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tract as stated in defendant's offer: Held, that these
letters constituted a valid contract of sale. CORNING
v. LOOMIS, Mich., 69 N. W. Rep. 85.

105. SALE - Election of Remedies Estoppel. - The
plaintiffs having, in a previous guit, judicially af.
firmed the legality and validity of a sale of goods to the
defendant for the purpose of obtaining a judgment
against him for the price, and sustaining an attach.
ment against the goods as his property, cannot be
heard, in a subsequent suit against the same defend-
ant, to deny the existence of such a sale on the ground
of fraud and deception on the part of the defendant,
as vendee, for the purpose of defeating the prior and
ranking attachments of other creditors, and recover.
ing the goods themselves, notwithstanding the former
suit has been in the meanwbile withdrawn.-LOWEN.
STEIN V. GLASS, La., 20 South. Rep. 890.

106. SALE OF STOCK - Reservation of Dividend.--One who sells stock, reserving the dividend that may be declared at a certain date, cannot claim the stock divi. dend then declared, but only the cash dividend.KAUFMAN V. CHARLOTTESVILLE WOOLEN MILL Co., Va., 25 S. E. Rep. 1003.

107. SALE OF TRUST PROPERTY-Netice.--A purchaser of stocks wherein the bolder is designated merely as 'trustee,” without a specification of the trust of a designation of the beneficiaries, whether he seeks in. formation from the trustee, and is deceived, or does not, is not, in absence of fraud on his own part, chargeable by the word “trustte" with notice that the sale is unauthorized and in fraud of the beneficiaries, if, by a reasonably careful investigation of the records or other proper sources, he could not discover the true state of the case.-GRAFFLIN V. ROBB, MU., 35 All. Rep. 971.

108. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE - Oral Contract. - It is settled law that if one, induces or knowingly permite another to perform in part an oral agreement for the sale of land, on the faith of its full performance by both sides, and it clearly appears that such acts of part performance were done in pursuance of the contract, that damages recoverable in law would not adequately compensate the plaintiff, and that iraud and injustice would result to him if the agreement be held void, then, on the principle of equitable estoppel, a court of equity is authorized to compel specific performance by the other party, in contradiction to the positive terms of the statute of frauds.-BENNETT V. DYER, Me., 35 Atl. Rep. 1004.

109. TELEGRAPH COMPANIES Cipher Messages. А telegraph company's liability for delay in delivering a cipher message whose importance is not disclosed is limited to the amount paid for its transmission.FERGUSSON V. ANGLO-AMERICAN TEL. Co., Penu., 35 Atl, Rep. 979.

110. TRESPASS Measure of Damages.-The measure of damages recoverable in an action of trespass for an injury to realty, by the inadvertent removal of part of coal, is its value as a part of the realty, and not as a chattel after its removal.- WARRIOR COAL & COKE Co. V. MABEL MIN. CO., Ala., 20 South, Rep. 918.

111. TRIAL-Remarks of Counsel.-Statement of coun. gel in argument, that defendant's name, "Union," implied that it had bought up all the compress companies in the State, and was a monopoly, not being authorized by the evidence, is ground for reversal, in a case closely balanced on the facts in evidence. UNION COMPRESS CO. V. WOLF, Ark., 378. W. Rep. 877.

112. TRUST-Proof to Establish.-Property voluntarily conveyed by a deed absoluto on its face, by a brother to his sister, because of his dissipated babits, and his fear that he would squander it or lose it to creditors, cannot be recovered back, in the absence of evidence of an express trust of such conclusive character as to establish the trust beyond reasonable controversy. -GUNTERT V. GONTEKT, Tenn., 37 8. W. Rep. 890.

113. VENUE – Action against Corporation. – In an ac. tion against a corporation for breach of contract it ap.

peared that defendant's principal place of business
was in S county, but that it bad an office in K county
where the contract was prepared, and was signed in
duplicate by plaintiff, and forwarded by defeodant's
agent to the main office for approval and signature;

2. ANTART.2, 1897
aud that, after it was signed by defendant, said con-
tract was returned to the agent in K county, and by

Irel. ri',in
him delivered to plaintiff: Held, that the contract was
made in K county, within Const, art. 12, § 16, allowing

the rigs le 10 ! a corporation to be sued in the county where the con

uite au bear's thefr ll. tract is made.-IVEY V, KERN COUNTY LAND CO., Cal., 46 Pac, Rep. 926.

