fied to follow the adjudications of our own court. In State v. Aetna Ins. Co., 117 Ind. 251, it is said by Elliott, J., when considering the question of superiority of a statutory lien over a prior mortgage lien: "The statute must determine the character and extent of the lien. It is not necessary that it should, in express terms, declare that the lien shall be a paramount one, for, if the intention can be gathered from the general words and purpose of the statute the courts will give it effect." This is in harmony with the principle asserted by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts which says, in Dunklee v. Crane, 103 Mass. 470: "The statute contains no express provision that the lien shall attach and have priority over mortgages and other incumbrances created after the contract, but such is the necessary implication." See, also, Mayor et al. v. O'Neill, 32 N. J. Eq. 386.

It is true as urged by appellant's counsel, that the Bass case does not decide that the labor lien is superior to a prior mortgage, that question not being involved, but it does not decide the debt is a charge against the property in the hands of a purchaser for value. The word "lien" includes every case in which personal or real property is charged with the payment of a debt. Anderson Law Dict. 623. In Warren v. Sohn, 112 Ind. 213, it was claimed that mortgage liens were superior to subsequent minor's labor liens, although the statute declared that such labor liens should be paramount to and have priority over all other liens except taxes; yet the court decided that the statute must be given effect, and the mortgages yield to the labor liens. Here the statute directs that the labor claims shall be preferred, and shall be "first paid in full." It being established as it is by the Bass case, that the statute gives a lien for the labor claim, then it seems to us the intent that it shall be a paramount lien is clearly expressed. If it is to be "first" paid in full, we do not well see how the mortgage can come in before it. When the mortgagee accepted his mortgage, he must be deemed to have done so with knowledge that if the business was continued, and the contingency contemplated by the statute should occur, then the labor debts would be preferred, and must be first paid. The law entered into the mortgage contract as a silent, but potent. factor, and the mortgagee accepted it subject to such rights as might accrue to others under the law. Warren v. Sohn, supra; Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Canada, etc., Ry. Co., 127 Ind. 264, 26 N. E. Rep. 784; Hancock v. Yaden, 121 Ind. 366, 23 N. E. Rep. 253. As said in some of the cases, it is wholly voluntary upon the part of the mortgagee whether he will accept a mortgage with the limitations by law incorporated therein. In Provident Inst. for Savings v. Jersey City, 113 U. S. 506, 5 Snp. Ct. Rep. 612, it was decided that a statutory lien for water rent was superior to mortgages executed prior to the attaching of the supply pipes to the mains. It is said: "When the complainant took its mortgages, it knew what the law was. It knew that by the law, if

the mortgaged lot should be supplied with Passaic water by the city authorities, the rent of that water, as regulated and exacted by them, would be a first lien on the lot. It chose to take its mortgages subject to this law." To the same effect are Vreeland v. O'Neil, 36 N. J. Eq. 399, and Vreeland v. Mayor, etc., 37 N. J. Eq. 574. There the statute made the water rent assessment a "lien from the time of the confirmation thereof until paid, notwithstanding any devise, descent, alienation or other incumbrance thereon." This language was adjudged to make the water rent paramount to prior mortgages, although it was not so expressly declared in the statute. The principle upon which a mortgagee is subordinated to a statutory lien authorized and made superior by a statute in force when the mortgage is executed is not by any means new or novel. Nor does Indiana stand alone in thus providing security for the wage earners, who depend upon their daily toil for support. For many centuries, in admiralty, the rights of seamen to their wages have been held superior to the mortgagees of the vessel. The J. A. Brown, 2 Low. 464, Fed. Cas. No. 7,118; 2 Jones, Liens, § 1775. In Mississippi the liens of agricultural laborers are made superior to prior mortgages. Buck v. Payne, 52 Miss. 271; Buck v. Payne, 50 Miss. 648. In Michigan the wages of miners are given liens paramount to all others. McLaren v. Byrnes, 80 Mich. 275, 45 N. W. Rep. 143. In that State, as in ours no notice of lien need be given, but the court says: "All persons are bound to take notice that unpaid laborers for a mining corporation in the Upper Peninsula have a lien for their labor upon all the real and personal property of the corporation in that portion of the State." In Iowa we find the decisions exactly in harmony with our own. There is a statute similar to ours substantially, identical in terms so far as it relates to the matters herein involved. It does not in terms create a lien, nor declare it paramount to prior mortgages, but provides, as does ours, that the debts owing to laborers "shall be considered and treated as preferred debts, and such laborers or employees shall be preferred creditors and shall first be paid in full, and if there be not sufficient to pay them in full, then the same shall be paid to them pro rata after paying costs." In Reynolds v. Black (Iowa), 58 N. W. Rep. 922, the question was presented as to whether, where the property had been taken by mortgagees, the laborers had any lien, and, if so, whether it was superior to the mortgagees. There, as here it was "contended that no lien is given to the laborer, that to give him preference over existing liens is to displace such liens, and that the preference only applies to what is left after satisfying existing liens;" but the court said, "to so construe this statute would largely defeat its manifest purpose," and adjudged that there was a lien superior to the mortgagees. The doctrine of this case was reaffirmed by St. Paul, etc. Co. v. Diagonal Coal Co. (Iowa), 64 N. W. Rep. 606.

