2. Extrinsic averments are not necessary where the words used, giving them their natural construction, tend to injure the reputation of the subject, and expose him to hatred, contempt or ridicule. Ib.

3. The scope and object of the whole article is to be considered, and such a construction put upon its language as would naturally be given to it. The test is, whether in the mind of an intelligent man the terms of the article and the language used naturally import a criminal or disgraceful charge. Ib.

DIGEST OF RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS. SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA. *

ARBITRATION AND AWARD.

1. An award of arbitrators is conclusive as to all matters submitted to them by the parties, but if it is doubtful, from the terms of the submission, whether certain matters were submitted to and passed upon by the arbitrators, it is competent for the court to admit evidence as to the truth of the facts of the case, and then to charge the jury as to the law applicable thereto. Keaton v. Mulligan, 308.

2. It is competent to introduce evidence to show a non-compliance with the terms of an award, inasmuch as that does not impeach the award, but merely goes to show a non-compliance with the terms of it. Ib.

BANKRUPTCY.

Where one filed his petition to be declared a voluntary bankrupt, and ten days thereafter a tract of land belonging to him was sold by the sheriff, under a fi. fa. from a court of this State against the petitioner, which had been previously levied, and the petitioner was afterward declared a bankrupt, but died before the proceedings in relation to his bankruptcy were concluded.

Held, that the sale by the sheriff was a good sale, and divested the title of the bankrupt; that no title to the property ever vested in the assignee, and the purchaser at the sheriff's sale got a good title, even as against the wife's right of dower, under the laws of this State. Thompson v. Moses, 383.

CONTRACT.

A corporation, though of the same name with a partnership, doing business, by the same agent, before the date of the charter, is not the same person, and to make it liable for a debt due from the partnership, a parol promise by the president, without a new consideration, is not sufficient. There must be a writing, signed by the party to be charged, or by its agent expressly authorized, or it must be shown that the incorporation has received the consideration. The Georgia Company v. Castleberry, 187.

CORPORATION.

1. It is not ultra vires for a railroad company to contract, to issue to contractors for the completion of the road preferred stock in the company, in payment for work to be done, and to agree that a majority of the directors shall be the holders of a certain number of shares of said preferred stock; provided the number of shares agreed to be issued does not make the whole amount of shares greater than the capital stock authorized by the charter. Warner, J., dissenting. Hazlehurst et al. v. The S. G. & N. A. R. R. Co., 13.

* To appear in 43 Georgia.

2. When a municipal corporation is, by its proper officers, acting within the scope of its powers, a court of equity will not, at the instance of the tax payers of the corporation, interfere to restrain or control its action, on the ground that the same is unwise or extravagant. To sustain such interference, it must appear either that the act is ultra vires or fraudulent and corrupt. Wells v. The Mayor, etc., of Atlanta, 67.

CRIMINAL LAW.

When the court admitted in evidence a particular act of insult, a quarrel between the prisoner and deceased, occurring several months before the homicide, and not connected with the cause occasioning it.

Held, that the admission of acts of previous quarrels, of particular acts, to be admissible against the prisoner, must not be a separate, distinct and independent act, but there must be some link of association, something which draws together the preceding and subsequent acts, something which gives color of cause and effect to the transaction, and sheds light upon the motive of the parties, to render such particular act or acts admissible. The state of feeling generally between them may go in evidence to illustrate their conduct at the time. Pound v. The State, 88.

The rule that a conviction cannot be had on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice alone, only applies to cases of felonies. In misdemeanors, the complicity of the witness goes to his credit, and the jury are to judge of his credibility from all the facts and circumstances, as in the case of other witnesses. Parsons v. The State, 197.

INDORSER.

Where a note is indorsed "to be liable only in the second instance," the indorser is not liable until the maker of the note has been sued to insolvency, or some legal excuse alleged for not having done so; but if it be alleged and proved that the maker of the note is notoriously insolvent, and was so at the time of the indorsement, that would be a sufficient legal excuse for not suing the maker of the note to ascertain that fact. Pittman v. Chisolm, 442.

LANDLORD AND TENANT.

A tenant for a year, under a contract for rent, stands in the shoes of his landlord, and, in general, is not a purchaser, entitled to notice of equities existing against his landlord, in favor of third persons. Clark et al. v. Herring & Mock, 226.

