perform within the corporate limits duties not strictly or properly local or municipal in their nature. In the performance of such duties they exercise State powers, and are in that respect State officers. As was said by Judge Staples in Burch v. Hardwicke, 30. Grat. 24, 34: "When the mob rages in the streets, when the incendiary and assassin are at work, they do not offend against the city, but against the State. When they are detected and arrested, it is by the chief of police and his subordinates, under the authority of the State laws, and as an officer of the State; and, when they are tried and convicted, it is by officers representing the State and her sovereign power." Municipal corporations are chartered, as we have seen, to regulate and administer the local and internal concerns of the people of the particular locality which is incorporated. They are not created to execute the criminal laws of the State. That is a matter for which the State has made ample provision by general statutes, and with which the corporation, as such, has nothing to do, unless expressly authorized by its charter or by statute. Hence the offer of a reward for the apprehension and conviction of an offender against the criminal law of the State is the exercise of a State power, and is foreign to the objects and purposes of a municipal corporation. It is not an ordinary corporate power, nor incident to it. Such power was not expressly conferred upon the common council of the city of Winchester; nor is it comprehended by the "general welfare" clause of its charter, heretofore quoted.

When a crime has been committed and there is reason to fear that the person charged therewith cannot be arrested in the common course of proceeding, or when an offense has been committed, but the person guilty thereof is unknown, the legislature has cɔnferred upon the executive of the State the authority to offer a reward for apprehending and securing, or for the detection and conviction of, such person, as the case may be. Code Va., § 4197. This is as far as the legislature has deemed it wise or expedient to confer such authority. It might sometimes be convenient and expedient for municipalities and the authorities of a county to possess such power, but it is a power that would be liable to great abuse. However, with its convenience or expediency we have nothing to do. That is a matter solely for the consideration of the legislature. Our duty is confined to the interpretation of the charter of the city and the statutes which confer any powers upon it, and their adjudication. If the power has not been expressly granted, or is not necessarily implied, it does not exist. If it be even doubtful, the doubt must be resolved against the corporation. The legislature has not expressly given such authority to the city of Winchester. It is not necessarily or fairly implied in any express power granted to it; and its possession is not indispensable to the performance of its corporate

duties, or the accomplishment of the purposes of its incorporation. Consequently, the offer of the reward by its common council for the apprehension and conviction of incendiaries was beyond its power. It was an act ultra vires, and void.

The decisions upon this question have not been uniform. It has been held by some courts (Crawshaw v. City of Roxbury, 7 Gray, 374, and Borough of York v. Forscht, 23 Pa. St. 391), that municipal corporations possess the authority to offer rewards for the apprehension and conviction of offenders against the criminal law; but the existence of the power has been oftener, and we think correctly denied by courts of equal dignity and respectability (Crofut v. City of Danbury, 65 Conn. 294, 32 Atl. Rep. 365; Hanger v. City of Des Moines, 52 Iowa, 193, 2 N. W. Rep. 1105; Abel v. Pembroke, 61 N. H. 359; Gale v. Inhabitants of South Berwick, 51 Me. 174; Butler v. City of Milwaukee, 15 Wis. 493; Patton v. Stephens, 14 Bush, 324; Murphy v. City of Jacksonville, 18 Fla. 318; and Baker v. City of Washington, 7 D. C. 134).

The reward claimed by the defendant in error, being a contract in excess of the powers of the council of the city of Winchester, constituted no ground of action against the city, and it was not liable for its payment. "The general principle of law is settled beyond controversy," says Judge Dillon, "that the agents, officers, or even city council of a municipal corporation cannot bind the corporation by any contract which is beyond the scope of its powers. * * *" And, again : "It is a general and fundamental principle of law that all persons contracting with a municipal corporation must at their peril inquire into the power of the corporation or of its officers to make the contract; and a contract beyond the scope of the corporate power is void, although it be under the seal of the corporation." 1 Dill. Mun. Corp. (3d Ed.) §§ 457, 447. See, also, Bunch's Exr. v. Fluvanna Co., 86 Va. 457, 10 S. E. Rep. 532. The demurrer to the declaration should have been sustained, and the suit dismissed. This being our conclusion, any consideration of the other interesting questions raised and discussed by counsel is rendered unnecessary. For the reasons given in this opinion, the judgment of the circuit court must be reversed.

