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llen on the property, as laborers, for the amounts due them, their failure to follow up the charge of fraud by any proof of it does not estop them from setting up a claim of priority on account of their alleged lien.GALLOWAY V. BLUE SPRINGS MIN. Co., Tenn., 37 S. W. Rep. 1016.

28. CRIMINAL LAW-Homicide.-A charge that, where one performs an act which it is known will produce a particular result, he is presumed to have anticipated and intended that result; and that "from the very fact of a blow being struck we have the right to infer as presumption of fact that the blow was intended prior to the striking, though at a period of time inappreciably distant," is not error.-ALLEN V. UNITED STATES, U.S. S. C., 17 S. O. Rep. 154.

29. CRIMINAL LAW-Homicide-Self-defense.-Where one, after making a slight assault upon another, provoked by insulting words of the latter, in good faith withdraws from further contest, his right of self-defense is restored if the assaulted person then, in viola. tion of law, pursues him with a deadly weapon, and seeks to take bis life, or do him great bodily harm.ROWE V. UNITED STATES, U. S. 8. C., 17 S. O. Rep. 172. 30. CRIMINAL LAW-Information Amendment. -An information may be amended as to a Christian name or initial, with leave of court, after plea and before trial-STATE V. MCDONALD, Kan., 46 Pac. Rep. 966.

1. CRIMINAL LAW-Warrant-Sufficiency of Charge.In charging a public offense it is not necessary that there should be the same fullness of statement in the warrant or preliminary papers that is required in the information.-STATE V. BAKER, Kan., 46 Pac. Rep. 947. 32. CRIMINAL PRACTICE — Obscenity.-Under Rev. St. 1884, § 2081 (Rev. St. 1881, § 1995), declaring guilty of publie indecency any one over 14 years of age who uses obscene or licentious language in the presence or hearing of a female, etc., if the words charged are not obscene or licentious per se, the indictment must show by extrinsic averments that they were used in that sense, and were so understood by the female.-STATE V. CONE, Ind., 45 N. E. Rep. 345.

33. DEED-Conditions Subsequent Equity.-A deed recited that, in consideration of the performance of Its conditions, the grantors "have given, conveyed," and "do give, grant," certain land, and provided that on the death of the grantors the absolute title should vest in the grantee, provided she had fulfilled the conditions, but on failure to perform such conditions all rights conveyed should revert to the grantors: Held, that the conditions were conditions subsequent, so as to authorize equity to relieve from a forfeiture in case of non-performance. - DONNELLY V. EASTES, Wis., 69 X. W. Rep. 157.

34. DEED-Defective Description. An administra. tor's deed, as well as all proceedings in the probate court, including the orders of sale and confirmation, described the land sold as "half interest in and to 893 acres" of a certain survey. Parol evidence, offered to identify the land intended, showed that the survey ineluded much more than 893 acres: Held, that the description was too vague and uncertair to pass title to any land, and that the deed constituted no defense to an action by the heirs to recover the land owned by the decedent.-HERMAN V. LIKENS, Tex., 37 S. W. Rep.

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3. DEED-Whether Mortgage or Assignment. - An instrument, reciting that the maker does "bargain, sell, and deliver" to W certain personal property, "to have and hold the same unto the said P, and his successors in this trust, forever," provided that, if the maker should, within 60 days, pay certain creditors named the specified amount of his indebtedness to them, the conveyance should be void, and the prop. erty restored to him, and that, in case of his failure so to pay, it should be the duty of W or his successors to sell the property: Held, a deed of trust in the nature of a mortgage, and not an assignment for the benefit of creditors.-W. B. GRIMES DRY GOODS Co. V. MALOtar, U. S. 8. C., 17 8. C. Rep. 158.

36. DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION Devisable Interest in Land. The right of a grantor to re-enter for breach of a condition subsequent is not an "estate or interest in real property descendible to heirs," within 2 Rev. St. p. 57, § 2, making such estate devisable, but, on the grantor's death, passes to his heirs, to be exercised by them as decedent's representatives, and not by virtue of the law of descent.-UPINGTON V. CORRIGAN, N. Y., 45 N. E. Rep. 359.