MASTER AND SERVANT.

When one man employs a laborer to work on his farm, and another man, knowing of such contract of employment, entices, hires or persuades the laborer to leave the service of his first employer during the time for which he was so employed, the law gives to the party injured a right of action to recover damages. Jones & Jeter v. Blocker, 331.

PAROL EVIDENCE.

In a suit on a life insurance policy, parol declarations made by the agent of the company prior to the execution, delivery and acceptance of the policy, cannot be received to vary or contradict the terms of the written contract, in the absence of any allegation and evidence as to fraud, accident or mistake, at the time of its execution, delivery and acceptance by the contracting parties. Sullivan v. The Cotton States Life Insurance Company, 423.

REMOVAL OF CAUSES TO UNITED STATES COURTS. 1. The circuit courts of the United States have no jurisdiction over the probate of wills; and a proceed- | ing before the ordinary of this State, propounding a will, cannot be removed to the circuit court by one of the caveators, who is a resident and citizen of another State. Hargroves v. Redd, 142.

2. The acts of congress for the removal of causes from the State courts to the circuit courts of the United States do not provide for the removal of a cause, by one of several non-resident plaintiffs, who is a co-plaintiff with citizens of Georgia, except in cases where the controversy between the non-resident plaintiffs and the defendant can be settled without the presence of plaintiffs, who are resident citizens of this State. Warner, J., dissenting. Bliss v. Rawson, 181.

BANKRUPTCY LAW.

ACT OF BANKRUPTCY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY.

A mutual life assurance company is a business corporation within the purview of the thirty-seventh section of the bankrupt act of March 2, 1867.

No one except a banker, broker, merchant, or trader could be proceeded against under the thirty-ninth section, for suspension of payment of commercial paper. By the act of July 14, 1870, this section was so amended that proceedings in bankruptcy may be instituted against,

I. A banker, broker, merchant, trader, manufacturer, or miner residing within the jurisdiction of the United States, and owing debts provable under the bankrupt act, exceeding the amount of $300, immediately upon his fraudulently stopping payment of his debts;

II. All persons residing and owing debts as aforesaid, who make commercial paper and then stop or suspend payment of it for want of means, and do not resume payment within a period of fourteen days.

A person who is not a banker, broker, merchant, trader, manufacturer, or miner, and who has not given any commercial paper, is not within this clause at all. A direct fraudulent stoppage of the payment of debts is made an act of bankruptcy, only when committed by a person belonging to one of the six classes specifled above.

A fraudulent stoppage of the payment of its debts by an insurance company is not an act of bankruptcy, because such a corporation is not within either of the said classes.

The refusal to pay commercial paper from a bona fide denial of liability, though persisted in for more than fourteen days, is not an act of bankruptcy, even if founded on reasons which would fail as a defense in a direct action on the paper.

Upon the resignation of the president of an insurance company, a new president took his place, who found the affairs of the corporation in confusion, its books not properly kept, and its accounts and those of the former president not separated, and the new president and his associates honestly doubted the liability of the corporation on certain commercial paper.

Held, that the refusal to pay it, though persisted in for more than fourteen days from its maturity, was not an act of bankruptcy, notwithstanding, in an action on the paper, the corporation would be held liable. U. S. Dist. Ct. S. D. N. Y., Blatchford, J. In the matter of the Hercules Mutual Life Assurance Co.

RAILROAD COMPANY.

Railroads fall within the designation of business or commercial corporations, and are therefore within the operation of the bankrupt act.

A railroad company organized under the laws of Iowa is not a banker, broker, merchant, trader, manufacturer or miner within the meaning of these words, as used in the bankrupt act, and cannot therefore be proceeded against in bankruptcy for the mere suspension or non-payment, however long continued, of its commercial paper.

An unexecuted agreement by a railroad company to transfer certificates of its stock is not an act for which the company can be forced into bankruptcy. Semble, that even the actual issue at par of the company's stock not heretofore issued, in payment of the bona fide debt of the company, would not be a fraud on the creditors; but that if the stock was owned by the company as paid-up stock lawfully acquired by it, it would probably be regarded as ordinary property, and the transfer thereof to creditors under circumstances to give them an illegal preference would be an act for which the company could be proceeded against under the bankrupt law. U. S. C. C., Iowa, Dillon, J. Winter v. The lowa, Minnesota and North Pacific Railway Company.