We are not able to perceive that any general disaster will be brought upon the business interests of the community by our holding. The lien does not attach save in those cases where there has been a seizure by an officer, or a collapse of the business; and it is, under this statute, in the absence of fraud, limited to the property then belonging to the debtor, Thus, the ordinary everyday transfer and sale of property in the usual course of a going business will not be affected. The smallness of the amount also serves to lessen our apprehension as to the evil results to follow from the application to this case of the ordinary rules of law, and the giving effect to the plain letter of the statutes as to the order of precedence. A result which affords to the day laborer protection to the amount of $50 does not appear to us so highly inequitable as to call for any strained or fanciful construction of the statute. That he "shall be a preferred creditor, and shall first be paid in full," seems to us simple, plain English, easily understood, the meaning of which would not ordinarily be mistaken by the average man. Neither is the statute to receive a strict construction as being in derogation of the common law. It is remedial in its nature. As was said by the supreme court in speaking of a statute similar in character, and enacted for a similar purpose, viz: "to secure to employees of corporations an efficient remedy for the collection of money due them for wages. Such statutes are not only constitutional, but they are to be liberally construed, with a view of rendering effectual the purpose of the statute." In any event, the law is plain, and, if not wise, the remedy is by legislative repeal, rather than by judicial nullification. Assuming, without deciding, that the complaint must show a transfer of all the property used in the business, we are of opinion that this fact sufficiently appears. The averment, in substance, is that Bell, on Oct. 25, 1894, had a mortgage on all the chattels in the barn, and that this property was turned over to him. The answer of estoppel was clearly bad. It counted upon appellee's failure to make known his claim. Appellant's want of knowledge of its existence is nowhere alleged. This was essential to enable him to obtain the benefit of the appellee's silence as an estoppel. Roberts v. Abbott, 126 Ind. 83, 26 N. E. Rep. 565; Bank v. Williams, 128 Ind. 423, 26 N. E. Rep. 75. Earlier cases held that it was reversible error to sustain a defective demurrer to an answer, without reference to its sufficiency. Gordon v. Swift, 39 Ind. 212; Dugdale v. Culbertson, 7 Ind. 664. Later and better considered decisions, however, declare the law to be that although the demurrer be insufficient to test the pleading, and might be overruled without error, yet if it is in fact sustained, and the pleading is really bad, then no harmful error occurs. Wade v. Huber, 10 Ind. App. 417, 38 N. E. Rep. 351; Foster v. Dailey, 3 Ind. App. 530, 30 N. E. Rep. 4; Firestone v. Werner, 1 Ind. App. 293, 27 N. E. Rep. 623; Board v. Gruver,

115 Ind. 224, 17 N. E. Rep. 290; Palmer v. Hayes, 112 Ind. 289, 13 N. E. Rep. 882; Hildebrand v. McCrum, 101 Ind. 61. We are unable to see that the degree of insufficiency or informality of the demurrer affects the application of the principle thus established.

