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Trades or occupations deemed extra-hazardous, as employment about gunpowder, or steam-engines, are sometimes enumerated, and either altogether prohibited, or admitted upon an extra premium.1

Death by the hands of justice is now excepted in all our policies. Before this provision was inserted in life policies, the question came before the courts whether this exception was not made by the policy of the law; and it would seem to be held that it was so prohibited. (d) 2 We incline to think that the same ruling would be applied to a loss of life in consequence of a duel, though this is now always one of the express exceptions.

A most important exception, and one which has created much difficulty, is that of death by suicide. The phraseology used is sometimes "death by suicide," sometimes "death by his own. hands," and sometimes "death by his own act," and probably sometimes by other equivalent words. The main question must always be, whether any prohibition of this kind covers a case of death caused directly by the act of the party, but unintentionally, and without knowledge. We should say, generally, if not uni

(d) Amicable Society v. Bolland, 4 Bligh (N. s.), 194; Bollande v. Disney, 3 Russ. Ch. 351. Where a policy provided that it should be void if the life-assured "should die in the known violation of a law of the State," it was held, that, to avoid it, the killing of the life assured, in an altercation, must have been justifiable or excusable homicide, and not merely under circumstances which would make the slayer guilty of manslaughter only. Harper Phoenix Ins. Co. 18 Misso. 109, 19 Misso. 506. Where a slave refused to

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surrender to patrols, and, attempting his escape, was shot by one of them in the

right side, of which wound he died in a few minutes, this was held not to come within the cases excepted in a policy of insurance on his life, of "death by means of invasion, insurrection, riot, or civil commotion, or of any military or usurped authority, or by the hands of justice.” Spruill v. North Carolina Ins. Co. 1 Jones (Ñ. C.), 126. Where the life-insured in Louisiana attempted to collect a debt by taking forcible possession of his debtor's goods, and was shot in an altercation which followed, the policy was held void. Bradley v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. 3

Lans. 341.

Semmes v. City Ins Co 6 Blatch. 445; s c. 13 Wall. 158; Sands v. New York Ins. Co 50 N Y. 626; Cohen v. New York Ins. Co. ib. 610; Hancock v. New York Ins. Co. 4 Big. L. & A. Cas. 488; Martine v. International Ins. Co. 53 N. Y. 339; Hamilton r. Mutual Ins. Co. 9 Blatchford, 234; Welts v. Coun. Ins. Co. 48 N. Y. 34. Contra, Tait v. N. Y. Ins. Co., 4 Bigelow Cas. 479; Worthington v. Charter Oak Ins. Co. 41 Conn. 372; Dillard & Manhattan Ins. Co. 44 Ga. 119; New York Ins. Co. v. Statham, 93 U. S 24; Semmes v. City Ins. Co. 36 Conn. 543; N. Y. Ins. Co. v. Hendren, 24 Gratt. 536.-K.

1 As to statements by the insured in regard to his occupation, see United Brethren Mut. Aid Soc. v. White, 100 Pa. 12.

2 Submission to an operation known to the assured to be dangerous to life, with intent to cause an abortion, without justifiable medical reasons, resulting in her death, will prevent any recovery on the ground of public policy. Hatch v. Mutual Ins. Co. 120 Mass. 550. — K.

3 The insurer is liable for death by suicide, unless the policy excepts death so caused. Northwestern Benevolent, &c. Assoc. v. Wanner, 24 Ill. App. 357; Mills v. Rebstock, 29 Minn 380; Darrow v. Family Fund Soc. 116 N. Y. 537. Contra, Supreme Commandery v. Ainsworth, 71 Ala. 436. But not if the policy was effected with the expectation of committing suicide. Smith v. Nat. Benefit Soc. 123 N. Y. 85.

versally, that the insurers would not be discharged by any act of this kind. As when for example, a life-insured, by his own mistake, or that of a nurse or physician, took a wrong medicine or an excessive dose; or pulled out a tooth and died from the bleeding, which has sometimes followed fatally from the extrac*476 tion of a tooth; or by cutting* off a corn, and so producing fatal inflammation or gangrene. It cannot be supposed

that the insurers ever intend to exclude a death self-inflicted in any such way, and it might almost be doubted whether they could. do so by any language.1

