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trust upon it in favor of the promisee, and to e pree such trust against the heirs and personal regre entatives of the deceased." Bolman v. Overall, la. 451; 3 Pars. Cont., marg., p. 406.

Even if the contract here is, as counsel for plaistiť

error contend, a contract by which the deceksel romised to let the statute of descents have its operi on and not a promise to make a devise in a par cular way, it is, nevertheless, a merely verbal agree ent, and as such could not have the effect to fasten g a trust upon the real estate devised to the defends its. A trust which affects land must be in writing, yler v. Tyler, 126 III. 525. Under hour statute d auds, all trusts shall be created or evidenced by riting, except resulting trusts, or else they are void." ovey v. Holcomb, 11 III. 660.

CRIMINAL LAW - CREDIBILITY OF WITNESS. The Supreme Court of Nebraska, in Argo right v. State, 69 N. W. Rep. 102, decides at the jury are the sole judges of the credibily of witnesses, and it is error for a trial court,

a criminal case, to single out a particular itness for the defense by name, and give to e jury & cautionary instruction, which sy ies directly to his testimony, the rule of Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus." The purt said in part: The instruction attacked is as follows: "If the jury lieve from the evidence, that the witnesses, Lewis prris, Hilton Stanley, and Perry Walz have wiltsily forn falsely on this trial as to any matter or thing aterial to the issue in the case, then the jury ate at erty to disregard their entire testimony, except in far as it has been corroborated by other credible idence, or by facts and circumstances proved du e trial.” It is contended that this portion of the arge of the court is erroneous, in that it singles out rtain individuals of the witnesses, and directs pecial attention to them and their testimony, ectively; that such action of the trial court was rel culated to induce a belief or an impression in the nds of the jury, or in the mind of any one or mit them, of the court's disbelief of the testimony el

witness or witnesses specifically named, or, s st, that the court viewed it with suspicion, and telt

lined to discredit it. One of the governing pria s of the question involved is that it is for the juny I not the court, to pass upon the credibility of alte

ses, and to determine the weight to be aceordel ir testimony (Hedman y. Anderson, 6 Neb, es ldt v. State, 20 Neb. 492, 30 N. W. Rep. 68; State Cushing, 29 Mo. 215; Shellabarger v. Nafus

, 16 Kaz State v. Stout, 31 Mo. 406), and extending this etrine, and applying it to an instruction, on the xim, Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus." "Th dibility of a witness who knowingly testifies falselt to one or more material facts is wholly a matter for jury.” Schuek v. Hagar, 24 Minn, 339. "It is er

to single out a particular witness, and to dinite ha cautionary instruction, although couched i per terms, against his testimony. The reastali t such a course tends to convey to the minds of the

the impression that the testimony of the Fall llar witness is disbelieved by the judge, and is le disregarded a question which it is their prorine Vetermine, and not his.2 Thomp. Trials, p.

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mony, is subject to the infirmity that it may mislead the service of the summons. It is considered the jury, or some members thereof, to believe that

to be a hard rule and is not favored by the the presiding judge doubts the integrity and truthfullness of such witnesses or witness, and discredit

courts, and, it a party makes a slip in his probe thus cast upon testimony, when the entire ques- ceedings, it is said the courts will not assist tion should have been solved by the jury, and, more

him in rectifying his mistake.?
over, that all difficulty may in all cases be avoided,
and the purpose sought be subserved, and effectually

Essentials in Creating the Lien.—The bill and properly attained, by giving a general instruction must be filed in good faith and not be colluson the subject, applicable to any and all witnesses,

ive. So if the bill be given to the clerk to we do not think it wise or best to extend the approval of this court to a doctrine or rule under which trial

indorse, and be then taken away by the party, courts may designate witnesses by name in instruc. it is not considered to be so filed as to create tions upon the weight and credibility which may be

a lis pendens. The property must be well given the testimony, beyond what has already been announced on the subject. Hence we must disap.

described in the pleadings, since the lis pen. prove the instruction given in the case at bar as im. dens only extends to what is claimed in the proper and erroneous. The judgment and sentence of

pleadings, and relates to property so dethe district court will be reversed, and the case remanded.