NOTE. As is stated by the court in the principal case, the cases relating to the power of a municipal corporation, in the absence of an express statutory provision, to offer a reward for the apprehension of criminals are conflicting. Such authority is denied in Michigan (Loveland v. Detroit, 41 Mich. 367), Maine (Gale v. Inhabitants of South Berwick, 51 Me. 174), Iowa (Hanger v. Des Moines, 52 Iowa, 195, 35 Amer. Rep. 266), Kentucky (Patton v. Stephens, 14 Bush [Ky.], 324), Florida (Murphy v. Jacksonville, 18 Fla. 318, 43 Amer. Rep. 323), and Indiana (Grant Co. Comm's v. Bradford, 72 Ind. 455, 37 Amer. Rep. 174). But the contrary rule appears to have been adopted in Pennsylvania (Borough of York v. Forscht, 23 Pa. St. 391), and by statute in Massachusetts (Crawshaw v. Roxbury, 7 Gray [Mass.], 374; Pool v. Boston, 5 Cush. [Mass.] 219; Brown v. Bradlee, 156 Mass. 28, 30

N. E. Rep. 85), and New Hampshire (Jarwin v. Exeter, 48 N. H. 83). Where a city has power to offer a reward, an offer made by the mayor in behalf of the city and subsequently ratified by the city council, is binding on the city, although not so ratified until after the performance of the service for which the reward was claimed. Crawshaw v. Roxbury, 7 Gray (Mass.), 374. In the absence of special authority and intent to bind the town, an offer in writing to pay a reward of $2,500, to "any person furnishing evidence that will lead to the arrest and conviction of the person who shot" one C, signed by the selectmen of the town, as such, will bind the signers personally, as Pub. St. ch. 212, § 12, only authorizes the selectmen to pay $500 as such reward. Brown v. Bradlee, 156 Mass. 28, 30 N. E. Rep. 85. The earlier authorities on the general subject of rewards will be found collected in 21 Amer. & Eng. Encyclopedia of Law, pp. 389-402.

Recent Cases on Subject of Rewards.-Where a stolen horse is left at the house of a person who knows nothing of the reward offered for its return, and in his absence an officer comes after it and returns it to the owner, the officer, and not such person, is entitled to the reward. Sanderson v. Lane, 43 Mo. App. 158. A city police officer especially detailed to guard the property of a railroad company, receiving a per diem compensation from the company, but nothing from the city, cannot recover a reward offered by the company for the arrest and conviction of any person destroying or injuring the company's property, which arrest it was his duty to make as a police officer. The prosecution of the offender devolving upon the prosecuting attorney of the county, the police officer cannot recover for procuring the conviction. Thornton v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 42 Mo. App. 58. Defendant advertised a reward of $200 for the recovery of the body of his drowned son. Plaintiff proposed to search for the body by diving, and applied to defendant's agent to furnish suitable apparatus and aid for the purpose, which was done. Plaintiff recovered the body. Held, that plaintiff's services were not rendered as a mere employee of defendant for the recovery of the body, and that he might recover the reward. Bagnall v. Barnard, 13 N. Y. S. 199, 59 Hun, 151. Under Code Crim. Proc. Tex. 1879, art. 229, providing that on the representation of a credible person that a felony has been committed, and that the of fender is about to escape, any peace-officer may, without a warrant, pursue and arrest the person accused, it is not the official duty of the officer to arrest without a warrant, unless the guilty party is made known to him, as well as the fact that a crime has been committed; and if, without such information, he pursues and arrests the guilty party, he is entitled to a reward offered for the arrest. Morris v. Kasling (Tex.), 15 8. W. Rep. 226. A private citizen who arrests a criminal escaped from the custody of a private detective and delivers him up for trial, is entitled to the allowance under Code Miss. sec. 3035, providing that "any person who shall arrest another who is fleeing or attempting to flee before arrest and shall deliver him up for trial shall be entitled to $100 out of the treasury of the county in which the homicide occurred." Wilson v. Wallace (Miss.), 8 South. Rep. 128, 64 Miss. 13. A reward offered for the capture of a thief is not earned by merely giving information to the sheriff which enables him to find and arrest the thief. Everman v. Hyman (Ind. App.), 28 N. E. Rep. 1099. A person who has captured a thief for whose apprehension a reward has been offered is entitled to the reward, although he made the capture without knowledge of the offer. Everman v. Hyman (Ind.