PARTNERSHIP.

1. Notes drawn by one partner, in the firm name, apparently in the course of partnership business, with out mala fides or actual knowledge by the holder of want of authority, or intended misapplication, entitle the holder to their allowance against the bankrupt estate of the firm. U. S. Cir. Ct., E. D. Pa., Van Campbush v. Josiah Crawford.

2. A, a member of a partnership, offered B, for indorsement, his individual notes, representing, however, that they were to be used for purposes of the firm. B refusing to indorse the same, A, at B's suggestion, substituted the firm notes, which B indorsed, and subsequently paid and became their holder.

Held, that, although it appeared that the notes, after said indorsement, were used by A to pay his separate indebtedness, and in fraud of his copartners, B might recover against the firm, there being no evidence of bad faith or actual knowledge by him of the intended fraud. Ib.

MORE ABOUT SOME GREAT ENGLISH

LAWYERS.

We gave last week some extracts from Justin McCarthy's article about "some great English lawyers," in which he devotes himself to the lawyers of the liberal party. In conclusion we present his remarks on the tory lawyers, with the suggestion that his comments on Sir John Coleridge and law reform should be taken cum grano salis, in view of that gentleman's recent very able speech on the subject before the Social Science Association.

The most successful tory lawyer in parliament now is Lord Cairns, who was lord chancellor a few years ago. The career of Cairns has been rapid and brilliant. He is an Irishman, but from the half Scottish and wholly shrewed North. Cairns is the son of a Belfast merchant. He became a member of the English bar, and soon leaped into a first-class practice. He was elected to parliament as member for his native city, and he attached himself to the political fortune of Mr. Disraeli. The tory party was then, as it is

now, singularly deficient in what I may call native talent. Disraeli had hardly any followers on whom he could count as an auxiliary in debate. The ready eloquence, the genuine legal knowledge, and the unfailing keenness of Cairns were a most welcome accession. Cairns made his political fame, as Cockburn did, by a single speech. It was during a great debate on some question of Indian policy, and when the tories, then in power, were somewhat hardly pressed, that the Belfast lawyer, new to the house, and almost unknown there, came to the rescue of the conservatives in a speech full of clever argument and powerful appeal. That speech made him the hero of the debate, and even of the session, and it rendered his career easy. He was at once acknowledged to be the greatest debater on the tory side, Disraeli alone excepted. He was then little more than thirty years old. He became solicitor-general and then attorney-general, and finally lord chancellor.

It is four years since the fall of his party withdrew him from office, but he still takes a leading place in the house of lords, where he is by far the ablest speaker on the Tory side. Nominally the Duke of Richmond is the leader of the Tory party in that house, but Lord Cairns is really its champion, its mouthpiece, and, perhaps, even its sense-carrier. The heavy dukes and marquises could as ill get on without the Irish lawyer in the one house as without the Jewish litterateur in the other. But Lord Cairns, though almost a model debater, is not, to my thinking, either an orator or a statesman. He has not a gleam of imagination, and he has no breadth of political judgment. He is shrewd and not sympathetic. He is an able lawyer, an inestimable partisan, and nothing more.

I have selected only the rather picturesque and striking figures among English lawyers in parliament. It would be hardly possible to interest American readers in the mere solid respectabilities of the bar who rise to a position in their profession or in the house of commons. There are many able lawyers in the house, even now, whom I shall not think it necessary to mention by name. But I must not pass over a man who, besides many better claims to distinction, has the fame of having delivered the longest speech ever made at the Eglish bar, or, perhaps, in the history of the world. Years ago I remember Punch giving a humorous description of a too copious speaker in parliament, and describing the orator as engaged in the preparation of a speech which should occupy about three weeks in the delivery. This was thought to be the very drollery of farcial exaggeration. But Sir John Coleridge spoke, I think, for some three weeks in the Tichborne case; at least he occupied every day, from the opening of the court to its closing, for about three weeks, in the delivery of his address, and there seemed to the listeners no particular reason why, if he chose, he might not go on for three years. Sir John Coleridge is really a great advocate, but I hardly think he shows to much advantage in the house of commons. He is terribly diffuse. Compared with him, Gladstone is concise and ('ardwell laconic. It seems as if he were positively incapable of answering the simplest question in a few clear words. Obviously he is enamored of his own style of speaking, and loves to hear his own voice. The voice and style are both, I own, very charming. John Bright once called Coleridge the most "beautiful " speaker in the house of commons. A better description could not well be given. The speeches are "beautiful." Coleridge's voice is sweet and pure; his manner

