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gubjected to the payment of a note executed by her for a mule to enable her and her husband to make a crop for the support of themselves and their infant children.-ALLEN V. LONG, Ky., 41 S. W. Rep. 17.
54. HUSBAND AND WIFE - Services of Wife.-A con. tract between a man and a woman, by which the latter agrees to render personal services to the former, for compensation, is abrogated by the subsequent mar. riage of the parties, by which the husband becomes entitled to his wife's services; and nelther ratification, performance, por partial payment, after the marriage, and before the passage of the act of 1892, allowing a wife to contract with her husband for pay for her personal services, will enable the wite to recover for serv. ices rendered after the marriage.-IN RE CALLISTER'S ESTATE, N. Y., 47 N. E. Rep. 268.
55. INJUNCTION - Elevated Street Railways-Damage to Abutting Owners.- Where the fee of a city street is in the municpality, the damage suffered by an owner of abutting property through the construction of an elevated railroad in the street is merely consequential, and, the owner having an adequate remedy at law for tbe damage suffered, if any, equity will not interfere by injunction to restrain the construction of the railroad on the ground that the ordinance authorizing it is 1l. legal.-BLODGETT V. NORTHWESTERN EL. R. CO., U. S.C. C. of App., Seventh Circuit, 80 Fed. Rep. 601,
56. INSOLVENCY - Preferences Assignments for Creditors.-The right of an insolvent debtor to pay one or more creditors in preference to others, and the right to make a general assigoment for the benefit of all his creditors ratably, are distinct and independent rights. -SMITH V. BAKER, Okla., 49 Pac. Rep. 61.
57. INSURANCE-Conditions-Walver.- Where a policy provides that, if the property be mortgaged, it must be potified to the company in the written part of the policy, or it will be void, and that no agent has power to waive or modity conditions except by writing, mere notice to the agent of the existence of a mortgage before he delivers the policy, or parol waiver of condi. tions by him, does pot estop the company to claim that the policy is void.-PHOENIX INS. Co. v. DUNN, Tex., 41 S. W. Rep. 109.
58. INSURANCE Use of Gasoline.-A prohibition in a fire insurance policy of the use of gasoline, any cus. tom "of trade or manufacture" to the contrary not. withstanding, does not preclude proof of a custom of using gasoline for domestic purposes to explain or avoid the prohibition.-AMERICAN CENT. INS. CO. V. GREEN, Tex., 41 S. W. Rep. 74.
59. JUDGMENTS-Federal Courts.-A judgment of the Circuit Court of the United States, sittirg in Kansas, is to be treated in the State courts as a domestic judg. ment; and the return of the marshal of personal sery. ice of a subpana in chancery in the action in which the judgment is rendered, is conclusive on the parties to the same extent as the return of a sheriff on a sum. mons issued from a State court.-THOMAS V. OWEN, Kan., 49 Pac. Rep. 73.
60. JUDGMENT-Res Judicata.-A decree enjoining a person from reasserting title to the property involved is in reality, one decreeing the plaintiff to be the owner of the same, though it may not so declare in express terms.-CHADWICK V. GULF STATES LAND & IMPROVE. MENT CO., La., 22 South. Rep. 237.
61. JUDICIAL SALES Void Confirmation.--Where a defendant, whose land has been sold under decree, dies before the sale is confirmed, an order of confirmation entered upon an order of revivor against the widow and heirs, entered within six months after the death of the defendant, is void, and the commissioner's deed passes no title.-FOKST V. DAVIS, Ky., 41 S. W. Rep. 27.
62. JUDICIAL SALES-Writ of Possession.-One who is in possession of land, claiming paramount title under deed, cannot be dispossessed under a writ of posses. sion issued in favor of the purchaser at a sale inade under decree rendered in a suit to which he was not a
party, though he has purchased from the defendant in that suit since the decree was rendered, as he is en. titled to notice, and to be heard upon proceedings to dispossess him.-WRIGHT V. CARR, Ky., 41 S. W. Rep. 23.