37. ELECTIONS-Conventions - Nominations.-Where a political party in a county divides into opposing factions, and each faction holds a convention, com posed of a large number of delegates, and nominates a full set of candidates for the offices to be filled by the voters of the county, the county officers whose duty it is to consider objections to certificates of nomination and nomination papers have no power or authority to determine which of the two opposing factions is the true representative of the party, nor to exclude the candidates of either faction from the official ballot after the nomination of its candidates has been duly and regularly certified to the county clerk in the man. ner pointed out by the statute.-SIMS V. DANIELS, Kan., 46 Pac. Rep. 952.

38. EQUITY- Jury Trial. While in a cause of an equitable character, neither party can demand a jury as a matter of right, and usually the better practice is for the court to try it alone, yet the court may, in its discretion, order any issue or issues of fact to be tried by a jury, and error will not lie, unless for an abuse of such discretion.-MACLELLAN V. SEIM, Kan., 46 Pac. Rep. 959.

39. EQUITY-Reformation of Contracts.-Where, in a suit for the rescission of a contract for the sale of land for non-performance on the part of the grantor, the grantor claims a reformation of the contract on the ground of mistake, the supreme court, on appeal from a decree of rescission, may, on reversal, reform the contract.-JOHNSON V. WILSON, Mich., 69 N. W. Rep.

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40. EXECUTION

Collateral Attack. In an action upon a note given as collateral security, an order, entered in an action on the principal debt, allowing the sheriff to amend his return to an execution issued therein, and vacating the judgment, execution, and sale in such action, cannot be collaterally impeached for irregularity. — ASHLAND NAT. BANK V. GREGORY, Wis., 69 N. W. Rep. 168.

41. FEDERAL COURT Ancillary Jurisdiction. - A federal court which has possession of property by receivers, and is engaged in administering the trusts pertaining to it, must take jurisdiction of any claim by any one whose interests would be injuriously affected by the action of the court in dealing with the property and administering the trust.-BLAKE V. PINE MOUNTAIN IRON & COAL CO., U. S. C. C. of App., Sixth Circuit, 76 Fed. Rep. 624.

42. FEDERAL COURTS-Circuit Court of Appeals.Where the record does not show that the original writ of error sued out in the circuit court of appeals has been formally filed in the trial court, even though it was in fact delivered to and lodged with the clerk, the appellate court is without jurisdiction.-MUTUAL LIFE INS. Co. v. PHINNEY, U. S. C. C. of App., Ninth Circuit, 76 Fed. Rep. 617.

43. FIXTURES Machinery.-The mortgagor constructed a series of buildings, and placed certain machinery in the same, with the intent and purpose of making of all of the same a manufacturing plant, and used the same as such. The court below found that, as between him and the mortgagee, all of this machinery is a part of the realty: Held, the mere placing of the machinery in position in the buildings with intent to make it a permanent part of the manufactur ing plant does not make it part of the realty unless it is actually or constructively attached to the building or land. SHEPARD V. BLOSSOM, Minn., 69 N. W. Rep.

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44. FRAUDS, STATUTE OF-Sale of Decedent's Land.An agreement by the purchaser of land sold for debts of a decedent, with heirs of decedent, any of whom had a right to redeem, because it was sold for less than two-thirds of its appraised value, that, if they would abandon their intention to redeem, and allow him to take a conveyance under his purchase, he would pay them the value of the interest of one of the heirs, is not a contract for the sale of real estate," within the statute of frauds.-KALER V. GRADY, Ky., 37 S. W. Rep. 955.

45. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES Evidence.-Under Myer's Rev. St. ch. 59, § 4, providing that every con veyance made with intent to disturb, delay, hinder, or defraud creditors or others persons shall be void as against such creditors, purchasers, or other persons, conveyances by a defendant, after suit brought, of a part of his property, and of the balance after service of summons upon him, but before judgment in the action, to his son, a young man apparently theretofore possessed of no property, are void as against the judg ment creditor.-SCHUMACHER V. BELL, Ill., 45 N. E. Rep. 429.

46. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES - Mortgage - Future Advances.-Defendants, owning property worth $8,700, gave a mortgage thereon for $7,000 to secure a bona fide, present indebtedness of $6,200, and a sun, to be im. mediately advanced, sufficient to make the debt equal to at least the face of the mortgage: Held, that the mortgage was not fraudulent as to creditors.-BRADLEY CO. V. PAUL, Wis., 69 N. W. Rep. 168.

47. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES -Sale to Creditor.The fact that a creditor accepts a conveyance from a failing debtor, knowing that the debtor is giving him a preference for the purpose of avoiding payment of other creditors, and that the latter will thereby fail to realize their claims, does not invalidate the instru ment if it be taken in good faith to secure an honest debt.-BLEILER V. MOORE, Wis., 69 N. W. Rep. 164.

