PRINCIPLES OF THE CRIMINAL LAW. BOOK I. INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER. CRIME. THE term "crime" admits of description rather than Crime. The question at once presents itself, What are the Punishments. distinguishing marks of "punishments?" This will, perhaps, be seen most clearly by a contrast. Sanctions (that is, evils incurred by a person in consequence of disobedience to a command, and thus enforcing that command) fall under two heads: 1. Those which consist in the wrongdoer being obliged to indemnify the injured party, either in the way of damages or of specific performance. 2. Some sufferings experienced by the wrongdoer. (a) Fitz. St. 1. B Crimes and contrasted. In the first case the enforcement of the sanction is in the discretion of the injured party (or his representative), and its object is his advantage. In the second case the sanction is imposed for the public benefit, and is enforced or remitted at the discretion of the sovereign body (b) as the representative of the public, such discretion being exercised according to law (c). Here we arrive at the true ground of distinction (or Civil Injuries rather difference, inasmuch as the two terms do not exclude each other, and therefore cannot be distinguished (d)) between Crimes and Civil Injuries or Torts. The difference is not a difference between the tendencies of the two classes of wrongs, but a difference between the modes in which they are respectively pursued; that is, whether as in the first or second of the cases mentioned above (e). That there is nothing in the nature of a crime which, per se, determines that a particular wrongful act should be necessarily relegated to the category of crime, two considerations will suffice to shew. First. In different countries and at different eras in the history of the same country the line between civil and criminal is, and has been, utterly different. For example, at Rome theft was regarded as a civil injury, for which pecuniary redress had to be made. And we have only to point back to the Anglo-Saxon system to illustrate the narrowness of the domain of criminal (b) Sometimes the exercise of this discretion is deputed to some member of the sovereign body-e.g., in England, to the king or queen. (c) Fitz. St. 4; Austin, 518. "To ask whether an act is a crime or a tort is like asking whether a man is a husband or a brother."-Fitz. St. 7. (e) Austin, 417. A good description of crimes having in view the true ground of difference is given in Bishop, 1 Cr. L. § 43. "Those wrongs which the government notices as injurious to the public, and punishes in what is called a criminal proceeding, in its own name." law in rude societies. The second consideration is, that the same wrongful act is regarded as a crime or a civil injury according as it is viewed and proceedings are taken with reference to the one or the other sanction. In the English law the best examples of this are libels and assaults. The same writings, or the same actions, may be made the subject of civil or of criminal proceedings. If A. write of B. that he is a swindler, B. may either indict A. for the crime, or bring an action against him for the civil injury (ƒ). both civil and It may be well to interpose an explanation of the The same act courses open to the injured person when the same the subject of wrong is both a crime and a civil injury. He has not criminal proalways the power of choosing in which way he will ceedings. proceed. The rule is based on the distinction of crimes into felonies and misdemeanors (g). It used to be considered that in the case of felonies the crime must be prosecuted before civil redress can be sought from the wrongdoer. In misdemeanors there is no such distinction; either proceeding may be taken first, or both may be pursued concurrently (h). Before leaving the subject of the difference between crimes and civil injuries two other false and groundless distinctions may be adverted to. Firstly. The distinction does not consist in this, that the mischief of crimes (as a class) is more extensive than that of civil injuries (as a class); nor, secondly, in this, that the end of the sanction in the case of crimes is prevention, in the case of civil injuries redress to the injured party (i). How nearly the two classes are related, even when the (f) Austin, 417, 518. (9) v. p. 8. (h) It is doubtful whether the omission to prosecute would now be considered a good plea in bar of the action. v. Addison on Torts, pp. 65, 66. (1) Austin, 417, 520. Proceedings, civil or criminal? Morality and act cannot be regarded as common to both, an example will serve to shew. A. knowingly, fraudulently, and with intent to deceive B., sells him a quantity of beer short of the just measure. This was held to be only an inconvenience and injury to a private person, which might have been guarded against with due caution (k). But if the defect in the amount had been owing to a false vessel for measuring, A. would have been indictable. So was S., who delivered a quantity of coals, to his knowledge weighing 14 cwt.,-he falsely and fraudulently representing that the quantity he had delivered weighed 18 cwt., and thereby obtaining the price of 18 cwt. (1). It is often of the utmost importance to determine whether a particular proceeding is a criminal or a civil proceeding. Thus, the evidence of the defendant may be required; and this is not allowed to be given in criminal, though of course it is in civil trials. The question arose on an information for the recovery of penalties for smuggling, under a particular statute (m). The true test is whether or not the infliction of punishment follows on the result being unfavourable to the defendant. If the end of the proceeding is that the defendant is required to pay a sum of money, the question will resolve itself into the form, whether the fine is a debt or a punishment (n). The moral nature of an act is an element of no value in determining whether it is criminal or not. On the one hand, an act may be grossly immoral, and yet it may not bring its agent within the pale of the criminal law-as in the case of adultery. "Human laws are made, not to punish sin, but to prevent crime and (k) R. v. Wheatley, 2 Burr. 1125. (1) R. v. Sherwood, 26 L. J. (M.C.) 81. |