scribed that any one can identify it by such description.10 The law imports notice of such facts as are alleged in the petition, which are

pertinent to the issue, and of the contents of SCOPE OF A LIS PENDENS.

exhibits. Such description need not be a The doctrine of lis pendens is found clearly particular one, when sufficient description is announced in the ordinances of Lord Bacon. given to enable the parties to understand It is chrystallized in the maxim pendente lite

what property is sought to be charged by the nihil innovetur. This doctrine is, that no one

suit; as where all the land belonging to & can acquire an interest in the subject matter party at his decease is sought to be charged.!? of a suit during the pendency thereof from The property described must be such as can any of the defendants therein to the preju- be affected by a lis pendens, and the court dice of the plaintiff ; otherwise, by transfer of

must have jurisdiction over the person and interest, it might be necessary to bring in new the property.18 If the pleadings are amended parties, and lawsuits could thereby be ren- and all the material grounds for relief were dered interminable.? Formerly, in England,

stated in the original petition, the lis pendens when the subpæna was served prior to the dates from the original filing; it the amendfiling of the bill of complaint, the lis pendens ment inserts a new equity, or new claim, or began from the filing of the bill, and reverted a different or distinct ground of relief, then to the service of the summons.: Now, how- as to such new matter the lis pendens begins ever, the lien begins upon the service of the from the filing of the amendment.14 The nosubpæna or summons after the bill has been tice only extends to those who obtain title affiled. Such summons may be served in the ter the institution of the suit from one of the manner prescribed by statute, by personal defendants in such suit.15 Where the comservice, by leaving it at the home of the de- plainant has neither title to the property in fendant, or by publication when allowed. controversy, nor a lien on it, at the time of When by statute a suit is declared to be in- its purchase by an innocent party, such party stituted by the filing of the bill and ihe issu

6 Burleson v. McDermott, 57 Ark. 229; Jordan V. ance of a summons, the lien attaches prior to Everett, 93 Tenn. 390; Rothschild v. Kobn, 93 Ky. 107.

7 Walker v. Goldsmith, 14 Oreg. 125. 1 Murray y. Ballou, 1 Johns. Ch. 566.

8 Allison v. Drake, 145 111. 1500; Diamond v. Lawn 2 Hailey v. Ano, 136 N. Y. 569; Wortham v. Boyd, rence Co., 37 Pa, St. 353; Skeel v. Spraker, 8 Paige, 66 Tex. 401; Randall v. Lower, 98 Ind. 255; Union T. 182. Co. v. Southern, etc. Co., 130 U. S. 565; Bellamy v. 9 Wilkinson v. Elliott, 43 Kan. 590. Sabine, 1 De G. & J. 566; Hayden v. Bucklin, 9 Paige, 10 Oliphant v. Burns, 146 N. Y. 218; Miller v. Sheny, 512.

69 U. S. 237; Leuders v. Thomas, 35 Fla. 518. 3 Burleson v. McDermott, 57 Ark. 229; Lincoln & 11 Walker v. Goldsmith, 14 Oreg. 125; Puckett v. Co. v. Rundle, 34 Neb. 559.

v. Benjamin, 21 Oreg. 370; Norris v. Ile, 152 III. 190; 4 Alison v. Drake, 145 III. 500; Franklin S. Bank v. Rothschild v. Kohn, 93 Ky. 107. Taylor, 131 III. 376; Norris v. Ile, 52 Ill. 190; Murray y. 12 Arrington v. Arrington, 114 N. C. 151. Ballou, 1 Johns. Ch. 566; Diamond v. Lawrence Co., 13 Norris v. Ile, 152 Ill. 190. 37 Pa. St. 353; Walker v. Goldsmith, 14 Oreg. 125;

14 Norris v. Ile, supra. Skeel v. Spraker, 8 Paige, 182.

15 Miller v. Sheny, 2 Wall. 287; Terrell v. Allison, 88 5 Hayden v. Bucklin, 9 Paige, 512.

U.S. 289; Travis v. Supply Co., 42 Kan.625.

