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and from permitting persons from playing, dealing, keeping, or exhibiting for the purpose of gaming, any table, bunk, or gambling device of any description whatsoever, for themselves, or for any other person, at or about said Gem Building, or in any part of said premises.

If, as urged by counsel for appellees and held by the trial judge, there are no equities in this bill entitling the appellant to the relief prayed for, it will not be necessary for us to inquire whether the district attorney was authorized, in the name of the State, to institute this proceeding, or verify the matters stated in the bill by his own affidavit: for, in that event, such inquiries would be of no importance. We will therefore consider first the merits of appellant's bill of injunction. Before entering upon this consideration, we will remark that when a State appears before a judicial tribunal, though it may be a creature of her sovereign authority, she appears as a suitor, and not in her sovereign capacity, and, as any other litigant, can only invoke such powers and jurisdiction as she has by her constitution and laws conferred upon the court before whom she has brought her action. For courts to recognize her in any other attitude, or draw a distinction in her favor against the humblest individual who appears before them, would be to stultify themselves, and subject their judges to the condemnation of the laws of the State in whose interest they sought to violate them. It is well established that a common gaming house is, at common law, a public nuisance, and the keeper thereof punishable criminally, for the reason that persons attracted to it, especially youths, are there lured to vice. Bish. Cr. Law, § 1135. It draws together evil-disposed persons, encourages idleness, cheating, and other corrupt practices, and tends to public disorder. Wood, Nuis. (2d Ed.) § 45; People v. Jackson, 3 Denio, 101; 2 Cooley, Bl. (3d ed.) 176; Com. v. Stahl, 7 Allen, 304; Hill v. Pierson (Neb.), 63 N. W. Rep. 835. And that courts of equity have jurisdiction to abate public nuisances is equally as well established. State v. Goodnight, 70 Tex. 682, 11 S. W. Rep. 119; City of Belton v. Central Hotel Co. (Tex. Civ. App.), 33 S. W. Rep. 297; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 672, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 273; U. S. v. Debs, 64 Fed. Rep. 740; In re Debs, 158 U. S. 587, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 900; City of Georgetown v. Alexandria Canal Co., 12 Pet. 98; Coosaw Min. Co. v. South Carolina, 144 U. S. 550, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 689; State v. Crawford, 28 Kan. 518; Littleton v. Fritz (Iowa), 22 N. W. Rep. 641; People v. City of St. Louis, 10 Ill. 351; 2 Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 921, 923, 924; 3 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 349; 2 Beach, Mod. Eq. Jur. §§ 742, 743; 2 Beach, Inj. § 1080. But it does not necessarily follow from the facts that a common gaming house is a public nuisance, and that courts of equity have jurisdiction by injunction to abate a nuisance, such jurisdiction will be exercised. A court of equity may have jurisdiction of a class of cases, but may not entertain it unless the facts in the particular case

wherein it is invoked require its exercise. Before such jurisdiction will be exercised, its necessity must appear from the facts and circumstances of the particular case. Though a court of equity has the power to interfere in all cases of nuisances, yet circumstances may exist in one case which do not exist in another to induce a court to interfere or refuse its interference by injunction. Courts will not in all cases interfere by way of injunction to restrain the continuance of an illegal trade, the abatement of a nuisance, or the prosecution of a dangerous employment; but its power to do so in such case belongs to the general powers possessed by courts of equity to prevent irreparable mischief and obviate damages for which no adequate remedy exists at law. Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 921, 924; Carlisle v. Cooper, 21 N. J. Eq. 579; 2 Wat. Eden, Inj. (3d Ed.) 259; Attorney General v. Railway Co., 27 N. J. Eq. 26. It is only when property or civil rights are involved, and an irreparable injury to such rights is threatened or is about to be committed, for which no adequate remedy exists at law, that courts of equity will interfere by injunction for the purpose of protecting such rights. The injury threatened to such rights may, if committed, constitute a crime, and subject its perpetrator to punishment under the criminal law; yet, as his punishment would furnish him whose property or civil rights have been irreparably injured by the acts constituting the offense no compensation for such injury, courts of equity will interfere to prevent such an injury, notwithstanding the commission would constitute a criminal offense, not because it would be a crime, but because the injury to such rights would be irreparable. It cannot be said that such interference by a court of equity is an invasion of the domain of the criminal law, for no crime has been committed where equity interposes its arm for the protection of property or civil rights. In extending such protection, it may prevent a crime; but as no one has a right to commit crime, no one should be heard to complain that he is restrained from its commission, when such restraint has been exercised in the jurisdiction of a court for the purpose of preventing him from irreparably injuring another in his property or civil rights. But courts of equity never interfere for the purpose of acts constituting crime because they are criminal, for they have nothing to do with crime as such. Their interposition is solely for the protection of property or civil rights; and, the only distinction between a private and a public nuisance being that the one is an injury to such rights of an individual and the other to the rights of the public at large, "the same principle must guide the interference of the court in both cases, and that principle is this: whether the extent of the damage and injury be such as the law will not afford an adequate and sufficient remedy." Attorney General v. Sheffield Gas Consumers' Co., 19 Eng. Law & Eq. 644. Therefore, when a State, through her proper officer, seeks the jurisdiction of a