A much more difficult question arises, when death is selfinflicted in a condition of and because of insanity. The authorities on this subject are conflicting. We cannot but think, however, that the law, especially if it were construed by the general principles of insurance, would say, that death by his own hands did not legally include a death which was self-inflicted, but not with the concurrence or action of a responsible mind or will. Here, however, we should say, that if the exception expressly included suicide under insanity, this provision would take effect. (e)

(e) In Borradaile v. Hunter, 5 Man. & G. 639, the policy contained a proviso, that in case "the assured should die by his own hands, or by the hands of justice, or in consequence of a duel," the policy should be void. The assured threw himself from Vauxhall Bridge into the Thames and was drowned. In a suit on the policy, Erskine, J., instructed the jury, that "if the assured, by his own act, intentionally destroyed his own life, and that he was not only conscious of the probable consequences of the act, but did it for the express purpose of destroying himself voluntarily, having at the time sufficient mind to will to destroy his own life, the case would be brought within the condition of the policy. But if he was not in a state of mind to know the consequences of the act, then it would not come within the condition." The jury found that the assured "threw himself from the bridge with the intention of destroying his life;

but at the time of committing the act he was not capable of judging between right and wrong." It was held (Tindal, C. J, dissenting), that the policy was avoided, as the proviso included all acts of intentional self-destruction, and was not limited by the accompanying provisos to acts of felonious suicide.

In Clift v. Schwabe, 3 C. B. 437, which was determined in the Exchequer Chamber, in 1846, where the condition was that the policy should be void if the life-insured "should commit suicide," it was held by a majority of the court (Rolfe, B., Patteson, J., Alderson, B., Parke, B.,) that the terms of the condition included all acts of voluntary self-destruction, and therefore if the life-assured voluntarily killed himself, it was immaterial whether he was or was not at the time a responsible moral agent. Pollock, C. B., and Wightman, J., dissented. So held also in Dufaur v. Professional Life Ass. Co. 25

1 A clause in a policy that if the assured should "die by suicide, felonious or otherwise, sane or insane," includes every case of "intentional self-destruction," but not accidental cases involving insured's negligence or carelessness. Pierce v. Traveler's Ins. Co. 34 Wis. 389. Thus the taking an overdose of medicine by an insured who was sane, through mistake or ignorance, causing death, will not avoid a policy, unless taken to destroy his life "voluntarily, knowingly, and intentionally." Penfold v. Universal Ins. Co. 85 N. Y. 317. See also Edwards v. Travelers' Ins. Co. 20 Fed. Rep. 661; Keels v. Mut. Reserve Fund Assoc. 29 Fed. Rep. 198; Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hazelett, 105 Ind. 212. — K.

*SECTION II.

WHAT INTEREST IS INSURABLE.

* 477

It may be said here, as in marine and life policies, that any legal or equitable interest may be insured. It is very common *for creditors to insure the life of a debtor, and for a debtor to insure his own life, and make the insurance pay

Beav. 599. On the other hand in New York, in a case decided before the above cases, it was held, that a provision in a life policy, that it is to be deemed void in case the assured shall "die by his own hand," imports a criminal act of self-destruction, and the underwriters were liable, where the assured drowned himself in a fit of insanity. Breasted v. Farmers Loan & Trust Company, 4 Hill, 73. The decision of the Supreme Court was affirmed in the Court of Appeals, but not with unanimity, five judges voting for an affirmance, and three for a reversal. The opinion of the majority, delivered by Willard, J., and the dissenting opinion of Gardiner, J., present the arguments on their respective sides, the latter sustaining the decisions of the English courts, 4 Seld 299. [The principle involved in this case is qualified by the later cases of Van Zandt v. Mut. Benefit Ins. Co. 55 N. Y. 169; Weed v. Mut. Benefit Ins. Co. 70 N. Y. 561; Meacham v. New York, &c. Assoc. 120 N. Y. 237.] In Dean v. American Ins. Co. 4 Allen, 96, the policy provided that it should be void if the assured should "die by his own hand, or in consequence of a duel, or by the hands of justice, or in the known violation of any State, national, or provincial law." The assured cut his throat with a razor, and the plaintiffs alleged, that the act whereby his death was caused was the direct result of insanity, and that his insanity was what is called suicidal impression, impelling him to take his life, and that suicide was the necessary and direct result of such insanity or dis