Tis sppästia, bo 15. au 114. WILL-Conditional Legacy-Assignability. The

to gather arise, offra porta not, thai, right to a legacy payable to the legatee "personally

iIn, Tla solution of the si when he shall come for it" becomes absolute on a per: sonal demand made by the legatee, and the legacy is

bebml bupati then assignable.-IN RE MARTIN'S ESTATE, Peno., 85

the Cnited States in that the Atl. Rep. 989.

RuwerC'nited States, acute 115. WILLS - Conditions and Restrictions.-In an ac. tion to construe a will, where there is nothing to pre

the right of self be taken vent the application of the rule that if a testator in

wered in grorladernizin tends one thing, and yet declares the opposite by the terms of his formal and final expression of inteut, the

Istice. In that (844

the court i latter must control, it is proper to exclude evidence to

Cat detendant wie gution li show the personal intent of testator, as distinguisbed from the intent which the will exhibits on the point at

Fin derdeel, bringuries in issue.- MERSMAN V. MERSMAN, Mo., 37 S. W. Rep. 909.

Fonts of 'be lat.

prin 116. WILL Interest on Legacies.-A will devising

al then stappen thank the 4 legacies to various legateeg upon certain conditions provided that the legatees should notify tbe executors

He counter, whereapon of the prices of the acceptance of the legacies within six months

it eased with a knife. important, after notification. Notice of a certain legacy was not sent to the legatee util more than a year after the

ha a judgment of copric. mitted to death of the testator, but within the six months lin

that it sboc bare fart of reire ited the legatee notified the executors of the accept ance of the conditions: Held, that the legatee was en.

to say whether the con aby rooli Í. titled to interest after the lapse of the year from tes.

, after kicking ibe de point fru'n tator's death, and not merely from the acceptance of the legacy.-WEBSTER V. WIGGIN, R. I., 35 Atl. Rep.

thai in good faitha from mutual muy 961.

11 that it was error to of self-lets : 117. WILLS-Life Estate-Remainder.--A testator de vised a life estate to bis wife, with remainder to bis children who should be alive at her death, and provided that if any child should have died, leaving chil:

as said list dren, such children should take the part the parent would have taken if alive. Pending the life estate, one of the testator's daughters died, leaving children who survived the life tenant: Held, that the daughter took a defeasible fee in remainder, which was divested by her death pending tbe life estate, and hence her children took as purchasers under the will, and not by descent.-DUNLAP V. FANT, Miss., 20 South. Rep. 874.

118. Will-Testamentary Capacity-Delusions.--Er. ror in an instruction in regard to testamentary capac

nous bodils harm, and | Hom. e. 4. ity that a sound mind is “a mind wholly free from delusion” is not cured by a subsequent statement that "a person whose mind is perverted by insane delusion

2 intend to do anything conflict. Its with reference to one or many subjects, however ud. reasonable and absurd, may nevertheless make a valid will, provided the provisions of such will are not

of self-lefense is re- peace, thel. influenced by sneh delusions,'--SHREINER V. SHREINER, Penn., 35 Ati. Rep. 974.

119. WILL - Vested and Contingent Remainders.-A vested remainder is an estate to take effect after an.

to takelis life, or do him cludes a fi other estate for years, life, or in tail, which is so limited that, if that particular estate were to expire or end in any way at the present time, some certain per: son, who was in esse and answered the description ol the renainder.man during the continuance of the particular estate, would thereupon become entitled to the

po ward to urge in his that his (O!. immediate possession, irrespective of the concurrence of any collateral contingency. A remainder is con

Le rester for the killing which preted. It is tingent when it is so limited as to take effect in a per. son not in €33e, or not ascertained, or upon an event

1x wrongful act, said: withdrawal

wiem, jo not of absolute and device by the which muy never happen, or may not happen until after the determination of the particular estate.

beting, An exception to it age of his a WOODMAN V. WOODMAN, Me., 35 Atl. Rep. 1937.