is full of ease and grace; the words and sentences flow out like a swift, clear, melodious stream. The orator, a tall, thin, bald man, looks all the while so benignly self-satisfied, so serenely conscious of his own gifts, graces and general superiority, that it seems a sweet condescension in him to consent to instruct mere common men. The personage who compels Coleridge to speak appears indeed to be drawing an angel down. Sir John's look, manner and tone quite convey this idea. He always appears to say to his opponent, 66 see what a good and great man I am! You must know that you are an ignoramus and a dullard, and that the view you have expressed is childish and ridiculous. Yet I, even I, condescend to occupy my time in setting you right, and explaining things to you. I bring myself down as nearly as I can to the level of your understanding, and I never in words complain, or say what a dolt I think you." This is always the manner in which the speaking of the eloquent attorney-general affects me. I am now talking of Coleridge in the house of commons, not Coleridge at the bar. Perhaps it is needless to add that Coleridge is not a great favorite in the house of commons. Men don't relish that tone of sweet and bland superiority. Some even declare that they find nothing in the matter of the attorney-general's speeches to warrant such a style; that he is an utter failure as a politican; that for law reform he has never done any thing more than to graciously demonstrate its mere impossibility and the dull fatuity of those who believe in it; that they would like something more in a great parliamentary officer than a beautiful voice, a choice diction and a vast self-conceit; and that in fact they consider Sir John Coleridge in Parliament as a good deal of a humbug. I do not say whether such is my opinion or not. But I doubt whether it would be possible for any man to be as wise, virtuous and eloquent as Sir John Coleridge looks.

There are many lawyers of mark among the minor celebrities of the house of commons. The name of Mr. Vernon Harcourt is well known in America. Mr. Harcourt- the "Historicus" of the London Times — is a man of forty-five, tall, loud-voiced, self-asserting, brassy in manner; a master of vigorous commonplaces, fearless in the complacent production of the oldest jests and the most hackneyed quotations; a personage who gets credit for great ability partly by means of an imposing manner and an unbounded confidence. A very rising man is Mr. Henry James, a man whose intellect has a peculiarly fine edge to it, whose speeches are as delicate in style as they are keen, reminding one somehow of a Damascus blade. Mr. James made probably the most telling speech delivered in the house of commons last session. I doubt, however, whether he has the breadth and robustness to make a political leader. So he will probably become a law officer one of these days, and then vanish out of politics and ascend the judicial bench. I ought to say a word about the Irish attorney-general, Mr. Dowse, the most successful buffo member of the house of commons at present, whose broad humor has left Bernal Osborne nowhere, and who can make even Disraeli laugh. He will be a judge, perhaps, before this appears in print, and will probably soberize his humor on the bench, for he is at bottom a man of sense and ability.

Nor should I pass over wholly unnoticed big, burly, lost Isaac Butt, the leader of the Irish home rule movement, a man sent into life with better intellectual endowments than nine out of every ten of the men who have left him long behind. Butt promised at one

time to be a great orator, and might have been a great leader and patriot, and perhaps even statesman. He is now only a failure and a wreck- -a man grown gray and old striving with futile energy to galvanize into life the corpse of a once bright and promising career. The parliamentary shore is strewn with such wrecks, for in the house of commons, when the favoring moment once is allowed to pass, there is little chance left of a successful voyage.

The lawyers in parliament remain, it will be seen, a distinct class for the most part. They seldom merge into the politician. Brougham did, and O'Connell did; but Brougham was not perhaps much of a lawyer, and O'Connell was swept into politics by a particular cause. As a rule the lawyer enters parliament only as a means of professional advancement. I do not say the system is good in principle which thus tempts a man to engage in one occupation only that he may thereby obtain advancement in another. But, as I have already said, the anomaly does not work so badly as might have been expected. Some of the best of our judges are those who have thus leaped on the bench through the hoop of a parliamentary debate.

CORRESPONDENCE.

