DISCOURSE XXV.

PART II.

THE suspicions which incline men to doubt whether God does at all concern himself with human affairs, have been considered: I shall proceed now to consider the suspicions which, consistently with admitting a general care of Providence over the world, lead men to fear that they themselves are either neglected or unkindly treated by God. This seems to have been the Psalmist's own case, and these the fears which possessed his mind. Of God's government of the world he entertained no doubt; he applied to him in his trouble and distress; but his grief was that he found no return to his prayers; his sorrows continued and increased: when he remembered God, he was troubled; when he complained, his spirit was overwhelmed.'

But this good man, being well grounded in religion, was able so far to get the better of his doubts and fears, as to pass a right judgment in his own case, and to pronounce of all his suspicions, This is my infirmity:' and to call to his assistance the proper reflexions which the great works of Providence administered for the support and confirmation of his hope and confidence towards God, I will remember the years of the right hand of the Most High.'

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Now it being admitted that God is not regardless of the world, but that his providence is watchful for the preservation of the whole, it may be doubted whether this care descends to particulars, and regards the actions and the well-being of individuals; which, singly considered, make but a small part of the whole, and whose fortunes, be they good or bad, have very little influence on the well-being of the whole.

If we consider this suspicion with respect to the material world, a little reflexion will help us to discern that it is intirely groundless, and built on the weak conceit that it will be too troublesome to Providence to attend to the very minute things of the world. For the minutest parts of matter follow the laws of God and nature as constantly and as regularly as the great

constituent parts of the world, and work in their proper sphere as strongly for the good and preservation of the whole. The warmth and comfort which you receive from the fire in your chamber, is as much owing to the laws and constitutions appointed and maintained by God, as the warmth and comfort you receive from the sun: and the light of a candle is as truly the work of God, and as much depending on his preservation and execution of the laws of nature, as the light of the heavenly bodies. If any man thinks otherwise, let him try to account for these lesser phenomena of nature, and he will find himself under the same necessity of recurring to the influence of a superior overruling power, as when he attempts to account for the motions of the great bodies in the firmament.

With respect to moral agents and God's government over them, the case is not quite so plain : and there is a plain reason why it is not because moral agents would not be moral agents, if they were as regularly moved by an overruling power as material beings are and must be; since they can only act as they are acted, which is the reason why all their actings are regular and uniform because the immediate agent is God.

But with respect to particular mer, and the care of Providence over them, we may consider that every man consists of two parts; one material, which is the body; another rational, which is the mind. With respect to the material part, every single man manifestly depends on the preservation and care of Providence, as manifestly as the great bodies of the world depend on the same care. The motion of the heart in a man no more depends on his will or on his own wisdom, than the motion of the moon does. The same may be said of all the animal functions which depend on involuntary motions, not under the influence or direction of the will. The life then of every particular man, which depends on these animal functions, depends on the preservation of Providence. And thus far we see, that by the same way of reasoning that we conclude God's government to extend to the whole of the creation, his care and government extends to individual men. This being allowed, can we possibly suppose that God, who shows so much care for men, as they are material animal beings, should intirely neglect them, considered as moral agents? This is the very

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question which our Saviour asks in a like case, Matt. vi. 26. 'Behold,' says he, 'the fowls of the air for they sow not, neither do they reap, nor gather into barns; yet your heavenly Father feedeth them. Are ye not much better than they?' In like manner we say, behold yourselves as ye are material beings; do not all the motions of the body, on which life depends, discover to you the hand of God supporting and maintaining your life and being here? Consider once more; are you not, as rational beings, and moral agents, much more worthy of his care? and can he, whose care descends to you as animals, be supposed to neglect you as moral agents?

But as strong as this proof is, by way of inference and conclusion, we do not want more direct proofs of God's care for men as moral agents. Of this sort are all the impressions and intimations which we receive from nature, that is, from the hand of our Creator, for our government and direction as moral agents the knowlege of the difference of good and evil, the power of conscience, the passions of hope and fear, the sense of honor and of shame, which are natural to all men, and may be said to be born with them, are so many proofs of the care of God for us, considered as moral agents and they are not the less so for being common to all men; though possibly they have, for that reason, been less considered in this light.

