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E. Rep. 308; People v. Cipperly, 101 N. Y. 631, 4 N. E. Rep. 107. The same rule that no criminal intent is necessary has been held to apply under an act forbidding the sale of oleomargarine or other imitations of dairy products, unless express notice be given to the purchaser. Bayles v. Newton, 50 N. J. Law, 549, 18 Atl. Rep. 77; Com. v. Gray, 150 Mass. 327, 23 N. E. Rep. 47. The English rule is in keeping with the doctrine in this country on this subject. Roberts v. Egerton, L. R. 9 Q. B. 494. The statute not requiring knowledge on the part of the seller to make the offense complete, we are satisfied that the conviction must be sustained. No case has been cited, and we are not able to find one, where a contrary doctrine is laid down. The act may work hardship in many cases, but that question is one to be addressed to the legislature, and not to the courts. As we have said, it was within the power of the legislature to pass the act making it an offense punishable with fine and imprisonment to sell adulterated food or drink, although the person selling the same has no knowledge that it is adulterated. Under this statute, one making sales must do so at his peril. The conviction is affirmed.
article so prepared as to be liable to deceive the pub. lic as to its real nature, was forbidden, it was beld that it was inmaterial that the immediate purchaser was aware of its real character. Com. y. Russell, 162 Mass. 520.
Liability of Master and Servant.—The agent, who makes the contract for the sale of a forbidden article, is personally liable, though the order is filled directly by the principal in another State. Meyer v. State supra; State v. Newton, 50 N. J. Law, 534. When the agent or employee makes the sale, the master is per: sonally liable, though he was unaware of that particular sale, since he is acting by his agent in the cou. duct of his business. Com. y. Stewart, 159 Mass. 113; Brown y. Foot, 66 Law T. (N. S.) 649; Meyer v. State, 54 Ohio, 242; Com. v. Warren, 160 Mass. 533.
Illustrations.-A sale of liquid chicory and coffee under the name of liquid coffee was considered a vio. lation of a law forbidding the sale of an article in im. itation of or sold under the name of another article. State v. Dreher (Obio, June, 1896), 44 N. E. Rep. 510. Where cocoa was sold, from which a part of its strength was extracted to make it more bealtbful, & had been the usage for many years, it was held by the lower court, that the law, forbidding the sale of an article of food from which a valuable or necessary in. gredient had been wholly or in part abstracted, ww not violated; Rose v. State, 11 Ohio Cir. Ct. 87; the appellate court took the opposite view. Rose y. State, 2 Ohio N. P. D. 270. A retail dealer in milk, who poured eight gallons of unskimmed milk into a pail and sold it to customers in small quantities by dipping it out from the pail, and finally, when only two quarto thereof were left, after four hours had been consumed in such selling, sold one pint to & cl tomer, wherein by examination there was found to be a deficiency of thirty three per cent of fatty matter, was held to have violated the law forbidding the sale of any article of food, from which any part of it had been abstracted so as to affect its quality, sub stance or nature, without notifying the purchaser of such alteration. During the four bours of sales the cream had risen to the top of the milk, leaving the lower portion of inferior strength, which the vendor might have prevented by occasionally stirring the milk. Dyke v. Gower, 1 Q. B. (1892) 220. The placing of a substance unmarked among other fr* ceries upon shelves or a counter in a sales room is 20 act from which, in the absence of rebutting testimons, an intent to sell may be inferred in a prosecution for exposing for sale adulterated articles without labels to clearly show their nature. State v. Dunbar, 1 Oreg. 591. Keeping an article, intended for sale bo hind a screen unlabeled was not considered a violk tion of a law forbidding the exposure for sale bs * tail of such article without its being labeled, in the absence of evidence that an evasion of the law 93 intended. Crane v. Lawrence, 25 Q. B. D. 152.