App.), 28 N. E. Rep. 1022. An offer of a reward is not void as against public policy, because made for conviction of offenses afterwards to be committed. Wilmoth v. Hensel, 25 Atl. Rep. 86, 151 Pa. St. 201, 30 W. N. C. 237. The fact that sentence is indefinitely suspended after a plea and verdict of guilty in a certain case does not affect the right to a reward offered for "conviction" in such case, as conviction is complete without sentence. Wilmoth v. Hensel, 25 Atl. Rep. 86, 151 Pa. St. 200, 31 W. N. C. 237. A reward having been offered for the arrest of an escaped criminal, two men who had discovered where he was, caused him to be arrested by the city marshal, without telling the marshal anything about the reward, and misstated to the marshal the charge on which the man was wanted in order to mislead him in regard to the reward. Held, in a bill of interpleader, that the marshal was not entitled to the entire reward, since he made the arrest in the performance of his official duty, and not in reliance upon the promise of a reward. Mahoney v. Whyte, 49 Ill. App. 97. Under Code 1892, sec. 1387, allowing a reward for the arrest and delivery of one who has killed another and is fleeing, it is not necessary that the victim should be dead when the arrest of the fugitive is made to entitle the person making the arrest to the reward, but it is sufficient that the victim has received a wound which results in death. Martin v. Copiah County (Miss.), 15 South. Rep. 73. In an action to recover a reward offered for the conviction of a thief, an instruction directing the jury to find for the plaintiff if they believe that he discovered who the thief was, and informed the defendant, without requiring that he should be the first person who found out facts leading to the discovery of the thief, or the first who communicated such facts to the defendant, is erroneous. Higgins v. Lessig, 49 Ill. App. 459. A reward offered for the apprehension and conviction of each of the perpetrators of a crime is not earned by one who merely informs the governor of the State that one such person is in the penitentiary of another State, and who, without risk, responsibility, or expense to himself appears as a witness to a trial. Lovejoy v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 53 Mo. App. 386. The lapse of twelve years between the time that a reward is offered and the time of performance is more than a reasonable time, and the offer will be presumed to have been revoked. Mitchell v. Abbott, 29 Atl. Rep. 1118, 86 Me. 338. A town marshal, whose duty it is to make arrests, cannot recover a reward offered for the arrest of persons accused of crime. Riley v. Grave (Ky.), 33 S. W. Rep. 207. Under Code 1892, Sec. 1387, providing that a person who shall arrest any one who has killed another and is fleeing, or attempting to flee, before arrest, shall be entitled to $100, the reward cannot be claimed for arresting one who, after killing a person, remained at home two days, not concealing himself, and then left for another State, remaining at one place till arrested, it being generally known where he was. Monroe County v. Bell (Miss.), 18 South. Rep. 121. A sheriff of Texas, required by Code Cr. Proc. Tex. 1879, art. 1023, to give aid in the arrest and detention of a fugitive from another State, is not entitled, for arresting in Texas a person who came there after committing a homicide in Mississippi, to the reward provided by Code 1892, sec. 1887, for arresting a person who has killed another and is fleeing, or attempting to flee. Monroe County v. Bell (Miss.), 18 South. Rep. 121. A reward for the arrest of a person may be apportioned among several persons furnishing information on which the arrest was made. Whiteher v. State (N. H.), 34 Atl. Rep. 745.

JETSAM AND FLOTSAM.