tes. Whough the defendant that, under

if that if defendant kiched so long as it een lightly, he could not jus. :: elf-defense the killing State v. D: neily 10 sztult, though Rep. 525,tíz len necessary to save

faith withila The court said that it to be a w is provocation of offensive reasonable y speaker personally withdrawn).

fart is Lrt

Ps an tashow that there is no

th circumstances as

the defenda

it withdraws from fur faith, and a

2Knin assaulted, in riola: self-defensa

Les liin with a deadly

The sul

a la Parker v. State, 88 ) that the jur 2. Rep. 18. 99, the court. I cused, after | sw'he general rule that the drew in goun

perd ibat defendant's principal place et horloges wus in $ county, but that it bad an offre il where the coutract was prepared, and is really alleate by plaintill, and forwarded by defens sent to the main office for approval abitanti d'id that, after it was signed by defendant, so trict was returned to the agent in Kroogty, and

milelivered to plaintiff feld, that tht eshte tunde in k county, withio Const. art. 13, K, 1987

corporation to ie Qed in the county There the It is tnade. -ISET V. KERS COCNTI CARTA to Pac. Rep. 926.

111. WILL-Conditional Legacy - A&EDDY right to a legacy payable to the legateam

to be shuti come for it becomes abuted 3. ad demand made by the legatee, and to be t',assignable.-IN RE Maria's ESTATE, IES Atl. Rep 949.

115. WILLS - Conditions and Restrictions - Ir t. D to construe a will, where there is ECLIT Veut tbe application of the rule that it : 4::2 ten'le one thing, and yet declares the opport tirous of his formal and final expression of it! 1.!ter must control, it is proper to excludeert abww the personal intent of testator, as distintas from the intent whleh the will exhib.la on 2) issue. - MERSMAX V. VERSMAX, MO., 37 S. WEB:

116. WILL – Interest on Legacies.-d wils: legacies to various legitees upon certain cve!! provided tbat tbe legatees should notify tbericht of the acceptance of the legacies within gibi after notitication. Notice of a certain lenta ment to the legatre until more than a star leitb of the testator, lut within the sig mode ited the legatee notified the executors of tte In

Årce of the conditions: Held, that the legate 11 ttled to interest after the lapse of tbe titur's death, and pot merely from thee, the legacy.-WEBSTER V. WIGGIN, R.I., 10 +1.

117. WiLLs-Life Estate-Remainder.Viard a llle estate to his wife, with renainder children who should be alive at her death, c. vided that if any child should bave died, leatized fpt, such children should take the part the Bould have taken if alive. Pending the site est one of the testator's daughters died, leaving this who survived the life tenant: Held, that the deve took a defeasible lee in remainder, which was toks

y her death pending the life estate, and to wildren took as purebasers under the #1,9210

descent.--Dunlap V. FANT, Miss, 20 sonte lot

originally provoked the conflict, he withdraws Central Law Journal.

from it in good faith, and clearly announces

his desire for peace. If he be pursued after ST. LOUIS, MO., JANUARY 22, 1897.

this, his right of self-defense, though once

lost, revives. Of course,' says Mr. Wharton, The law pertaining to the right of self-de- in referring to this modification of the rule, fense, has long been determined and is clearly “there must be a real and bona fide surrender understood by courts. Its application, how- and withdrawal on his part; for, if there be erer, to specific facts as they arise, often pre- not, then he will continue to be regarded as sent perplexing problems. The solution of the aggressor.' l Whart. Cr. Law, 9th ed. such a problem was happily accomplished by section 486. The meaning of the principle is the Supreme Court of the United States in that the law will always leave the original the recent decision of Rowe v. United States, aggressor an opportunity to repent before wherein the law as to the right of self

he takes the life of his adversary.” Recdefense was administered in accordance ognizing this exception

to be a just one, with reason and justice. In that case the court properly said, in addition: "Due there was eridence that defendant while caution must be observed by courts and in an hotel office with deceased, being juries in its application, as it involves provoked by insulting words of the lat- a principle which is very liable to abuse. fer. kieked him lightly and then stepped back The question of the good or bad faith and leaned against the counter, whereupon of the retreating party is of the utmost be was assaulted by deceased with a knife. importance, and should generally be subIt was held, reversing a judgment of convic. mitted to the jury, in connection with the tion of manslaughter, that it should have fact of retreat itself, especially where there is been left to the jury to say whether the con- any room for conflicting inferences on this duct of the defendant, after kicking the de- point from the evidence.” Both parties to a Ctased, was a withdrawal in good faith from mutual combat are wrong-doers, and the law further contest; and that it was