Constitutional Limitations.To what extent a State by legislation under its police power may interfer with or control interstate commerce is a questios yet free from doubt. The fact that congress bas 25 legislated on a question relating to interstate ftp merce is held to raise a presumption, that a stale shall not create any restrictions in such matter. Lever v. Hardin, 135 :U. S. 100. The fact that the Centet States imposes a license on those conducting a certal business, does not prevent a State from probibing such business within its borders. Com. v. Crabe, la Mass. 218. It is well settled that a State cannot pip vent the importation of articles from another stat nor the sale thereot so long as the original package
NOTE.-It is universally recognized, that a State may pass laws to prevent the sale of adulterated articles of food or of such as are prejudicial to health. Such legislation is a proper exercise of the police power of the State for the protection of the health of its citizens. McAllister v. State, 72 Md. 370; State v. Horgan, 55 Minn. 183; Cook v. State (Ala. May, 1856), 20 South. Rep. 360. So the sale of any article may be forbidden if the public is liable to be deceived as to the nature of such article, and more especially if it be deleterious to health. Butler v. Chambers, 36 Minn. 69. Such sale becomes unlawful by reason of the existence of the statute forbidding it (Haines y. People, 7 Colo. App. 467); and the statute is not invalidated, because it makes that unlawful which before its existence was lawful or even innocent. People y. West, 106 N. Y. 293.
Criminal Intent.-A guilty intent is generally an essential element in crimes at common law; Com. y. Weiss, 139 Pa. St. 247), but a different rule prevails in statutory crimes. In such cases the question is de. termined by the phraseology of the statute (Com. v. Weiss, supra.) When a statute makes an act indictable, irrespective of a guilty knowledge, then ignorance of the fact is no defense, Com. v. Gray, 150 Mass. 327; People v. West, 106 N. Y. 293; Meyer v. State, 10 Ohio Cir. Ct. 226; Farrell v. State, 30 Am, Rep. 614, note; Com. v. Warren, 160 Mass. 533; Altschut v. State, 8 Ohio Cir. Ct. 214; State v. Newton, 50 N. J. Law, 534. In many cases the object of the law would be defeated, if it were necessary to prove such knowledge on the part of the defendant. On this proposition the principal case is well sustained by the authorities, though there are decisions to the con. trary. Farrell v. State, 32 Ohio St. 456; Kelly v. State, 2 Ohio Dec. 239; Haas v. State, 2 Ohio Dec. 177. It has been held, that where the act done is not an offepse, unless some independent fact co-existed with it, ignorance of the existence of such fact or a mis. taken belief in good faith and on reasonable grounds of its non existence should excuse from cr me. Meyer v. State, 10 Ohio Cir. Ct. 226.
Where the sale of an
or employee of the shipper would revolutionize the whole law relating to the duties, obligations, and liabilities of common carriers."'-- Yale Law Journal.
containing such goods upon their arrival in the State, are unbroken. In re Wortben, 58 Fed. Rep. 467; Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100; Ex parte Scott, 66 Fed. Rep. 45; Donald v. Scott, 67 Fed. Rep. 854. A recent modification of this principle has been promulgated. A State may exclude from its markets any compound artificially colored or adulterated so as to look like an article of food in general use, whereby the public may be cheated into buying what they do not intend to buy. The prohibition of the manufacture of such articles or of the selling, or of the having with the intent to sell, of such articles is a lawful exercise of the police power of a State, even relative to imported original packages. Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678; Plumley y. Massachusetts, 155 U. S. 461; State v. Newton, 50 N. J. Law, 534; Com. y. Huntley, 156 Mass. 236.
S. S. MERRILL. St. Louis, Mo.
QUERY-ASSAULT WITH DEADLY WEAPON. A steps up to B and covers him with a loaded gun and says to him, “B I am going to kill you," and raises the hammer of his gun and places the piece to his shoulder. Bimmediately begins to plead for his life, and while A's fivger is trembling on the trigger and about to send the fatal bullet on its destroying errand B succeeds, by persuasive manners, inducing A to desist and gets away from him. Immediately there. after B has A arrested and charges him with an "assault with a deadly weapon." Should A be convicted as charged? Cite authorities.
JETSAM AND FLOTSAM.
ACTION FOR INDUCING THIRD PARTY TO BREAK CON.
OI ALL the Current Opinions of ALL the State and Territorial Courts of Last Resort, and of the Supreme, Circuit and District Courts of the United States, except those that are Published in Fall or Commented upon in our Notes of Recent Decisions, and except those Opinions in whicb no Important Legal Principles are Dis. cassed of Interest to the Profession at Large.
