REG. v. MEAL. Burglary. rectly stated by the learned counsel for the prisoner, it would be the duty of the jury to find him guilty of this charge; but if they should come to the conclusion that the prisoner had actually entered the house, then they ought to acquit him. The jury, after some deliberation, said,-We find the prisoner guilty of breaking and entering the house. COLTMAN, J.-Gentlemen, do you think he actually entered the window? The Jury.-Yes, my Lord. We think he entered with his head and shoulders. COLTMAN, J.-Very well, gentlemen, then that is a verdict of Not Guilty on this charge. The prisoner was accordingly acquitted. REG. บ. SCARBOROUGH Indictment- NORFOLK CIRCUIT. Cambridge, Crown Court, Tuesday, March 21. (Before COLTMAN, J.) REG. v. SARAH SCARBOROUGH.(a) Indictment for murder-Name of deceased party-Bastard—Reputation. In an indictment for the murder of "William Scarborough," it appeared that the deceased was the infant illegitimate son of the prisoner, Sarah Scarborough; that he was sometimes called "William and "Coley," and was spoken of as "Sarah Scarborough's child," and on one or two occasions as "William Scarborough," in his mother's presence, and there was no proof that he had been baptized. Held, that there was evidence to go to the jury that the deceased had acquired the name of "William Scarborough" by reputation. THE HE indictment charged that the prisoner feloniously and maliciously killed William Scarborough, by administering to him a quantity of laudanum. Couch, for the prosecution, proved that the deceased was the illegitimate son of the prisoner, and that he was four years of age, and that he was generally called "William" or "Coley," after his reputed father; that he was frequently spoken of as "Sarah Scarborough's child," and sometimes his aunt said she might have heard him called "William Scarborough;" but there was no proof that he had ever been baptized. At the close of the case for the prosecution, Naylor, for the prisoner, contended that there was not any evidence to go to the jury that the name of the deceased was William (a) Reported by JOHN B. DASENT, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. The deceased was an REG. v. Indictment Name. Scarborough, as laid in the indictment. illegitimate child, and as such he could only acquire a name by SCARBOROUGH reputation. The evidence here went to show that the deceased was by some called "William," by others "Coley," and sometimes "Sarah Scarborough's child," but there was no direct proof that he was ever addressed or known as "William Scarborough." The nearest approach to that name was the occasion on which he was spoken of as "Sarah Scarborough's child," but that was not the mode of acquiring a name. It is only a mode of speaking of him behind his back. The name by which he was generally addressed was "William" or "Coley." It is therefore contended that there is no evidence that the deceased had acquired the name of "William Scarborough," as charged in the indictment. He cited R. v. Stroud (2 Mood. C. C. 270); and R. v. Waters (Ibid. 457). COLTMAN, J.-I cannot stop the case, for, though it is very slight, I yet think there is some evidence sufficient to go to the jury in support of the charge laid in the indictment, that of killing a person named "William Scarborough." A party may acquire more names than one by reputation, and he may be indifferently described by either in an indictment. Here, at all events, it is established that the deceased, being the bastard child of Sarah Scarborough, had acquired the name of "William," and was sometimes spoken of as Sarah Scarborough's child while in his mother's presence; he was sometimes, though not frequently, spoken of as "William Scarborough," the name laid in the indictment. This, I think, is sufficient evidence to show that the deceased, being Sarah Scarborough's bastard, and being frequently or generally addressed as "William," had also acquired by reputation the name of "William Scarborough." Naylor then addressed the jury on the merits. Not guilty. REG. v. ROBERTS AND JACKSON. OXFORD CIRCUIT. Shrewsbury, March 21, 1848. (Before Mr. Justice PATTESON.) REG. v. ROBERTS AND JACKSON. (a) Larceny-Master and servant-Receiver. A servant entrusted with the care of his master's property, and who subsequently appropriates it to his own use, is guilty of larceny at the time he so disposes of it, and not at any previous time he may have intended to steal it, the principle of animus furandi not applying to the relation of master and servant. THE HE prisoners were indicted for stealing a quantity of bran and hay. The prisoner Roberts was a servant in the employment of Mr. Pugh, a farmer, and was sent on a journey by his master, on the morning of the 13th of November, with a wagon Larceny. and horses. The hay and bran, the subject of the indictment, were placed in the wagon by the direction of the prosecutor, for the use of the horses. The prosecutor had lost hay and bran before, and on this occasion caused them to be marked, so as to lead to their identification. When the prisoner had gone about four miles from his master's house, the prisoner Jackson was seen in the road with a cart, and going towards Roberts. The hay and bran were subsequently found in Jackson's cart. Phillimore, for the prisoner Jackson, submitted that the facts proved made him a receiver, and not a principal, in the felony. The evidence tended to show that Roberts must have entertained a design to steal the bran and hay a considerable time before they were placed in Jackson's cart. The felony by Roberts must be referred to the time the articles were placed in the wagon. Huddleston, contrà.