court of equity to abate a public nuisance, she must show that such nuisance is an injury to the property or civil rights of the public at large, which it is to her duty, as the agent of the public, to prevent. All the State shows by her bill in this case is the offense of keeping a common gaming house, and the corrupting and vicious influences attending such a nuisance. It is not shown that any property or civil rights of the public which it is her duty to protect are invaded, or that any irreparable injury will be done any such rights by the maintenance of such nuisance. The case presented is a criminal one, pure and simple, in which the criminal law furnishes the only remedy that courts are required to enforce. That the law against this offense is not enforced and observed is no ground for the interposition of a court of equity, for, as has been observed, such a court has no jurisdiction to restrain the commission of crime, nor enforce moral obligations or the performance of moral duties as such, nor can it rightfully interfere with the performance of an illegal act merely because it is illegal, in the absence of an injury to property or civil rights. High, Inj. (3d Ed.) § 20; Mor. Cov. § 1041; In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 900; Cope v. Association, 99 Ill. 489; People v. Chicago Fair Grounds Assn., 28 Chi. Leg. News, p. 1. Courts can only administer the law as it is, and believing, as we do, that the matters alleged in appellant's bill show no equities entitling the State to a perpetuation of the injunction, it is our duty to affirm the judgment of the district court, which is accordingly done.

NOTE.-Public or common nuisances affect the community at large or some considerable portion of it, such as the inhabitants of a town; and the person therein offending is liable to criminal prosecution. A public nuisance does not necessarily create a civil cause of action for any person; but it may do so under certain conditions. A private nuisance affects only one person or a determinate number of persons, and is the ground of civil proceedings only. Generally, it affects the control, use or enjoyment of im. movable property, but this is not a necessary element according to the modern view of the law. 16 Amer. & Eng. Encyclopedia of Law, p. 926, and cases cited. A nuisance, to be a public nuisance, must be in a pub. lic place or where the public frequently congregate or where members of the public are likely to come within the range of its influence, for if the act or use of property be in a remote and unfrequented locality, it will not, unless malum in se, be a public nuisance. Ellis v. State, 7 Blackf. (Ind.) 534; Greene v. Nunnemacher, 36 Wis. 50: Com. v. Perry, 139 Mass. 198; Ray v. Lynes, 10 Ala. 63; Monk v. Packard. 71 Me. 309; State v. St. Louis Board of Health, 16 Mo. App. 8; Foucher v. Grass, 60 Iowa, 505; Whitney v. Bartholomew, 21 Conn. 213; Coker v. Birge, 10 Ga. 336; Shivery v. Struper, 24 Fla. 103; Pruner v. Pendleton, 75 Va. 516; Bushnell v. Robeson, 62 Iowa, 542; Dennis v. State, 91 Ind. 291. The remedies for nuisances are threefold: preventive, compensatory, and punitive. The first divides itself again into the remedy by abatement without process of law and by injunction. The compensatory remedy is an action at law for damages, the punitive remedy an indictment on behalf of the public. 16 Amer. & Eng. Encyclopædia of Law, p.