The Supreme Court of Missouri in the recent case of Glencoe Sand & Gravel Co. v. Hudson Bros. Commission Co., 40 S. W. Rep. 93, has decided that no ac. tion will lie against one who induces a third party to break a contract with another, unless the relation of master and servant was created by such contract. In reaching this conlcusion the court has departed from the English doctrine as laid down in Lumley v. Guy, 2 El. & B. 216, and Bowen v. Hall, 62 B. Div. 333, and from Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mags. 555; Haskins v. Royster, 70 N. C. 601; Jones v. Stanley, 76 N. C. 355, and Jones v. Blocker, 43 Ga. 331, the early decisions of this country following the English decisions.
Lumley v. Guy, supra, decided in 1863, was the first English case to extend the doctrine and hold that an action would lie for the procurement of a breach of contract even though the strict relation of master and servant did not exist. Bowen v. Hall, supra, followed and affirmed this in 1881. Walker v. Cronin, supra, and cases following it, held that the action did not rest upon the relation of master and servant alone, but was founded upon the legal right derived from the contract, and that it applied to all contracts of employment if not to contracts of every description. The later American decisions, wbich are relied upon by the court in the present case, hold directly the re
In Chambers v. Baldwin, 91 Ky. 122, and Bourlier v. Macauley, Id. 135, decided in 1891, it is beld that there are only two exceptions to the rule that an action capnot be maintained against one who maliciously procures the breach of a contract, viz:
(1) Where by a contract of employment the relation of master and servant exists, and (2), where the party has been procured to make the breach against his will by deception and coercion. Boysop v. Thorn, 98 Cal. 579, decided in 1893, holds that the action will not lie unless the relation of master avd servant exists, or there were threats, violence, falsehood, deception, etc., used in procuring the breach.
In the present case, which was an action brought for procuring a railway company to break a contract of carriage with the plaintiff, the learned judge thought It not pertinent to inquire whether the relation of master and servant existed between the plaintiff and the railroad, for "to hold that a carrier is the servant
. 20, 31, 79 COLORADO..
.37, 38 INDIANA......
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..5, 23, 33, 48, 59, 68, 77, 86 KENTUCKY..
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7, 21 MISSOURI....
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14, 19, 46, 87 NEW YORK.
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.35, 47, 74 SOUTH CAROLINA.
.88 TEXAS, 2, 8, 12, 22, 39, 40, 51, 52, 57, 58, 67, 69, 70, 72, 82, 84 UNITED STATES C. 0........ .15, 24, 41, 42, 45, 76, 81, 83 UNITED STATES C.C. APP.. .4, 11, 16, 18, 43, 44, 55, 64 UTAH....
1. APPEAL--Bills of Exceptions. – Where a bill of ex. ceptions has been improperly signed by the regular judge, instead of a special judge, the appellee, by fail. ing to object to its filing in the lower court, does not waive his right to object to its consideration on ap. peal.-LOUISVILLE SOUTHERN R. Co.'s RECEIVERS V. LEWIS, Ky., 41 S. W. Rep. 3.
2. ASSIGNMENT FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS Garnishment. Garnishment of an assignee for the bene. 4. BANKERS AND BROKERS-Pledge.- When securities have been purchased from one who deals in them sometimes as owner, and sometimes as broker for others, though a credit is given for a greater part of the price, and the securities remain in the vendor's hands subject to a lien for the balance, the mere fact that the vendor has, in other transactions, acted as the vendee's broker in dealing in securities with others, does not convert the securities purchased into the subject of a pledge for the payment of balances due from the vendee on the general account for brokerage transactions.-LEAHY V. LOBDELL, FARWELL & Co., U. 8. C. C. of App., Sixth Circuit, 80 Fed. Rep. 665.
at of creditors after the assignee has accepted the trust, but before the expiration of the four months in which creditors may accept the assignment, holds only so much of the assigned fund as remains after payment of the creditors accepting within guch time. -PATTY-JOINER CO. V. CITY BANK OF BHERMAN, Tex., 41 S. W. Rep. 173.