Was God to speak directly to every man, and teach him his duty, was he visibly to rebuke every sinner, you would not doubt of his care for particular moral agents; but you might doubt, perhaps with good reason, how consistent such methods would be with the freedom which is necessary to the morality of human actions. But now the same care is taken, the same instructions, the same admonitions given; with this only difference, that they are conveyed in a manner and a method which do not interfere with the freedom of moral agents. Consider a little: when you find that you have a natural notion of the difference of good and evil, and consequently of the great duties of morality, who then is your teacher and instructor? What you have from nature, you have from the Author of nature; and if your sense of moral good and evil be indeed natural, you learnt it from God, and from him only. If the power of conscience be natural to a rational mind, who is it that ad

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VOL. II.

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monishes you when conscience flies in your face? Must it not be he who placed the power of conscience in every rational mind, to act there as his deputy, in restraining, rebuking, and correcting every iniquity? When you are moved by a sense of honor to do things that are virtuous and praiseworthy, and encouraged and supported by hope of reward; when you are restrained from evil by the sense of shame, or deterred by the fear of punishment; whence have you these great assistances and encouragements to virtue, these guards and defences against vice? If these are natural passions, and undoubtedly they are, it is God who calls you daily by these his messengers into the ways of honor and virtue, and warns you to flee from vice and iniquity.

These are undeniable proofs of God's care for moral agents; and they reach to every particular man's case, who has not extinguished the powers of conscience, and the natural sense of honor and shame.

That the providence of God over particular men extends still farther, and often interposes to bless and prosper the righteous, to punish and confound the wicked, there can be no doubt in general, though it is always difficult, and generally presumptuous, to pretend to judge in particular instances; for the appearances of things will not answer to the observation; the wicked being sometimes suffered to triumph in this world, and virtue left to struggle with many hardships and distresses : which is the case of the Psalmist in the text, complaining that ⚫ God had forgotten to be gracious;' and has been, and, in the reason of the thing, must be the case of many righteous men in every age.

But this is not the only difficulty in the case: for when the wicked suffer here as they deserve, and the righteous prosper in their undertakings; yet the blessings on one side, and the punishments on the other, seem to be conveyed by such natural means, and so much to be expected from the common course of things, that men seldom think of an immediate interposition of Providence, and there are hardly grounds on which to prove it. But, to balance this difficulty, let it be considered,

First, that an immediate and visible interposition of Providence in behalf of the righteous, and for the punishment of the

wicked, would interfere with the freedom of moral agents, and not leave room for their trial: and this is a sufficient reason for not using this method,

Secondly, that this reason excludes only such methods of rewarding virtue and punishing vice here, as are inconsistent with freedom of actions; but does by no means exclude any methods not liable to this objection.

Thirdly, that the natural course of things being under the direction of God, it is reasonable to believe that they are oftentimes disposed for the benefit of the righteous, and for the punishment of the wicked; though such disposition of things cannot fall under our observation, every thing appearing to happen according to a natural and ordinary course.

The first proposition has been already considered; and the second is but the immediate consequence of it: of the third there can remain no doubt with any man who believes that the providence of God has any concern at all in the affairs of the world. That whole nations may suffer by unseasonable weather, by storms and tempests, by lightning or by earthquakes, is manifest in experience: that all these things, whenever they happen, are looked on as natural events, is allowed: admitting then, that these things are under the government of God, and happen as he thinks fit to direct, the consequence is manifest, that God can, whenever he pleases, punish wicked nations or reward good ones, by a secret disposition of the course of nature, without any such interposition as is inconsistent with the method of his government over rational and moral beings.

And if this can be done, it is highly reasonable to think it is ́done; it being in all its views agreeable to the goodness and justice of God, and not inconsistent with the government of moral agents. The truth of this observation is not confined to the case of nations only; it is the same with respect to particular persons: there are a thousand accidents in life (so we call them) on which the fortunes of men depend: as these things happen one way or other, a man is made or undone; and how easy must it be for the power that presides over all these accidents, to determine the fate of men, and at the same time to escape their observation! Though it be unreasonable, because inconsistent with the methods of the divine government over