48. GARNISHMENT.-The attachment by garnishment of property of defendant upon which the garnishee has a lien is sufficient, under Minnesota statutes cited in the opinion, to give a court jurisdiction to render a valid judgment in rem against a non-appearing nonresident defendant served by publication only. The court has power to make all necessary orders for the ultimate application of defendant's interest in the property in satisfaction of such judgment.-HARTZELL V. VIGEN, N. Dak., 69 N. W. Rep. 203.

49. GARNISHMENT Assignment for Collection.-An assignment of a policy, after loss, for collection merely, does not exempt insurer from garnishment at the instance of a creditor of insured, the assignee being made a party to the proceedings.-RIGNEY V. JACOBS, Ind., 45 N. E. Rep. 343.

50. HOMESTEAD-Real Estate as Exempt.-Acts 1879, ch. 171, § 1, which provides that "a homestead or real estate in the possession of or belonging to each head of a family, and the improvements thereon, if any, to the value of, in all, one thousand dollars, shall be exempt," and the owner shall have the right to elect where the homestead or exemption shall be set apart, whether living on the same or not," does not exempt real estate as such, but secures to a debtor a homestead in lands not now occupied, but such as he may select and appropriate to that purpose when he desires.-MOSES V. GRONER, Tenn., 37 S. W. Rep. 1031.

51. INJUNCTION Maintaining Street Bridge.- An injunction to restrain a defendant railway company from maintaining a street bridge over its tracks, and to compel the removal of the same, will not lie at the instance of a property owner on the street, where the bridge was constructed by defendant as agent of a board of engineers, authorized by Laws 1872, ch. 702, to superintend the construction of the same, and the city, after its construction, assumed entire control over it.-TALBOT V. NEW YORK & H. R. Co., N. Y., 45 N. E. Rep. 382.

52. INJUNCTION PENDING EJECTMENT SUIT.-When plaintiff in ejectment shows title to the property, and that he will suffer irreparable injury unless defendant, who is hopelessly insolvent, be restrained from breaking the land and destroying it as pasture land, an injunction may Issue pendente lite.-GAINES V. LESLIE, I. T., 37 8. W. Rep. 947.

53. INLAND BILLS-Certificate of Protest-EvidenceNotice of Dishonor.-Under the statutes of this State the certificate of protest of a notary public is prima facie evidence of the facts of presentment, demand, and dishonor therein set forth, as well in the case of an inland bill or note as in the case of a foreign bill.ASHE V. BEASLEY, N. Dak., 69 N. W. Rep. 188.

54. INSOLVENT ESTATE-Lands Fraudulently Conveyed. By the provisions of section 6139, Rev. St., the administrator of an insolvent estate is a trustee for the creditors of his decedent with respect to lands conveyed by said decedent in fraud of his creditors, and he may maintain a suit to subject them to the pay. ment of the demands of such creditors, unless the rights of a purchaser in good faith from the fraudu lent grantee have intervened.-DONEY V. CLARK, Ohio, 45 N. E. Rep. 316.

55. INSURANCE Cancellation Waiver.-An insur ance company, having issued a "binding slip" con tinuing a policy in force for another year, subsequently wrote to the assured, informing him that unless he would consent to reduce the amount of the policy it would be considered canceled: Held, that the letter did not constitute a cancellation of the policy.-VAN TASSEL V. GREENWICH INS. CO. OF CITY OF NEW YORK, N. Y., 45 N. E. Rep. 365.

56. INSURANCE-Conditions-Waiver.-An indivisible policy, conditioned that it shall be void if insured's interest in the property insured is other than an uncon. ditional and exclusive ownership, is entirely avoided where a portion of the property is held on conditional sale, part of the purchase price being unpaid, though at the time of the issuance of the policy the seller had commenced proceedings to recover possession of the property for non-payment of the price, and insured had given bond in such case, in order to retain the property, to perform the judgment of the court.PHOENIX INS. Co. OF BROOKLYN V. PUBLIC PARKS AMUSEMENT Co., Ark., 37 S. W. Rep. 959.

57. INSURANCE-Conditions Waiver.-An insurance company is estopped to claim a forfeiture of a policy because consent to a transfer of title to the insured property was not indorsed on the policy, as required by its terms, where its general agent, having authority to make such indorsement, promised to go to a third person, who held the policy as collateral, and make the indorsement.-MANCHESTER V. GUARDIAN ASSUR. Co., N. Y., 45 N. E. Rep. 381.

