he shall recover only the interest that he hath. If he has an interest when the policy is made, he is not wagering or gaming, and the prohibition of the statute does not apply to his case. Then the third clause provided that no more than the amount or value of the interest should be insured. A question might have been raised whether, if the insurance had been for a larger amount, the whole would not have been void; but the prohibition to recover or receive more than that amount obviates any difficulty on that head. On the other hand, the defendants contend that the meaning of this clause is, that he shall recover no more than the value of the interest which he has at the time of the recovery, or receive more than its value at the time of the receipt. The words must be altered materially to limit the sum to be recovered to the value at the time of the death; or, if payable at a time after death, then when the cause of action accrues. But there is the most serious objection to any of these constructions. It is, that the written contract, which, for the reasons given before, is not a wagering contract, but a valid one, permitted by the statute, and very clear in its language, is, by this mode of construction, completely altered in its terms and effect. It is no longer a contract to pay a certain sum on the value of a then existing interest in the event of death, in consideration of a fixed annuity, calculated with reference to that sum, but a contract to pay, contrary to its express words, a varying sum, according to the alteration of the value of that interest at the time of the death, or the accrual of the cause of action, or the time of the verdict or execution; and yet the price or the premium to be paid is fixed and calculated on an original fixed value, and is unvarying, so that the assured is obliged to pay a certain premium every year, calculated on the value of his interest at the time of the policy, in order to have a right to recover an uncertain sum, namely, that which happens to be the value of the interest at the time of the death, or afterwards at the time of verdict. He has not, therefore, a sum certain, which he stipulated for and bought with a certain annuity; but it may be a much less sum, or even none at all. This seems to us so contrary to justice, and fair dealing, and common honesty, that this construction cannot, we think, be put upon this section. We should therefore have no hesitation, if the question were res integra, in putting the much more reasonable construction upon the statute, that if there is an interest at the time of the policy it is not a wagering policy, and the true value of that interest may be recovered in exact conformity with the words of the contract itself. The only effect of the statute is to make the assured value his interest at its true

amount when he makes the contract. But it is said that the case of Godsall v. Boldero, 9 East, has concluded this question. Upon considering this case it is certain that Lord Ellenborough decided it upon the assumption that a life policy was in its nature a contract of indemnity, as policies in marine risks and against fire undoubtedly are, and that the action was in point of law founded on a supposed damnification occasioned by the death of the debtor existing at the time of the action brought; and his Lordship relied upon the decision of Lord Mansfield in Hamilton v. Mendes, 2 Burr. 2110, that the plaintiff's demand was for an indemnity. Lord Mansfield was speaking of a policy against marine risks, which is in its terms a contract for indemnity only. But that is not of the nature of what is termed an insurance for life. It really is what it is on the face of it-a contract to pay a certain sum in the event of death. It is valid at common law; and, if it is made by a person having an interest in the duration of the life, is not prohibited by the statute 14 Geo. III. c. 48. But, though we are quite satisfied that the case of Godsall v. Boldero was founded on a mistaken analogy and wrong, we should hesitate to overrule it, though sitting in a court of error, if it had been constantly approved and followed, and not questioned, though many opportunities had been offered to question it."

The court then goes on to show that few, if any decisions have really been had on the point, inasmuch as the officers have refrained very generally from availing themselves of the law as laid down in Godsall v. Boldero: so that instead of the law there laid down being constantly upheld, it has been constantly disregarded.

* There can be no doubt that this decision is a perfectly just

one.

RAILWAY INSURANCE.

Theobald v. Railway Insurance Company, 23 Law J., Exch. 73.

THE rights of persons insuring, and the liabilities of insurance companies themselves, are undergoing some degree of alteration. A few years since, the Railway Insurance Company was established, to insure travellers by railways against accidents in their journeys. In this case, an accident happened to the plaintiff, who was insured in this manner. As he was travelling from Birmingham to Shrewsbury in the railway, he had occa

sion to get out at Wolverhampton, and in so doing, the step being wet, he slipped from it and injured himself. The company having refused to pay the damage, an action was brought and a verdict given for the plaintiff,—damages, 1007. for loss of time, 1007. for loss of profits, and 347. for expenses. A rule nisi was obtained to set aside the verdict. The jury had found that there was no negligence on the part of the plaintiff.

The Court held that he could not be indemnified either for loss of time or of profits. The Chief Baron said,—“We are of opinion that the object of the insurance, whether with reference to death, or any accident inflicting an injury short of death, must receive the same consideration; and we are of opinion that, in considering the damage and injury done to the traveller, the consequential mischief of losing some profit is not to be taken into consideration; otherwise a passenger whose time is more valuable than another would, for precisely the same personal injury, receive a larger remuneration than another whose time would be of less value. What the insurance company calculate upon indemnifying for is the expense, and pain, and loss-it may be of a limb-connected with the immediate accident, and not the remote consequences that may follow, according to the pursuit or profession which the passenger may be following. We think, therefore, that the verdict must be reduced to the sum of 31. 19s. So much, therefore, of the rule will be absolute as reduces the verdict to that sum; and the residue of the rule will be discharged."