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* 478

were not liable. The opinion was expressed, that if the death was caused by accident, by superior or overwhelming force, in the madness of delirium, or under any combination of circumstances from which it might be fairly inferred that the act of self-destruction was not the result of the will or intention of the party, adapting means to the end, and contemplating the physical nature and effects of the act, that it might be justly held a loss not excepted within the meaning of the proviso. Where a condition of the policy is, that it shall be void, if the party "shall die by his own hand in or in consequence of a duel," it is held to include the case of suicide by swallowing arsenic; and the first part of the clause is to be separated from the latter, as the whole taken together would lead to an absurdity. Hartman v. Keystone Insurance Co. 21 Pa. 466, and Cooper v. Massachusetts Ins. Co. 102 Mass. 227. In Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Paterson, 41 Ga. 338, the insured died from laudanum accidentally taken by him when drunk, and the insurers were held. [See also the following cases holding the insurers liable for death by suicide when the insured owing to insanity did not appreciate the nature and effect of his act, or was urged on by uncontrollable impulse. Accident Ins. Co. v. Crandal, 120 U. S. 527; Life Assoc. v. Waller, 57 Ga. 533; Blackstone v. Standard Ins. Co. 74 Mich. 593; Scheffer National Ins. Co. 25 Minn. 534; Schultz v. Insurance Co. 40 Ohio St. 217; Conn. Mut. Ins. Co. r. Groom, 86 Pa. 92; Hathaway e. National Ins. Co. 48 Vt. 335.]

1 That an insurable interest is necessary, see Helmetag's Adm. v. Miller, 76 Ala. 183; Equitable Ins. Co. v. Paterson, 41 Ga. 338; Guardian Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hogan, 80 Ill. 35; Golden Rule v. People, 118 Ill. 493; Amick v. Butler, 111 Ind. 578; Burton v. Conn. Mut. L. Ins. Co. 119 Ind. 207; Missouri Valley Ins. Co. v. McCrum, 36 Kan. 146; Mut. Benefit Assoc. v. Hoyt, 46 Mich. 473; Whitmore v. Supreme Lodge Knights, &c. 100 Mo. 36; Ruse v. Mut. Benefit Ins. Co. 23 N. Y. 516; Keystone, &c. Assoc. v. Norris, 115 Pa. 446. But see De Ronge v. Elliott, 23 N. J. Eq. 486; Vivas v. Knights of Pythias, 52 N. J. L. 455, 469.

able to a creditor for his security. (f) But if the debt be not founded on a legal consideration, it does not sustain the policy. (g) In a recent case, M. V. & S. formed a copartnership, M. & V. furnished the capital, and S. shared equally in the profits, on account of his skill in the business; but in lieu of capital on the part of S., and as an indemnity, an insurance was effected on his own life by S., and it was agreed between the partners that should S. die during the continuance of the partnership, and unmarried, the benefit of the policy should go to the survivors of the firm. It was held, that this was not a wager policy. (h) And a person may effect insurance on his own life, in the name of a creditor, for a sum beyond the amount of the debt, the balance to enure to his family, and the policy will be valid for the whole amount insured. (i)

Courts have given a wide construction to the rule requiring in

terest. It may now be said, that wherever there is a posi479 tive and real dependence of one person upon another,

the person so dependent has an insurable interest in the life of the other. Thus, not only may a wife insure the life of her husband, (j) 1 but a sister may insure the life of a brother on whom

(f) Anderson v. Edie, 1795, 2 Park on Ins. (8th ed.) 915. In this case, Lord Kenyon, said: "It was singular that this question had never been directly decided before; that a creditor had certainly an interest in the life of his debtor, because the means by which he was to be satisfied might materially depend on it; and that, at all events, the death must, in all cases, in some degree, lessen the security." See comments on this case, in Ellis on Ins. p. 125. A creditor of a firm has been held to have an insurable interest in the life of

one of the partners thereof, although the other partner may be entirely able to pay the debt, and the estate of the insured is perfectly solvent. Morrell v. Trenton Ins. Co. 10 Cush. 282. It seems that the purchaser of an expected devise from the expectant devisee, may insure the life of the testator. Cook . Field, 15 Q. B. 460. A trustee may insure for the benefit of the trust. Tidswell v. Angerstein, Peake, 151; Ward v. Ward, 2 Smale & G. 125, 23 Eng. L. & Eq. 442. If A, being indebted to B, die, and C agreed to pay the debt, by instalments, in five years, B has an insurable interest in the life of C, for those five