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58. INSURANCE Contract to Insure.-A contract to insure is not shown by evidence that an application for insurance was made to an insurance agent repre senting several companies, the property and terms of insurance being specified, and that the agent, who at the time did not agree to place the insurance, but merely stated that he would see what he could do, for the purpose of determining whether the companies represented by him would take the risk, distributed the amount applied for among them, and sent his daily report to them in the usual way, which ordi narily indicated that the policies had been written.JOHN R. DAVIS LUMBER Co. v. SCOTTISH UNION & NATIONAL INS. Co., Wis., 69 N. W. Rep. 156.

59. INTOXICATING LIQUORS-Constitutionality of Acts. -Acts 23d Leg. p. 177, which places an annual tax on each establishment for the sale of intoxicating liquors, regulates the sale in many particulars, requires a bond conditioned that the obligor shall keep an open and orderly house, etc., and provides that the bond may be sued on at the instance of any person ag grieved by its violation, and such person shall be entitled to recover the sum of $500 as liquidated damages

for each infraction of the condition of such bond, is not in conflict with Const. art. 1, § 15, providing that the right of trial by jury shall be inviolate, etc.PRAVY V. GOSS, Tex., 378. W. Rep. 990.

60, JUDGMENTS Liens.-The fact that a decree for the sale of several pieces of property, to satisfy liens against them, permits a lien which only attached to one piece to share pro rata in the proceeds of all, does not render the decree void, but only reversible for error.-RYAN V. STAPLES, U. S. C. C. of App., Eighth Cir. cult, 76 Fed. Rep. 721.

61. JUDGMENT-Negligence of Attorney.-The negli gence of an attorney is attributable to his client, and when, through such negligence, a judgment is rendered against the client by default, he is not entitled to be relieved from it, under Rev. St. 1881, § 396, authorizing the vacation of a judgment when taken through the party's "mistake, inadvertence, surprise or exeusable neglect."-MOORE V. HORNER, Ind., 45 N. E. Rep. 341.

62. JUDGMENT-Vacation.-It was not an abuse of discretion to deny a motion to vacate a judgment rendered in the absence of plaintiff and his counsel, on account of the illness of the counsel, when the court was not satisfied from the showing that plaintiff had a good cause of action, and where a previous postponement had been made to the day on which the judg ment was rendered on account of the illness of plaintiff's counsel, and on an agreement with his representative that it should be tried on the day set, other counsel being employed if necessary.-HITTLE V. ZEIMER, III., 45 N. E. Rep. 419.

63. JUDGMENT AGAINST CORPORATIONS Conclusive. ness upon Stockholders.-Stockholders of a corporation are estopped from alleging that a decree estab lishing a vendor's lien upon corporate property should not be enforced because the vendor had waived the right to a lien by certain representations made to them before they became stockholders, when it appears that they were aware of the proceedings resulting in the decree, and yet failed to insist at the time that the vendor had waived such right.-WILSON V. SEYMOUR, U. S. C. C. of App., Eighth Circuit, 76 Fed. Rep. 678.

64. LANDLORD AND TENANT- Fixtures.-A tenant of lands purchased at execution sale certain buildings erected on the lands by a former tenant. The tenant subsequently took a lease of the land, without reserv. ing her rights in the buildings: Held, that her ownership in the buildings was thereby terminated, precluding her from maintaining an action against the owner of the land for fraudulently inducing her to surrender possession of the buildings.-TALBOT V. CRUger, N. Y., 45 N. E. Rep. 364.

6. LANDLORD AND TENANT-Lease-Construction.-A lease for one year provided for a renewal if the tenant should be satisfactory as a tenant, and should do what was right: Held that, where the landlord refused to rent the farm to the tenant for another year, the lat ter was not entitled to retain possession whether he had proved satisfactory as a tenant or not.-MULLEN V. PUGH, Ind., 45 N. E. Rep. 847.

6. LANDLORD AND TENANT-Lease-Lien for Rent.-A landlord who seizes property of a tenant under a provision in the lease giving him a lien for rent on all the tenant's property has the burden of showing that the property seized was owned by the tenant at the time the lease was executed.-POWELL V. DAILY, Ill., 45 N. E. Rep. 414.