"EVENING LAW SCHOOLS."

NEW YORK, November 18, 1872. DEAR SIR-It is of great importance that immediate action be taken upon the well-timed communication of "S. G.," in last week's number of the LAW JOURNAL, in relation to establishing an evening law school, and, with that desirable end in view, I would suggest that a petition of law students be presented to the bar association.

There should be, to begin with, unity of action on the part of the students, and if a proper number will send their names and addresses to me, I shall see that they be called together at an early day. Very respectfully yours,

СНОАТЕ,

In care of box 2223, P. O.,
New York city.

BOOK NOTICE.

Lawyers' Record and Official Register of the United States: Containing Federal Officers of Bureaus and Departments; Foreign Ministers and Consuls; State, county and city officials; Judiciary, with jurisdiction and time of holding courts; Blank Legal Forms, and a Record of Practicing Lawyers throughout the United States; together with a convenient and comprehensive digest of the laws of the several States, touching subjects of commercial law; with laws relating to descent of property. By H. Charles Ulman, Counselor, etc. New York: A. S. Barnes & Co., 1872, pp. 1143.

This is one of the most useful works that has been issued for years. In it will be found a vast deal of information that it is very desirable to have at hand at one time or another. Several years ago one Livingston issued a work on a plan somewhat similar, but it was never decently accurate, and is now valueless. It will not be necessary to recapitulate the contents of Mr. Ulman's book, as it is sufficiently indicated in the title above given. It is essential to the utility of a work of this kind that it should be accurate; so far as we have examined, and we have taken some pains to test it, we

have found this to be so. We have compared portions of the "Record of Practicing Lawyers" with our subscription books, and have invariably found the name given and correctly given. From our personal knowledge, also, we are satisfied that the names of long ago dead lawyers, and of officers long out of office, have not been given, as they were in Livingston's book. We notice some names of lawyers who have died recently, but probably while the work was in course of preparation. The information about the different State officials and courts, and the forms given for deeds and mortgages, and the instruction for taking depositions, and many other things contained therein, will prove of interest, as well as of service in cases of emergency. The book is handsomely printed and bound, and will make a very acceptable addition to a law library.

FOREIGN NOTES.

From some cause, which has not yet been made known, three of the English common-law judges are about to retire, it is said. These three are Barons Martin and Channell, and Mr. Justice Byles. The Law Times is authority for the report that their successors will be Sir George Honyman, Mr. Manisty and Mr. Archibald Sir J. D. Coleridge, the attorney-general, having declined the seat on the bench of the probate and divorce court, made vacant by the resignation of Lord Penzance, Baron Martin will, it is thought, be appointed to that position. The Scotsman state, that the remuneration to the Geneva Arbitrators will be at the rate of £5,000 apiece, and England will have to pay it, costs following the decision. - It may sometimes be inconvenient to be even a Prince, for not only was Prince Napoleon expelled from France, but now the procureur-general has decided that the prince aforesaid has no locus standi in the courts against the Minister of the Interior. The Right Hon. Richard Dowse has been sworn in as fourth Baron of Her Majesty's Court of Exchequer in Ireland, to fill the vacancy caused by the death of the late Baron Hughes.

LEGAL NEWS.

As the decisions now stand William M. Tweed is between cross-fires. In the case of the State v. Tweed, to recover $6,000,000 alleged to have been fraudulently paid out of the county treasury, the general term of the third department held that the State could maintain the action, and that the county was not a necessary party. And, now, in an action to recover the same sum brought by the supervisors, the general term of the first department has decided that the right of action lies with the county.

The commissioner of internal revenue has ruled that where instruments were dated previous to the 1st day of October, 1872, but not actually issued or delivered until that date or afterward, they do not required to be stamped; but in view of the prima facie presumption of the delivery of an instrument on the day of its date, he suggests that, upon instruments of the description in question, some memorandum should be made showing that they were not issued until on or after October 1, 1872, so as to explain the absence of the stamps which the date would indicate were required.

The Albany Law Journal.

ALBANY, NOVEMBER 30, 1872.