It is argued that upon the principle, declared in Eversole v. Chase, 127 Ind. 297, 26 N. E. Rep. 835, section 7051, Rev. St. 1894, is not in force, because it was an amendment of a statute (section 5206, Rev. St. 1881) passed in 1879, which had been repealed by implication by the passage of the act of March 3, 1885 (Elliott's Supp., § 1598, being section 7058, Rev. St. 1894). "Repeals by implication are not favored in the construction of statutes," yet it is ordinarily true that the enactment of a new statute covering the whole subject matter of an older statute, and containing provisions that cannot be reconciled with it, operates as an implied repeal of the older one. Robinson v. Rippey, 111 Ind. 112, 12 N. E. Rep. 141." This is the rule declared by this court, through Davis, J., in Allen v. Town of Salem, 10 Ind. App. 650, 38 N. E. Rep. 425. It was further said in the same case: "In order to effect such repeal by implication, it must appear that the subsequent statute revised the whole subject-matter of the former one, and was intended as a substitute for it, or that it was repugnant to the old law." The act of March 3, 1885, makes no provision for, and does not cover, the subject of labor liens where the property has not passed into the hands of an assignee or receiver, but is confined to those cases where it does come into the hands of an assignee or receiver. It falls far short of covering the whole subject matter of the act of 1879, nor is there any good reason why both should not stand together. Upon the principles of law announced in the Town of Salem Case, supra, and the authorities therein cited, we are of opinion that the act of March 3, 1885, did not repeal the law of 1879. Judgment affirmed.

NOTE. A common-law lien is a right to retain possession of property belonging to another, until the claim of the party in possession, against the owner is satisfied. 2 Abbott's Law Dic. Such are the liens of workmen, on property upon which they have performed service; of pawn brokers, of innkeepers and of carriers upon property in their possession for charges. Story on Bailments, secs. 440, 303; Edwards on Bailments, sec. 420, 245 and 473. These and other liens at common-law, are inseparable from possession, and are lost if it is surrendered. An equitable lien may be defined to be a right not recognized at law, to have a fund or specific property, or its proceeds, applied in whole or in part to the payment of a particular debt or class of debts. 2 Story, Eq. Jur. sec. 1215; Gladstone v. Berkley, 2 Meriv. 403. Such liens are based either upon express contract or the abstract principles of justice. They are upheld against all other interests except bona fide mortgages or vendees without notice. Story, Eq. Jur. sec. 1217. They are usually enforced when upon chattels, by a sale of the property to which they are attached. Equity begins where the law leaves off, and allows liens without reference to possession and are termed "equitable liens" and applicable to those liens which only exist