error to of self-defense cannot be invoked by either, charge to the effect that if defendant kicked so long as he continues in the combat. But, deceased, however lightly, he could not jus

as said by the Supreme Court of Iowa in tify on the ground of self-defense the killing State v. Dillon, 74 Iowa, 653, 658, 38 N. W. of deceased in resisting an assault, though Rep. 525, 528, if one "actually and in good such killing may have been necessary to save faith withdraws from the combat, he ceases defendant's own life. The court said that if

to be a wrong-doer; and if his adversary have a person under the provocation of offensive reasonable ground for holding that he has so language

, assaults the speaker personally, withdrawn, it is sutlicient, even though the but in such a way as to show that there is no

fact is not clearly evinced.” In Whart. intention to do him serious bodily harm, and Hom. sec. 483, the author says that “though then retires under such circumstances

the defendant may have thus provoked the show that he does not intend to do anything conflict, yet, if he withdrew from it in good more, but in good faith withdraws from fur

faith, and clearly announced his desire for ther contest, his right of self-defense is re

peace, then, if he be pursued, his rights of stored when the person assaulted, in viola

self-defense revive.” tion of law, pursues him with a deadly

The supreme court in the Rowe case Weapon, and seeks to take his life, or do him

cludes as follows: "We do not mean to say great bodily harm. In Parker v. State, 88

that the jury ought to have found that the acafter adverting to the general rule that the

cused, after kicking the deceased lightly, withdrew in good faith from further contest, and that his conduct should have been so inter

preted. It was for the jury to say whether the This rule, however, is not of absolute and

withdrawal was in good faith, or was a mere universal application. An exception to it

device by the accused to obtain some advantage of bis adversary. But we are of opinion that, under the circumstances, they might

118. WILL-Testamentary Capacits-Delos (?-?

rin an instruction in regard to testamentarii ty that a sound mind is "a mind wholly free

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driu-ion" is not cured by a subsequent stalento

a person whose mind is perverted by insane der sich reference to one or many subjects, howete

d'id will, provided the provisions of suck wil em 31

con

Csonable and absurd, may nevertheless olluenced by sach delusions."-SHREINER F, GEN! 91.,

Vested and Contingent Dr.de/ Pated remainder is an estate to take effect alte

35 Ati. Rep. 971.

11. WILL

Ala. 4, 6, 7 South. Rep. 98, 99, the court,

ther estate for years, life, or in tail, which is on ed that, if that particular estate were to err

hd in any way at the present time, some della..!

pn, who was in esse and answered the desi pe

oppressor cannot be heard to urge in his
justification a necessity for the killing which
was produced by his own wrongful act, said:

pe remainder-nian during the continuant of chiar estate, would thereupon become catil.dk Jamediate possession, irrespective of the con

20 collateral contingency. A remainder pyent when it is so limited as to take it. in not in 88e, Or not ascertained, or upon hcb may never happen, or may not b3,732 Itt r the determination of the particolar out

exists in cases where, although the defendant

JOODMAN V. WOODMAN, Me., 35 Atl. Rep. 16

of fraud was denied, but the execution of the
mortgage was admitted. The only question
presented for the determination of the court
was, whether the statement in the original
affidavit, that the defendant had disposed
of its property with intent to defraud its
creditors, had been

sustained.

The respondent contended that

an insolvent corporation could not legally execute mortgage to its own president of substantially all of its property, to the exclusion of its other creditors, even for a just debt. The court said that while this is correct as a legal proposition, still it does not follow that the execution of such a mortgage will constitute sufficient evidence of an actual intent to defraud creditors.

