better prices for their labor than when dealing singly with rich employers, because the necessities of a single employee might compel him to accept any terms offered him. In illustra

tion the court said that if, when the receiver made a reduction of 10 per cent. in the wages of his em ployees, Phelan had come to Cincinnati, and urged and succeeded in maintaining a peaceable strike, he would not have been liable to contempt, even if the strike seriously impeded the operation of the road under the order of the court, and that his action in giving advice or issuing an order based on unsatis factory terms of employment would have been entirely lawful, but that his coming to Cincinnati, and his advice to the employees to quit work, had nothing to do with their terms of employment. They were not dissatisfied with their service or there pay. His coming was to carry out the purpose of a combina. tion of men, and as a part of that combination to incite the employees of all Cincinnati roads to quit work. The plan of this combination was to inflict pecuniary injury on Pullman by compelling the railway companies to give up using his cars, and in the event of their re fusal so to do to inflict pecuniary injury on them by inciting their employees to quit their service and thus paralyze their business. That combination, the court held, was for an unlawful purpose, and was conspiracy; citing Angle v. Railway Co., 151 U. S. 1, 14 S. C. Rep. 240. The court also held that the combination was unlawful without respect to the contract feature, because it was a boycott. The court re cognized that the employees had the right to quit their employment, but declared that they had no right to combine to quit, in order thereby to compel their employer to withdraw from a profitable relation with a third person for the purpose of injuring him, when that relation had no effect whatever on the character or reward of their service. Phelan was held guilty of contempt, and sentenced to imprisonment. The Supreme Court of the United States, in the Des Case, 158 U. S. 564, 15 S. C. Rep. 900, held that the jurisdiction in equity to apply the remedy by injune tion when any obstruction was put upon highways, natural or artificial, to impede interstate commerce or the carrying of mails, was not ousted by the fact that the obstructions were accompanied by or con sisted of acts in themselves violations of the crimina law, or by the fact that the proceeding by injunction is of a civil character, and may be enforced by pro ceedings in contempt, inasmuch as the penalty for a violation of such injunction is no substitute for and no defense to a prosecution for criminal offenses com mitted in the course of such violation. This author ity, which is conclusive in this court, disposes of the objection, made in this case, that if the defendants had committed the acts charged against them they were amenable to the criminal laws and should be put upon trial. The remedy by injunction was not first applied in the United States, either by state courts or by the federal courts. Mr. Stimson, in his handbook on the Labor Law of the United States, page 315, says that it is traced back to the leading cas of Spinning Co. v. Riley, L. R. 6 Eq. 551, decided ♫ 1868, which was prior to any of the American cases. He adds that that case did not announce any ce doctrine, but rather the revival of a very old one, ferring to the exercise of the chancellor's authority i the reign of Richard II. to repress disorderly obstru tions to the course of law. Spinning Co. v. Riley overruled by the court of chancery appeals in Ass ance Co. v. Knott, 10 Ch. App. 142, in 1874; Lor Chancellor Cairns deciding (and Sir W. M. James, L. J., and Sir G. Mellish, L. J., concurring) that th court in chancery has no jurisdiction to restrain the publication of a libel, as such, even if it is injurious t property. The court, in Spinning Co. v. Riley, t

joined the issuing of placards and advertisements intending and having the effect to intimidate and prevent workmen from hiring themselves to the plaintiffs; that being the only act complained of, and the court finding that the plaintiffs were thereby prevented from continuing their business and that the value of their property was thereby seriously injured. Vice Chancellor Malin's opinion is a strong presentation of the doctrine recognized by him, but no American court, State or federal, has gone to the length of that case, nor beyond the doctrine stated by the Supreme Court of the United States in the Debs Case. It conclusively appears, from the authorities above referred to, that the English courts, the American State courts, and the federal courts are in perfect harmony, and that, while they recognize the right of employees of whatever rank or degree to combine for the purpose of resisting any measures of oppression or coercion by their employers, and even for the purpose of instituting strikes and adopting other measures for their own protection or for the bettering of their condition, they are agreed that they must not interfere with the rights of employers to manage their own business in their own way, so long as they do not trespass upon the rights of others.

DUTY AND LIABILITY OF ATTORNEY TO CLIENT.