in equity. 2 Story, Eq. Jur. sec. 1215; Bis. Prin. Eq. sec. 351. Equitable liens are very frequently allowed upon the principle that equity looks upon that as done which ought to be done. Reed v. Gillian, 2 Desaus. Eq. (S.C.), 552. A lien is sometimes referred to as a pledge. But a pledge is not only a lien but also something more. It is a deposit by the debtor of per sonal property by way of security, with an implied power in the creditor to sell it upon default. In a lien, as in a pledge, the general property remains in the debtor, and the creditor had only a special property. A pledgee has such an interest in the thing pledged that he may transfer it to another, and he may enforce his security by sale without the aid of a court. A lien is neither a jus ad rem nor a jus in re. It is neither a right of property in the thing, nor a right of action for the thing. It is simply a right of detainer. Bruce v. Marlborough, 2 P. W. 491. In a legal sense a lien imports that a person is in possession of the property of another, and that he detains it as security for some demand which he has in respect of it. A lien therefore implies: 1. Possession by the creditor. 2. Title in debtor. 3. A debt arising out of the specific property. The case above depends upon the later division and is denominated a lien by statute. By recent legislation many of the liens recognized by the common-law, and many of those asserted in equity, have been materially enlarged in their scope, or made more effectual by provisions for their enforcement. Modern legislation bas also in many instances gone beyond the liens previously recognized at law or in equity, and has created a great number of new liens, and it would seem that the Indiana statute had been extended to its full constitutional limit for the protection of all persons who labor for wages. A lien created by statute may be taken away or amended by a subsequent statute. Frost v. Ilsey, 54 Me. 345. An amendment seems to have been made to the Indiana statute for the benefit of a wage worker, notwithstanding such a lien is no part of the contract, but merely an incidental accompaniment of it, or means of enforcing it, a remedy given by law, and, like all matters pertaining to the remedy, and not to the essence of the contract, until vested rights or preferred claims are settled or prorated. A statutory lien, without possession, has the same operation and efficacy that a common-law lien has with possession. Beall v. White, 94 U. S. 382; Grant v. Whitwell, 9 Iowa, 152. Statutory liens are regulated by the law of the forum, and connot be claimed by virtue of the law of another State. Swasey v. Steamer Montgomery, 12 La. Ann. 800. A lien is either specific or general. The former attaches to specific property as security for some demand which the creditor has in respect to that property, such as work done or materials furnished in repairing or constructing that specific thing. Such a lien may be given by commonlaw or by statute. But a specific lien upon property cannot be enforced for the payment of other debts due claimant by the owner, at least without a special agreement to that effect. Nevan v. Romp, 8 Iowa, 207. A general lien is one arising not from some particular demand, but for a general balance of accounts. A general lien exists: First, where there is an express contract; second, where it is implied from the usage of trade; or third, from the manner of dealing between the parties in the particular case. Green v. Farmer, 4 Burr, 2214, 2221. Liens have always been favored by the courts. Lord Mansfield said: "The convenience of commerce and natural justice are on the side of liens. Green v. Farmer, supra. As be. tween debtor and creditor the doctrine of lien is so

equitable that it cannot be favored too much. Jacobs v. Latour, 5 Bing. 130.

Superiority of Liens.-It is not necessary that a stat ute shall, in express terms, declare that the lien shall be a paramount one. If it determines the character and extent of the lien, and the intention can be gath ered from the language and purpose of the statute, courts will give it such effect. State v. Ins. Co., 117 Ind. 251. It is a necessary implication that such lien shall attach and have priority over mortgages and incumbrances created after the contract with a laborer, notwithstanding the statute contains no express provision thereon. Dunklee v. Crane, 103 Mass. 470. In Pennsylvania a different rule prevails. A statute providing that all moneys due for labor for any time not more than six months preceding the sale of the property, by execution or otherwise, on account of the insolvency or death of the employer, shall be a lien on such property, and first paid out of the proceeds of such sale, does not give a creditor for wages, a lien on personalty transferred in good faith by an insolvent employer in payment of his debts. The sale intended by the statute is a judicial sale. Wilkinson v. Patton, 162 Pa. 12. When one acquires a mort. gage lien on property with knowledge of the use and purposes to which such property is put by its owner, and without notice that, under the statutory provisions giving persons employed in and about the property a prior lien on such property for labor, such property is liable to be subjected to afteracquired liens for labor and such labor liens will be paramount to and have priority over such mortgage liens. Warren et al. v. Sohn et al., 112 Ind. 219. The lien of a mortgage on a railroad, given to a contractor before its construction, and assigned by him, is inferior to liens of laborers and material men for the subsequent construction of the road. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 127 Ind. 264, 26 N. E. Rep. 784. On the other hand a debt may be a preferred debt in a sense, and yet not be superior to another debt for which a lien is given, and so a cred. itor, may be a preferred creditor and still his claim may not be superior to that of lien, holders. The word "preferred" is a relative term. It necessarily refers to something else and means that the thing to which it is attached has some advantage over another thing of the same character, which but for such advantage would be like the other. State v. Cheraw & Chester Ry. Co., 16 S. C. 524. A preferred debt or claim which is not a lien is superior only to another preferred debt or claim of the same character, or that is not a lien. It is never superior to a lien, unless made so expressly by the terms of the law. A physician's bill for services in attending the decedent in his last sickness is a preferred claim or debt and the physician holding such claim is a preferred creditor; but it cannot be said that his claim is superior to that of a mortgage or other lien created in the life time of the decedent. The same is true of funeral expenses, of administration, etc. Such a claim is pre. ferred simply to the general debts of the decedent, t. e., to debts or claims that are not liens; and it becomes a charge upon the assets of the estate, and are preferred to such other debts or claims that are not liens, just as a claim of the character named in the opinion above, is a charge upon the assets of the insolvent, and is preferred to other debts not liens; hence, it does not become superior to those claims which are liens. Therefore, the Indiana statute in question, cannot by any process of reasoning be construed so as to make the claim of a laborer a lien superior and paramount to all other liens, of whatever character