959. The most efficient and flexible remedy is that of injunction. Under this form the court can prevent that from being done which, if done, would cause a nuisance. The principal case brings up a question much mooted of late, both in political as well as legal circles, viz., the authority and justification for what is known as "government by injunction," that is, the power of the court to enjoin the commission of a crime. The leading case on the subject is In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564, in which the United States Su.. preme Court affirmed such power. In adopting the broad rule of the use of injunctions, the Supreme Court of Texas in the principal case approves the Debs decision. That these cases now established is shown by the fact that a bill has been proposed in congress to cut down by statute the power of the federal courts to enforce such injunctions. The legal question involved is sufficiently discussed in the principal case, but the following additional recent cases might be examined with interest. Injunction will, at the suit of the State, lie against a corporation where it is misusing and abusing its corporate franchises and privileges, and is maintaining its property as a nuisance, though its acts also constitute a crime. Columbian Athletic Club v. State (Ind. Sup.), 40 N. E. Rep. 914. In consequence of a dispute with reference to an alleged preferential employment of non union men by a building firm, a trade union pub lished a poster headed "Trollope's Black List," containing the names of non-union men employed by the firm. Held that, the trade union, having done more than was in fact necessary for their own protection, an interlocutory injunction was properly granted. Trollope v. London Building Trades' Federation, 72 Law T. 542. A "boycott" by the members of trades unions or assemblies (which term, in law, implies a combination to inaugurate and maintain a general prescription of articles manufactured by the party against whom it is directed) is unlawful, and may be enjoined by a court of equity. Oxley Stave Co. v. Coopers' International Union of North America (C. C.), 72 Fed. Rep. 695. It is no ground for refusing an injunction to restrain conspirators from doing irrep arable damage to complainant's property rights that some of the acts enjoined would subject the wrongdoers to a criminal prosecution. Arthur v. Oakes, 11 C. C. A. 209, 63 Fed. Rep. 310, followed. Elder v. Whitesides (C. C.), 72 Fed. Rep. 724. While equity will never interfere by injunction to prevent the com. mission of a crime, it may enjoin an act which threat ens irreparable injury to the property of an individual, though such act may also be a violation of a criminal law. Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Saxey, 32 S. W. Rep. 1106, 131 Mo. 212. The business of a person, lawfully conducted, is a property right; and equity may enjoin the carrying on of a conspiracy to destroy or injure it, though the acts enjoined are violations of the criminal laws. Davis v. Zimmerman, 36 N. Y. S. 303,91 Hun, 489. In the absence of a statute, injunction will not lie to enjoin the sale of liquor in vio lation of law, unless the sale will injuriously affect complainant's property rights. Manor Casino v. State (Tex. Civ. App.), 34 S. W. Rep. 769.

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continues to vex the courts. The Supreme Court of Canada recently handed down what is submitted to be a correct decision in Grinsted v. Toronto Ry. Co., 24 S. C. Rep. 570. The facts were similar to those so often appearing in cases of this sort. The plaintiff, wrongfully ejected from one of the company's cars on a winter's night, took cold, and suffered an attack of bronchitis and rheumatism. He was allowed to recover for the sickness as an injury resulting from the defendant's act. The court rested their decision on the ground that the question whether the result was proximate and natural was to be determined by the jury.

