of the statute in such case made and provided. And you the said keeper," &c.

Not delivering up his goods, books, &c.] “Or if any such bankrupt shall not, upon such examination, deliver up to the commissioners all such part of such estate, and all books, papers, and writings relating thereunto, as be in his possession, custody, or power, (except the necessary wearing apparel of himself, his wife, and children) :" felony, &c. as ante, p. 143. 6 G. 4, c. 16, s. 112.

Commitment, same as the form, ante p. 143 to the asterisk,* and then thus: upon being examined before the commissioners in that behalf, on at -, feloniously did not deliver up to the said commissioners or to any of them, or to any person in their behalf, certain personal property, to wit, one gold watch of the value of 201. which was then and there in the possession, custody, and power of the said C. D., and not being any part of the necessary wearing apparel of the said C. D., or of his wife or children; against the form of the statute in such case made and provided. And you the said keeper, &c.

Concealing or embezzling to the value of 101.] "Or if any such bankrupt shall remove, conceal, or embezzle any part of such estate, to the value of 101. or upwards, or any books of account, papers, or writings relating thereto, with intent to defraud his creditors:" felony, &c. as ante, p. 143. 6 G. 4, c. 16,

s. 112.

at

Commitment same as the form, ante, p. 143, to the asterisk,* and then thus: on -, feloniously did remove, conceal, and embezzle a certain part of his personal estate, to the value of 101. and upwards, to wit, one gold watch of the value of 201., with intent thereby then and there to defraud the creditors of him the said C. D. of the same; against the form of the statute in such case made and provided. And you the said keeper, &c. If the commitment be for removing or concealing merely, it seems that it should show that the bankrupt had passed his last examination. See R. v. Walters, 5 Car. & P. 138..

BARON AND FEME.

See "Husband and Wife."

BARRATRY.

A Barrator is said to be a common mover, exciter, or maintainer of suits or quarrels, either in courts or in the country. 1 Hawk. c. 81, s. 1. The offence is punishable with fine, imprisonment, or both. By stat. 12 G. 1, c. 29, if any person, convicted of common barratry, shall afterwards practise as an attorney, he is liable to be transported for seven years,

BASTARD.

Who, and proof thereof

Settlement of, p. 146.

Who liable to maintain it, p. 147.

Application against the putative father, p. 148,

Bastard, who, and proof thereof.

Who.] A bastard is a person begotten and born out of lawful matrimony. The child of a woman who has never been married, is a bastard. The child of a woman, whose marriage is unlawful and void, is a bastard; as for instance, where the person to whom she was married, had at the same time another wife living, in such case the children of the second marriage are bastards, whether born during the lifetime, or after the death, of the first wife. A child born of a widow, at such a time after her husband's death, that the husband could not have been the father of it, is a bastard; but if born within the time of gestation, namely, 40 weeks after the husband's death, it is otherwise.

On the other hand, if the woman be married at the time the child is born, the child will be deemed legitimate, although it were begotten before marriage, and although there be every reason to believe that the husband was not the father of it; Co. Lit. 244; and a fortiori, where the woman was married during the whole time of gestation. In this latter case, however, if it can be proved that the husband could not have been the father of it, as for instance, that he had not access to his wife during the time when by the laws of nature he might have been the father, the child will be deemed a bastard. See Head v. Head, 1 Sim. & St. 150, 1 Turn. & Rus. 138. R. v. Luffe, 8 East, 193. Pendrel v. Pendrel, 2 Str. 925. R. v. St. Bride's, 1 Str. 51. R. v. Bedall, 2 Str. 1076. But access will h

VOL. I.

be presumed, unless the contrary be plainly proved; and if access be proved or presumed, sexual connexion between the parties will also be presumed, unless the impossibility of it by reason of the impotency of the husband or otherwise, be clearly established. See Cope v. Cope, 1 Moody & R. 269. Lomax v. Holmden, 2 Str. 946. Where sexual intercourse between the husband and wife may be presumed, proof of her adultery with other men will not affect the legitimacy of the offspring. See Morris v. Davies, 3 Car. & P. 215, 427. Bury v. Phillpot, 2 Mylne & K. 349.

If a woman, who is divorced from her husband à mensâ et thoro, have a child, it must be presumed to be a bastard; for the court will presume a due obedience to the sentence of the court, until the contrary be proved. St. George's v. St. Margaret's Westminster, 1 Salk. 123. But if she live separate from her husband without such sentence, access shall be presumed, and her children deemed legitimate, until the contrary be proved. Id.

Proof thereof.] If the mother be unmarried, she may prove her child to be a bastard, by proving that she was unmarried at the time of its birth, and during the whole time of gestation; if a widow, she may prove it, by proving the time of its birth, and the time of the death of her husband. If the mother be reputed to be a married woman, the marriage may be disproved, or facts shewing its invalidity may be proved, either by her, R. v. Bramley, 6 T. R. 330, or by the man to whom she was reputed to be married. R. v. St. Peter's in Worcestershire, Burr. S. C. 25. Or if she be married, she may prove her connexion with the putative father; R. v. Luffe, 8 East, 193; but she shall not be permitted to prove the non access of her husband, Id. R. v. Rook, 1 Wils. 340, even after the husband's death. R. v. Kea, 11 East, 132.

Settlement of Bastards.