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have found that the accused, although in the wrong when he kicked or kicked at the de. ceased, did not provoke the fierce attack made upon him by the latter, with knife in hand, in any sense that would deprive him altogether of the right of self-defense against such attack. If the accused did, in fact, withdraw from the combat, and intended so to do, and if his conduct should have been reasonably so interpreted by the deceased, then the assault of the latter with a deadly weapon, with the intent to take the life of the accused, or to do him great bodily harm, entitled the latter to the benefit of the principle announced in Beard v. U. S. 168 U, S. 540, 564, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 962. 967, in which case

it was said: “The defendant was where he had a right to be when the deceased advanced upon him in a threatening manner and with a deadly weapon; and, if the accused did not provoke the assault, and had at the time reasonable grounds to believe, and in good faith believed, that the deceased intended to take his life or to do him great bodily harm, he was not obliged to retreat nor to consider whether he could safely retreat, but was entitled to stand his ground and meet any attack made upon him with a deadly weapon in such a way and with such force as, under all the circumstances, he, at the moment, honestly believed, and had reasonable grounds to believe, was necessary to save his own life or to protect himself from great bodily injury.” lipon this subject of what has been called “the duty to retreat' see editorial in 41 Cent. L. J. 185, discussing the recent cases of State v. Evans, decided by the Supreme Court of Missouri, and Page v. State, decided by the Supreme Court of Indiana.

o the cancellation of te Cent L. cleal injuries on ground 111:.. 7. Wabash R: Co., 16 Rr. (..

edied by the Cuited States Railr suf' - dypeals, Sixth Circuit, und mit al ! E Co. F. McElroy, 37$. and R. : wel by the Court of Ap anta” 1..' CI. In the first mentioged Louis (A: : ts if the surgeon of de 32. *", company knew that a te sidera“;..', ! ons he plaintiff

, as ignorant by the hi uzained for bf both par. Girard Core se of his opinion as to the exhaust*** ua of the injuries and the on the mid! "I paintiff would lose from up thereof, it was his

RECENT 1 Pant opinion; and his fail. Cipher Mpel for disregarding or Catse-1

that if both parties 37 S. W.R brit had received certain Missouri : milet and character of which cannot. lix wisd dimussed with reference bility for t "at te injured party would tranáininaj

quence thereof, and a Telegraphic Stocally mentioning the tion bet wrt:

MECHANIC'S LIEN-RightS OF PROPERTYLIEN OF SUBCONTRACTORS CONSTITUTIONAL Law.-In Palmer v. Tingle, 45 N. E. Rep. 313, the Supreme Court of Ohio argue that the inalienable right of enjoying liberty and acquiring property, guarantied by the first section of the bill of rights of the constitution, embraces the right to be free in the enjoy. ment of our faculties, subject only to such restraints as are necessary for the common welfare ; that liberty to acquire property by contract can be restrained by the general assembly only so far as such restraint is for the common welfare and equal protection and benefit of the people, and such restraining statute must be of such a character that a court may see that it is for such general welfare, protection, and benefit. The judgment of the general assembly in such cases is not conclusive, and while a valid statute regulating contracts is, by its own force, read into, and made a part of, such contracts, it is otherwise as to invalid statutes. Applying these principles it is held that the act of April 13, 1894, in so far as it gives a lien on the property of the owner to subcontractors, laborers, and those who furnish machinery, material, or tile to the contractor, is unconstitutional and void.

All to whom the contractor becomes indebted in the performance of his contract are bound by the terms of the contract between him and the owner.

ten ktown and considered as | is not reme

fruit, general language fol in this (ame risale a particular injury mitted as

hard parties of a character that the artis Harly indicate that, if it It was bell. La be release would not have gence wala

the rule that damages re- the colisal? 1 he same cause of action message wijn

I sai recovered once for all oflice in the "povedure, and does not to a point il.

för part of the damages contract wan ts release for the other relating to

shing to recover part of panies. Pa

utrom an accident is not delivered to y received by him on addressed to se given by him of the that certain

I. In the Kentucky I could be me

NOTES OF RECENT DECISIONS.

employee cannot when receive to of a claim for personal | fered as $1

is the original cause of telegraphed

plat such compromise deed bs m3

wal, unless he repays or

answer all!