So many rules, theories, and maxims regarding legal cause have been evolved from the time of Lord Bacon down to the present day, that there is now a profusion of recorded thought tending to confuse a fundamentally important subject. It is submitted that to begin with the simplest possible statement of the question is the proper way to work out the true rule, if there is one. When a plaintiff comes into court and shows that he has suffered such damage as the law will recognize, and that the defendant's conduct has failed to come up to the standard required by law, the point in issue is, simply, did the defendant do this? It is certainly possible to contend that the average juror might better be trusted to work out justice in answering the question thus stated according to the dictates of common sense, than in applying a complicated rule of law, however elaborately it be explained. If, however, a rule can be phrased which will embody the real intent and meaning of this simple question, and will do nothing more, such rule will have the decisive advantage of precision. The effort to find a more definite form in which to leave the issue to the jury, then, is certainly worth while.. It is suggested that the solution was reached when the idea of looking at the chain of events from the "after" point of view was conceived. Wardlaw, J., in Harrison v. Berkley, 1 Strob. 525; Earl, J., in Ehrgott v. Mayor of New York, 96 N. Y. 280; Smith v. London & Southwestern Ry. Co., 6 Com. Pl. 14. If it appear that in fact nothing which could be an efficient cause has intervened between the act complained of and the ensuing harm, the causal connection between the two would seem to be sufficiently established. In such a case, the fact that the result was one not rea sonably to have been foreseen, or not found likely to occur on calculation of chances, would certainly not make the defendant's act any less the cause. The fact that the consequence was probable is important in that such probability determines, in a measure, the character of the defendant's act. That is, the occur. rence of an injury which was or should have been foreseen would appear to be a natural and proximate result, even though circumstances intervened which would break the causal connection had the result not been contemplated. Lord Wensleydale in Lynch v. Knight, 9 H. L. Cas. 577. The Supreme Court of Canada in laying down the natural and proximate rule adopted the proper definite form of leaving with the jury the question, did the defendant do this Wrong?-Harvard Law Review.

DEFINITION OF "CATTLE" GOATS-HORSES-FOWLS. In State v. Groves (N. C.), 25 S. E. Rep. 819, under a statute making it a misdemeanor to willfully and unlawfully kill or abuse any "horse, mule, sheep, or other cattle," the court was called upon to decide whether the word "cattle," as here used, included a goat. Clark, J., who delivered the opinion, said that while the word "cattle" was often used in a restrictive sense as applicable to the bovine species only, it

had another and broader meaning, which took in all domestic animals; and the context made it evident that it was here used in the broader sense.

"Indeed," said the court, "the broader sense is the more usual one. Worcester's definition, 'a collective name for domestic quadrupeds, including the bovine tribe, also horses, asses, mules, sheep, goats and swine,' was approved by this court in Randall v. Railroad Co., 104 N. C. 410, 413, 10 S. E. Rep. 691. To the same effect are the Standard, Webster and Century Dictionaries. In the Scriptures, the word 'cattle' ordinarily and usually embraces goats, notably in the contract between Laban and Jacob. Gen. xxx, 30, 32. In Decatur Bank v. St. Louis Bank, 21 Wall. 294, the word 'cattle' is held to be broad enough to include even swine. In England, the statute 9 Geo. I., ch. 22 (commonly called the 'Black Act') made it punishable with death, without benefit of clergy, to 'maliciously and unlawfully kill any cattle.' Under this it was held that the statute embraced domestic animals other than the bovine species, as a mare, in 2 East P. C. 1074; Rex v. Paty, 2 W. Bl. 721, and 'pigs,' in Rex v. Chapple, 1 Russ. & R. 77."

In Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co. v. Bank, 92 Va. 495, 1 Va. L. R. 825, it was held that a statute forbidding transportation companies from keeping "cattle, sheep, swine or other animals," confined for a longer period than twenty-eight hours, without unloading and allowing them to rest, included horses. In State v. Dunnavant, 3 Brev. (S. C.) 9, 5 Am. Dec. 530, the term "horses," in a criminal statute, was held to apply to mares. "Cattle" usually includes horses and sheep (Louisville, etc. R. Co. v. Ballard, 2 Metc. [Ky.] 177); also pigs (Child v. Hearn, 9 Exch. 176); but not buffaloes. State v. Crenshaw, 22 Mo. 457. A domestic fowl is an animal (State v. Bruner, 111 Ind. 98); and "bird or animal" would include a game cock (People v. Klock, 48 Hun, 275); and tame linnets are within the protection of a statute punishing cruelty to "domestic animals." Colam v. Pagett, 12 Q. B. Div. 66.— Virginia Law Register.

CORRESPONDENCE.

QUERY-COLLECTION Of forged PAPER. To the Editor of the Central Law Journal:

A issues an order on B to pay C or order $3,000. D obtains possession of the order and forges C's endorsement upon it. He presents it to a local bank for payment. The bank refuses to pay it but received it for collection, indorses it for collection and forward it to B, and B pays it, having funds in his hands belonging to A for that purpose. D is the only person who has any knowledge of the forgery. The forgery is finally discovered and A now desires to know who is liable for his loss. Can he recover from the local bank that received the order from D for collection and sent the same to B so indorsed for collection? L. N. A.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

A Treatise on Mechanics' Liens. By Louis Boisot, Jr., A. B., LL. B. Of the Chicago Bar. St. Paul, Minn. West Publishing Co. 1897.