A bastard born before the 14 August, 1834, is settled in the parish or township in which it was born, R. v. Spitalfields, 1 Ld. Raym. 567. R. v. Astley, 2 Bott. 10, unless it were born of a mother who was at the time actually confined within the walls of a prison, or in a house duly licensed for the reception of pregnant women. 54 G. 3, c. 170, s. 2. And if born in an extraparochial place, it had no place of settlement, either by birth or parentage. R. v. St. Nicholas Leicester, 2 B. & C. 889, and see R. v. Wilson, 2 Ad. & El. 230. But if it were born in a house of industry or poor house of an incorporated district, or which was locally situate out of the parish, &c. by which the mother was sent, then the child was deemed to be settled in the parish, &c. by which the mother was sent, or on whose

account the mother was received or maintained in the house. 54 G. 3, c. 170, s. 3. So, if an order for the removal of an unmarried woman, pregnant, were suspended, and during the suspension she was delivered of a bastard, the child would be settled, not in the parish where it was born, but in the parish in which the mother was settled at the time of her delivery. 35 G. 3, c. 101, s. 6. So, if a woman, pregnant of a bastard, were by the fraud or collusion of the parish officers, and not merely of the putative father or the like (R. v. Mattersey, 4 B. & Ad. 211, and see R. v. Wilson, 2 Ad. & E. 230), sent from one parish, to be delivered in another, and she were delivered in the latter parish accordingly, the child would be deemed to be settled in the parish from which the mother was sent. Tewkesbury v. Twining, 2 Bulst. 349. Masters v. Child, 3 Salk. 66. So, if, after a regular order obtained for the removal of a woman, pregnant of a bastard, the child were born before the mother could be removed, R. v. Icleford, 1 Sess. Ca. 32, or whilst the mother was removing, Jane Grey's case, Sit. & Rem. 66, the child would be settled in the parish to which the mother was about to be removed. Or if the mother were actually removed, but the removal were wrongful, and the order were afterwards quashed upon appeal, her child, born in the parish to which she was removed, either before or pending the appeal, would be deemed to be settled in the parish by which she was removed. Westbury v. Coston, 2 Salk. 532. Boreham v. Waltham, Carth. 397. Much Waltham v. Peram, 2 Salk. 474. R. v. Great Salkeld, & M. & S. 408. R. v. Martlesham, 10 B. & C. 77. R. v. St. Andrew Holborn, 6 M. & S. 411. If, however, after removal, the mother were secretly to return to the removing parish, and there be delivered of the bastard, the child would be settled where born. R. v. Halifax, 2 B. & Ad. 211.

As to bastards born after the 14th August, 1834, it is enacted by stat. 4 & 5 W. 4, c. 76, s. 71, that every such bastard "shall have and follow the settlement of the mother of such child, until such child shall attain the age of 16 years, or shall acquire a settlement in its own right." This enactment may in some years hence give rise to a question, whether the mother's settlement at the time the child attains the age of 16 years, shall be his settlement afterwards until he acquire one in his own right, or whether he shall have and follow the settlement of his mother only until he is 16 years of age, and then revert to his birth settlement.

Who liable to maintain it.

As to bastards born since the 14th August, 1834, it is enacted by stat. 4 & 5 W. 4, c. 76, s. 71, that the "mother, so long as

she shall be unmarried or a widow, shall be bound to.maintain such child as a part of her family, until such child shall attain the age of 16; and all relief granted to such child, while under the age of 16, shall be considered as granted to such mother; provided always that such liabilty of such mother as aforesaid, shall cease on the marriage of such child, if a female." If the mother, however, be unable to maintain it, and on that account it become chargeable to the parish, the parish officers, by application to the sessions, may compel the putative father to reimburse the parish for its maintenance and support, as shall be fully mentioned under the next head. As to bastards born before the 14th August, 1834, two justices of the peace might make an order of filiation, and thereby charge the putative father, or mother, or both, with the payment of a sum weekly for the support of the child. 18 Eliz. c. 3, s. 2. And if the order were not obeyed, a justice of the peace might commit the party to the common gaol or house of correction, there to be imprisoned and kept to hard labour for three months, unless the sum due were sooner paid; 49 G. 3, c. 68, s. 3; or the party might be indicted as for a misdemeanor at common law. But these statutes, as far as respects bastards born after the 14th August, 1834, are expressly repealed; 4 & 5 W. 4, c. 76, s. 69; and as cases of bastards born before that time seldom now require the interference of magistrates, it is unnecessary to treat further upon the subject of orders of filiation.

If the mother marry, the husband shall be liable to maintain any child or children she may have at the time of her marriage, whether legitimate or illegitimate, as a part of his family, and shall be chargeable will all relief or the cost price thereof, granted to or on account of such child or children, until the child or children attain the age of 16, or the mother die. 4 & 5 W. c. 76, s. 57. And where an order of filiation was made upon the putative father of a bastard child, before this statute, and the mother afterwards married a man who was able to maintain it, the Court of Exchequer held that the marriage of the mother relieved the putative father from his liability; and Parke, B., intimated an opinion that the affirmative words of this section amounted to a repeal of the former statutes relating to bastardy, and destroyed altogether the effect of the order of filiation, during the marriage of the mother. Lang v. Spencer, 3 Cromp. M. & R. 129.

Application against the Putative father.

In what cases, &c.] "Where any child shall hereafter be born a bastard, and shall, by reason of the inability of the mother of such child to provide for its maintenance, become