INSOLVENT CORPORATION MORTGAGE TO PRESIDENT-ATTACHMENT.-In Trebilcock v. Big Missouri Mining Co., 68 N. W. Rep. 330, decided by the Supreme Court of South Dakota, an insolvent corporation had given a mortgage to its president of substantially all ite property.

A warrant of attachment was issued by a creditor, stating that the defendant had disposed of its property with intent to defraud its creditors. The charge

aleration received by closed the for bentucky court cites and held that to

Vandervelder v. Ry. would be res : Rs. Co. v. Hayes, 83 the loss of dibes the following received an

RELEASE AND DISCHARGE-COMPROMISE OF
CLAUN FOR PERSONAL INJURIES

AVOIDANCE
FOR FRAUD RETURN OF CONSIDERATION.-
Two recent cases involve the much contro-

paring that doctrine.

14., 160 Mass. 456, 38 | Atl. Rep. 1

In Fergu

V.

Law.-In Paliner v. Tingle. 45 N. E. R 3133, the Supreme Court of Ohio argue there inalienable right of enjoying liberty and quiring property, guarantied by the fire tion of the bill of rights of the constit embraces the right to be free in the et ment of our faculties, subject onlītos restraints as are necessary for the day welfare; that liberty to acquire profety! contract can be restrained by the general: sembly only so far as such restraint is the common welfare and equal protectie 2 benefit of the people, and such restra's statute must be of such a character to court may see that it is for such general fare, protection, and benefit. The juda of the general assembly in such cases 1 conclusive, and while a valid statute re. fing contracts is, by its own force, read in and made a part of, such contracts. i) ptherwise as to invalid statutes. Apa These principles it is held that the act April 13, 1894, in so far as it gives a lito

i fraud was denied, but the execution of

verted question as to the cancellation of re- Cent. L. J. 271; Stewart v. Railroad Co., lortgage was admitted. The only queda lease of claim for personal injuries on ground 141 Ind. 61; Stone v. Ry. Co., 66 Mich. 83; resented for the determination of the ir of fraud: Lumley v. Wabash R Co., 76 Ry. Co. v. Harris, 158 U. S. 331 ; Mullen v. 139, whether the statement in the orga Fed. Rep. 66, decided by the United States Railroad Co., 127 Mass. 86. The court ad. tilavit, that the defendant had diper Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, and mit that O'Brien v. Ry. Co., 89 Iowa, 644, { its property with intent to defraude Louisville & N. R. Co. v. McElroy, 37 S. and Railroad Co. v. Doyle, 18 Kan. 64, are reditors, had been sustained. II W. Rep. 814, decided by the Court of Ap- antagonistic. The case of Girard St. espondent contended that an inse tu peals of Kentucky. In the first mentioned Louis Car Wheel Co. (Mo.), 39 Cent. L. J. orporation could not legally execute case it was held that if the surgeon of de- 302, wherein the question of return of conportgage to its own president of fendant railroad company knew that a re- sideration was fully discussed, is not noticed tantially all of its property, to the erelis: lease of damages by plaintiff, an ignorant by the Kentucky court.

by the Kentucky court. Appended to the of its other creditors, even for a jus: del: man, was being bargained for by both par- Girard Case last mentioned will be found an The court said that while this is corre? E ties upon the basis of his opinion as to the exhaustive note reviewing all the authorities legal proposition, still it does not

extent and character of the injuries and the on the subject. -39 Cent. L. J. 306. hat the execution of such a mortgage T probable time that plaintiff would lose from

bis occupation by reason thereof, it was his 'onstitute sufficient evidence of an actual

RECENT TELEGRAPH COMPANY LITIGATIONduty to give an honest opinion; and his failent to defraud creditors.