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him to complete possession.-MERCIL V. BROUILLETTE, Minn., 69 N. W. Rep. 218.

69. LIBEL Justification-Truth.-A defense of truth of a publication that a person was jailed on a charge of horse stealing is not made out by proof that he was so charged and was jailed on that charge, but the truth of the charge must be shown.-DEMENT v. HOUSTON PRINTING CO., Tex., 87 S. W. Rep. 985.

70. LICENSE TO CUT TIMBER Assignment.-An instrument executed by a railroad company by its at torney in fact, conveying to the grantee and his as signs the right to cut and remove, for his own use, during a period of 20 years, all the pine timber on certain land, for a full consideration, the receipt of which was acknowledged,-being sealed with as croll, but not signed by the president of the company, nor countersigned by its secretary,-is a mere license to cut the timber, and vests no title thereto in the licensee until it is actually severed.-KEYSTONE LUMBER CO. V. KOLMAN, Wis., 69 N. W. Rep. 165.

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71. LIMITATION OF ACTION Disability Habitual Drunkards. An habitual drunkard for whom a guardian has been appointed is not under legal disabilities as a person of "unsound mind" (Rev. St. 1894, § 1309; Rev. St. 1881, § 1285), so as to be within section 279, Rev. St. 1894 (section 278, Rev. St. 1881), authoriz. ing persons under legal disabilities when their action accrued to sue within two years after the disability is removed.-MAKEPEACE V. BRONNENBERG, Ind., 45 N. E. Rep. 336.

72. MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.-An instruction in an action for malicious prosecution that "if this prosecution was instituted for the purpose of forcing the pay. ment of a debt, and not for the purpose of bringing an offender to justice, you would be justified in finding that it was malicious," is not erroneous, as likely to lead the jury to think that it was for them to say whether there was malice, though they found that the prosecution was instituted only for the purpose of. collecting a debt.-GRAHAM V. FIDELITY MUT. LIFE ASSN., Tenn., 37 S. W. Rep. 995.

73. MARITIME LIENS - Judgments of State Courts.The holder of a judgment rendered in a State court, who has issued process of execution against a vessel which has been seized under maritime liens, has no lien for the satisfaction of his judgment upon the surplus arising from a sale of the vessel to pay such maritime liens.-THE WILLAMETTE VALLEY, U. S. D. C., N. D. (Cal.), 76 Fed. Rep. 830.

74. MARRIAGE OF SLAVES-Evidence.-A common-law marriage between former slaves is shown by an agree. ment between them to live together as man and wife, and by their so living, irrespective of whether they were married, before emancipation after the manner of slaves.-SCHWARZ V. ALLEN, Tex., 37 S. W. Rep. 986. 75. MASTER AND SERVANT-Railroads - Defective Engine. While evidence that inspectors of engines employed by a railroad company, were competent, and that an engine which collapsed, resulting in the death of an employee, was inspected and found in good condition three days before the accident, tends to show due care on the part of the company, evidence of the condition of the engine after the accident is admissible; and a jury may be warranted in finding therefrom that the report of the inspector as to its condition was incorrect, and that the inspection was not carefully made.-CLEVELAND, C. C. & ST. L. RY. Co. v. WARD, Ind., 45 N. E. Rep. 325.

76. MECHANICS' LIEN-Notes for Balance Due.-Upon completion of a structure, three notes were taken by the contractors from the owner for the balance due, which notes were indorsed and sold to a bank; and within four months after the completion of the structure, and while the bank was the owner and holder of the notes, the contractors made and filed with the county recorder an affidavit in due form for perfecting a mechanic's lien to secure the indebtedness for erect. ing the structure: Held, that such lien is valid.STANDARD OIL Co. v. SOWDEN, Ohio, 45 N. E. Rep. 320.

77. MONOPOLIES-Combination of Patent Owners.-A combination among manufacturers of spring-tooth harrows, by which each manufacturer assigns to a corporation organized for the purpose the patents under which he is operating, and takes back an exclusive license to make and sell the same style of harrows previously made by him, and no other, all the parties being bound to sell at uniform prices, held to be an unlawful combination for the enhancement of prices, and in restraint of trade.-NATIONAL HARROW Co. v. HENCH, U. S. C. C., E. D. (Penn.), 76 Fed. Rep. 667.

78. MORTGAGES-Assignment.-A bona fide indorsee of a bond and mortgage negotiable in form, and the gen. uineness of the signatures to which is admitted by the makers, is not affected by alleged fraudulent representations, made by the original payee to the maker thereof.-CONVERSE V. BARTELS, Kan., 46 Pac. Rep.