THE WAY OF THE PHYSICIAN IS HARD. An interesting example of the extent of a physi cian's liability for negligence is furnished by a recent decision of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts-Harriott v. Plimpton, 44 N. E. Rep. 992. The facts of the case were briefly as follows: The plaintiff, who was engaged to marry the daughter of M, was falsely accused of being afflicted with a venereal disease. M employed the defendant, a physician, to examine the plaintiff, who consented to the transaction, and to report the result to himself and family. The defendant mistakenly pronounced the disease to be venereal. In consequence the engagement was broken. The court held that the defendant's duty of exercising ordinary diligence, care, and skill in a professional undertaking extended to a case where only information was sought; and that the breaking of the engagement was a damage not too remote to sustain the action. This conclusion, it is submitted, is entirely correct. The evident justice of the result, however, is at first more apparent than the really substantial grounds of decision which a further consideration of the case reveals. It is a perfectly well established principle of law, "that he who undertakes the public practice of any profession undertakes that he has the ordinary skill and knowledge necessary to perform his duty toward those resorting to him in that character." 2 Bevin, Neg. (2d ed.) 1397; Sears v. Prentice, 8 East, 348. This duty arises out of the fact of the undertaking merely, and therefore is not at all dependent upon the existence of any contractual relation. The plaintiff's right to careful and skillful treatment, then, was in nowise affected because the defendant was employed by M. Pippin v. Sheppard, 11 Price, 400; Longmeid v. Halliday, 6 Exch. 761, per Parke, B., at p. 767; Dubois v. Decker, 130 N. Y. 325. See also an article on Gratuitous Undertakings, 5 Harvard Law Review, 222. The defendant would have been bound to use due diligence in performing an operation or in prescribing a remedy. Was the duty of care any less in making an examination for the sole purpose of giving information to those interested? If legal damage might result in each case, it would seem irrational to draw distinctions. Legal damage certainly resulted in this case. As early as the sixteenth century loss of marriage, whether the plaintiff was man or woman, was held to be injury sufficient to support an action of slander. Dame Morrison's Case, Jenk. 316; Davies v. Gardiner, Popham, 36; Matthew v. Crasse, 2 Bulst. 89. There is no reason why it should not equally well support an action for negligence. The only remaining question is whether the damage was too remote. It was surely a natural and proximate result, and, in view of the fact that part of the defendant's task was to report to M's family, it was not only a probable, but an intended consequence. Unusual as the steps to the decision at first appear, the conclusion is found to be sound in point of principle and law.-Harvard Law Review.

knowledge of the mortgagor's intention to make an assignment.

It was claimed by the opponents of the mortgage that the secret intent, on the part of the mortgagor, to execute and deliver the assignment, would work its invalidity, when followed by the assignment, but this contention was overruled on principle, in the absence of any national or State bankrupt laws affect. ing the subject.

The Circuit Court of Appeals (8th Circuit) also found that the Kansas decisions do not bear out such a construction, if the mortgagee was ignorant of such an intent, and was in no sense a party to the execu tion of the assignment. Judge Sanborn's dissenting opinion adopts the view that the secret intention of the assignor does control the validity of the pref erences when closely following the assignment, and he also concludes that the Kansas decisions avoid such preferences, irrespective of the ignorance of the creditor of the assignor's motive or his pressure for payment of his claim. Misled by the decision in White v. Cotzhausen, 129 U. S. 329, Judge Sanborn concludes, that the Kansas decisions are in accord with those of the courts of Illinois, to which he adds Iowa, Maine and New York. "They rest on the ground (says the Judge) that such preferences in themselves constitute a violation of the letter and spirit of that provision of the assignment law which requires the assigned property to be distributed pro rata among all the creditors of the insolvent. This provision is as much violated when preferred creditors are ignorant as when they are aware of the intention of the debtor to immediately follow their pref erences with an assignment. It is as much violated when they have urged the insolvent to give them securities as when he has done so voluntarily. It is as much violated when he gives the preferences, and they accept them in good faith, with the intent that the preferred creditors shall thereby secure the payment of their bona fide claims, as when the debtor and the creditors intend to delay the unsecured creditors. The question under this statute is not, what was the knowledge or the intent of these cured creditors? It is not whether the debtor or the creditors intended by the preferences to hinder, delay, or defraud unsecured creditors, but the only question is, did the insolvent debtor contemplate and intend, to make, the assignment, when he was making the preferences? Did he intend to dispose of his property when he en tered upon the transaction by the use of the instruments which gave the preferences and the assignment which immediately followed them? As Judge Love well said in deciding in the court below the case of Lumber Co. v. Ott, 142 U. S. 622, 630, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 318, 321, "the intention of the assignor must be the true and guiding principle of decision."

