equitable, need not be specified; an insurance of property or interest generally covering all these. (o)

We have seen, in the chapter on shipping, that public policy disapproves the carrying goods on deck, although the owner and shipper may agree to it, if they choose. For the same reason, a

general policy on cargo does not cover goods on deck, without express provision to that effect. (p) But an exceptional usage may, if known and established, affect the policy on this point. There are numerous cases referring to this question. (q) It has been intimated, that a usage to carry such goods on such a vessel

and on such a voyage, is not sufficient to bring the goods 364 within the policy, unless there be also evidence of a usage by insurers of paying for the loss of such goods. (r)

SECTION IV.

OF THE BEGINNING AND THE END OF THE RISK.

A policy of insurance should define, with great precision, the time when the risk insured against begins, and when it terminates. This definition may be, either by referring to a moment of time, or to some fact, or to some place. That is, the insurance may be from a certain hour to a certain hour, or it may begin when certain goods are laden on board, or as soon as the ship reaches a certain place. In some way these termini must be sufficiently defined. A policy from to

(0) Oliver v. Greene, 3 Mass. 133; Finney v. Warren Ins. Co. 1 Met. 16; Russel v. Union Ins. Co. 1 Wash. C. C. 409; Stetson v. Mass. Ins. Co. 4 Mass. 330 Higginson v. Dall, 13 Mass. 96; Wells v. Phil. Ins. Co. 9 S. & R. 103; Crowely v. Cohen, 3 B. & Ad. 478; Chase v. Wash. Ins. Co. 12 Barb. 595.

(p) Wolcott v. Eagle Ins. Co. 4 Pick. 429; Adams v. Warren Ins. Co. 22 Pick. 163; Taunton Copper Co. v. Merchants Ins. Co. id. 108; Milward v. Hibbert, 3 Q. B. 120.

or from

to A,

(q) Milward v. Hibbert, 3 Q. B. 120; Da Costa v. Edmunds, 4 Camp. 142; Rogers v. Mechanics Ins. Co. 1 Story, 603; Cunard v. Hyde, 2 Ellis & E. 1; Merchants Ins. Co. v. Shillito, 13 Ohio, 559.

(r) Taunton Copper Co. v. Merchants Ins. Co. 22 Pick. 108.

(s) Molloy, book 2, c. 7, § 14. See also, Manly . United Ins. Co. 9 Mass. 89, Folsom v. Merchants Ins. Co. 38 Me. 414; Cleveland v. Union Ins. Co. 8 Mass. 308.

1 Insurance effected on the cargo carried by a specified steamship "and connections" means necessary connections, and the insurance does not cover a loss occurring in a vessel to which the goods were unnecessarily transshipped. Schroeder v. Schweizer & Gesellschaft, 60 Cal. 467.

We have seen that actual delivery may be proved in contradiction of the date, when the policy is to take effect from the time. of delivery. But a policy may be made and delivered much later than the date, with the intention that it shall take effect from the prior date, or be retrospective. It may also be intended that the insurance shall attach, although the property has ceased to exist before the making and delivery of the policy. This is uusally effected by the words in common use, lost or not lost;"(t) but any other equivalent language would have the same effect. (u)

An insurance beginning "on" a certain day covers the whole of that day. If it begins "from" a certain day, the word "from" has the effect of "after," and the day is excluded. (v) *This, at least, is the general rule, although it might be *365 varied by other language in the policy, or by circumstances. (w)

Where the insurance is on goods, we know no better rule for determining when the policy attaches to them, than that it so attaches when it would attach to the vessel carrying them, were she insured.

If the insurance is made "at and from" a certain place, the risk begins as soon as the vessel is at that place, and continues while she is there, and also when she leaves that place. The question has arisen, What must be the condition of the vessel on her arrival, for the policy to attach? It has been said, that she must then be in safety from the perils insured against. And as an insurance to a place does not cease until she has arrived there, and been there moored twenty-four hours in safety (and our policies usually contain a clause to that effect), it has been held, that a policy" at" did not attach on the arrival of a ship, until after the twenty-four hours of safety had expired. (x) But it is obvious that the terms of the policy and the circumstances of the case must have much effect in the application of these rules.

(t) Paddock v. Franklin Ins. Co. 11 Pick. 227; Hucks v. Thornton, Holt, N. P. 30; Mead v. Davidson, 3 A. & E. 303; Sutherland v. Pratt, 11 M. & W. 296; Cobb v. New England Ins. Co. 6 Gray,

192.

(u) Hammond v. Allen, 2 Sumner, 396, per Story, J. See also March v. Pigot, 5 Burr. 2802.

(v) Chiles v. Smith, 13 B. Mon. 460;

Lorent v. South Carolina Ins. Co. 1 Nott & McC. 505.

(w) See Howard's Case, 2 Salk. €25; Pugh v. Leeds, Cowp. 714; Fuller v. Russell, 6 Gray, 128.

(x) See Garrigues v. Coxe, 1 Binn. 592; Patrick v. Ludlow, 3 Johns. Cas. 14; Motteux v. London Ass. Co. 1 Atk. 548; Parmeter v. Cousins, 2 Camp. 235; Bell v. Bell, 2 Camp. 478.