A Treatise on the Law of Fire Insurance, with a Philosophical and Analytical Discussion of Leading Cases. By D. Ostrander. Second Edition, Revised and Enlarged. St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co. 1897.

The American and English Encyclopædia of Law. Index-Digest. By Thomas J. Michie. Volume XXXI. Northport. Long Island, N. Y.: Edward Thompson Company, Law Publishers. 1896.

A Practical Treatise on the Law of Receivers, with Extended Consideration of Receivers of Corporations. By Charles Fisk Beach, Jr., of the New York Bar. Author of Treatises on "The Law of Contributory Negligence," "Modern Equity Jurisprudence," etc., etc. Second Edition, with Elaborate Additions to the Text and Notes and material changes therein, by William A. Alderson, of the St. Louis Bar. Author of a Treatise on "Judicial Writs and Process." New York: Baker, Voorhis and Company. 1897. The Law Relating to Private Trusts and Trustees. By Arthur Underhill, M. A., LL. D., of Lincoln's Inn, and the Chancery Bar, Barrister-at-Law, Author of "A Treatise on the Settled Land Acts," "A Manual of Chancery Procedure," "A Summary of the Law of Torts," etc., and Sometime Assistant Examiner in the Law of Real and Personal Property in the Inns of Court, and Lecturer on Equity to the Incorporated Law Society of the United Kingdom. Fourth Edition, Enlarged and Revised. First American Edition by F. A. Wislizenus and Adolph Wislizenus, of the St. Louis Bar. St. Louis: The F. H. Thomas Law Book Co. 1896.

Commentaries on the Laws of England. In Four

Books. By Sir William Blackstone, Knight. One of the Justices of His Majesty's Court of Common Pleas, With Notes Selected from the Editions of Archbold, Christian, Coleridge, Chitty, Stewart, Kerr, and Others; and in Addition, Notes and References to all Text Books and Decisions Wherein the Commentaries Have Been Cited, and all Statutes Modifying the Text. By William Draper Lewis, Ph., D. Dean of the Department of Law of the University of Pennsylvania. Book 2. Philadelphia: Rees Welsh and Company. 1897.

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..13, 14, 45, 48, 55, 61, 64, 96, 109 ....4, 15, 53, 54, 75, 77, 89, 114 1. ACTION Abatement by Assignment Corpora. tlons. Upon the formation of a corporation by the members of a mercantile firm, succeeding to all the properties, interests, and rights of the firm, its mem. bers are improperly joined as parties in an action by the corporation on a cause of action accruing before its formation.-LOTTMAN BROS. MANUFG. CO. v. HOUS TON WATERWORKS CO., Tex., 38 S. W. Rep. 357.

2. ADVERSE POSSESSION- Possession of Part of Tract.-Possession of another part of a tract of land does not carry constructive possession of a smaller tract, owned by another under a senior grant, but in. cluded within the boundaries of the larger as conveyed.-COOK V. LISTER, Tex., 38 S. W. Rep. 380,

3. ASSIGNMENT FOR CREDITORS-What Constitutes.A deed of trust conveying property of the grantor absolutely to the trustee, with directions to sell it and out of the proceeds of sale pay certain preferred debts of the grantor, is an assignment for the benefit of creditors, and not a mortgage.-TUTTLE V. MER. CHANTS' NAT. BANK OF GREAT FALLS, Mont., 47 Pac. Rep. 203.

4. ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-Contract.-A client, under a contract whereby he agrees to pay an attorney for the prosecution of an action a fee of $50, and also a percentage of the damages which he may "recover" in the action, is not liable for such percentage of the judgment obtained, but only for a percentage of the damages received.-FISHER V. MYLIUS, W. Va., 26 S. E. Rep. 309.