years. Von Lindenau v Desborough, 3
C. & P. 353. So, the grantee of an an-
nuity for one or more lives has an insur-
able interest in those lives. Holland v.
Pelham, 1 Cromp. & J. 575. Where A
furnished funds to B to enable him to go
to California, and it was agreed that A
should have one-half of all the profits
which should arise from gold digging by
B, it was held that A had an insurable in-
terest in B's life, and the policy was to be
treated as a valued one, and it was not
necessary to show that B would have dug
any gold or made any profit.
Miller v.
Eagle Life Ins. Co. 2 E. D. Smith, 268.
See also Bevin v. Conn. Ins. Co. 23 Conn.
244; Loomis v. Eagle Ins. Co. 6 Gray,
396; Morrell v. Trenton Ins. Co. 10 Cush.
282; Mitchell v. Union Ins. Co. 45 Me. 104.
(g) Dwyer v. Edie, 2 Park, Ins. 914.
(h) Valton v. National Ass. Co. 22 Barb.
9, 20 N. Y. 32. See also Trenton Ins. Co.

v. Johuson, 4 N. J. 576.

() American Ins. Co. v. Robertshaw, 26 Pa. 189.

(j) Reed v. Royal Exch. Ass. Co. Peake's Ad. Cas. 70; St. John v. American Ins. Co. 2 Duer, 429.

1 A policy on their joint lives, payable to the survivor, is not avoided by their divorce and a decree of alimony to the wife. Conn. Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U. S. 457. See Baker v. Union Life Ins. Co. 43 N. Y. 283; Gambs v. Covenant Life Ins. Co. 50 Mo. 44. — - K.

she is dependent for support. (k) A father has an insurable interest in the life of his minor child. (1) A clerk may insure the life of one who has promised to employ him a certain number of years; but not the life of one from whom he has only a promise, from which he may expect an act of important kindness. (l) This dependence may undoubtedly exist without any relationship.1 And generally it is said to be enough, if, according to the ordinary course of events, pecuniary loss or disadvantage will naturally and probably result from the death of the life-insured. (m)

In England, insurance on the life of any person, or on any other event, wherein the person for whose use, benefit, or on whose account such policy is made, has no interest, is forbidden by law, as are also all gaming or wagering contracts. (n) In that country the law is now well settled, that the contract of life insurance is not a contract of indemnity, and that although the insured must have an interest at the time the insurance is effected, in order to comply with the statute, yet there is no necessity of this interest continuing; and where a creditor insures the life of his debtor, he may recover the amount insured, although the debt is paid. (0)

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1 And relationship unless accompanied with pecuniary interest is insufficient. Helmetag's Adm. v. Miller, 76 Ala. 183, 187; Guardian Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hogan, 80 Ill. 35, 45; Rombach v. Piedmont, &c. Ins. Co. 35 La. An. 233; Singleton v. St. Louis Mut. Ins. Co. 66 Mo. 63, 74; Whitmore v. Supreme Lodge Knights, &c. 100 Mo. 36. Contra are Warnock v. Davis, 104 U. S. 775, 779; Valley, &c. Assoc. v. Teewalt, 79 Va. 421. But certain relationships establish presumptively a pecuniary interest, as in the cases stated in the text. Other relationships do not give rise to this presumption, e. g., the relationship of a nephew to his uncle, Singleton v. St. Louis Mut. Ins. 66 Mo. 63; or aunt, Corson's Appeal, 113 Pa. 438; or that of a brother to his brother, Lewis v. Phoenix Mut. L. Ins. Co. 39 Conn. 100; or that of a granddaughter to her grandfather, Burton ». Conn. Mut. L Ins. Co. 119 Ind. 207. For other similar instances, see Continental Ins. Co. v. Volger, 89 Ind. 572; Rombach v. Piedmont, &c. Co. 35 La. An. 233; United, &c. Aid Soc. v. McDonald, 122 Pa. 324.

2 Cases cited in note (o); Rittler v. Smith, 70 Md. 261, 265; Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Allen, 138 Mass. 24, 36; Corson's Appeal, 113 Pa. 438. 593

VOL. II.

38

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