CIPHER MESSAGES-NEGLIGENCE-PROXIMATE ure to do so is ground for disregarding or CAUSE.-In Reed v. West. Union Tel. Co., MECHANIC'S LIEN-Rights of Pre

canceling the release; that if both parties 37 S. W. Rep. 904, the Supreme Court of LIEN OF SUBCONTRACTORS — CONSTITUT

supposed that plaintiff had received certain Missouri holds that a telegraph company
injuries, the extent and character of which cannot, by contract, relieve itself from lia-
were considered and discussed with reference bility for negligence of its servants in the
to the time which the injured party would transmission of messages, overruling Wann v.
probably lose in consequence thereof, and a Telegraph Co., 37 Mo. 472 ; that the distinc.
release was given, specifically mentioning the tion between negligence and gross negligence
particular injuries known and considered as is not recognized in Missouri. It was shown
the basis of settlement, general language fol-
lowing will not include a particular injury

in this case that the message was not trans

mitted as it was written by the sender, and then unknown to both parties of a character that the addressee acted upon it as received. $0 serious as to clearly indicate that, if it had been known, the release would not have

It was held, that a prima fucie case of neglibeen signed ; that the rule that damages re

gence was established, placing the burden on

the company. sulting from one and the same cause of action

It appeared also that the must be sued for and recovered once for all

message was delivered to the company at an

office in the State of Iowa, for transmission is merely a rule of procedure, and does not

to a point in Missouri. It was held, that the prerent a recovery for part of the damages after the giving of a release for the other relating to the liability of telegraph com

contract was governed by the laws of Iowa part, and that one seeking to recover part of the damages aceruing from an accident is not

panies. Plaintiff's agent residing in Iowa bound to return money received by him on

delivered to a telegraph company a message account of a release given by him of the

addressed to plaintiff in Missouri, stating other part of the damages . In the Kentucky could be sold for $1,300 cash. The message,

that certain real estate owned by plaintiff case it was held that, an employee cannot

when received by plaintiff, gave the price ofaroid a compromise of a claim for personal fered as $1,900, and plaintiff immediately the property of the owner to subcontractes

lajuries and recover on the original cause of telegraphed her acceptance, and forwarded,

action, on the ground that such compromise deed by mail. Upon the receipt of plaintiff's Toaterial, or tile to the contractor, i una

answer accepting the price offered, the agent closed the contract of sale at $1,300. It was held that the negligence of the company

would be regarded as the proximate cause of 6. 558, and distinguishes the following received and the market value of the lot.

the loss of the difference between the price RELEASE AND DISCHARGE-COMPROVE UP

Bliss v. Railroad Co., 160 Mass. 456, 38 FLAIM FOR PERSONAL INJURIES - FUDAN

In Ferguson v. Anglo-Amer. Tel. Co., 35

Atl. Rep. 979, decided by the Supreme Court JOR FRAUD — RETURN OF CONSIDERATIE To recent cases involve the much coat

Jaborers, and those who furnish liae hurt

titutional and void. All to whom the Tractor becomes indebted in the performant at his contract are bound by the terzi de the contract between him and the owner

138 procured by fraud, unless he repays or tenders back the consideration received by bán thereon. The Kentucky court cites and approves the doctrine of Vandervelder v. Ry. Co.

, 61 Fed. Rep. 56; Ry. Co. v. Hayes, 833 cases apparently opposing that doctrine.

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reason

passet erist in tbe present." The the corte !

preber says, "that the leading word "19:!. Bite tie constitution and statutes that the

sa te protection of the family. word. I:: 12 mtent, the bomestead of bensive te fit a family is protected from body of fui te brisividual of either ser may curtilagres. No a family." It is not neces. eric des. The End of a family should be a doubt die re

: The family may consist of which it is u stand or husband, wife and city of our pa dober persons who may stand Examina: 3 Azerbace in the family reis specific

vast of persons who stand most oli 104. panese relations to the bead of the citic sessed : Be the father or mother or a constitutiva #sav other relative is the bead; use in su us 19. * jesons who are dependent, less and nu 324 on the head for support, impractica'.

sliced by the seizure and affairs of i k nader execution. That a used in its

siz sed is indispensable to the hold como 2 state of bomestead the other relacise Lety sastains. A Georgia in short, es

If no collect

wa mdow without children is living forei adt benefit of homestead. substituting

of Pennsylvania it was held that the rule as to virtue, industry, and love of country than a
the measure of damages confines the plaint- permanent home around which gather the
iff's recovery in actions against the company affections of the family, and to which the
for negligence to such as may fairly be sup- members fondly turn, however widely they
posed to have been in contemplation of the may become dispersed.” This
parties at the time of making the contract. linked with the grander and fundamental
This being true, it follows as a logical and reason that tenantry is unfavorable to free-
necessary sequence that, where the message dom and lays the foundation for separate or-
as delivered for transmission is unintelligible,

ders in society, gives us the foundation for except to the sender or the addressee, and these laws. Then upon these reasons is the the company had no information otherwise as protection of the family, wbich reasons as to its character and purport, nor of its im

given must exist or the law can give no relief. portance and urgency, the party injured can