-The position contended for might be correct if Roberts had, contrary to his duty as a servant, taken the bran and hay; but, having a right to take them in his wagon, there was no conversion by him before the delivery to Jackson. PATTESON, J.-In the case reported, the servant had exceeded his duty. The doctrine of an animus furandi has never been applied to cases of master and servant. A servant entrusted with plate may long have had an intention to steal it before he actually removes it, but no case has gone to the extent that such an intention, or animus furandi, constituted the larceny. (a) Reported by J. E. DAVIS, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. PATTESON, J., to the jury.-A man can only be guilty of receiving stolen goods when the goods were stolen previously. In this case the act of stealing was the delivery of the hay to Jackson. Huddleston for the prosecution. Greaves for the prisoner Roberts. Phillimore for Jackson. REG. บ. ROBERTS AND JACKSON. Larceny. OXFORD CIRCUIT. Shrewsbury, March 20, 1848. (Before Mr. Justice PATTESON.) REG. v. KELLY AND MALONEY. (a) Practice-Counsel acting as interpreter. Semble, a barrister who acts as an interpreter must be sworn. THE E prisoners were indicted for stealing potatoes. pleaded guilty; Maloney was ignorant of the English lan- KELLY AND guage, and could only speak Irish. Kelly REG. v. MALONEY. P. McMahon was about to act as interpreter, and to be sworn accordingly, when Woolrych, amicus curiæ, submitted that a barrister who acts as an interpreter is not sworn. He had acted as interpreter at the Central Criminal Court in a case of murder, tried before Maule, J., and Rolfe, B., and, after discussion, he was allowed to interpret without being sworn. PATTESON, J.-I understand that in a case at the Old Bailey, tried before Mr. Serjt. Dowling, he acted as interpreter, and caused the oath to be administered to himself. Counsel are not privileged from taking an oath on giving evidence, and I think the learned gentleman must be sworn. The oath was not given to M'Mahon, the prisoner who pleaded guilty acting as interpreter for his fellow-prisoner. Cape for the prosecution. Practice. (a) Reported by J. E. DAVIS, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. REG. v. BRITTAIN NORFOLK CIRCUIT. BUCKINGHAMSHIRE SPRING ASSIZES, 1848. Aylesbury, March 8. (Before Mr. Justice COLTMAN.) REG. v. BRITTAIN AND SHACKELL. (a) Conspiracy-Overt act-Proof of common design-High treason. Where an indictment charges an ordinary conspiracy, it is not necessary to prove a common design between the defendants before proving the acts of each defendant, for the acts of each defendant are only evidence against himself, and may be the only means of establishing the conspiracy. In high treason, the overt act of one is the overt act of all; and therefore, a common design must, in such cases, precede the proof of individual acts. THE HE prisoners were indicted for having unlawfully conspired together to forge the signature of one William Warrington, to a post-office order for 17. 8s. 6d., with intent to defraud Her SHACKELL. Majesty the Queen, the Postmaster-General, and Job Rawlins, and others. AND Conspiracy- Pryme, with whom was Sanders, for the prosecution, proved that William Warrington was a member of the Slough branch of the United Patriot's Benefit and Provident Society; that the husband of the prisoner Brittain was, in 1846, the secretary of that branch, and that, according to the rules of the society, every member was entitled to 11. 10s. on the birth of a legitimate child. In February, 1846, the secretary of the parent institution in London received an application for 11. 10s., purporting to come from William Warrington, and enclosing a certificate from a midwife, of the fact that on the day before his wife had been delivered by her of a female living child. The writer excused the transmission of his marriage certificate, on the ground that he had been married in the north, and had mislaid it; he, however, requested that the money might be sent to him by a post-office order in a letter addressed to him at "Solomon's Beer-house, Windsor, to be left till called for." The secretary, upon this, forwarded a declaration of the truth of these facts, with directions to be observed in filling it up before a magistrate of the county. In a few days this document was returned filled up; and by return of post, a post-office order was forwarded to the same address, for which a receipt was subsequently returned. In the following year, it was discovered that though William Warrington was a married man, he had never had any issue, and it was further ascertained (a) Reported by J. B. DASENT, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. |