1 But when the insured knows that the property is destroyed, no valid insurance can be made. People v. Dimick, 107 N. Y. 13.

* 366

*

So if the insurance is to take effectat and from a certain port," it may be difficult to determine what is that port, or what places are comprehended within it. And this question of mixed law and fact can only be determined by usage, or other evidence. (y) Insurance "from" a place begins only when a vessel casts off her moorings, or weighs her anchor, and moves, with the intention of sailing. (2) Goods insured "at and from" a place, do not, unless it is expressly so provided in the policy, (a) come under the policy until laden on board the vessel, or on board a boat or lighter to be carried to the vessel in conformity with the usage of that place. (b) But they would be covered by such a policy, if brought there in a vessel from another place. (c) If the insurance be to a port of discharge, it continues at and from such ports as the vessel may touch at for inquiry, advice, or repair, without discharging any part of her cargo. (d) Any such expression as " final port," or "ports of discharge," would continue the insurance on so much of the cargo as is not there discharged. (e) And if the insurance be to a port of discharge, the insurance ceases when the cargo is actually unladen at any port, whether it be the port originally intended or another. (f)

Sometimes it is provided that the insurance is for a definite period, and if the vessel is "at sea" at the end of the time, the risk is to continue until her arrival at port, or the port of destination. The meaning of the phrase "at sea," or the equivalent phrase" on her passage," (g) seems to have been somewhat con

(y) De Longuemere v. Firem. Ins. Co. 10 Johns. 126; Higgins v. Aguilar, cited 2 Taunt. 406; McCargo v. Merchants Ins. Co. 10 Rob. La. 334; Moxon v. Atkins, 3 Camp. 200; Bell v. Mar. Ins. Co. 8 S. & R. 98; Hull Dock Co. v. Browne, 2 B. & Ad. 43; Stockton R. Co. v. Barrett, 7 Man. & G. 870; Payne v. Hutchinson, 2 Taunt. 405; Constable v. Noble, 2 Taunt. 403; Brown v. Tayleur, 4 A. & E. 241.

(z) Mey v. South Carolina Ins. Co. 3 Brev. 329. If a vessel is insured at and from A to B, from thence to C and back to A, a loss at B will be covered. Bradley v. Nashville Ins. Co. 3 La. An. 708; Bell v. Marine Ins. Co. 8 S. & R. 98.

(a) See Kennebec Co. v. Augusta Ins. Co. 6 Gray, 204.

(b) Coggeshall v. Am. Ins. Co. 3 Wend. 283; Parsons v. Mass. Ins. Co. 6 Mass. 208. (c) Gardner v. Col. Ins. Co. 2 Cranch, C. C. 473.

(d) Coolidge v. Gray, 8 Mass. 527; Lapham v. Atlas Ins. Co. 24 Pick. 1; King v. Hartford Ins. Co. 1 Conn. 333; Clark v. United Ins. Co. 7 Mass. 365.

(e) Inglis v. Vaux, 3 Camp. 437; Preston v. Greenwood, 4 Doug. 28; Moore v. Taylor, 1 A. & E. 25; Upton v. Salem Ins. Co. 8 Met. 605; Brown r. Vigue, 12 East, 283; Oliverson v. Brightman, 8 Q. B. 781.

(f) Moffat v. Ward, 4 Doug. 31, note; Shapley v. Tappan, 9 Mass. 20.

(g) In Bowen v. Hope Ins. Co. 20 Pick. 275, insurance was effected for one year, and if "at sea when the year expired, then until the arrival of the vessel at port. In Bowen v. Merchants Ins. Co. 20 Pick. 275, the insurance was the same, except that the phrase in the latter case was "if on her passage." The two expressions were considered as synonymous.

1 A policy covered goods "now on board or to be shipped," "at and from " a specified port. It was held to attach as soon as a portion was shipped at the port named. Colonial Ins. Co. v. Adelaide Marine Ins. Co. 12 App. Cas. 128.

If a

troverted; but we consider the rule as now well settled. vessel is in a port at the expiration of the time, she cannot be said to be at sea, (h) unless she is in that port by restraint and against her will. (i) If a vessel has set sail before the expiration of the time, although not fairly at sea, the *367 underwriters are liable for a subsequent loss. (j)

The clause terminating the insurance only when the vessel has been moored twenty-four hours in safety at the port of arrival, has received judicial construction. If the vessel be ordered off or into quarantine before the twenty-four hours have passed, the policy does not cease to attach; (k) but if she be safely moored, and continue safe through a storm or other peril, which begins either before or within the twenty-four hours, and is afterwards lost through the same storm or peril, she is not lost within the policy. (1)

If goods are usually landed from a ship in a certain port by boats or lighters, they are not landed and are under the policy while on board the lighters. And this would be true if this mode of landing the goods was unusual, but justified by the necessity of the case. (m) It has, however, been held, that if a consignee sends his own lighter to receive the goods, they are delivered to him when put on board his lighter, and the insurance ceases. (n)

Whenever the voyage insured is abandoned or broken up, by a peril not insured against, the insurance ceases. (0)

Because the insurers are liable for the direct, immediate, and inevitable consequences of a' peril insured against, we should say

(h) It was said by Parker, C. J., in Wood v. New England Ins. Co. 14 Mass. 31, that "A vessel is considered in that condition (at sea '), while on her voyage, and pursuing the business of it, although during part of the time, she is necessarily within some port, in the prosecution of her voyage." This dictum has however been pronounced to be incorrect. Gookin v. New England Ins. Co. 8 Am. Law Reg. 362; Am. Ins. Co. v. Hutton, 24 Wend. 330, 7 Hill, 321. See Eyre v. Marine Ins. Co. 6 Whart. 247, 5 Watts & S. 116.