5. BANKS-Lien on Stock.-A purchaser of registered bank stock cannot compel a transfer of the stock on the books of the bank, where the former owners are members of a firm which is indebted to the bank, as 3 How. Ann. St. § 3208a8, provides that "no transfer of stock shall be valid against a bank so long as the regis tered holder thereof shall be liable as principal debtor, surety, or otherwise, to the bank for any debt due."CITIZENS' STATE BANK OF MONROEVILLE, IND. V. KAL AMAZOO COUNTY BANK, Mich., 69 N. W. Rep. 663.

6. BANKS-Transfer of Stock.-Where no demand has been made on a bank for a transfer of stock till the stockholder's indebtedness to the bank has matured, the bank may refuse to transfer on its books the cer tificate of stock, which had theretofore been pledged to a third person, and for the stockholder's unpaid indebtedness may claim a superior lien, under 3 How. Ann. St. § 3208a8, which provides, among other things, that "no transfer of stock shall be valid against a bank so long as the registered holder thereof shall be liable as principal debtor, surety or otherwise to the bank for any debt which shall be due and unpaid."-MICHIGAN TRUST Co. v. STATE BANK OF MICHIGAN, Mich., 69 N. W. Rep. 645.

7. BILLS AND NOTES Consideration.-In an action on a note given in payment for real estate, a demurrer will not lie to the answer which alleges that the de fendants tendered the amounts due on the note, and demanded a conveyance of the premises in accordance with plaintiff's bond therefor, but that plaintiff could not give title to the land, and that, in consequence thereof, defendants abandoned the property, and rescinded the contract; since the answer states a defense.-SAYRE V. MOHNEY, Oreg., 47 Pac. Rep. 197.

8. BILLS AND NOTES-Failure of Consideration.When the consideration entirely fails for a note in the hands of the payee thereof, neither such payee, nor a subsequent holder with knowledge of the failure of consideration, can maintain an action thereon against

the maker.-HALE V. ALDAFFER, Kan., 47 Pac. Rep. 320.

9. BONDS-Joint and Several Liability.-Signers of a bond for the admission of a person to the insane hospital as a paying patient (Code, § 1238), conditioned to pay all charges against such patient, are principals on the bond, so far as the hospital is concerned, and jointly and severally liable thereon.-ENSLEN V. ALABAMA INSANE HOSPITAL, Ala., 21 South. Rep. 74.

10. BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS - Withdrawal of Member. Where a borrowing member of a building and loan association, on withdrawing from it, made a voluntary settlement, in which he was allowed the unearned part of the premium bid by him, and a certain sum as dividend on his stock, which was his share of the profits, in which profits was included the inter est charged him and other members on premiums, he was not entitled to recover from the association, as usurious, the interest charged him on his premium.BUILDING & LOAN ASSN. OF JACKSON V. LEONARD, Miss., 21 South. Rep. 53.

11. CARRIER OF GOODS-Conversion.-Where the contract for the transportation of cattle by defendant over its and connecting lines for a through freight exempts defendant from liability for anything be yond" its line, "excepting to protect the through rate of freight named therein," defendant is not liable for conversion of the cattle, on refusal of a connecting carrier to deliver the cattle unless a greater freight rate is paid.-LITTLE ROCK & FT. S. RY. Co. v. D. V. ODOM, Ark., 38 8. W. Rep. 339.

12. CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS-Negligence at Station. -The mere fact that a train fails to stop the usual and reasonable time to enable passengers exercising ordinary diligence to get on and off does not constitute negligence as to a person who gets on to assist a passenger, and is injured in getting off after the train has started.-INTERNATIONAL & G. N. R. V. SATTERWHITE, Tex., 38 8. W. Rep. 401.

13. CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS-Street Railroads-Negligence. Whether a passenger who, in the absence of any rule forbidding it, rides on the front platform of an electric car, as he and others have been accustomed, and whose fare is there taken, is guilty of negligence which will preclude a recovery for injuries received in a collision with another car, is a question for the jury.-BAILEY V. TACOMA TRACTION CO., Wash., 47 Pac. Rep. 241.

14. CHATTEL MORTGAGE Foreclosure.-A return of service of a notice of foreclosure of a chattel mortgage, reciting that the notice was served upon the defendant "by delivering to and leaving with father of said [defendant], at his usual place of abode," is sufficient, in that it does not show that defendant could not be found, or that the attempted service was made at the defendant's usual place of abode.-MITCHELL, LEWIS & STAVER Co. v. O'NEIL, Wash., 47 Pac. Rep.

