is no lying by, no encouragement, no licence, no acquiescence either in a legal, or if there be a different sense here in an equitable sense of the expression:" (Hills v. Rowlond, 22 L. J., Ch. 964). The following case well illustrates the rule of equity on the subject of fraud:-A party applied to the agent of an insurance company to effect an insurance on the life of his son. The agent gave him a printed form of application, which was filled up as to the name, age, &c. of his son, and signed, but he did not fill up the declaration as to the nature of his pecuniary interest in his son's life; the agent had inquired into these particulars and filled them up, after the insurer had left his office, with a statement which was incorrect. The insurance was effected, but upon the death of the nominee the company refused to pay the amount of the policy, on the ground that the interest of the insurer was falsely described, and that the policy was therefore void. No evidence being produced as to the statements which had been made to the agent respecting the matters inserted by him in the declaration, the court refused to rectify it, or to grant an injunction to restrain the company from setting up the declaration as a defence to an action at law (Parsons v. Bignold, 15 L. J., N. S. L. C. 379). Plaintiff, being owner of an estate, employed an agent and receiver, who paid into defendant's bank, rents of estate, to an account headed with name of estate, to distinguish it from his private account. Receiver's private account being overdrawn, he transferred the balance of estate accounts to make up the deficiency due upon his private account. Upon bill filed by plaintiff against bankers, to refund this balance so transferred, it was held that, according to the principles of a court of equity, a person who deals with another, knowing him to have in his hands or under his control moneys belonging to a third person, must not enter into a transaction with him, the effect of which is, that a fraud is committed on the third person; and it appearing upon the evidence that the bankers were aware that the money was the produce of the rents of the plaintiff's estate, a decree was made against the bankers for repayment of the amount (Bodenham v. Hoskins, 21 L. J., Ch. 864). A surgeon or solicitor will be restrained in equity from suing on a bill or bond obtained from a patient or client by undue influence, which in law would not amount to fraud, and which of course, under this section, would constitute an equitable defence (Billing v. Southee, 16 Jur. 188). For observations on relief in equity against insurance companies in cases of fraud, see Collett v. Morison, 21 L. J., 878. As to the general principles on which the courts of equity act in restraining a party from prosecuting a legal right, see Dalglish v. Jowie, 2 Mac. & G. 231. If a party joining as surety to a bond is not truly informed by the principals as to the real nature of the transaction, he may be discharged in equity, although not at law (Squire v. Whitton, 1 H. of L. Ca. 333). Query, as to fraudulent representations by the debtor to the surety, unknown to the creditor (Owen v. Hornan, 3 Mac. & G. 378; 20 L. J., Ch. 314). Vide as

Ch.

to discharge at law, Mills v. Guardians of Alderberg, 3 Ex. 580; as to equity, Cross v. Sprigg, 2 M. & G. 113; 2 H. & T. 233; 19 L. J., Ch. 526. In many cases in which a court of equity would on equitable grounds set aside a contract, a party may, in an action against him thereon, be "entitled to relief on equitable grounds, under this section; and facts which will not amount to fraud at law may vitiate a contract in equity. Thus the mere fact of a large gift being made to a companion by an aged person of the property which is devised to relations may, in the view of a Court of Equity, constitute a prima facie case for inquiry, and might, under this section, first support a claim for interrogatories, and then sustain an equitable defence (Eate v. Bank of England, 9 Jur. 545). See as to undue influence, which at law would be no defence, Archer v. Hudson, 13 L. J. 380, M. R.; 7 Beav. 557. See a purchase by a steward under the value set aside forty years afterwards on equitable grounds, Charter v. Trevelyan, 8 Jur. 1015. As to inadequacy of consideration, Bowen v. Cooper, 2 Hare, 408. See as to fraud in the view of Court of Equity, Walford v. Adie, 5 Hare, 112. See Clapham v. Shillito, 7 Beav. 146, as to the effect in equity of misrepresentations made by parties upon entering into contracts. Cases have frequently occurred in which, upon entering into contracts, misrepresentations made by one party have not been in any degree relied on by the other party. If the party to whom the misrepresentations were made himself resorted to the proper means of verification, before he entered into the contract, it may appear that he relied upon the result of his own investigation and inquiry, and not upon the representations made to him by the other party; or, if the means of investigation and verification be at hand, and the attention of the party receiving the representations be drawn to them, the circumstances of the case may be such as to make it incumbent on a court of justice to impute to him a knowledge of the result, which, upon due inquiry, he ought to have obtained, and thus the notion of reliance upon the representations made to him may be excluded (ib.). Again, when the Court is endeavouring to ascertain what reliance was placed on the representations, it must consider them with reference to the subject matter and the relative knowledge of the parties. If the subject is capable of being accurately known, and one party is or is supposed to be possessed of accurate knowledge and the other party is entirely ignorant, and a contract entered into after representations made by the party who knows or is supposed to know, without any means of verification being resorted to by the other, it may well enough be presumed that the ignorant man relied on the statements made by him who was supposed to be better informed; but if the subject is in its nature uncertain, if all that is known about it is matter of inference from something else, and if the parties making it and receiving representations on the subject have equal knowledge and means of acquiring knowledge, and equal skill, it is not easy to presume the representations made by one would have