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the service of the summons. It is considered to be a hard rule and is not favored by the courts, and, if a party makes a slip in his pro

ceedings, it is said the courts will not acest him in rectifying bis mistake.

Essentials in Creating the Lien-The ti must be filed in good faith and not be colo ive. So if the bill be given to the clerð të indorse, and be then taken away by the party. it is not considered to be so filed as to create a lis pendens. The property must be wel described in the pleadings, since the lis pas ilens only extends to what is claimed in the pleadings, and relates to property so de scribed that any one can identify it by soch description. The law imports notice of such facts as are alleged in the petition, which an pertinent to the issue, and of the contents i exhibits. Such description need not be ! particular one, when sufficient description : given to enable the parties to understas

what property is sought to be charged by the suit; as where all the land belonging to 1 party at his decease is sought to be charge).

is not affected by the judgment finally ren- judgment of dismissal but before the time
dered. An innocent purchaser from the de- allowed for appeal or writ of error had ex-
fendant to a suit of his interest in the prop- pired, should be protected, was admitted to
erty, which is the subject of the suit, is not be a controverted question.26 In a case where
charged with notice of the interest of another a party purchased after the time for appeal-
defendant in the same property, though it ing has passed, he was considered to have
appeared on the face of the pleadings to bought subject to the suit, the decree being
which it was not necessary for any of the pur- set aside as being unwarranted. The court
poses of the suit to give effect. The law of stated that a purchaser must ascertain at his
118 pendens does not prevent a defendant from peril whether the decree is warranted.27 The
purchasing from a person, not party to the dissolution of a temporary injunction while
suit, a title superior to complainant's title the suit still goes on does not affect a lis
and setting it up to defeat his title.18 It was pendens.28
held that a suit in partition was a notice as to Enforcing a Lis Pendens.-It is said that
the complete title, as its object was to deter- a successful claimant can enforce his judg-
mine the rights of all parties interested there- ment by ignoring the rights or claims of a
in, and though new parties were subsequently purchaser pendente lite, and acting as though
introduced, yet all purchasers pendente lite he had never interfered with the property.23
from any of the interested parties took subject It may, however, sometimes be necessary to
to the final judgment. A lis pendens is un- obtain a writ of assistance ;30 and in case the
necessary as against those who buy with purchaser has obtained the legal title, a bill
knowledge of the adverse rights of others, in equity may be required. 31
and their purchases are subject to such right, Lis Pendens as to Real Estate. The rule
and if suit be pending subject to its results, of lis pendens is always applicable in suits
though the law of lis pendens may be inappli- affecting the title to real estate. 32 Divorce
cable. 20

suits have been filed, claiming alimony in How the Lis Pendens may be Vitiated.- property specially described in the suit. To maintain the lis pendens, the bill must be Some courts hold, that lis pendens apply to followed by a decree; and it falls, if the bill such suits ;33 others disallow such application, is voluntarily abandoned or dismissed by the alleging that the claim for alimony does not complainant." The bill must also be duly pros- apply to any specified part of the husband's ecuted, but mere lapse of time would not be

estate, nor does such claim become a lien till considered to vitiate the lis pendens, unless it

it is allowed by the decree.34 One who atwas such as to induce the belief that the taches real estate is not regarded as an innoprosecution had been abandoned.23 The lis

cent purchaser, and is bound by a suit conpendens is lost by a dismissal of the suit.24 A

cerning the title to said land against his writ of error is regarded as a new suit, and a

debtor, wherein the summons was served bepurchase without notice, after the termination

fore he obtained a judgment in his attachof a suit and before a writ of error is sued ment suit.86 One who took a mortgage on out, will be protected.25 So a bill of review,

real estate, while a suit to foreclose the taken after the time usually allowed, was considered not to operate as a lis pendens;

vendor's lien was pending, was held to be a but whether an innocent purchaser, after