15. CONTRACT-Breach.-Where land is conveyed in consideration of a maintenance bond for the support of the grantors, by which the grantees bind themselves to support the grantors in their families on the land conveyed, no right of action accrues to the grantors, either against the grantees or the land, if any exists, until the grantees fail to perform their covenant and undertaking, as set forth and stipulated in their bond. -CRIM V. HOLSBERRY, W. Va., 26 S. E. Rep. 314.

16. CONTRACTS-Estoppel.-A vendor who is induced by the fraud of the purchaser to make a conveyance is not precluded, on a reconveyance to him, from attacking a lease by the purchaser as in violation of the statute of the Chickasaw Nation prohibiting leases to nonresidents for longer than one year, because in pari delicto.-WHITE V. BROWN, I. T., 38 S. W. Rep. 335.

17. CONTRACT FOR LEASE OF PERSONALTY-Signature. -The signature of a lessor to a lease of an article of personal property is not essential to its validity, where the article is delivered to the lessee thereunder.

SINGER MANUFG. CO. v. CONVERSE, Colo., 47 Pac. Rep. 264.

18. CONTRACT OF WIFE Liability of Husband.Where a wife purchases by oral contract furniture which is used jointly by herself and husband, he becomes liable on her contract of purchase; but where she subsequently, without his knowledge or consent, signs writings giving a lien on the furniture for the unpaid balance, he is not liable on such subsequent contract.-HAMILTON V. PECK, Tex., 38 S. W. Rep. 403.

19. CONTRACTS-Wagers-Premiums on Horse Races. -Competing for premiums offered by an association on horse races is not competing for bets or wagers, and an agreement between two owners of horses to pool all premiums and stake moneys awarded on their horses, and to divide the same equally, is valid.-HANKINS V. ÖTTINGER, Cal., 47 Pac. Rep. 254.

20. CONVERSION - Insolvency.-The acceptance by a creditor from his debtor of a preferential security, voidable under the insolvent law, does not constitute a wrongful conversion.-HAY V. TUTTLE, Minn., 69 N. W. Rep. 696.

21. CORPORATION—Allegation of Corporate Capacity. -In an action in the name of a national bank, an allegation that "the plaintiff is a national bank, doing business under the act of congress," is a sufficient averment of the corporate character of the plaintiff.JOSEPH HOLMES FUEL & FEED CO. V. COMMERCIAL NAT. BANK OF DENVER, Colo., 47 Pac. Rep. 280.

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23. CORPORATION -Insolvent Corporation - Stock. holder. An assignee at law of an insolvent corporation may maintain an action against a delinquent stockholder therein to collect an unpaid subscription to the capital stock of such corporation, and in such action the stockholder may interpose the defense that he was fraudulently induced to become a subscriber to the capital stock through the false and fraudulent rep. resentations of the corporation and its officers.-BEAL V. DILLON, Kan., 47 Pac. Rep. 317. 24. CORPORATION - Foreign Insurance Company Compliance With Statute.-Under the statute of Missouri requiring foreign insurance companies desiring to do business in that State to first file with the superintendent of insurance authority to accept service of process in their behalf, and providing that such serv. ice shall be binding on them, a company so served, and which is shown to have transacted business in the State, cannot question the validity of the service on the ground that it has not complied with the law, such compliance being conclusively presumed from the fact of doing business in the State.-SPARKS V. NATIONAL MASONIC ACC. ASSN., Iowa, 69 N. W. Rep. 679.

25. CORPORATIONS Statute Prohibiting Similar Names.-A corporation organized under the laws of another State, though permitted to do business in Michigan, cannot maintain a proceeding to prevent a corporation organized in Michigan from taking a sim. ilar name, under How. Ann. St. § 3960d3, providing that "corporations organized in this State shall not take any name in use by any other organization of this State, or so closely resembling such name as to mislead the public as to its identity," the foreign corporation not being a corporation "of this State," within the provision.-HOME LIFE INS. Co. v. HOME LIFE ASSUR. Co., Mich., 69 N. W. Rep. 653.

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