The relation of attorney and client is one of mutual trust, confidence and good will, and the fidelity of the attorney to the client involves the most difficult questions in the consideration of this subject. That he is responsible for the want of ordinary skill, care and reasonable diligence, is well understood,1 as is also the fact that the skill required has reference to the character of the business undertaken, but it is extremely difficult to fix upon any rule which shall define negligence in a given case. The habits and practice of men are widely different in this regard. It has been laid down, that if the average degree of skill and diligence could be determined, it would furnish the true rule.3 "God forbid that it should be imagined that an attorney or counsel, or even a judge, is bound to know all the law," said Lord Tenterden. Naturally, the scope of moral responsibility of the attorney to the client goes further than mere legal liability, and embraces the entire devotion to the client's interests, zealousness in the maintenance of his rights, and the exertion to the utmost of his learning and ability, and by the use of these

attributes alone can the conscientious attor

1 Weeks on Attys., Sec. 259.

2 Holmes v. Peck, 1 R. S. 242; Pennington v. Yell, 6 Eng. (Ark.), 212; Cox v. Sullivan, 7 Ga. 144.

3 Pitt v. Yalden, 4 Burr. 2060.

* Montrion v. Jeffery, 2 Carr. & P. 113.

ney be satisfied. It is possible that an attorney will maintain, with great warmth and earnestness, the side which he must know to be unjust, and the success of which will be a wrong to the opposing party, and the attorney might be considered a participator in the injustice, but he cannot be held morally responsible for the act of his client in maintaining an unjust cause. The lawyer who would refuse to lend his professional assistance to a cause on the ground that, in his judgment, the case was unjust, would usurp the functions of both the judge and the jury. It might be well to quote here the words of Lord Brougham in his celebrated defense of of the Queen: "An advocate," said he, "in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the world, and that person is his client. To save the client by all means and expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons, and among them to himself, is his first and only duty; and in performing this duty, he must not regard the alarm, the torments, the destruction he may bring upon others. Separating the duty of a patriot. from that of an advocate, he must go on, reckless of consequences; though it should be his unhappy lot to involve his country in confusion." But an attorney owes the duty of good faith and honorable dealing to the court before whom he practices; he is an officer of the court and it is his high vocation to correctly inform it as to the law and facts of the case and to aid it in doing justice. He is not bound to suffer false and perjured testimony to be presented with the possible result of inducing the court to take jurisdiction where there would be otherwise no power to act, and to grant a judgment or decree which the law would prohibit were the real character of the testimony known. In resorting to deception or permitting his client to do so the attorney violates his oath of office. An attorney cannot disobey the express lawful instructions of his client, and he is liable if he negligently fails to bring suit, also if, through his negligence, the papers or securities of the client are lost; but where such papers are stolen from his office,

5

5 People v. Beattie, 137 Ill. 553.

6

6 Gilbert v. Williams, 8 Mass. 57; Cox v. Livingstone, 2 W. & S. (Pa.) 103; Wilcox v. Plummer, 4 Pet. (U. S.) 172.

7 Moore v. Juvenal, 92 Pa. St. 484.

Northwestern Co. v. Sharp, 28 Eng. L. & E. 555.

he cannot be held responsible, unless through negligence on his part.9

The attorney can only undertake to avoid errors and mistakes which any prudent practitioner would avoid;10 and where there is a reasonable doubt as to want of skill and diligence, he cannot be held liable, and the error being such as a cautious man might fall into, he cannot, on that account, be deprived of his fee.12 If, however, the attorney disregards well established and clearly defined rules of law, or ignores the ordinary rules of court and practice, pleading and evidence, sometimes even the right construction on cases free from doubt, such as bringing an action of assumpsit on a deed under the common law system;13 if his papers are defective through lack of diligence on his part, or the part of his clerks, he will be liable;14 and the failure to deliver a fi. fa. to the sheriff, whereby a levy is lost, renders him liable.15 Where an attorney undertaking to search the records, overlooks prior liens, he is liable to his client who loaned money on a mortgage of property.16 It is not required that the attorney insure a client as to the result of the proceedings which he has advised, and in an action for attorney's fees, it is no defense that some other course than that advised by him would have