Moving within the circle of national decisions, and expounding the effect of State decisions, in the light of the rulings of the supreme court, the error of Judge Sanborn is pardonable, so far as he attempts to state the actual state of the law in Illinois. White v. Cotzhausen has never met the approval of the Illinois State tribunals, and they have declined to adopt its conclusions. We question whether the national judges in this circuit would now follow it in the light of their knowledge of the jurisprudence of Illinois. Whenever the supreme court shall again be called upon to review the decision, they will likely do so by the aid of the later rulings of the Illinois Supreme Court, upon this subject. They practically hinted so in Chicago Union Bank v. Kansas City Bank, 136 U. S. 235, when the court spoke of the Illinois decisions

"as understood by this court." The truth is that the court misunderstood, and hence misinterpreted the local jurisprudence on this subject.-National Corporation Reporter.

BOOK REVIEWS.

KENT'S COMMENTARIES.

This is the fourteenth edition of this standard treatIse, edited by John M. Gould Ph.D., who has attained considerable of a reputation as a law writer. It is interesting to note that the very able annotation of Judge 0. W. Holmes, Jr., in the twelfth edition, which placed the work fully in harmony with the later researches and the current of more recent decislon, has, in all respects, been preserved and retained, as first published, in this edition. The notes of Mr. Barnes in the thirteenth edition are also retained. As stated in the preface "the aim of the present editor has been to present fully the growth of doctrine in recent years upon all the topics discussed in this work; to supply new illustrations of the'principles derived from the very latest decisions; to define the extension or limits of those principles resulting from such decisious and especially to fortify the work in parts not recently much developed, especially in those relating to the law of nations, equity, judgments, taxation, copyrights and trade-marks." Of the commentaries themselves there is no need to speak. They have become so much a part of the growth and study of American Jurisprudence, that the merest tyro in law cannot fail to know them and to appreciate their great merit. As to the work of the editor nothing but praise may be said. He has evidently brought to his work great diligence, care, and attention to the details of the subjects, and has exhibited, in the preparation of the notes, ability and judgment of a high character. The treatise is in four volumes beautifully printed and bound. Published by Little-Brown & Co., Boston. HALE ON TORTS.

This is the latest volume of the Hornbook series. The author has heretofore prepared works on Bailments, and on Damages, of which we have spoken at the time of their appearance. The present volume is of the same character and intended primarily for students. It contains a clear, comprehensive statement of the general principles applicable to the law of torts, and a reference in notes to all the important and recent cases on the subject. The volume bears evidence of careful and conscientious labor. It is in one volume of six hundred pages. Published by West Publishing Co., St. Paul.

WILL ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

A work on circumstantial evidence, such as that before us, has long been needed by American lawyers. We are surprised that no American writer has cultivated this field since the work of Burrill was written forty years ago. Circumstantial evidence is an interesting study. Some of the most fascinating topics of the law are property dealt with under this head, and we must say that the style in which the present author has handled the subject does not by any means detract from the expectant interest we feel when we Approach it. The points of law are in all instances stated clearly and concisely, and enough space is given to the facts of famous cases to illustrate satisfactorily the rule of law. The volume is thoroughly American and modern. The character of the citations is high. A great number of authorities have been consulted, and we notice frequent references to important arti

cles in legal periodicals, and to annotations of leading cases in select series of reports. All this is evidence of great care and labor, and, of necessity, adds much to the value of the book. The work is divided into six parts. Under the head of Part I, preliminary considerations, the author deals with the nature and various kinds of evidence, the nature of the assurance produced by the different kinds of evidence, the sources and characteristics of circumstantial evidence, and the relative value of direct and circumstantial evidence. Thereafter follows the treatment of the subject proper. A very valuable part is that which deals with the proof required to establish the corpus delicti. And especial attention is given to the manner in which the general principles are applied in cases of poisoning and of infanticide. There are other valuable portions of the work which space will not permit us to do more than refer to. Such are the chapters dealing with the motives to crime, the law of recent possession, expert testimony, proof of handwriting, evidence of character and of alibi,the quantity of evidence necessary to convict. The general practitioner will find this work a valuable addition to his library and it should be the vade mecum of the criminal lawyer. Published by T. & J. W. Johnson & Co., Philadelphia.