63. LIBEL-Publication-Privlleged Communications. -A printer who prints a libel, and delivers the printed copies to the author, knowing that be intends to submit them to various persons to be read, becomes liable as publisher of such libel from the moment that any third person reads it, provided the words are not priv. ileged.-YOUMANS V. SMITH, N. Y., 47 N. E. Rep. 265.
64. LIEN-Laborers' Liens-Recording of Claims.-To acquire a laborer's lien, under Code Va. $$ 2485, 2487, as amended by Acts 1891-92, p. 362, the requirement that the claims must be filed in the clerk's office within 90 days after the wages become due must be strictly complied with, and the record must sbow the fact of compliance. Therefore the mere recording of labor tick. ets within 90 days from their date, with nothing to show that the wages were due on the day the tickets were dated, gives po lien; nor can the record be sup. plemented by parol evidence on this point after suit brought to enforce the lien.-LIBERTY PERPETUAL BUILDING & LOAN CO. V. M. A. FURBUSH & SON MACH. Co., U.S. C. C. of App., Fourth Circuit, 80 Fed. Rep. 631.
65. LIFE INSURANCE Suicide-Answer.- Where the proof of death furnished by plaintiff shows that the in. gured came to his death by his "own hand and act," no recovery can be had under a policy exempting from Hability for such a death without some satisfactory ex. planation of the proof, or until it is withdrawn. And if the statement of the reply that the proof was fur. nished merely as evidence of death, and not as proof of the cause, be a satisfactory explanation, yet being denied by rejoinder, the burden on the issue is on the plaintiff.-- PRUDENTIAL INS. CO. OF AMERICA V. BREUSTLE'S ADMR., Ky., 41 8. W. Rep. 9.
66. LIMITATIONS — Accrual of Cause.Where coin. plainant contributed money to build a house on land of another, relying on a vague idea that she was to have an interest therein, and her right to recover for money loaned or expended was barred, no right of ac. tion accrued to her on the death of the owner against his estate, because she had not received an interest in the land, on the ground of failure of consideration, or of her mistaken belief that she was entitled to guch in. terest.-WALKER'S ADMR. V. TYLER, Va., 27 S. E. Rep. 434.
67. LIMITATIONS-Now Promise.-Letters which do not contain an express promise to pay, nor anything from which such promise can be implied, are ineffect. ual to revive a debt barred by the statute of limita. tions.-CRAWFORD COUNTY BANK OF VAN BUREN, ARK. V. HENRY, Tex., 41 S. W. Rep. 201.
68. LIMITATIONS-Payment of Interest.-Payment of interest by the principal maker on the note of himself and a surety does not suspend the operation of the statute of limitations in favor of such surety.-MCMIL. LAN V. LEEDS, kan., 49 Pac. Rep. 159.
69. MASTER AND SERVANT · Fellow.servants.-Inde. pendent of the follow.servants' act, a section foreman, having authority to employ and discharge the men working under him, is, in his relation toward such men, a vice principal of the railroad company.-Mis. SOURI, K. & T. RY. CO. OF TEXAS V. HANNIG, Tex., 41 S. W. Rep. 196.
70. MASTER AND SERVANT-Fellow servants.- Where the engineer of a freight train has no authority to superintend, control, or direct the head brakeman of the train, but such authority is in the conductor, such brakeman and the engineer are fellow.servants, and there is no liability on the part of the railroad company for any injuries the brakeman gustaing through the negligence of the engineer.-INTERNATIONAL & G. N. R. CO. V. MOORE, Tex., 41 S. W. Rep. 70.
71. YASTER AND SERVANT-Negligence.- Where the master has knowledge of the risks and dangers, not
discernible, tbat are incident to the work to be performed by a servant, and he is also aware of the sery. ant's inexperience, and fails to inform him of the precautions and care necessary for him to take in order to avoid injury, and the servant is injured without any negligence on his part, the master will not be allowed to exonerate himself from liability by showing that servant failed to exercise the same degree of skill to avoid injury as his more experienced tellow.workmen. -ANDERSON V. DALY MIN. CO., Utah, 49 Pac. Rep. 126.