26 Rector v. Fitzgerald, 59 Fed. Rep. 808.

27 Ritson v. Dodge, 33 Mich. 463; Cook v. French, 96 Mich. 525.

28 Hixon y. Oneida Co., 82 Wis. 515.

29 Norris v. Ile, 152 III. 190; Skeel v. Spraker, 8 Paige, 182.

30 Terrell v. Allison, 88 U. S. 289.
31 Powell v. Campbell, 20 Nev. 232.

32 Faulkner v. Vickers, 94 Ga. 531; Dodd v. Lee, 57 Skeel v. Spraker, 8 Paige, 182; Diamond v. Law.

Mo. App. 167; Lacassagne v. Chapuis, 144 U. S. 119;
McCutchen v. Miller, 31 Miss. 65.

33 Powell v. Campbell, 20 Nev. 232; Wilkinson v. Elliott, 43 Kans. 590.

34 Scott v. Rogers, 77 Iowa, 483; Houston v. Timmerman, 17 Oreg. 499.

35 Cotton v. Dacey, 61 Fed. Rep. 481; Puckett v. Benjamin, 21 Oreg. 370.

The property described must be such as ca be affected by a lis pendens, and the mu

must have jurisdiction over the persons the property. If the pleadings are amek

and all the material grounds for relief : stated in the original petition, the lis per dates from the original filing; if the sa ment inserts a new equity, a different or distinct ground of relief, 'e as to such new matter the lis pendens het from the filing of the amendment." The tice only extends to those who obtain title ter the institution of the suit from one of the defendants in such suit. 15 Where the esta plainant has neither title to the properts ! controversy, nor a lien on it, at the time a its purchase by an innocent party, such per

6 Burleson v. McDermott, 57 Ark. 99); Jordee! Everett, 93 Tenn. 390; Rothschild v. Kohe, 8 kif

? Walker v. Goldsmith, 14 Oreg. 125.

or dew claim i

18 McCutehen v. Miller, 31 Miss. 65.
"Bellamy v. Sabine, 1 De G. & J. 566.
13 Douglas v. Davies, 23 III. App. 618.
! 9 McCloskey v. Barr, 48 Fed. Rep. 130.
1 * Manaudas v. Mann, 25 Oreg. 597; Pacific M. Co. v.
Brown, 8 Wash. 347; Scotland Co. v. Hill, 112 U. S.

8 Allison v. Drake, 145 III. 500; Diamonds.LT

rence Co., 37 Pa. St. 353; Skeel v. Spraker

, Pet 182.

9 Wilkinson v. Elliott, 43 kap. 59).

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1 Allison v. Drake, 145 Ill. 500.

10 Oliphant v. Burns, 146 N. Y. 218: Millerr, Shery

69 U. 8. 237; Leuders v. Thomas, 35 Fla. 5ls

11 Walker v. Goldsmith, 14 Oreg. 13; Puente v. Benjamin, 21 Oreg. 370; Norris r. Ile, 1911. D.

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renee Co., 37 Pa. St. 353.

* Norris v. Ile, 152 111. 190; Hayes v. Nourse, 114 N.
* Wortham v. Boyd, 66 Tex. 401; Karr v. Burns, 1
* Macklin v. Allenborg, 100 Mo. 337.

Rothschild v. Kohn, 93 Ky. 107.