HUMORS OF THE LAW.

Justice-You are charged with stealing Colonel Julep's chickens. Have you any witnesses? Uncle Mose-I heb not. I don't steal chickens befo' witnesses.

ONLY ONE CORRECT ANSWER.-Gov. Mattox, of Vermont, was at one time Chairman of the committee appointed to examine candidates for admission to the bar of Caledonia county. He reported that one of the candidates was, in his opinion, unqualified, having answered correctly but one of the questions put to him. "Only one? Well, what was that?" asked the presiding judge. "I asked him what a freehold estate is," replied Mattox. "Important question," said the judge; "and what was his reply?" "He made it without the least hesitation," said the Chairman with a twinkle in his eye; "of course that fact is in his favor." "Well, what did he say?" asked the judge with some impatience. "He said," returned the Chairman, "that he didn't know."

AN UP-TO-DATE DEFENSE.-"We propose to show, gentlemen of the jury," said counsel for defense, in Judge Chetlain's court the other day, "that it is impossible for the defendant to have committed this crime.

"In the first place we will prove that the defendant was nowhere near the scene of the crime at the time the crime was committed.

"Next we will offer the indisputable testimony of persons who saw the defendant on the spot, and who did not see the defendant commit the crime.

"We will show that no poison was found in the body of the deceased.

"Not only that, but we will prove that it was put there by the prosecution in this case.

"We will, furthermore, show that the deceased committed suicide.

"And last, but not least, we will prove beyond the shadow of a doubt that the deceased is not dead.

"In view of which corroborative facts, gentlemen of the jury, we respectfully ask for an acquittal."

KENTUCKY.

LOUISIANA.

MAINE.

MARYLAND...

MICHIGAN................

MISSISSIPPI....

MISSOURI..

NEBRASKA.....................

NORTH CAROLINA.. OREGON..

..83, 110 ..54, 59, 111 ..2, 23, 26, 31, 50, 66, 68, 113 44, 84 ..11, 97 ..21 .82, 87 ...12

....

.32, 80, 90, 94 ..34, 36, 77, 79, 105 .1, 28, 49, 52, 64, 108, 119 .107 .8, 55, 75, 100, 103, 104 ..18, 43, 53, 65, 73, 102, 117 .3, 15, 29, 35, 37, 38, 39, 41, 91, 115 .7, 10, 16, 17, 27, 56, 58, 62 .30 ..9, 42, 57, 67, 74, 86 99

PENNSYLVANIA............6, 25, 40, 63, 71, 78, 81, 85, 96, 109, 114, 118

2. ADMINISTRATION - Executors-Validity of Sale.-A sale of property of a deceased person by his executrix passes no title unless it is confirmed by the probate court and a subsequent administrator can recover from the purchaser for its conversion. - HORTON V. JACK, Cal., 46 Pac. Rep. 920.

3. ADMINISTRATION Probate Court-Jurisdiction.While probate courts are given power to order the distribution of funds belonging to estates of decedents, and, for that purpose, may determine who are entitled to receive such funds, they are without jurisdiction to declare trusts in the estate, distributed, or to follow up the trust fund and impose conditions on its use and disposition; such powers belonging exclusively to courts of equity. - BRAMELL V. COLE, Mo., 37 S. W. Rep. 925.

4. APPEAL-Supreme Court Jurisdictional Amount. -That certain subscribers to the stock of a corporation, in a suit against them to recover the amounts individually subscribed, claim to have paid for the s ock by a conveyance of joint property, does not create a question of joint liability, by reason of which the sum of the subscriptions may be considered to give juris. diction on appeal.-WILSON V. KIESEL, U. s. S. C., 17 S. C. Rep. 124.