WHEN IS A REMAINDER CONTINGENT? To answer this inquiry it may be well to ascertain what is meant by a remainder, and wherein a vested one differs from one that is contingent. Nor is it necessary, in doing this, to go beyond the more simple and elementary principles which govern them. Without attempting to follow the terms in which courts and writers have defined these, we shall assume a remainder in fee to imply the creation of two or more estates in the same land, by the same act or instrument, in several and distinct owners taking in succession: the first to take effect presently, and the second in possession immediately upon the natural expiration or determination of the first. This implies, further, that the first estate is vested in possession, and is less than a fee, while the second may be a vested interest or contingent, according to the circumstances under which the same is limited. If the remainder be vested, it is an estate which has the incidents of being alienable, and descendible like any other absolute estate, if in fee, and is in no way dependent upon the prior estate, except to wait for its expiration before vesting in possession. Defeating the prior estate before its natural determination, therefore would not affect it. Nor could the tenant of such prior estate bar it. Whereas, if the remainder be contingent, whether it ever will become an estate being uncertain, it is, at best, a mere possibility of becoming such, and is not the subject of conveyance at common law until it becomes vested, in which event it acquires the same incidents and qualities as if it had originally been so. While it remains contingent, it depends for the seisin which is to give it its vitality as an estate upon the prior estate which must, consequently, he a freehold. But, as soon as it is vested, it acquires the character and incidents of an independent estate, except having to wait, as before stated, till the prior estate is determined before it vests in possession.

This brief epitome of the qualities and characteristics of remainders would seem to be so simple and familiar, that, comparatively, few questions of difficulty could arise in construing and applying the rules upon which they depend. It is now an hundred years since Mr. Fearne's treatise upon the subject, which has become an authority, was published, and more than half that time since the notes of Mr. Butler were added to it. Since that time, editions have multiplied, and courts and legal writers have been engaged in explaining and applying the system in particular cases. The chief point of inquiry in these cases has turned upon, whether the limitation, in any given case, has been a vested or a contingent one. That settled, the incidents followed pretty much as a matter of course.

And even this point, it would seem, must have been settled upon principle, where the leading and distinguishing rules between them are so distinctly disclosed. The rule in general terms, so far as the person to take is concerned, seems to be this: If the remainder is limited to a person in esse, and ascertained, it is vested; if limited to a person not in esse, or not ascertained, it is contingent. The particular examples given in the books, are rather modes of applying this general test in cases where the vesting or contingency depends upon the person who is to take than limiting or varying the rule itself. We content ourselves with citing Doe v. Considine, 6 Wall. 476; Blanchard v. Blanchard, 1 Allen, 226; Fearne, 9; 2 Cruise, 205; Preston Estate, 70.

These remarks, though somewhat protracted, have been elicited by our attention being called to two comparatively recent decisions of American courts, which it seems difficult to reconcile with each other, and quite as much so with what have heretofore been understood to be the rules as to contingent remainders. We give the head notes in each of the cases, so far as they bear upon the question of the character of the estates limited as remainders, that the reader may see the point in question, and how the authorities bear upon it. One of these is Hall v. Nute, 38 N. H. 422; the other is Moore v. Littel, 41 N. Y. 66. In the first of these, the court held the remainder to be contingent, in the second, vested. The one was decided in 1859, the other in 1869. In the one the court denied the right of the remainderman, though alive and ascertained, to convey, because he had but a contingent remainder; in the other, they held he could convey because it was a vested estate, although when he did so, it depended upon whether he or the holder of the particular estate died first, whether he was to have the estate or not.

The head note of the first case is in these words: If land be devised to A for life, remainder to B for life, after the death of A, remainder to the heirs of B after the death of B, the remainder to B is, during the life of A, contingent." Before giving the reasons of the court for such a ruling, we cannot forbear placing in contrast with this position, some of the propositions which are laid down as law by other courts and law writers. Swaine, J., quoting from Preston in Doe v. Considine, supra, says, "where a remainder is limited to a person in esse and ascertained, to take effect by express limitation on the termination of the preceding particular estate, the remainder is unquestionably vested." The italics are borrowed from the original. And an example of a vested remainder given by Chancellor Kent is, "a grant of an estate to A for life, with the remainder in fee to B, or to A for life and, after his death, to B in fee, is a grant of a fixed right of immediate enjoyment in A, and a fixed right of future enjoyment in B." (4 Kent (10th ed.) 237.) See also Fearne, 2; Butler's Notes, Bouv Inst., § 1835.