No law can exist without first a reason for its recover of the company nothing more than

enactment; a wrong to be either prevented or nominal damages, or at most the price paid corrected by an adequate remedy at law. for transmission. And this is the rule which

Underlying the spirit of all homestead exhas been adopted by the English and Ameri- emption laws is the protection of the fam; can courts almost without exception.” Many ily; protection from the wild speculative and decisions of the courts of this country and

improvident tendencies of the husband and England are cited as sustaining the rule above father. When the natural protector of the stated. The numerous decisions of the courts

family fails, the law steps in, puts its strong of many States will be found to be opposed

arm around the defenseless family, kindly to the decisions of the courts of only three States-those of Virginia, Georgia and Ala

cares for them, protects them in a home, free

from the avarice of creditors. bama. Florida has recently reversed an ear

ive body of persons can invoke the protection lier case, and thus joined the majority of the States on this question. The reasons ad

of these laws till they are denominated a fam

ily does it not stand to reason that on the vanced in support of the decisions which support the contrary ruling have been various,

family relation ceasing, the reason for the

law ceases to exist? The reason gone, is it
the one most commonly applied being the
rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341.

not good logic to say the law ceases? In
Revalk v. Kramer, we find an opinion which

is worthy of careful thought and study for DO THE BENEFITS OF HOMESTEAD

its logical reasoning and just interpretation SURVIVE THE FAMILY,

of the law. The court says: “The language

used in the constitution can be given but one The construction of homestead laws has

construction, that is, a family must exist bealways been a matter of deep concern and interest to the profession. In some of our

fore the homestead right vests; once vested State courts, and we might say in nearly all,

will continue until the family relation ceases.

Its creation is for the family, the family gone the construction has become more of a matter of sentiment than a true interpretation of

the reason for the law is gone, and when no law. There are two phases of these

reason exists why should not the privilege
laws
also cease?

As the end contemplated by the which have been before the courts for deter

law can no longer be attained, why should States; nor have our legal writers seen fit to

the means be preserved when they are no
more wanted ?

As the law will not allow an the one upon which hinges the whole tbeory

individual the right before he becomes the
head of a family, why should it allow him
this right after he ceases to be such? The
very reason why the law will not allow it in
the one case is equally applicable in the
other. The law cannot anticipate wbat may
take place, but can only deal with facts and

i Campbell v. Adair, 46 Miss. 182.

2 8 Cal. 66. Approved in McQuade Cal. 535.

ering going a long ways to tion to & co!

238 of the law for it is surely their mutua:

in objects of the law to These m'at wa kit the wife and mother the family"

I do not think it was the various in that the benefit should ever provision of lehen ur husband when left most populs:

E se other dependencies ; more fully i si stise wife or mother for conception of

I object of the protective in making 30

person that is a as that of t. ma tome of which he is the from all inva

the benefits of homestead, these laws al a one of the purposes of tion we can b.

habilding up of bome, not survive the as which is the prime factor tion would tu De bome around which cen. ernment into puernment, good or evil is bibited by the

mination, one more particularly, in but few

discuss the one I deem quite important and

mala plaation sends through

lite blood or corrup

A up or tear down every son, 40 N. H.

the case may be. v. Davis, 31 low

8 Meader v. PE

of the homestead laws and exemption clauses found in our constitutions. The weight of authority is with the theory that a family must exist before the benefit of the homestead law can be asked as a matter of right or law. Says Justice Tarbell in a Mississippi decision : "There is no greater incentive to

se se without a family

. Reeves v. Petti

kaniny of less number of

A widower without any | 273; Sec. 70, TL

Texas, 50; Peit Whaley, 31 Cali

V. Whaley, 31

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e is not a family. tion; Doyle v.

all our knowledge of 39 Kan. 342; Doet:

12 Allen, 34; P: Rep. 138; Wbaila

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