3. ATTACHMENT Jurisdiction - Service.--It is indis. pensable, to give a court jurisdiction in attachment proceedings, that there should be personal service of the summons in the action upon the defendant, or that the order of attachment be levied upon property of the defendant, or that an order of garnishment should be served upon a garnishee having property in his possession belonging to the defendant, or who is in. debted to such defendant. Where there has been no personal service in an action, and no property of the defendant seized under an attachment, and no prop. erty or credits belonging to the defendant reached by an order of garnishment, the court has acquired no jurisdiction, there being neither a service upon the de. fendant por any seizure of his property, there is nothing for the jurisdiction to rest upon, and any proceed. ings taken in the cause are coram non judice and void, and the cause must be dismissed. CENTRAL LOAN & TRUST Co. v. CAMPBELL COMMISSION CO., Okla., 49 Pac. Rep. 48.
mortgage with notice. - STANLEY V. CITIZENS' COAL & COKE CO., Colo., 49 Pac. Rep. 85.
10. CHATTEL MORTGAGES - Valldity - Possession, The right having been reserved to the maker of a chattel mortgage of a stock of goods, wares, and merchandise to sell, "in the usual course of business, and apply the proceeds of such sales to pay the actual and necessary expenses of carrying on the business, and replace enough goods to keep the stock up to its present value," the mortgage also provided that it was to “cover all goods, wares, and mercbandise bere. after bought for said store." The power is thus re. served to the mortgagor to appropriate the surplus. Such an instrument is itself fraudulent and void as to creditors, as a matter of law, irrespective of the ques. tion as to whether or not any fraud or fraudulent intent did, in fact, exist. - WILL T. LITTLE CO. V. BORK. HAM, Okla., 49 Pac. Rep. 66.
11. CONFLICT OF LAWS-Interest.-A contract intended to be performed, and actually performed, partly in one State and partly in another, may be treated by the parties as a contract of either State, and interest will then be due at the rate prevailing in that State.PORTER V. PRICE, U. S.C. C. of App., Eighth Circuit, 80 Fed. Rep. 655.
12. CONTRACT--Alterations.-A stipulation in a build. ing contract as originally made, that the contractor should make no claim for additional work, unless the same was done under order from the architect, and such claim made in writing, did not apply to work done pursuant to alterations made in the contract by subsequent agreement of the parties. - WILKENS V. WILKERSON, Tex., 41 $. W. Rep. 178.
13. CONTRACT-Building Contract.-General StrikeThe operatives of the planing mills in the city of St. Louls were on a strike from June 15th to August stb. There were 28 of such mills, and only 3 of them were in operation, and they were unable to secure skilled labor: Held, that there was a "general strike," witbin the meaning of a contract to erect a building in guet city excusing delay caused by a general strike WEBER V. COLLINS, Mo., 41 S. W. Rep. 249.
14. CONTRACTS-Interpretation – Receivers.--The de fendant appointed the plaintiff its agent for the state of Massachusetts for the term of five years, for which he was to receive a specified percentage of the business he procured in that State. The company, on the 23d of August, 1894, was declared to be insolvent by a decree of the court of chancery of this state, a receiver appointed, and the charter of the company declared to be forfeited and void: Held, that an action cannot be maintained by the plaintiff to recover damages from the receiver, because the plaintiff was not contioned after the date in such employment as agent under the contract. UNITED STATES CREDIT SYSTEM CO. V. ROSENBAUM, N, J., 37 Atl, Rep. 595.
15. CONTRACTS-Patents-Purchaser from Licensee.Where one purchases machines from a licensee of 1 patent and proceeds to use the game with knowledge of the facts and after notice from the owner of the patent that if he does so he will be held liable to make compensation for such use, an action may be brought by the owner of the patent upon an implied contract to recover such compensation. TRACK CO., U. S. C.C., E. D. (Penn.), 80 Fed. Rep. 7. 16. CONTRACTS
Performance to Satisfaction of Architect, When a contractor has undertaken to do certain work to the satisfaction of an architect, the determination of the architect go constituted an uw pire is final and conclusive, and can be impeachel only for fraud, collusion, or such gross mistake as in plies bad faith; but the parties have a right to the in dependent and honest judgment of the umpire with respect to the matters submitted to him, and an arbi tary refusal to determine the fact, or to accept per formance, where the work has been in good faith per formed, constitutes a fraud in law, a failing to die pense with the necessity for his judgment as a cond tion precedent to the right of recovery by the con
WEAVER V. SORTAT
5. BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATIONS Action by Members. -The general laws of a mutual benefit society, which, by the use of permissive words, only allow an appeal from the decision of an officer of the order, before whom the claimant of a death or disability benefit is required in the first instance to prosecute his claim, but which do not obligate him to appeal from an ad. verse decision as a condition precedent to an action upon his certificate or policy of insurance, may, in the event of such decision, maintain an action in the courts for the recovery of his logs.-SUPREME LODGE OF ORDER OF SELECT FRIENDS V. DEY, Kan., 49 Pac. Rep. 74. 6. BILLS AND NOTES - Assignment of Note.