72. MECHANICS' LIEN-Priority over Homestead.-A contract liep for improvements on the homestead, beIng conferred by the constitution, is superior to the statutory right of the surviving wife and minor chil. dren in the property of the insolvent estate of the deceased husband and father.-HEATHERLY V. LITTLE, Tex., 41 8. W. Rep. 79.
73. MINING LEASES Licenses.-An instrument de. clared that the owner of land, "does demise and lease," for mining purposes only, certain land. The grantee was given the right to erect all necessary buildings and machinery, and was required to provide and keep closed gates through which to enter upon and pass off the land. He was to take possession for 10 years, and pay a fixed rent: Held, that the instru. ment was a lease, and not & mere mining license.KIRK V. MATTIER, Mo., 41 S. W. Rep. 252.
74. MORTGAGE8-Estoppel.-One who induces & person to make a loan to another and take as security a mortgage from such other person on land, the description of which he furnishes, is estopped to claim that part of the land within the description is his own, and not bound by the mortgage of the other.-EAST GREENWICH INST. FOR SAVINGS V. KENYON, R. I., 37 Atl. Rep. 632.
75. MORTGAGE-Subrogation.-One who held title to land under a recorded deed, in trust for a wile, with power of disposal on her appointment during the life of her husband only, after the husband's death exe. cuted to B a deed of the land, in which the wife joined. As part consideration for the land, B paid a mortgage thereop. B and his grantees heid peaceable and un. disturbed possession over 20 years: Held, that such grantees, on discovering the defect in the title result. ing from the trustee's want of power to convey, were not entitled to be subrogated to the rights of the mort. gagee, or other equitable relief.-MCDONALD V. QUICK, Mo., 41 6. W. Rep. 208.
76. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Bonds-Estoppel by Recitals.-As against a bona fide holder of its bonds, a municipal corporation is estopped, by recitals in such bonds of the purpose of their issue and that all the provisions of the act authorizing their issue were com. plied with, from asserting that they were not issued for such purpose or that the provisions of the act were pot complied with.-SECOND WARD SAV. BANK OF MILWAUKEE V. CITY OF HURON, U. S. 0. C., D. (8. Dak.), 80 Fed. Rep. 660.
77. MONICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Construction of Sew. erg.-In devising a plan of sewerage the inunicipal au. thorities of a city are vested with a large legislative discretion, and, if it is exercised in good faith, the city is ordinarily not liable for incidental injuries to prop. erty which are solely attributable to the plan.-KING v. CITY OF KANSAS CITY, Kan. , 49 Pac. Rep. 88.
78. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Liabilities.- Where a city, under authority of its charter, authorized a rail. way company to build a tunnel for its road under a street, it was not liable for the negligence or wrongful acts of the company in so constructing the tunnel that the land in front of plaintiff's lot receded to the injury of the houses thereon, since in so authorizing the com. pany the city merely exercised a delegated govern. mental power.-TERRY V. CITY OF RICHMOND, Va., 27 S. E. Rep. 429.
79. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION-Ordinance-Regulation of Drummers.--Under Sand. & II. Dig. $ 5132, giving a
city authority to regulate the drumming of persons, arriving on trains, for hotels, etc., an ordinance pro. viding that every person obtaining a drummer's ll cepse shall, while engaged in the business, wear & badge of a certain character, showing for what he is drumming, is not void as unreasonable.-CITY OF HOT SPRINGS V. CORRY, Ark., 41 S. W. Rop.55.
80. MONICIPAL CORPORATION-Street Railroads-Franchises.-The authority to make use of the public streets of a city for railroad purposes primarily resides in the State, and is a part of the sovereign power. Cits authorities bave no power to grant the right, except in so far as they may be authorized by the legislature, and then only in the manner and upon the conditions prescribed by statute.--BEEKMAN V. THIRD AVE. R. 00., N. Y., 47 N. E. Rep. 277.
81. NATIONAL BANKS Insolvency, - Remittances made by a national back to its correspondents, in the ordinary course of business, before the commission of any act of insolvency, are not void under Rev. St. $ 5242, though the bank is in fact insolvent at the time, and is closed by the bank examiner before the retolttances are actually received by the correspondent banks.-HAYDEN V. CHEMICAL NAT. BANK, U. S. C. C., 8. D. (N. Y.), 80 Fed. Rep. 587.