12 Arrington v. Arrington, 114 N. C. 151. 13 Norris v. Ile, 152 III. 190. 14 Norris v. Ile, supra.

15 Miller v. Sheng, 2 Wall. 237; Terrell y, Allir C. S. 289; Travis v. Supply Co., 4 kane

purchaser pendente lite, though the vendor's bonds, 47 to corporate stock, to corporate deed stated that the consideration had been bonds, 49 and to articles of ordinary comfully paid.36 One who fails to record his merce.50 Though we derive the law of lis deed to real estate till a suit affecting his pendens from the English, yet it was claimed grantor's title thereto has been commenced, in the year 1894 that it had never been apis bound, as though he were a purchaser lite plied in England to goods, chattels or choses pendente by the judgment rendered therein, 87 in action. Since the law of lis pendens does even though the plaintiff had knowledge of not apply, where there is no title to the propthe existence of his deed.38 The last decis- erty sued for nor a lien on it, there can be no ion is due to the provisions of a statute, de- lis pendens where the contention is a mere declaring that by reason of such subsequent mand for money, or in an action of trespass.52 registration the grantee in such deed shall be When personal property is already in the cusdeemed a subsequent purchaser or incum- | tody of the law, as when in replevin the de. brancer. A purchaser of real estate during fendant retains it under a redelivery bond, it the pendency of a bill to foreclose a mortgage is subject to the judgment finally rendered.53 thereon is not affected by the doctrine of lis Statutory Provisions.-In many States this pendens, if such mortgage was not then of matter has been regulated by statute, which record in the register's office, because by provide that there shall be no lis pendens statute a purchaser has a right to presume till a notice of the suit, specifying the parties, there is no incumbrance upon an estate it the property affected and the relief sought, none is shown in the register's office.39 A has been filed in the office of the recorder of bona fide purchaser of real estate without deeds of the proper district.54 In such cases notice pendente lite is liable for the property the delivery of the notice to the proper officer itself, but not personally, nor for the rents for record protects the complainant, though and profits.40

the officer fails to file it. 55 A failure to de. Lis Pendens as to Personal Property. liver such a notice to the proper officer will There is great diversity in the rulings of the not protect a purchaser, who had notice of courts as to the application of lis pendens to the litigation. It is not necessary to file & suits concerning personalty. It is said to notice of lis pendens in an action of ejectapply to personal property, 41 though that has ment, since in such action the plaintiff must been questioned where the property was recover on the legal title, and a lis pendens is movable. It has been applied to slaves, only efficacious in protecting a purchaser but under the laws of the southern States without notice against equities.57 When slaves were largely assimilated to real es- State laws have been passed requiring such

It was realized that the universal ap- notices to be filed in the office of the recorder plication of the law of lis pendens would of deeds in suits affecting the title to real esgreatly hamper commercial transactions. As tate, it has been held that such legislation a result the law has been held inapplicable to does not affect the law of lis pendens as apmoney and bank notes, 44 to commercial paper, 15 though it is sometimes confined to v. Elliott, 11 Ohio St. 252; Howe v. Hartness, 11 Ohio commercial paper not yet due, 46 to municipal

St. 449; Kellogg v. Fancher, 23 Wis. 1.

47 Union T. Co. v. Southern, etc. Co., 130 U. S. 565;

Warren Co. v. Marcy, 97 U. S. 961; Contra: Diamond 36 Owen v. Kilpatrick, 96 Ala, 421.

v. Lawrence Co., 37 Pa. St. 353. 37 Williams v. Kerr, 113 N. C. 306.

48 Holbrook v. New Jersey, etc. Co., 48 N. Y. 616. 38 Collingwood v. Brown, 106 N. C. 362.

49 Farmers', etc. Co. v. Toledo, etc. R. R., 54 Ped. 89 McCutchen v. Miller, 31 Miss. 65.

Rep. 759. 40 Jacobs y. Smith, 89 Mo. 673.

50 Carr v. Lewis C. Co., 15 Mo. App. 551; Union T. 4 Dodd y. Lee, 57 Mo. App. 167; McCutchen v. Mil. Co. v. Southern, etc. Co., 130 U. S. 565. ler, 31 Miss. 65; Contra: McClernand v. Phillips, 6 31 Wigram v, Buckley, 63 L. J. Ch. 689. Jolo. App. 47.

52 McCutchen v. Miller, 31 Miss. 65; Hailey v. Ano, 42 McLaurine v. Monroe. 30 Mo. 462.

136 N. J. 569; Loudon v. Mullins, 52 Ill. App. 4:0; 43 Fletcher v. Ferrel, 9 Dana, 372; Bolling v. Carter,

Crocker v. Lewis, 29 N, Y. Sup. 798. 9 Ala, 921.