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79. MORTGAGE - Description of Lands-Sufficiency.— Where a mortgage deed conveys property as certain tracts owned and held by the mortgagor "under the following chain of title," reciting it in full, with references to the county records, and with such descriptive particulars as make it possible to identify the lands, the description is sufficient.-RANKIN V. MCCARTHY, Tex., 37 S. W. Rep. 979.

80. MORTGAGES-Foreclosure.-In an action to foreclose a mortgage, where all the defendants except the administrator and another are heirs at law of the intestate, the sole maker of the notes secured by said mortgage, which was executed by the intestate and her husband upon her separate estate, an appeal by defendants is governed by the provisions of the Civil Code, and not by the provisions of the act concerning the settlement of decedents' estates.-STULTZ V. GIBLER, Ind., 45 N. E. Rep. 340.

81. MORTGAGES-Priority Foreclosure.-A building association, which had a first mortgage, and knew there was a second mortgage on the land, changed the loan from one series of stock to another, took a new note and mortgage, and canceled the first mortgage of record, retaining the note. It intended that the new mortgage should be the first lien, and had an understanding with the borrower that the latter would so arrange the matter with the second mortgagee. The association relied on the investigation, opinion, and report of its attorney, who told the borrower that such mortgagee had no lien, and the borrower then said nothing to the latter in regard to having his mortgage retain second place: Held, that such association lost the first lien.-WORKINGMAN'S BLDG. & SAV. ASSN. V. WILLIAMS, Tenn., 37 S. W. Rep. 1019.

82. MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE Process.-A suit to foreclose a mortgage on real estate must be commenced in the county where the land is situated, and, when rightly commenced in the county where the land is situated, summons may be issued by the clerk of the district court where the petition is filled, and directed to the sheriff of any other county in the State where the defendants may reside, or where they may be served; and, when duly served by the sheriff of the county where the defendants reside, the district court acquires jurisdiction over the subject of the action and of the defendants, and has authority to render such judgment against the defendants as may be proper under the pleadings and evidence.-SPARKS V. BEYER, Kan., 46 Pac. Rep. 980.

83. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Action to Cancel City Ordinances. In a suit by a waterworks company against a city, a decree will not be granted, declaring void, and requiring the city to cancel, as in derogation of the rights of the company under its contract with the city, ordinances permitting certain property own. ers to lay pipes in the streets to convey water to their premises; such owners not being brought before the court, or given an opportunity to be heard.-NEW ORLEANS WATER WORKS CO. v. CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, U. S. S. C., 17 8. C. Rep. 161.

84. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION-Licenses-Validity.-A

city of the second class may impose a license tax on photographers, and the fact that a larger tax is required from a traveling or non-resident photographer than from a resident regularly engaged in the business does not render the ordinance invalid.-UITY OF CALDWELL V. PRUNELLE, Kan., 46 Pac. Rep. 949.

85. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Power to Levy School Taxes.-Under Sayles' Civ. St. art. 425a, providing that incorporated cities and towns may levy a school tax if such city or town is a separate and independent school district, an action to establish a lien upon real estate for unpaid school taxes cannot be maintained by a city unless it is averred and proved that such city has been duly organized as a separate and independent school district.-MCCOOMBS V. CITY OF ROCKFORT, Tex., 37 S. W. Rep. 988.

86. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Public Improvements. -Where a city council has unlimited power, under the charter in respect to street improvements, the mere passage of a large number of ordinances for the macadamizing of many streets, in anticipation of a proposed change of law whereby such improvements cannot be made at the expense of property owners unless on petition of a majority of such owners in front feet, etc., is not of itself any proof of fraud on the part of the council in enacting such ordinances.-MORSE V. CITY OF WESTPORT, Mo., 37 S. W. Rep. 932.

87. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS - Use of Streets for Railway.-A city is estopped to deny the authority of a railway company to lay its tracks across streets where it has acquiesced for 20 years in such use of its streets, and has required the company to expend considerable sums in the improvement of the street crossings, such as the erection of gates, lights, and sidewalks, authorized it to construct depots, and passed many resolu tions mentioning the tracks as established monuments in fixing street grades, etc.-CITY OF CHICAGO V. UNION STOCK YARDS & TRANSIT Co., Ill., 45 N. E. Rep. 430.

88. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT-Action-Pleading.-In an action by an indorsee upon a note negotiable and transferable by indorsement under the laws of Illinois, it is unnecessary to allege that the note is negotiable under the laws of Indiana, where it was executed.-HAKES V. NATIONAL STATE BANK ON TERRE HAUTE, Ill., 40 N. E. Rep. 444.

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89. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT Bills and Notes.Plaintiff, as indorsee of notes due August 4th, sent them to defendant bank for collection. Prior to their receipt by defendant, the bank building was burned, but on August 1st the bank resumed business, and noti fied the maker of the notes. The notes were not paid at maturity, but defendant failed to protest them for non-payment. The notes were returned to plaintiff August 8th, and the indorsers were on that day notified by the plaintiff of the non-payment: Held, that the defendant, having undertaken the collection of the notes, is not excused from liability for its negligence by rea son of the confusion consequent upon the fire.-MERCHANTS' STATE BANK V. STATE BANK OF PHILLIPS, W18., 69 N. W. Rep. 170.

90. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT -Indorsement. - The mere fact that a promissory note, when offered in evi dence, had indorsed upon its back the name of the payee, does not establish the fact that the payee indorsed the same, in the absence of proof of actual indorsement.-VICKERY V. BURTON, N. Dak., 69 N. W. Rep. 193.

91. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT-Note-Protest.-Notice of protest to an indorser is sufficiently shown by the notary's certificate of protest which Mill. & V. Code, § 2471, makes prima facie evidence of the facts it purports to recite, where neither the notary nor the indorser have any independent recollection of the matter.CITY SAV. BANK V. KENSINGTON LAND CO., Tenn., 37 S. W. Rep. 1037.

92. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS-Parol Evidence.-It is no defense to an action on a note by the payee against the makers that the makers were the officers of a corporation, and applied to the payee for a loan to the

corporation, agreeing to give their own notes as security, on condition that the payee would take the building and leases of the corporation, and operate the same honestly, and would first look for payment from the rents and profits of said property, and that, in accordance with such agreement, payee, through his agent, took possession of the property, but so misman. aged it that loss instead of profit resulted; there being nothing to show what income the property would have yielded if properly managed, nor the amount of loss sustained by his mismanagement.-MOORE V. PRUSS ING, Ill., 45 N. E. Rep. 447.

93. OFFICER-Liability-Public Moneys.-An officer, on the ground of public policy, is liable for public moneys intrusted to him, and lost through the failure of the bank in which they were deposited by him, though he was not negligent.-TILLINGHAST V. MERBILL, N. Y., 45 N. E. Rep. 375.

44. OFFICERS-Municipal Officers-Salary.-Members of a city board of public works, and those employed by them, having in good faith performed the duties of their offices, and judgment in their favor, holding abolishment of the board invalid as to them, not hav ing been superseded, they should receive compensabou till entry of the mandate of the court of appeals, on reversal of the judgment. BOARD OF COUNCILHIN OF CITY OF FRANKFORT V. BRAWNER, Ky., 37 S. W. Rep. 951.

5. PARTNERSHIP-Bond of Survivor - Liability of Sureties.-In case of a partnership estate, where the surviving partner had been cited before the probate court, and had given a bond, and undertaken the man. agement and settlement of the partnership estate, and where the debts of the partnership had been paid, and the estate practically settled, except to make an accounting, and to divide the assets between the surviv ing partner and the sole heir of the deceased partner, the district court has jurisdiction in an action for accounting between them, although the matter is pending in the probate court, and no final settlement of the estate has been made therein.-CARTER V. CHRISTIE, Kan., 46 Pac. Rep. 964.

5. PARTNERSHIP-What are Firm Debts.-Evidence that notes, though signed with the individual names of persons composing a firm, instead of the firm name, were given in part payment of land purchased as a partnership venture; that the cash paid for improvements, etc., was from the partnership funds, and that the land and its proceeds, were carried on the firm's books as partnership debts-is prima facie sufficient to charge the firm.-DREFUS V. UNION NAT. BANK, Ill., 45 N. E. Rep. 408.

97. PARTY WALLS-Rights of Parties.-A party wall, built by one of two adjoining owners, and resting partly on the ground of each, must be one that both parties can use, and have the right to use; and the owner of a lot who sells part of it, restricting, by condition in the deed, the height of the building to be erected thereon, cannot extend a party wall built between the two parts above such height for his own exclusive use, but, if extended, it must be built with out openings, and the owner of the other part will have the right to use it, on proper payment, by adding to the height of his building.-FIDELITY LODGE, NO. 59, 1.0.0. F., NEW CASTLE, V. BOND, Ind., 45 N. E. Rep.