The as. signee of a forged note may recover of the assignor the amount paid for the note without a previous judi. cial determination that the note is a forgery.-BROWN V. BOONE, Ky., 41 S. W. Rep. 18.
7. BILLS AND NOTES Bona Fide Purchasers. In. dorsees of negotiable notes, taken before maturity, in payment of an antecedent debt, without knowledge of any defense on the part of the maker as against the payee, are purchasers for value.-HOLDEN V. PHOENIX RATTAN CO., Mass., 47 N. E. Rep. 241.
8. CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS-Limited Ticket.-A rail. road ticket containing a statement that it is good for one continuous passage on and from date stamped on back” entitles the holder to only a passage beginning on such date.-TEXAS & N, O. R. CO. V. DEMILLEY, Tex., 41 S. W. Rep. 147.
9. CHATTEL MORTGAGES - Possession-Priority.-Un. der the statute of frauds, providing that every sale or assignment of goods not accompanied by immediate delivery, and followed by actual and continued change of possession, shall be conclusively presumed fraudu. lent as against the vendor's creditors, where, on maturity of a chattel mortgage, the mortgagee neglects to take possession of the property, he loses the priority of his lien against a creditor who took a subsequent
tractor for the work done.-CRANE ELEVATOR CO. v. CLARK, U. 8. C.C. of App., Seventh Circuit, 80 Fed.
17. CONTRACTS-Prior Oral Agreement.-The buyer of a machine under a written contract of conditional sale, full in its terms, and free from ambiguity, cannot show by parol evidence that, just before the contract was executed, it was agreed that, if the buyer's hus. band should not be satisfied with the contract and sale, the seller was to return to her an old machine take by him as a partial payment on the contract, and take the new one. SINGER MANUFG. 00. V. SULTS, Ind., 47 N, E. Rep. 341.
18. CONTRACTS--Rescission-Abandonment.-Besides technical rescission of a contract, releasing each party from every obligation under it, as if it had never been made, there is a mode of abandoning a contract, as a live and enforceable obligation, which still entitles the party declaring its abandonment to look to the con: tract to determine the compensation he may be en. titled to under its terms for the breach which gave him the right of abandonment; and courts, in construing the language used by laymen in such cases, will con. sider, not only the language of the party, but all the circumstances, including the effect of a complete rescission, and the probability or improbability of the party's intending such a result.-HAYES V. CiTY OF NASHVILLE, V. S. C. C. of App., Sixth Circuit, 80 Fed. Rep. 641.
19. CONTRACT OF INDEMNITY-Validity.-A contract to indemnify a common carrier of passengers against losses occurring from injuries to passengers carried by it is not invalid as against public policy, because it covers losses resulting from its negligence or the neg. ligence of its servants.--TRENTON PASS. R. CO. V. GUARANTORS' LIABILITY INDEMNITY CO., N. J., 37 Atl. Rep. 609.
20. CORONERS-Powerg. -A coroner has authority to employ a physician to make an anxopsy in order to as. certain the cause of death, and the county court can. not deppive him of the power to select suoh physician, and compel bim to accept one appointed by the court. -KEMPNER V. PULASKI COUNTY, Ark., 41 S. W. Rep. 50.
21. CORPORATIONS — Dissolution-Reincorporation.The creditors of a corporation ceased to do busi. ness, and its stockholders, with one other person, formed a pew corporation, with a different name, tak. ing all the assets of the old corporation except the books: Held, that a creditor of the old corporation had an equitable right to follow its assets, but could not maintain an action at law against the new corporation.-EWING V. COMPOSITE BRAKE-SHOK CO., Mass., 47 N. E. Rep. 211.