53 Sherburne v. Strawn, 52 Kans. 39. 44 Winston v. Westfeldt, 22 Ala. 760.

54 Smith v. Gale, 144 U. S. 509. 45 Carr v. Lewis C. Co., 15 Mo. App. 551; Union T. 55 Heim v. Ellis, 49 Mich. 241. Co. v. Southern, etc. Co., 130 U. S. 565; Warren Co. 56 Frank v. Jenkins, 11 Wash. 611. v. Marcy, 97 U. S. 961; Winston v. Westfeldt, supra. 57 Sheridan v. Andrews, 49 N. Y. 478.

46 Diamond v. Lawrence Co., 37 Pa. St. 353; Stone

tate. 48

onds," to corporate stock, us to corporate

ods, 19 and to articles of ordinary com erce. Though we derive the law of is endens from the English, yet it was claimed

the year 1894 that it bad never been ap ied in England to goods, chattels or closes

action. Since the law of lis pendens die »t apply, where there is no title to the prety sued for nor a lien on it, there can be ea

pendens where the contention is a mere do and for money, or in an action of trespasa. hen personal property is already in the coly of the law, as when in replevin the de ndant retains it under a redelivery bond, i subject to the judgment finally rendered Statutory Provisions.-In many States this atter bas been regulated by statute, whi: ovide that there shall be no lis perdone Ta notice of the suit, specifying the parties 2 property affected and the relief sought, s been filed in the office of the recorder at eds of the proper district. In such cases 2 delivery of the notice to the proper of record protects the complainant, thong

officer fails to file it.85 A failure to de er such a notice to the proper officer i

plied to a lawsuit relative to personal prop. erty, which law remains as it was before.58

Proceedings in United States Courts.Since the laws of the States can have no authority over the federal courts, they can only become efficacious, in affecting their pro. ceedings, or in determining the efficacy or effect of their judgments, by their adoption by federal legislation or by the rules of those courts. The State laws, requiring notices of the pendency of suits to be filed in certain offices in order to create a lis pendens, have not been so adopted, and therefore do not apply to proceedings in the federal courts.59 For the same reasons the judgments of these courts do not cease to be liens, because they are not recorded as required by State laws.60 A recent act of congress requires such judgments to be recorded as provided by State laws in order to continue to be liens on the defendant's property, where the State laws provide for the record of the judgments of the United States courts.61 St. Louis, Mo. S. S. MERRILL.

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* Dodd v. Lee, 57 Mo. App. 167; Osborn v. Glasscock, 39 W. Va. 749; Leitch v. Wells, 48 N. Y. 585.

9 McCloskey v. Barr, 48 Fed. Rep. 130; Majors v. Cowell

, 61 Cal. 478; Rutherglen v. Wolf, 1 Hughes

all other chattels belonging to the said Jasper in said barn," to secure $1,000, this being more than the value of the property. Jasper, being upon that day insolvent, threatened with suit, and pressed for payment by Bell, and unable to meet bis liabilities, at his request, conveyed to Bell all of said property in payment of said debt; and his business was on said day and thenceforth continuously suspended by the actions of said Bell, who afterward sold the property to one Martin, who had knowledge of appellee's claim. Appellee was a laborer employed in the stable, to whom seven weeks' wages were due for work performed within that period last preceding the salé, and subsequent to the execution of the mortgage and the due recording thereof.

Section 7051, Rev. Stat. 1894, (sec. 5206, Rey. St. 1881), provides that when the property of any person engaged in business “shall be seized upon any mesne or final process of any court of this State, or where their business shall be suspended by the action of creditors or put into the hands of an assignee, receiver or trustee, then, in all such cases, the debts owing to laborers or employees, which have accrued by reason of their labor or employment, to an amount not exceeding fifty dollars to each employee, for work and labor performed within six months next preceding the seizure of such property, shall be considered and treated as preferred debts, and such laborers and employees shall be preferred creditors, and shall be first paid in full, and if there be not sufficient to pay them in full, then the same shall be paid to them pro ruta, after paying costs." Under this section, appellee sought to enforce a lien for $50, against the property in Martin's bands.