82. NEGLIGENCE Landlord and Tenant.--Corpora. tions-Leases.-Where a lease of hotel property im. posed the obligation on the lessee to keep an elevator in the building in repair, and operate it by a competent person, the lessor was not liable to an employee of the lessee for injuries resulting from a fallure to discharge such obligation, but was liable only for de. fects in the elevator existing at the time the premises were leased, and then only unless he practiced fraud on the lessee as to such defects.-ORIENTIAL INT. CO. Y. SLINE, Tex., 41 S. W. Rep. 130.
83. NEGOTIABLE BONDS-Bona Fide Holders-Presumptions. Ia an
action upon negotiable bouris, when evidence has been given to show that they are illlegal, the plaintiff cannot rely on the presumption arising from title and possession thereof, but must prove that he gave the value tberetor in the usual course of business, in order to onstitute himsell a bona fide holder.- JOAN HANCOCK MUT. LIFE INS.CO. v. CITY OF HURON, U.S.C. C. D. (8. D.), 80 Fed. Rep. 652.
84. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT Collaterals.- W bere stock is pledged as collateral for a note, the payet need not sell the collateral before suing on the pote.SINCLAIR V. WEEKS, Tex., 41 8. W. Rep. 107.
85. OFFICERS-Tenure Vacancies. — Under Const. art. 15, $ 3 (Rev. St. 1894, $ 225; Rev. St. 1881, § 225), providing that an officer shall hold bls office until his successor is elected and qualified, there is no vacancy la the office of a school trustee who was elected presi dent of the school board twice as his own successor, but failed to file a bond within 10 days from the begin ning of the third term as such president, notwithstand ing Rev. St. 1894, $ 7542 (Rev. St. 1881, $ 5527), provides that if any officer shall fail to give bond within 10 days from the commencement of his term in the manner prescribed by law the office shall become vacant.KOERNER V. JUDY, Ind., 47 N. E. Rep. 323.
86. PARTNERSHIP – Rights of Surviving Partner.-A surviving partner is not entitled to reimburse himsesi out of the partnership estate for money collected by the deceased partner upon notes intrusted by suel surviving partner to deceased for collection only where the latter failed to account for the mones $ collected.-HACKETT V. PRATT, Kav., 49 Pac. Rep. 10,
87, PLEADING-Plea in Avoidance.-A plea in avoidance of a fact that the plea does not admit is bad.WILLITTS MANUFG. Co. v. BOARD OF CHOSEN TRES HOLDERS OF MERCER COUNTY, N. J., 37 Atl. Bep. 609.
Central Law Journal. tion of fact, which the court correctly held
was settled by the verdict. The Texas court
claims that the main force of the opinion is ST. LOUIS, MO., AUGUST 13, 1897.
spent upon this third question in attempting
to show that the evidence was of such a charAccording to the Supreme Court of Texas
acter that the jury were justified in finding no duty is owing by a railroad company, even that the company had not used such care in to a child of tender years, to use care to keep guarding the turntable as a reasonably pruits premises in such condition that such child
dent person would have done under similar going thereon without invitation may not be circumstances. There could have been no injured. Dobbins v. M., K. & T. Ry.