5. APPEALS FROM STATE COURTS-Federal Question.The Supreme Court of the United States has no juris. diction to review the final judgment of the supreme court of a State, and to determine whether it is in derogation of a right protected by the federal constitution, unless it appears from the record that the party against whom the judgment was rendered specially

set up or claimed such right in the State court.CHICAGO & N. W. RY. Co. v. CITY OF CHICAGO, U. S. S. C., 17 S. C. Rep. 129.

6. ATTORNEYS-Disbarment.-Where an attorney was guilty of forgery, but was acquitted on the plea of insanity, the court is warranted in disbarring him, and in refusing his re-enrollment after discharge from an insane asylum; the evidence not being sufficient to prove that he did not know right from wrong.-IN RE KENNEDY, Penn., 35 Atl. Rep. 995.

7. AWARD-Revocation of Submission-Impeachment. -An award, whether at common law or under the statute, when regularly made and published, is, in the absence of fraud or mistake, prima facie binding upon the parties thereto; and the burden of alleging and proving the contrary is upon the party seeking to impeach it.-CONNECTICUT FIRE INS. Co. v. O'FALLON, Neb., 69 N. W. Rep. 118.

8. BAILMENT OR SALE - Theft from Bailee.-In an action by a bailor against a bailee to recover the value of goods which the latter refused to redeliver, defendant may show, under the general issue, that the property was stolen from him without negligence on his part.KNIGHTS V. PIELLA, Mich., 69 N. W. Rep. 92.

9. BANKS Collections. - Plaintiff bank forwarded a check to its correspondent, indorsed for collection. The correspondent also indorsed it for collection, and forwarded it to defendant bank. Defendant credited the amount on its account with such correspondent, and collected the check. Subsequently to the entry of the credit, the correspondent bank made an assignment. The correspondent bank was at the time indebted to the defendant: Held, that the defendant was liable to plaintiff for the amount collected by it on the check.-NATIONAL CITIZENS BANK OF N. Y. V. CITI. ZENS NAT. BANK OF RALEIGH, N. Car., 25 S. E. Rep. 971. 10. BANKS-Insolvency-Trust Funds.-A fund which comes into possession of a bank, with respect to which the bank has but a single duty to perform, and that is to deliver it to the party thereto entitled, is a trust fund, and is therefore incapable of being commingled with the general assets of such bank subsequently transferred to its receiver. - CAPITAL NAT. BANK V. COLD-WATER NAT. BANK, Neb., 69 N. W. Rep. 115.

11. BANKS AND BANKING Bills and Notes.-Where a suit was brought by the receiver of a bank, suing for the use of the bank, on a promissory note payable at that bank to a named person as cashier, a plea by the maker of the note admitting the truth of an allegation in the plaintiff's petition that the note sued on was a part of the assets of the bank, although denying that the plaintiff was the holder or owner of the note, was properly stricken on demurrer, it not appearing that an inquiry into the ownership of the note was neces sary to any defense insisted upon by the defendant, or that the form in which the suit was brought affected or changed the defendant's rights.-MAYER V. THOMAS, Ga., 25 S. E. Rep. 761.

12. BILL AND NOTES- Void Consideration - Sale of Lottery Tickets.-Under Code, § 4029, providing that all notes or other contracts, mortgages, etc., when any part of the consideration thereof is money laid, staked, or bet at or upon any game or wager are absolutely void, a note and chattel mortgage, part of the consid eration of which is the price of tickets for a raffle of a piano, are absolutely void. KOSTER V. SENEY, Iowa, 68 N. W. Rep. 824.

-

13. CARRIERS-Passengers Contributory Negligence -Evidence. Where plaintiff, leaving defendant's railroad train, and going onto a platform of insufficient width, provided by the company, was caught between two trains passing on the nearest tracks on either side of such platform at a high rate of speed, and injured thereby: Held, that evidence to show that theretofore passengers had been accustomed to leave the trains on that side was admissible as bearing on the question of contributory negligence. ILLINOIS CENT. R. Co. v. DAVIDSON, U. S. C. C. of App., Seventh Circuit, 76 Fed. Rep. 517.