How to Get Good Judges: A Study of the Defects of the Judicial System of the States with a Plan for a Scientific Judicial System

Mr. John A. Wright, of San Francisco, puts forth a little book, for general readers, entitled "How to get good judges; a study of the defects of the judicial system of the States, with a plan for a scientific judicial system." He starts out with the assertion that " a large class of people throughout the United States entertains a growing distrust of our judges and judicial systems," which "exists side by side with the utmost respect for the character and attainments of particular courts and particular judges." One indication of this is in the increasing prevalence of mob-law, and one ground of it, as given by him, is the fact that in New York certain judges have been forced to confess that they had bought their nominations. The principal reasons of the spreading 'of this notion, he says, is the newspaper press. But he thinks that the influence of great corporations and private interests, of corrupt politicians and their retainers and patrons is omnipotent in nominating and electing the judges, "and we have no adequate means of disciplining or vindicating our judges when their reputations are assailed." He also states that for forty years our courts "have steadily become less capable of satisfactorily dispatching business." For "dispatching" read "Keeping up with" and we are with him. The remedies he proposes are to make the bench more attractive than the bar; to make elevation to it unattainable by any but the best men; to make dismissal certain to follow misconduct; and to elevate the character and capacity of the bar. The means he proposes are better salaries, tenure during good behavior, pensions, and "a scientific method of evolving the best men for the bench." Our people probably would not object to the last means suggested if they could understand it, but to the other three they would certainly say no. They think the salaries are large enough, they are sure the tenure is long enough, and they are deadly opposed to judicial pensions. On the last two points argument to the people of this State would be wasted. Possibly but not probably they might consent to increase certain of the judicial salaries, but certainly they would 'never fall in with Mr. Wright's opinion that they ought to be paid as much as officers of great corporations. But the most curious part of Mr. Wright's scheme is what he calls the Council or Court of Juristic Discipline. This is to be composed of lawyers, elected by the lawyers upon the Australian ballot system, with exclusive power to admit to the bar, to discipline members of the bar, and from whose members the bench is to be exclusively supplied. He would have the ultimate law court composed of judges selected by the judges of the trial courts. We have not space to unfold this scheme in all its details, nor are we sure that as yet we precisely understand them all; but enough has been stated to enable the reader to see that he proposes to put the bench and the bar pretty much in the hands of the bar. Whether this would-greatly tend to increase popular confidence in the bench and the bar we may be permitted to doubt. It seems to us just now that the people would be apt to regard it as a close legal corporation, and that they decidedly would not assent to it. Excepting the political assessments on judicial candidates in the city of New York, there does not seem to be much reasonable ground for finding fault with the judicial system of this State; as to mode of selection, salaries, tenure, pensions, the present system seems to meet general approval. (The pension matter can be controlled by the nominations.) There is little fault found with the manner in which the judicial business is transacted. There is little danger of favoritism, none of corruption. The judges are generally men of fair abilities, candor, learning and industry. The only ground for serious fault is that business is not dispatched with enough promptitude.....
-Albany Law Journal, Volume 45