and antiquity, that may exist against the insolvent property. To hold that the laborer, by virtue of this statute, has a lien for his wages superior to all other lens then or before then existing, is to inject into the statute language which is not there, and to enlarge, by construction, the scope of the rights conferred by this statute beyond that contemplated. If such a construction prevails, a class of liens will be created which was never intended, and which in the language of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, would be "of the most dangerous and noxious character. No one could purchase property without assuming the risk of insolvency of the vendor." Wilkinson v. Patton, 162 Pa. 12. Statutes which are in derogation of common or private rights, or which confer special privileges or impose special burdens or restrictions upon individuals, or upon any class of persons, which are not shared by others outside of such class, are to be strictly construed. Black Int. Law. 300. "To construe a statute so as to greatly restrict the rights and interest of lien holders other than the class established by this contruction, and to confer special privileges upon the class of persons coming within the provisions of the law thus construed, that cannot be enjoyed by others outside of such class, would be such an interpretation in favor of the class thus benefited, as to violate one of the cardinal rules of statutory construction," says Reinhard, J., dissenting. "And to say, as does the majority opinion, that the creation of such a preferred lien by mere construction affects only the remedy, and not any right, of the parties is incomprehensible." A lien given by statute is not a remedy, and to so characterize it would be a misapplication, as much as it would be to say a mortgage was but a remedy. Atkins v. Little, 17 Minn. 342. In the case of Bank v. Black, 129 Ind. 595, the general statement is made that such statutes should be liberally construed, but this is no authority for ejecting language into the statute which is not contained therein. In Bank v. Black, supra, it was simply held that the lien is extended to property of the corpora. tion acquired and transferred by it the day before it went into the hands of a receiver, and after the performance of the labor for which the lien was asserted. It is claimed that this interpretation, while just and reasonable, falls far short of supporting a proposition that the mortgagee of a chattel mortgage executed in good faith and for a valid debt, or the assignee of such mortgage, may under the provisions of the statute quoted, be cut out and deprived of the benefits of the legally acquired mortgage lien by a claim originating nine months subsequent to the execution and the recording of such mortgage, and by mere silence, and without any legal steps being taken by which the intention to hold such a lien is declared and made a matter of public record, a charge may be fastened upon the mortgaged property superior and paramount to that of a chattel mortgage more than nine months old, in the absence of an express provision to that ef feet in the statute. Isolated expressions or dicta of judges cannot be used as authority for the establishment of a doctrine calculated to destroy security in a mortgage and other honestly acquired liens. That a statute may by its terms give the kind of preference elaimed is not disputed, but it is insisted that the Indiana statute does not give it. If a lien is purely statutory, it exists and must be controlled by the statute. See Cook v. State, 101 Ind. 446; Hanch v. Ripley, 127 Ind. 151; Jones, Liens, Sec. 105. That the legisla. ture has the power to enact such a law is not disputed but that the construction of the present statute can be made to cover such a case is disputed. If such a