Appellants assert (1) that by the statute no lien is created nor any charge made against the property unless it shall come into the hands of some officer, assignee, or other trustee under the court, to be administered upon according to law; (2) that, even if a lien is created, it is junior to the lien of the mortgage. Under our authorities, neither position is tenable. The statute, it is true, does not in terms create any express lien eo nomine; but the supreme court, in Bass v. Doerman, 112 Ind. 390, 14 N. E. Rep. 377, decided that by this statute a lien was given to the laborer, superior to the rights of and enforcible against one to whom the property of the insolvent debtor was sold in payment of debts due the purchaser, where the business of the debtor was by such action of the creditor thereby suspended. The court's liberal construction of this statute has been approved in subsequent cases. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Canada etc, Ry. Co., 127 Ind. 250, 26 N. E. Rep. 784; Bank v. Black, 129 Ind. 595; Pendergrast v. Yandes, 124 Ind. 159. Counsel rely upon Wilkinson v. Patton (Pa. Sup.), 29 Atl. Rep. 293, as establishing a better and different doctrine. There is some difference in the statutes, by wbich the cases may perhaps be distinguished. In any event, however, we are satis

{ protect a purchaser, who had notice s

litigation. It is not necessary to fl : lice of lis pendens in an action of eject nt, since in such action the plaintiff rist over on the legal title, and a lis pendem y efficacious in protecting a purchten hout notice against equities. We te laws have been passed requirios suk ices to be filed in the office of the recorder leeds in suits affecting the title to real és 2, it has been held that such legislative is not affect the law of lis pendens ss 2

** U. 8. v. Humphreys, 3 Hughes, 201; Skrew v. Jones, 2 McLean, 84; Doyle v. Wade, 23 Fla. 90; U. S. V. Holstead, 10 Wheat. 51; Stewart v. Wheeling, etc. A R. (Ohio), 41 N. E. Rep. 247.

Acts of Congress, 1887-88, p. 357.

LABORER'S LIEN-CHATTEL MORTGAGE

PRIORITIES.

BELL V. HINER.

Indiana Appellate Court, June 18, 1896. Where the statute (Rev. St. 1894, sec. 7051) (Rev. St. 1881, sec. 5206), provides that when the property of any person engaged in business shall be seized, or the business suspended by the action of creditors, or put into the hands of any assignee, receiver, or trustee then the debt owing to the laborers (not ex. ceeding $50 each), which have accrued within six wonths preceding the seizure shall be preferred debts, and shall be first paid in full, if sufficient, that the statute creates a lien in favor of such laborers superior to the lien of a prior chattel mortgage, and attaches to the chattels though they are transferred bs the employer to the mortgagee in payment of the

lliott, 11 Ohio St. 259; Howe v. Hartness, 10 49; Kellogg v. Fancher, 23 Wis. 1. C'nion T. Co. v, Southern, etc. Co., 190 C.S. * ren Co. v. Marcy, 97 U. S. 961; Contra: Discos awrence Co., 37 Pa. St. 353. Holbrook v. New Jersey, etc. Co., 48 V. 1, 616 Farmers', etc. Co. v. Toledo, etc. R. R., 54 1.4 · 759. (arr v. Lewis C. Co., 15 Mo. App. 551; L'niga 1. V. Southern, etc. Co., 130 U. S. 561. Wigram v. Buckley, 63 L. J. Ch. 684. McCutchen v. Miller, 31 Miss. 63; Hailes y, N. J. 569; Loudon v. Mullins, 62 111. App. ker v. Lewis, 29 N. Y. Sup. 798. sherburne v. Strawn, 52 Kaos. 39. mith v. Gale, 144 U. S. 509. Heim v. Ellis, 49 Mich. 241. Frank v. Jenkins, 11 Wash. 611. Sheridan v. Andrews, 49 N. Y. 178.

otherwise paid pro rata after paying costs. Held,

debt.

GATIN, J.: On Oct. 25th 1894, one Jasper was engaged in keeping a livery stable at Ft. Wayne. At this time and prior thereto, one Bell held

mortgage on the property used by Jasper in said business, viz: certain horses, carriages, etc., "and

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