doubt upon this question. "The opinion of Co., 41 S. W. Rep. 62. This general
the court,” they say, “would have been much proposition of law is undoubtedly cor
more satisfactory if it had undertaken to es. rect, for the common law imposes tablish instead of assuming the affirmative of duty upon the owner to keep his prop- the first question. If a child go uninvited erty in such condition that persons going upon a neighbor's property, and be drowned thereon without his invitation may pot be in his tank, creek, or river, or fall off bis injured, and there can be no distinction be
fence, woodpile, haystack, or precipice, or is tween a case where an infant is injured, and
injured while playing with his cane mill or one wbere the injury is to an adult, though corn sheller, and the courts assume the afwhere the duty is imposed the law may exact firmative of the first question above stated, as more vigilance in its discharge as to the was done in the Stout Case, the jury would former. If there be no duty the question of in most cases be warranted in finding that negligence is not reached, for negligence can
the neighbor had not used reasonable care to in law only be predicated upon a failure to so guard bis tank, etc., or lock bis cane mill use the degree of care required of one by or corn sheller, as to avoid such injury. Unlaw in the discharge of a duty imposed der this new doctrine the question as to thereby
whether the tank, etc., or the cane mill, etc.,
was attractive and dangerous to the child There are cases, however, asserting ap- would be for the jury, and they could as parently a contrary doctrine, and they are
truthfully say it was as they could of the reviewed by the Texas court which does not turntable; for our common experience, as think they are based upon sound principle.” well as the reported cases, demonstrate that They rest mainly upon Railroad Co. v. Stout,
a great many more children lose their lives 17 Wall. 657, and cases following same by such means than upon turntables.” known as the "Turntable Cases.” In the Stout Case, says the Texas court, there were This logical extension or rather applicathree questions to be determined: (1) Did tion of the doctrine of the Stout Case has rethe law impose upon the company a duty to cently found expression in the case of City of use care to keep its property in such condi
Pekin v. McMahon, 154 Ill. 141, 39 N. E. tion that persons going thereon without its Rep. 484, where a verdict and judgment invitation would not be injured? (2) Was holding the owner of a lot in the city, upon the child, six years old, guilty of contributory which there was a pool of water, liable for negligence? And (3) was the company guilty
the death of a boy who went there uninvited, of negligence in leaving the turntaole un- and was drowned, was upheld, the court, locked? The first and most important ques
after assuming the existence of the duty, as tion, without an affirmative answer to which was done in the Stout Case, saying: "The the third could not arise, was not even re- question, whether a defendant has or has not ferred to, and, to judge from the opinion, been guilty of negligence in case of such an that learned court's attention was not called accident upon his land to a child of tender to its presence in the case; the second was years, is for the jury. Involved in this admitted by the railroad in favor of plaintiff ; question is the further question whether or and the third, if the first were determined in not the premises were sufficiently attractive the affirmative, was clearly a disputed ques
to entice children into danger, and to sug
gest to the defendant the probability of Circuit Court, Northern District of Ohio, in the occurrence of such an accident; and, volves questions of present and growing intherefore, such further question is also a terest as regards the right to enjoin intimidamatter to be determined by the jury. Mackey tion of workmen by labor unions. The court v. City of Vicksburg (Miss.), 2 South. Rep. held that an injunction will be granted wbere 178; Railroad Co. v. Stout, supra. The sub. members of labor organizations conspire unject of the attractiveness of the premises was lawfully to interfere with the management of submitted to the jury by the instructions the business of a corporation, and to compel given for the plaintiff in the case at bar.” the adoption of a particular scale of wages, See, also, Stendal v. Boyd (Minn., 1897), 69 by congregating riotously and in large num. N. W. Rep. 899, affirming such a judgment bers, at and near the works of the corporawithout discussion on authority of the tion, for the purpose of preventing persons "Turntable Cases ;” Bransom's Admr. v. not members of said organizations from enterLabrot, 81 Ky. 638; Manufacturing Co. v. ing the employ of the corporation or remainCooper (Ark.), 31 S. W. Rep. 154.
ing therein, by intimidation, consisting in
physical force or injury, actual or threatened, The difficulty about these cases is, as stated
to person or property. The jurisdiction of by the Texas court, that they either impose equity is not ousted because the acts comupon owners of property a duty not before plained of may also be the subject of indictimposed by law, or they leave to a jury to ment. Upon the law governing the case, the find legal negligence in cases where there is no legal duty to exercise care. In these cases
In State v. Glidden, 55 Conn. 46, 8 Atl. Rep. 890, the the courts, yielding to the hardships of indi- defendants were prosecuted for a conspiracy having vidual instances where owners have been
for its object to compel a newspaper publishing com
pany against its will to discharge its workmen, and to guilty of moral though not legal wrongs in
employ such persons as the defendants and their aspermitting attractive and dangerous turn- sociates should name. This case was decided in Feb tables to remain unguarded on their premises
ruary, 1887. It is the first American case in which
the word "boycott" is used. That word originated in popular cities to the destruction of little
from the efforts of certain Irish tenants to exclude children, have passed beyond the safe and Capt. Boycott from all intercourse with bis neighbors ancient landmarks of the common law, and
because he endeavored lawfully to collect his rents.