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9. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-Implied Notice of Agent's Acts.-One M received from plaintiff, as his agent, money to deposit in defendants' bank, under an agree ment that he would send plaintiff, for each deposit, either his individual check, or defendants' cheek in. dorsed by him. He deposited the money in his own Bae, and induced defendants to deliver him checks drawn by them, as bankers, on themselves, payable to ale order, by representing that he was plaintiff's partser, that the money was his share of the business, and that he desired the checks only as memoranda to be ed in settling with plaintiff, after which he would return them. He indorsed the checks, and sent them

by mail to plaintiff, who received them in good faith, supposing that they represented deposits made according to his agreement with M. Afterwards M drew the money deposited, on his own checks, and appro priated it to his own use: Held, that plaintiff was not chargeable with notice of the agreement between M and defendants that the checks should have no bind. ing force, and plaintiff could recover on them from defendants.-HENRY V. ALLEN, N. Y., 45 N. E. Rep. 355. 99. PRINCIPAL AND SURETY - Bond.-Sureties who sign a bond for the fidelity of a firm as agents for the obligee are not liable for funds misappropriated by one of the members of such firm after the dissolution of the partnership and the retirement of the other partner from the business of such agency. And this is the rule notwithstanding the fact that the obligee knew nothing of such dissolution.-STANDARD OIL CO. V. ARNESTAD, N. Dak., 69 N. W. Rep. 197.

100. PUBLIC LANDS Mortgage on Homestaed.-A mortgage given upon a piece of land prior to the making of a final proof by a person occupying the same under the homestead laws of the United States is void. -BIDDLE V. ADAMS, Kan., 46 Pac. Rep. 986.

101. RAILROAD COMPANIES-Change of Gauge-Ordi nances.-A railroad company authorized by its charter to build a three-feet, standard and narrow-gauge railroad" cannot broaden its tracks to the standard gauge without the consent of a city through whose streets the tracks are laid, even though the city ordinance granting the use of such streets to the company did not specify any gauge. The charter and ordinance should be construed together.-WALKER V. CITY OF DENVER, U. 8. C. C. of App., Eighth Circuit, 76 Fed. Rep. 670.

102. RAILROAD COMPANY-Negligence - Injuries to Employee.-While a trainman ordinarily cannot recover for injuries arising from perils that are obvious, yet the mere fact that the switchman had seen and handled the switch does not necessarily show that he had such information as would charge him with knowledge of the dangerous proximity of the same when the spear on the top of the switch was turned towards the track, and is not conclusive evidence of contribu tory negligence. SOUTHERN KANSAS RY. Co. v. MICHAELS, Kan., 46 Pac. Rep. 938.

103. RAILROADS Obligation of Purchaser. - Purchasers of a railroad and its franchises are not liable to pay the value of life passes, to be given by the original company in consideration of a parol license to build and operate a road over his premises, where the purchasers had no knowledge of the parol contract at the time of purchase, or while using such premises, where they have in no manner ever ratified such contract, or assumed its obligation.-MISSOURI PAC. RY. Co. v. HENRIE, Kan., 46 Pac. Rep. 976.

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104. REFORMATION OF INSTRUMENTS Mistake. policy of insurance on a building owned by a wife, providing for non-liability of the insurer if the title of the insured is not absolute, will not be reformed and enforced on the ground of mistake in issuing the same in the name of the husband, if the latter, with whom the contract was made, said nothing as to the title, but left it to be inferred that he was the owner.-SCHMID V. VIRGINIA FIRE & MARINE INS. Co., Tenn., 37 S. W. Rep.

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105. RELIGIOUS SOCIETIES-Unincorporated Societies. -The members of the building committee of an unincorporated religious society, through whom materials for the construction of a church are purchased, are liable therefor, though the seller charged the material in the name of the society, and at the time inquired and was told that the money for payment was to be raised by subscriptions among the congregation, and by the proceeds of fairs, etc. - CLARK V. O'ROURKE, Mich., 69 N. W. Rep. 147.

106. REMOVAL OF CAUSES - Diverse Citizenship-Jurisdiction - Amendment. - A general averment, in a petition for removal, that the controversy is between citizens of different States, is sufficient to authorize

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