much or any influence on the other (ib.). As to fraudulent purchase Bowen v. Evans, 2 H. of L. Ca. 257. After fifty years, if fraud is proved, the lapse of time will not protect the parties to it, nor those who claim through them, against the jurisdiction of a Court of Equity, and it is immaterial by what machinery or contrivance the fraudulent transaction may have been effected, whether by decree in equity, judgment at law, or otherwise (ib.). See as to fraud as understood by a Court of Equity, in an agent, Hamilton v. Bunkin, 19 L. J., Ch. 307. See as to fraud in equity, Langley v. Fisher, 9 Beav. 90; 15 L. J., Ch. 33. As to setting aside an annuity deed, both parties having been mistaken, Carpmael v. Powis, 10 Beav. 36; and see the recent case of Feret v. Hill, 2 C. L. Rep. 1366."

The views taken by Mr. Finlason of the practical bearing and operation of these Acts are remarkably shrewd and suggestive. He is evidently resolved to be an author, and not a mere compiler, and he has reflected on the subject to good purpose. Such men and their editions of statutes tend very greatly to improve the laws they expound, and powerfully assist the objects of the legislature. The chief defect we perceive in this work is in a style too nearly akin to that of the Conveyancer. Shorter sentences would be a great improvement.

NOTICE.

WE have complied with the wish of every subscriber who has yet favoured us with his opinion on the subject, in omitting the Digest, which all deemed useless, and in increasing the original matter of the MAGAZINE.

We have also reduced its price: The amount of the matter will necessarily vary with the circumstances and legal events of each quarter. The literary activity or quiescence of different seasons will, in some measure, necessarily affect the dimensions of each number. This, however, will not alter the bulk of the half-yearly volumes, which we intend shall not average less than 400 pages.

This work has now nearly completed the twenty-seventh year of its existence. This fact alone gives it a claim to preference and support; for, whether it be rational or not, certain it is, that in periodical literature age is essential to influence and authority. Co-ordinate with this requisite, but not predominant over it, are talents and independence. These combined procure status, and give weighty effect as well as prosperity to the publication which unites these great elements of

success.

To a considerable extent, these recommendations exist in this work, and empower it to aid the interests, and represent the tendencies of English jurisprudence. It is confessedly the leading law publication of this country, and is so received on the continent and in America. We may advisedly say that it has a more extended circulation over the civilized world than

any newer publication could possibly obtain within a period of several years.

We believe that credit will be readily given to our contributors for a fair amount of legal knowledge and literary power not unworthy of the high reputation of our profession. And we never yet heard our entire independence of all sinister influences, commercial or forensic questioned.. Errors of judgment we are doubtless liable to commit; but it may, even in these times of general nepotism, go for something, that, as a body of public writers, we speak as we think,—

Nullius addicti jurare in verba magistri.

While they who differ from us have had no reason to complain that we have obstructed free discussion in our columns. On the contrary, we have frequently invited, and again express our willingness to promote it.

We shall not discuss the line we have adopted with reference to individual questions of professional economy and morals, or even on the great topics of law reform, for our sentiments are to be found written in plain language in our pages. We by no means shut our eyes to the fact that these might have been easily cast in more popular moulds.

We should have been, in one sense, more prosperous, if we had been less free spoken,-nay, much gain would assuredly have rewarded a little subservience, a good deal of winking at faults, and a moderate amount of fawning. We question, however, if we should have wielded half the same power, or have effected a tithe of the same good.

If it be of any use-and we sincerely believe it is—to the higher and permanent interests of the profession, and to the credit and dignity of English jurisprudence, to have, at least, one free-spoken organ "tied to no idols," and sworn to the

VOL. LIII. NO. CVI.

2 A