The supreme court, in State v. Glidden, said: "It assumed legislative functions where none ex
seems strange that in this day, and in this free country isted. The opinion in the Texas case does -a country in which law interferes so little with the not go to the extent of holding (and the
liberty of the individual--it should be necessary to
announce from the bench that every man may carry court directly repudiates such an idea) that
on his business as he pleases, may do what he will one is not liable for injuries to persons going with his own, so long as he does nothing unlawful
, on to his land uninvited when such injuries
and acts with due regard to the rights of others, and
that the occasion for such an announcement should are intentionally inflicted, e. g., where a pit
be, not an attempt by government to interfere with is sunk or a gun is set upon one's land to the rights of the citizen, nor by the rich and powerful injure trespassers. In such cases the liability to oppress the poor, but an attempt by a large body
of workingmen to control, by means little, if any, is based upon the breach of the duty imposed
better than force, the actions of employers." The by law not to intentionally injure even a court further said that the defendants in effect said to trespasser. In such cases the liability is not
the publishing company: “It is true we have no inbased upon the assumption that the owner
terest in your business, we have no capital invested
therein, we are in no wise responsible for its losses of owes a duty to the uninvited person to keep failures, we are not directly benefited by its succes, his premises reasonably safe, but upon the and we do not participate in its profits; yet we base fact that he owes a duty to such person not
a right to control its management, and compel you to
submit to our dictation." The court declared that to intentionally injure him.
the bare assertion of such a right was startling, and that: “Upon the same principle, and for the same reasons, the right to determine what business other
shall engage in, when and where it shall be carried NOTES OF RECENT DECISIONS.
on, etc., will be demanded, and must be conceded.
The principle, if it once obtains a foothold, is aggress INJUNCTION-INTIMIDATION OF WORKMEN BY
sive, and is not easily checked. It thrives by what it LABOR UNIONS.—The case of Consolidated feeds on, and is insatiate in its demands. More re Steel & Wire Co. v. Murray, 80 Fed. Rep.
quires more. If a large body of irresponsible mer
demand and receive power outside of law, over and 811, recently decided by the United States
above law, it is not to be expected that they will be
satisfied with a moderate and reasonable use of it. All history proves that abuses and excesses are inevitable. The exercise of irresponsible power by men, like the taste of human blood by tigers, creates an unappeasable appetite for more.” The court sus. tained the verdict of guilty against the defendants. The case of State v. Stewart, 59 Vt, 273, 9 Atl. Rep. 559, was a prosecution for conspiracy to hinder and prevent the Ryegate Granite Works, a corporation, from employing certain granite cutters, and to hinder and deter certain laborers from working for said corporation. The court, sustaining the indictments, held that: “The labor and skill of the workman, the plant of the manufacturer, and the equipment of the farmer, are in equal sense property; every man has the right to employ bis talents, industry and capital as he pleases, free from the dictation of others; and, if two or more persons combine to coerce his choice in this behalf, it is a criminal conspiracy, whether the means employed are actual violence or a species of intimidation that works upon the mind.” The court further said: "The exposure of a legitimate business to the control of an association that can order away its employees and frighten away others that it may seek to employ, and thus be compelled to cease the further prosecution of its work, is a condition of things utterly at war with every principle of justice, and with every safeguard of protection that ens under our system of government are entitled to enjoy. The direct tendency of such intimidation is to establish over labor and over all industries a control tbat is unknown to the law, and that is exerted by a secret association of conspirators, actuated solely by personal considera. tions, and whose plans, carried into execution, usually result in violence and the destruction of property."