22. CORPORATION-Foreign Corporation - Interstate Commerce.- Where a foreign corporation, by agent, in Texas, sold a piano stored in that State, it was entitled to recover therein on notes given for the price, though It had not taken out a permit to transact business in the State, as required by statute; since the sale was a transaction of interstate commerce.-SHAW PIANO Co. V. FORD, Tex., 41 S. W. Rep. 199.
23. CORPORATION-Forfeiture of Franchise.-Courts are extremely reluctant to adjudge forfeitures of corporate privileges and franchises, and, being vested with some discretion in proceedings brought for that purpose, will ordinarily only do so where no other adequate remedy is available.-CITY OF TOPEKA V. To. PEKA WATER CO., Kap., 49 Pac. Rep. 79.
24. CORPORATIONS-Liability of Directors.-A director of a corporation is not liable for the misconduct of codirectors, not participated in by him as a wrong.doer, and a bill wbicb seeks to fix upon a director liability for negligent acts of the board, but does not charge him personally with any neglect, charging only neg. lect, by the board of directors, without mentioning bim, and alleging that information showing the char. acter of their acts was accessible to all the directors, is insufficient.-FISHER V. GRAVES, U.S.C. C., S. D. (N. Y.), 80 Fed. Rep. 590.
25. COUNTIES-Funding Bends-Increase of Indebtedness.-The issuance of funding bonds by a county in exchange for outstanding valid warrants is not the creation of a debt.-BOARD OF COMRS. OF LAKE COUNTY V. STANDLEY, Colo., 49 Pac. Rep. 23.
26. CREDITORS' SUITS-Parties--Abatement and Revival. In a creditors' suit to set aside ag fraudulent a general assignment for the benefit of creditors, the ag. signor, or, after his death, his personal representative, is a necessary party; and when the assignor, originally a party to such a guit, has died after its commence. ment, and his representative is not brought in, a judg. ment rendered for the plaintiff is fatally defective, though the facts of the assignor's death, the proot of bis will, and the qualification of his executrix are pleaded by supplemental complaint, and the executrix is a party in her individual capacity.-FIRST NAT. BANK OF AMSTERDAM V. SHULER, N. Y., 47 N. E. Rep. 262.
27. CRIMINAL EVIDENCE-Bigamy-Indictment-sufficiency-Evidence of Former Marriage.-Evidence, on a prosecution for bigamy, that defendant lived with a woman as his wife, and held her out to the world as such; that children were born to them; and that, after he had deserted her, he admitted the marriage, but claimed to have obtained a divorce-was sufficient to show a former marriage, without evidence of a wit. ness to the ceremony.-STATB V. JENKINS, MO., 41 8. W. Rep. 221.
28. CRIMINAL EVIDENCE - Confession--Joint Indict. ment.-Statements by one of two defendants jointly indicted, attempting to inculpate his co-defendant and excuse himself, are not admissible as a conteggion,STATB V. MITCHELL, S. Car., 27 $. E. Rep. 424.
29. CRIMINAL EVIDENCE-Larceny.-One charged with larceny cannot prove declarations of his as to who owned the horse etc., made long after the taking.STATE V. WTTERS, MO., 41 S. W. Rep. 221.
SO. CRIMINAL LAW-Evidence-Former Conviction.Under Rev. St. $ 3959 (providing that any person com. mitted after pardon, or discharge for compliance with prior sentence to the penitentiary, shall be punished for the subsequent offense by imprisonment for the longest term prescribed for such offense), where an in. dictment is drawn in accordance with such section, evidence of a prior conviction and imprisonment is ad. missible.--STATE V. MANECKE, Mo., 41 S. W. Rep. 223.
31. CRIMINAL LAW--Homicide - Justification. - One upon whom an assault is made with intent to kill may stand bis ground, and, if need be, kill his assailant, al. though he might retreat with safety to himself, and thereby avoid the killing.-LA RUE V. STATE, Ark., 41 $. W. Rep. 53.
32. CRIMINAL LAW-Rape.-An allegation in an in. dictment for rape which charges that the defendant "feloniously made an assault and attempted by force, threats and violence to have carnal knowledge of a fe. male without her consent," is equivalent to a statement that she resisted, and under such an allegation evidence that she resisted or was prevented from resisting is admissible.-HARMON V. TERRITORY, Okla., 49 Pac. Rep. 55.