construction prevails there is not a chattel in Indiana upon which it would be safe to take a mortgage for purchase money or any other debt, for the owner and vendee may choose to put it into a use which wil bring it within the operation of this statute and any number of labor liens may attach to it. "Mortgaged property may readily be put to uses in the future of which, at the time the security was accepted, there was not the remotest indication nor prospect. Hence, to say that the lienholder must anticipate such extraordinary contingencies, is, as it appears to me," said Reinhard, J., "to strike down vested rights and securities, and to inaugurate a system by which creditors will be driven to resort to other means of securing themselves than those heretofore depended upon for their benefit in the commercial and business world. The construction placed upon the statute by the majority opinion is regarded by Reinhard, J., who dissents,as exceedingly liberal and characterizes it as dangerous. R. D. FISHER.

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1. ACTIONS - Joinder of Causes Party Plaintiff.Under Code, § 267, subd. 1, allowing several causes of action to be united in the same complaint "when they arise out of the same transaction, or transactions connected with the same subject of action," causes of action against a sheriff and the surety on his official bond, for illegal levy and sale, and against the person who directed such levy and gave the sheriff an indemnifying bond, are properly joined. STATE V. SMITH, N. Car., 25 S. E. Rep. 958.

judgment creditor of the intestate, whose judgment was obtained before the execution of the security deed. -COMMERCIAL BANK OF Augusta v. BURCKHALTER, Ga., 25 S. E. Rep. 917.

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4. ADVERSE POSSESSION Parental Relation.-As between parties sustaining parental and filial relations, the possession of the land of the one by the other is presumed to be permissive, and not adverse. To make such possession adverse, there must be some open assertion of hostile title, other than mere possession, and knowledge thereof brought home to the owner of the land.-O'BOYLE V. MCHUGH, Minn., 69 N. W. Rep. 37.

5. APPEALS-Election of Remedies.-By Act March 3, 1891, a party seeking to appeal is not put to an election of remedies where a constitutional question arises, but has a right to raise such question by a resort to the supreme court, under the fifth section, and, while such appeal is pending, to avail itself of the defenses permissible under the sixth section by an appeal to the circuit court of appeals; but the latter court will continue the cause to await the decision of the supreme court.-PULLMAN'S PALACE-CAR Co. v. CENTRAL TRANSP. CO., U. S. C. C. of App., Third Circuit, 76 Fed. Rep. 401.

6. APPEAL Mandamus. Mandamus will issue to direct the execution of a judgment of the circuit court of appeals, notwithstanding a second appeal for matter arising previous to that judgment.-IN RE PIKE, U. S. C. C. of App., First Circuit, 76 Fed. Rep. 400.

7. ASSIGNMENT FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS.-A failure to comply with Pub. St. ch. 201, § 8, which requires a debtor, within 10 days after making an assignment, to file schedules of his creditors and of all his estate, does not invalidate the proceedings.-APPEAL OF HOW LAND, N. H., 35 Atl. Rep. 943.

An in

8. ASSIGNMENT FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS. solvent, after an assignment for the benefit of creditors, agreed with a creditor bank, if the latter would furnish the funds to pay off the claims of all other creditors who would agree to compromise, the assigned property should be transferred to such bank for the payment of its claim and the amount so advanced, in full. Over 90 per cent. of the claims were thus compromised, and the bank, after paying the amount advanced and its own claim in full, reconveyed the property to the insolvent: Held, that such reconveyance was a fraud on the rights of a creditor not accepting the compromise, rendering the bank liable for the amount of its claim to the extent of the property so transferred,-AMERICAN EXCHANGE NAT. BANK V. WALKER, Ill., 45 N. E. Rep. 271.

When an instrument is intrusted to a bank for collection, the bank secures no title thereto, and no right to hold it in any other capacity than as agent.-NATIONAL BANK OF COMMERCE OF SEATTLE V. JOHNSON, N. Dak., 69 N. W. Rep. 49.