The same court, in State v. Dyer, decided at the October Term, 1894, and reported 67 Vt. 690, 32 Atl. Rep. 814, held: “That a combination of two or more persons to restrain an employer to discharge a particular workman by threatening to prevent bis obtaining other workmen, or to constrain a workman to join a certain organization by threatening to prevent him from obtaining work unless he does so, is a criminal conspiracy at common law.” The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Murdock v. Walker (Jan., 1893), 162 Pa. St. 595, 25 Atl. Rep. 492, decided that a court of equity will restrain by injunction discharged employees, members of a union, from gathering about their former employer's place of business, and from following the workmen whom he has employed in place of the defendants, from gathering about the boarding houses of such workmen, and from interfering with them by threats, menaces, intimidation, ridicule and annoyances on account of their working for the plaintiffs. The Court of Errors and Appeals of the State of New Jersey, at its October Term, 1894, in the case of Barr v. Trades Council, 53 N. J. Eq. 101, 30 Atl. Rep. 881, very thoroughly and elaborately considered the questions involved in this case. Before entering upon the discussion, the court said: “No unprejudiced person at this cay wishes to place any obstacle in the way of labor organizations conducting their operations within Jawful limits. It is unfortu. nate that, despite the warning and counsel accredited leaders, the reckless and revengeful among the mem. bers, with the vicious and lawless always to be found among the idle, so often take advantage of labor demonstrations to commit acts of violence against persons and property, and thus weaken the sympathy of the public with the system. Yet every one must acknowledge that organization has accomplisbed much in the past for the benefit of the workingman, and
recognize its possibilities to secure to him, in the future, enjoyment of other privileges. But while en. gaged in this laudable purpose, those who give directions to affairs should not attempt to secure their ends by infringing the lawful rights of others." The sug. gestions contained in this quotation are well worthy of consideration by all labor organizations. No class of men stands more in need of the protection of the law and of its safeguards than do laboring men, nor to any class is public sympathy and the support of public opinion more desirable; and to no class will both these be more cordially extended so long as these organizations keep themselves within the limits of law and order. Whenever they exceed such limits, they greatly weaken themselves and the cause they represent, for an overwhelming majority of the American people are so thoroughly in favor of the maintenance and supremacy of law that they will de. feat any attempt to pervert or overturn it. The court, in Barr v. Trades Council, declared that a man's busi. ness is his property, and that the right to acquire, possess and protect property is a natural and inalienable right, which all men have, with those of enjoying and defending life and property, and of pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness. The court said that this was an echo of Magna Charta, and quoted from Mr. Justice Bradley in the Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, at page 116, where he says: “For the preservation, exercise and enjoyment of these rights (life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness), the individual citizen, as a necessity, must be left free to adopt such calling, profession or trade as may seem to him most conducive to that end. Without this right be cannot be a freeman. This right to choose one's calling is an essential part of that liberty which it is the object of the government to protect; and a calling, when chosen, is a man's property and right. Liberty and property are not protected where these rights are arbitrarily assailed." The court also said: “This freedom of business action lies at the foundation of all commer. cial and industrial enterprises. Men are willing to embark capital, time and experience therein, because they can confidently assume that they will be able to control their affairs according to their own ideas, when the same are not in contlict with law. If this privilege is denied them, if the courts cannot protect them from interference by those who are not interested with them, if the management of business is to be taken from the owner and assumed by, it may be, irresponsible strangers, then we will have to come to the time when capital will seek after other than indus. trial cbannels for investments, when enterprise and development will be crippled, when interstate rail. roads and canals and means of transportation will be. come dependent on the paternalism of the national government, and the factory and the workshop subject to the uncertain chances of co-operative systems."
The court found that the acts of the defendants practically infrioged upon the exercise of this right by Mr. Barr. The defendants were 18 bodies known as “abor unions,” embracing many trades in the city of Newark, affiliated in a society or representative body known as the “Essex Trades Council.” One of these unions was incorporated; the others were not. The Essex Trades Council itself was a voluntary as. sociation, composed of delegates or representatives chosen thereto by each of the 18 different unions or as. sociations. Mr. Barr, as proprietor of the daily morning newspaper in Newark, determined to employ plate or stereotyped matter in the making up of his paper for publication. All the employees were members of the local typographical union, wbich had de