33. CRIMINAL LAW-Robbery.-Robbery in the first degree may be committed by taking property from the possession of a servant or agent of the owner, as well as from the owner himself; and in the information the ownership of the property may be alleged as in the person robbed, or the true owner.--STATE V. ADAMS, Kan,, 49 Pac. Rep. 81. 34. CRIMINAL PRACTICE - Indictment
DemurrerGrand Jury.-A demurrer to an indictment goes only to the sufficiency thereof and of the averments therein, and not to questions affecting the regularity or legal. ity of the organization of the grand jury that returng it.-PATSWALD V. UNITED STATES, Okla., 49 Pac. Rep. 57.
35. DEATH-Presumption.-Where three sisters perish in the same disaster, and there is no way to determine
which died first, the rights of succession to their es tates are to be determined as it death occurred to all at the same moment.-IN RE WILBOR, R. I., 37 Atl. Rep. 634.
36. DECREE – Vacating-Fraud. -Where a deed was assailed in a proceeding to avoid the same on the ground that it had been obtained through fraud on the maker, the decree declaring the validity of such deed will not, in a subsequent proceeding to vacate such de. cree, be set aside on the ground that such deed had been forged, unless it be made to appear that fraud was practiced in the "very act" of obtaining such decree, or that plaintiff was prevented by interposition of defendants from showing the alleged forgery in the former suit.-HAMILTON V. MOLEAN, MO., 41 8. W. Rep. 224.
37. DEEDS-Escrow-Waiver.- Where a grantee takes possession of land under a deed which, with a note for the price, is deposited with a third person, with an agreement that it shall not be delivered till the note is pald, one who, after the grantee's death, purchases the note at the request of the administratrix, may, by agreement with her, without notice to the heirs, walve bis rights under the original agreement, allow the deed to be delivered, and enforce the note against the heirs.--SMITH V. GOODRICH, 111., 47 N. E. Rep. 316.
38. DEED-Resulting Trust.-Where a deed, absolute on its face, purported to be for a valuable considera. tion, and to the sole use of the grantee, and there was no fraud or mistake, there can be no implied trust in favor of the grantor.-MYERS V. MYERS, II., 47 N. E. Rep. 309.
39. DEPOSITION-Failure to swear Interpreter.-The fact that the interpreter for the officer by whom a dep. osition was taken was not sworn in accordance with law, where the officer himself did not understand the language of the witness, requires the suppression of such deposition.-DAVIS V. MIGLIPACA, Tex., 41 S. W. Rep. 91.
40. ELECTION-Ballot - Office.- Where a ballot has upon it defendant's name, but does not disclose the office voted for, and it appears that defendant was running for the office of alderman, and none other, and no one, at the election, of the same name, was running for any office, the ballot will be construed as a vote for the defendant as alderman.-VOGLER V. MAHNCKE, Tex., 41 S. W. Rep. 185.
41. EQUITY_Bill to Recover Oil Wells.-In Pennsyl. Vania, equity has no jurisdiction of a bill to restrain the operation of oil wells, or the taking of oil there. from, where the complainant's title is purely legal, the respondent is solvent, and there are neither complicated accounts nor such irreparable injury as warrants interference by injunction. The substantial purpose of such a bill being to recover possession of the wells, the remedy by ejectment, aided by writ of estrepment under the State statutes is full and adequate.-ERSKINE v. FOREST OIL CO., U. S. C. C., W. D. (Penn.), 80 Fed. Rep. 53.
42. FEDERAL COURTS - Enjoining Sales Ordered by State Court.-After the entry of an order in a State court dissolving a corporation and ordering a sale of its property, consisting chiefly of real estate, certain members of the corporation (some of whom had had notice of the proceedings in the State court two years before, but had taken no action) applied to the federal court to restrain the sale, on the ground that the State court was wholly without jurisdiction: Held, that such injunction should not be granted.-SIMPSON V, WARD, U.S.C. C., S. D. (N. Y.), 80 Fed. Rep. 561.