12. BANKS AND BANKING - - Officers Fraudulent Receipt of Deposits. Const. Wash. art. 12, § 12, making individually liable an officer of a bank receiving deposits after he has knowledge of the bank's insolvency, is self-executing. MALLON V. HYDE, U. S. C. C. (Wash.), E. D., 76 Fed. Rep. 388.

13. BENEVOLENT SOCIETY Membership CertificateBeneficiary.-Where a member of a mutual benefit association makes a proper change in the beneficiary of his membership certificate, and duly notifies the asso

ciation, the failure of the directors to consent to the change, and to record it as required by the by-laws, because no meeting occurred between the notice and the member's death, cannot defeat the beneficiary's rights.-SANBORN V. BLACK, N. H., 35 Atl. Rep. 942.

14. CARRIERS-Injuries to Passenger on Street Car.The concurrent facts of the happening of an accident to a passenger on a street car and the exercise by the passenger of ordinary care do not raise a presumption of negligence against the carrier, so as to shift the burden of proof on it to show that it was not guilty of negligence, where plaintiff's evidence shows that the accident was due to a wagon driven so close to an open car as to strike plaintiff's foot. - CHICAGO CITY Rr. Co. v. ROOD, Ill., 45 N. E. Rep. 238.

15. COMPROMISE. The compromise of a doubtful claim is a sufficient consideration to support a promis. sory note fairly given in settlement of the controversy compromised. JOHNSON v. REDWINE, Ga., 25 S. E. Rep. 924.

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17. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Election and Voters.-The act of April 17, 1896 (92 Ohio Laws, p. 185), which prohibits the name of any candidate for office from being placed upon the official ballot more than once, is a valid law.-STATE V. BODE, Ohio, 45 N. E. Rep. 195. 18. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Taxation Situs of Railroad Rolling Stock.-It is no objection to the imposi tion of a State tax upon railroad rolling stock used partly within the State that the same is engaged as a vehicle of interstate commerce, or that its legal situs is in another State or territory, where taxes on it have been paid.-REINHART v. MCDONALD, U. S. C. C., N. D., (Cal.), 76 Fed. Rep. 403.

19. CONTEMPT OF COURT-Power to Punish.-The general assembly is without authority to abridge the power of a court created by the constitution to punish contempts summarily, such power being inherent, and necessary to the exercise of judicial functions; and sections 6906, 6907, Rev. St., will not be so construed as to impute to the general assembly an intention to abridge such power.-HALE V. STATE, Ohio, 45 N. E. Rep. 199.

20. CONTRACT-Public Policy. A contract between a board of trade and a person who represents himself as having control over certain industries which he is about to establish in another town, whereby such person agrees to withdraw from that deal, and use his in fluence to have those industries established in the town represented by said board, is not against public policy.-LORD V. BOARD OF TRADE OF WICHITA, Ill., 45 N. E. Rep. 205.

21. CONTRACT-Rescission-False Representations.Representations that a saloon is first-class in every respect, and well fitted up, and that the business will yield a profit of $4,000 in two years, though false, will not entitle the purchaser to rescind the sale for fraud. -O'DONNELL & DUER BAVARIAN BREWING CO. v. FARBAR, III., 45 N. E. Rep. 283.

22. CONTRACTS-Rescission-Fraudulent Representations. A party cannot avoid a contract for false representations made by the other party, which his own testimony shows he did not rely upon, nor act upon, in making the contract.-DADY V. CONDIT, Ill., 45 N. E. Rep. 224.

23. CONVERSION-Ownership of Crops.-The owner of real estate is presumed, prima facie, to own its products, including annual crops. Such presumption, however, is not conclusive and may be rebutted by evidence.ELSTAD V. NORTHWESTERN ELEVATOR Co., N. Dak., N. W. Rep. 44.

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24. CORPORATIONS - Foreign Corporations - Surety Bonds. A surety bond taken as security for the conduct of an agent of a foreign corporation which under