As respects the claim itself, under the circumstances stated, the Chief Baron held that, “ It is quite plain that the plaintiff's journey, though it had in one sense terminated by the carriage having stopped, he had not at the time of the accident ceased to be connected with the carriage by being still in or upon it. He was stepping out of it when this occurred, without any negligence or culpable inattention to his security, which the jury have found. This occurred while he was doing an act, which, as a passenger, he must necessarily do; every passenger must get into a carriage and out of the carriage when the journey is at an end; and he can hardly be considered as disconnected with the carriage and railway and with the machinery of

motion-he can hardly be considered as disconnected with it, until the time when he was safely landed, as it were, if we may use that expression, from the carriage, and got upon the platform. While in the act of leaving the carriage this accident occurred, and it is attributable to his being a passenger on the railway, and it arises out of an act immediately connected with his being such passenger." Baron Alderson says:-" My own impression is, that a railway accident means an accident to the person in the course of travelling by a railway, and arising out of the circumstance of that fact of travelling ending in injury, and it does not in the slightest degree depend upon any accident to the railway itself."

Supposing an accident then to occur to the passenger after he had stepped on to the platform, of any kind disconnected with the railway, it seems that the insurance ticket indemnifies the holder, and extends to all risks of accident incidental to the journey.

EQUITY.

TERMINATING BUILDING SOCIETIES.

Fleming v. Self, 24 Law Journ. Chan. 29; 24 Law Times, 101.

This case was an appeal from a decree of Wood, V.C., and it presents an illustration of the adage, "there is never a blot till it is hit." Terminating building societies have always been radically faulty in principle and untoward in practice: as might not unreasonably have been expected from the fact that they are constituted in virtue of a perfectly unintelligible Act of Parliament, which set them adrift with clauses couched in the following gibberish, which we transcribe verbatim et literatim, to the disgrace of the man or men who composed it, if, indeed, the drawers of our modern statutes have any character left for capacity to write plainly :

The Act is the 6 & 7 Wm. 4, c. 32. The 1st section begins by reciting that certain societies, commonly called building societies, have been established in different parts of the kingdom, principally amongst the industrious classes, for the purpose of raising by small periodical subscriptions a fund to assist the members thereof in obtaining a small freehold or leasehold property, and it is expedient

VOL. LIII. NO. CVI.

Y

to afford encouragement and protection to such societies.' Then it enacts, 'That it shall and may be lawful for any number of persons in Great Britain and Ireland, to form themselves into and establish societies for the purpose of raising, by the monthly or other subscriptions of the several members of such societies, shares not exceeding the value of 150l. for each share, such subscriptions not to exceed in the whole twenty shillings per month for each share, a stock or fund for the purpose of enabling each member thereof to receive out of the funds of such society, the amount or value of his or her share or shares therein, to erect or purchase one or more dwelling-house or dwelling-houses, or other real or leasehold estate, to be secured by way of mortgage to such society, until the amount or value of his or her shares shall have been fully repaid to such society, with the interest thereon, and all fines or other payments incurred in respect thereof, and to and for the several members of each society, from time to time, to assemble together, and to make, ordain, and constitute such proper and wholesome rules and regulations,' &c. Then they are to regulate the forms of conveyance. Then it is provided, that on the mortgages which are made, when they are paid off, receipts may be indorsed without any further

reconveyance.

"Thus" said the Lord Chancellor in giving judgment on the

case:

"The principle is this -Members subscribe monthly sums, which are accumulated till the fund is sufficient to give a stipulated sum to each member, and then the whole is divided amongst them. In the society now in question, the sum to be raised for each member is 1007. If this were all, it would be a very simple transaction-mere accumulation; and the only question would be how to invest the sums subscribed to the greatest advantage. But this is not all. One main object is to enable members to obtain their 1007. by anticipation, on their allowing a large discount. For this purpose, when a sufficient fund is in the hands of the treasurer, the members who desire to get their shares in advance bid, by a sort of auction, the sum which they are ready to allow as discount; and the highest bidder obtains the advance. Thus, if at the end of a year the sum of 5007. is in the hands of the treasurer, arising from the monthly subscriptions, and the holder of the shares is willing to allow a discount of 501. per cent. (no one offering more), the 5007. is, or may be, advanced to him, being 507. in satisfaction of each of his ten shares. For this accommodation he is bound to pay, monthly, till a fund is raised sufficient to give 1007. per share to all the other members, not only his original monthly subscription, but also a further monthly sum called redemption-money. The statute provides that the shares shall not in any society exceed 1507. each. In this society the shares are fixed by the rules at 1007. The amount of monthly subscription and redemption-money is fixed by the rules of each society. Here the monthly subscription in respect of each share was 8s. 6d., and the