43. FEDERAL COURTS -- Jurisdiction -- Citizenship.Where a trustee under a mortgage made to secure a series of bonds refuses to foreclose after default, any holder of such bonds may file a bill for the benefit of himself and all others, and pray foreclosure. To such a bill the trustee holding the legal title to the mortgaged property is a pecessary party, and may be made a defendant when he refuses to file such bill himself.
FIRST NAT. BANK OF CHATTANOOGA, TENN., V. RADFORD TRUST Co., U.S. O. C. of App., Sixth Circuit, 80 Fed. Rep. 569.
44. FEDERAL COURTS – Jurisdiction - Mandamag to Levy Tax.-A federal circuit court issued a mandamus requiring the county court to levy a tax to pay a judgment against the county. Certain inhabitants of the town flled a bill in a state court to enjoin the levy on property in the town, claiming that such property was not subject to the claim upon which the judgment was based. This injunction suit was then removed by defendants to the federal court: Held, that the latter court had jurisdiction thereof, as it involved the enforcement of a judgment of a federal court acting under the federal laws and constitution.-FIRST NAT. BANK OF CEREDO V. SOCIETY FOR SAVINGS, U. 3. C. C. of App., Fourth Circuit, 80 Fed. Rep. 581.
45. FEDERAL COURTS Jurisdiction – Rights under State Statutes.-Whenever a statute of a State gives a right, such right may, on proper citizenship, be enforced by suitable proceedings in the federal courts.LILIENTHAL V. DRUCKLIEB, U. S. C.O., S. D. (N. Y.), SO Fed. Rep. 562.
46. FRAUDS, STATUTE OF - Contract not to be Per formed in a Year.-The defendant made an oral agree. ment, 20 years ago, that, in consideration of certain domestic services to be performed by the plaintifi, he would support and maintain her during her life-time: Held, that this contract was not within the statute of frauds, because it might have been fully performed and terminated by her death within a year.--EISER MAN V. SCHNEIDER, N. J., 37 Atl. Rep. 623.
47. GOARDIAN AND WARD – Setting Aside Release.The mere fact that a court of probate has received and recorded a release obtained by a guardian from her ward on his arrival at full age does not conclude the ward from maintaining a bill in equity to set aside the release for fraud.--O'CONNOR V. O'CONNOR, B. 1., 37 Atl. Rep. 634.
48. HABEAS CORPUS -- Review.-To permit of petitioner's release on habeas corpus on the ground that the crime for which he was convicted was committed at a place which did not permit of the trial court's having jurisdiction, such fact must clearly appear.-IN RI TERRILL, Kab., 49 Pac. Rep. 158.
49. HIGHWAY8-Obstruction-Rights of Abutters.-AD abutting owner, who owns the fee in no part of the highway, cannot recover for obstruction of the highway, unless he has sustained an injury not common to all who use the highway.--PITTSBURGH, ETC. $1. L. RY. CO. V. NOFTSGER, Ind., 47 N. E. Rep. 332.
50. HIGHWAYS - Vacation of Public Road-Damages. -The owners of land along and through which a pab lic road runs are not entitled to damages on vacation of the road by the proper authorities.-JOHNSON V. BOARD OF COMRS. OF DEER LODGE COUNTY, Mont., Pac. Rep. 147.
51. HOMESTEAD Conclusiveness of Patent.-Where one entitled to acquire a homestead donation takes steps to acquire it, and thereby acquires an equity in the land, the subsequent issuance to another of 3 patent to the land, based on false affidavits of occa pancy, does not extinguish his right, the patent not being conclusive on the question of the patentee's uc cupancy.-DRINKARD V. BARNETT, Tex., 41 8. W. Rep. 198.
52. HOMESTEAD-Evidence.-On an issue whetber A certain lot was the homestead of defendant, evidence of preparation to improve the land, together with dee larations of the defendant as to his intent, was aduis: sible.- FORTNER V. EDGEWOOD DISTILLING CO., Tel.: 41 S. W. Rep. 184.
53. HUSBAND AND WIFE – Necessaries.--Uoder Gez. St. ch.52, art. 2, § 2, providing that the wife's reale tate shall be liable for such of her debts contracted after marriage son account of necessaries for bersell or any member of family, her husband included," 13 shall be evidenced by writing, the wife's land may be