tator instructed the attorney should be given such person by will. 18 Where the attorney allows a cause to be called for trial without previously inquiring whether a material witness was absent, and his client was nonsuited, he is liable; 19 also where he allows judgment to be taken for want of an answer, or where he fails to appear in court when the cause is regularly reached on the docket." Where money has been collected for the client, the attorney is bound to notify him of the fact within a reasonable time; and if he does so, the client has no cause of action against him until after a demand and a refusal to turn it over. 22 An attorney for a decedent's estate who has collected money on a claim due the estate while acting in the eploy of the administrator cannot be compelled by the probate court to turn over such collections under the statutory clause providing for commitment to jail of any person who refuses to surrender property belonging to a decedent after the administrator has on oath sworn before such court that the attorney bas such property in his possession. The suspension of the attorney is the proper remedy. The usual remedy of a client against

an

attorney for neglect or misconduct is by an action on the case ;24 sometimes. however, the courts have interfered sum

been more advantageous to the client, it ap-marily, especially where the transaction pearing that the attorney acted in good faith." An attorney who is employed to draw a will is not liable to a person who, through the former's negligence and ignorance in the discharge of his professional duties, was deprived of the portion of the estate which tes

9 Hill v. Barney, 18 N. H. 607.

10 Bowman v. Talman, 27 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 212; Citizens' Loan, etc. Asso. v. Friedly, 123 Ind. 143, 7 L. R. A. 619; Eggleston v. Boardman, 37 Mich. 14.

11 Morrison v. Burnett, 56 Ill. App. 129; Watson v. Muirhead, 57 Pa. St. 161; 1 Parsons' Contracts, 114, and cases cited; Gilbert v. Williams, 8 Mass. 51.

12 Pitt v. Yalden, 4 Burr. 2060; Godefroy v. Dalton, 6 Bing. 467, 4 Moore & P. 149.

13 Cliffe v. Prosser, 2 Dowl. O. S. 21; Hoping v. Quinn, 12 Wend. (N. Y.) 519.

14 Weeks on Attys., Sec. 284; Goodman v. Walker, 30 Ala. 482; Marsh v. Whitman, 21 Wall. (U. S.) 178; Wharton on Agency, 598; In re Spencer, 18 W. R. Ch. 240; Dearborn v. Dearborn, 15 Mass. 316; Reilley v. Cavanaugh, 29 Ind. 435; McWilliams v. Hopkins, 4 Rawle (Pa.), 392; Newman v. Schneck, 58 Ill. App. 328; Davis v. Jenkins, 11 Mees. & W. 745. 15 Phillips v. Bridge, 11 Mass. 246.

16 Lawall v. Groman (Pa.), 37 Atl. Rep. 98.

17 Harriman v. Baird (Sup.), 39 N. Y. S. 592; Kirkey v. Jones, 7 Ala. 622; Meyer v. Sage, 65 Iowa, 606.

appears tainted with fraud, 25 or where the attorney having been paid fails to per form his duty,26 in which event he may be proceeded against by attachment.27 But without some showing of fraud, the court will generally leave the client to his remedy by action. 28 In equity, a distinction is drawn between fraud and negligence, and only

18 Roddy v. Railway Co., 104 Mo. 234; Shear. & E. Neg. Sec. 215; Fish v. Kelly, 17 C. B. (N. S.) 194; Robertson v. Fleming, 4 Macq. H. L. Cas. 167, 209: Longmerd v. Holliday, 6 Exch. 761; Winterbottom v Wright, 10 Mees. & W. 109; Buckley v. Gray (Cal.), 42 Pac. Rep. 900.

19 Reece v. Rigby, 4 Barn. & Ald. 202. 20 Godefroy v. Jay, 7 Bing. 413.

21 Mix v. Chandler, 44 Ill. 174.

22 Denton v. Embury, 5 Eng. 228; Voss v. Bachop, Kan. 67; Taylor v. Bates, 6 Cow. (N. Y.) 596; MeDowell v. Potter, 8 Pa. St. 189. Contra: Tinkham v. Hey worth, 31 Ill. 519.

23 Dinsmoor v. Bressler (Ill.), 45 N. E. Rep. 1086. 24 Russell v. Palmer, 2 Wils. 235.

25 4 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 118; Wendell v. Van Rensselaer, 1 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 344.

26 Garner v. Lawson, 1 Barn. 101.

27 Floyd v. Hangle, 3 Atk. 568.

28 Barker v. Butler, 2 W. Black, 780.

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