(i) Wood v. New England Ins. Co. 14 Mass. 31.

(J) Bowen v. Hope Ins. Co. 20 Pick. 275; Union Ins. Co. v. Tysen, 3 Hill, 118. (k) Waples v. Eames, 2 Stra. 1243.

(1) Bill v. Mason, 6 Mass. 313. By arrival is meant the reaching the usual place of unloading. Samuel v. Royal Exch. Ass. Co. 8 B. & C. 119; Angerstein v. Bell, Park, Ins. 45; Meigs e Mutual

Ins. Co. 2 Cush. 439; Whitwell v. Harrison, 2 Exch. 127; Dickey v. United Ins. Co. 11 Johns. 358; Zacharie v. Orleans Ins. Co. 17 Mart. La. 637; Gray v. Gardner, 17 Mass. 188. If a vessel arrives a mere wreck, she cannot be said to have been in safety a moment. Shawe v. Felton, 2 East, 109.

(m) Matthie v. Potts, 3 B. & P. 23; Stewart v. Bell, 5 B. & Ald. 238; Wadsworth v. Pacific Ins. Co. 4 Wend. 33; Osacar v. Louisiana State Ins. Co. 17 Mart. La. 386.

(n) Sparrow v. Caruthers, 2 Stra. 1236. But see Langloie v. Brant, cited 2 B. & P. 434, note. If he merely hires a lighter and pays for it himself, the risk continues till the goods are landed. Rucker v. London Ass. Co. 2 B. & P. 432, note; Hurry v. Royal Exch. Ass. Co. 2 B. & P. 430. See Strong v. Natally, 4 B. & P. 16; Low v. Davy, 5 Binn. 595.

(0) Brown v. Vigne, 12 East, 283.

that they were thus liable for those consequences, although they occur after the insurance has ceased, provided the injury took place while the property was covered by the policy. (p)

* 368

* SECTION V.

OF OPEN AND OF VALUED POLICIES.

A. Of Open Policies.

As wager policies are now void both in England and in this country, the insured must have at risk some interest in the subject of insurance. (9) This may be any legal or equitable interest whatever, if it be such that the peril against which the insurance is made, would cause a pecuniary loss to the insured by its immediate and direct effect. (r)

If the policy does not state the value of the property insured, as agreed upon by both parties, this value must be proved by evidence after the loss occurs. Such a policy is called an OPEN

POLICY.

A policy may be made and delivered which as yet covers no property; beause it may provide that the property to be insured under it shall be defined and ascertained by statements to be subsequently and at various times indorsed upon the policy. (s) 1 These policies always provide for the manner in which ships or cargo or any maritime interest shall be indorsed upon the policy, or entered in a designated book so as to come under insurance; and these provisions are strictly enforced. (ss) Such a policy is

(p) Knight v. Faith, 15 Q. B. 649. See Meretony v. Dunlope, cited 1 T. R. 260; Furneaux v. Bradley, 2 Marsh. Ins.

584.

(q) Amory v. Gilman, 2 Mass. 13; Stetson v. Mass. Ins. Co. 4 Mass. 336; Lord v. Dall, 12 Mass. 118; King v. State Ins. Co. 7 Cush. 10; Alsop v. Commercial Ins. Co. 1 Sumner, 464. By statute, 19 Geo. II., c. 37, wager policies are made illegal.

(r) Lucena v. Craufurd, 5 B. & P. 302; Craufurd v. Hunter, 8 T. R. 13; Stirling v. Vaughan, 11 East, 619; Hancox v.

Fishing Ins. Co. 3 Sumner, 140; Fireman's Ins. Co. v. Powell, 13 B. Mon. 311; Waters v. Monarch Ins. Co. 5 Ellis & B. 870; Wilson v. Martin, 11 Exch. 684; Rice v. Tower, 1 Gray, 426.

(s) Langhorn v. Cologan, 4 Taunt. 330; Neville v. Merch. Ins. Co. 17 Ohio, 192; Newlin v. Ins. Co. 20 Pa. 312; Ralli v. Jansen, 6 Ellis & B. 422, 36 Eng. L. & Eq. 198.

(ss) Plahto v. Merchants Ins. Co. 38 Mo. 248; Hartshorn v. Shoe, &c. Ins. Co. 15 Gray, 240.

1 Under a "floating" marine policy for "goods" contracted for, there is no insurable interest in goods not specifically appropriated to the insured prior to the loss. Stock v. Inglis, 9 Q. B. D. 708. - K.