See DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, 4.
1. When the plaintiff in a bill in equity alleges facts material to his re-
covery, and the defendant in his answer denies them under oath, the
burden of proof is thrown upon the plaintiff. Cochran v. Blout, 350.
2. It being shown that the transactions in dispute were to be conducted
under the rules and regulations of the Board of Trade at Chicago, and
that those rules and regulations were explained to the defendant below,
they became competent evidence. Hansen v. Boyd, 397.
3. Stenographers' minutes of evidence are not records. Matthews v. United
States, 500.
See CRIMINAL LAW, 3, 4, 12;
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, 3.
When the defendant at the close of plaintiff's evidence, requests an instruc-
tion to the jury to charge in his favor, which is refused, and he then
introduces testimony, an exception to that refusal is waived. Hansen
v. Boyd, 397.
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS, HEADS of.
1. The act of the head of one of the Departments of the government in
calling the attention of any person having business with such Depart-
ment to a statute relating in any way to such business, cannot be made
the foundation of a cause of action against such officer. Spalding v.
Vilas, 483.
2. The same general considerations of public policy and convenience which
demand for judges of courts of superior jurisdiction immunity from
civil suits for damages arising from acts done by them in the course
of the performance of their judicial functions, apply to a large extent
to official communications made by heads of Executive Departments
when engaged in the discharge of duties imposed upon them by
law. Ib.
EXECUTION.
See LOCAL LAW, 2, 3.
EXECUTION SALE.
See EQUITY, 1 to 6.
1. A writ of habeas corpus cannot perform the office of a writ of error, and
in extradition proceedings, if the committing magistrate has jurisdic-
tion of the subject-matter and of the accused, and the offence charged
is within the terms of the treaty of extradition, and the magistrate, in
arriving at a decision to hold the accused, has before him competent
legal evidence on which to exercise his judgment as to whether the
facts are sufficient to establish the criminality of the accused for the
purposes of extradition, such decision cannot be reviewed on habeas
corpus. Ornelas v. Ruiz, 502.
2. Whether an extraditable crime has been committed is a question of
mixed law and fact, but chiefly of fact, and the judgment of the magis-
trate rendered in good faith on legal evidence that the accused is guilty
of the act charged, and that it constitutes an extraditable crime, can-
not be reviewed on the weight of evidence, and is final for the purposes
of the preliminary examination unless palpably erroneous in law. Ib.
3. It is enough if it appear that there was legal evidence on which the
commissioner might properly conclude that the accused had committed
offences within the treaty as charged, and so be justified in exercis-
ing his power to commit them to await the action of the Executive
Department. Ib.
HABEAS CORPUS.
See EXTRADITION.
INDIAN DEPREDATIONS.
See CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES;
JURISDICTION, E, 1.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 12.
JUDGMENT LIEN.
See LOCAL LAW, 1.
In June, 1861, O. recovered judgment in a Pennsylvania court for the re-
covery of a sum of money against H. and F., both residents of that
State. In 1865 H. removed to Louisiana, and became a citizen of that
State and continued so until his death. In 1866 the judgment was re-
vived by scire facias, process being served on F. only. In 1871 it was
in like manner revived. In 1880 O. proceeded on the judgment against
H. in the courts of Louisiana, where a judgment is barred by prescrip-
tion in ten years from its rendition. Being compelled to elect upon
which judgment he relied, he elected to stand upon the scire facias
judgment of 1871. Held, that, viewed as a new judgment rendered as
in an action of debt, the judgment had no binding force in Louisiana,
as H. had not been served with process or voluntarily appeared; and
considered as in continuation of the prior action and a revival of the
original judgment for purposes of execution, it operated merely to
keep in force the local lien, and, for the same reason, it could not be
availed of as removing the statutory bar of the lex fori. Owens v.
Henry, 642.
See DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, 4.
A. JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
1. As the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of the United States was in-
voked throughout this litigation upon the ground of diverse citizen-
ship, and as this bill must be regarded as ancillary, auxiliary or
supplemental to the suit for the foreclosure of the mortgage, or, as
it were, in continuation thereof, the decree of the Circuit Court
of Appeals in that suit being made final by section 6 of the act of
March 3, 1891, c. 517, 26 Stat. 826, no appeal lies to this court. Carey
v. Houston & Texas Central Railway Co., 115.
2. The decision by the Supreme Court of the State that the exemption
from taxation applies to new stock in the bank, created and issued
since the adoption of the constitution of 1870, being in favor of the
exemption claimed by the bank, cannot be reviewed by this court.
Bank of Commerce v. Tennessee, 134.
3. As a claim of invention, made in an application for a patent, is a right
incapable of being ascertained and valued in money, no appeal lies to
this court from a judgment of the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia, affirming the decision of the Supreme Court of the Dis-
trict that the applicant was not entitled to a decree, under Rev. Stat.
§ 4915, authorizing the Commissioner of Patents to issue a patent to
him for his alleged invention. Durham v. Seymour, 235.
4. When, in a case appealed from a Circuit Court, the record discloses
that the defendants below appealed upon the express ground that
the court erred in taking jurisdiction of the bill and in not dismiss-
ing the bill for want of jurisdiction, and prayed that their appeal
should be allowed, and the question of jurisdiction be certified to the
Supreme Court, and that said appeal was allowed, and the certificate
further states that there is sent a true copy of so much of the record
as is necessary for the determination of the question of jurisdiction,
and as part of the record so certified is the opinion of the court
below, in accordance with which defendants' motion to dismiss the
cause for want of jurisdiction was denied, it sufficiently shows that
the appeal was granted solely upon the question of jurisdiction.
Smith v. McKay, 355.
5. When the requisite citizenship of the parties appears, and the subject-
matter is such that the Circuit Court is competent to deal with it,
the jurisdiction of that court attaches, and whether the court sustains
the complainant's prayer for equitable relief, or dismisses the bill
with leave to bring an action at law, either is a valid exercise of
jurisdiction; and if any error be committed in the exercise of such
jurisdiction, it can only be remedied by an appeal to the Circuit
Court of Appeals. Ib.
6. An interlocutory order or decree of the Supreme Court of the District
of Columbia at special term may be reviewed by the general term on
appeal, without awaiting a final determination of the cause; and, on
appeal to this court from the final decree at general term, the entire
record is brought up for review. Spalding v. Mason, 375.
7. This court cannot pass upon a refusal of a motion to instruct gen-
erally in defendant's favor when the record contains only a part
of the evidence. Hansen v. Boyd, 397.
8. The appellees were brought before a Circuit Court commissioner in the
Western District of Texas, charged by the Mexican consul with the
commission, in Mexico, of a crime extraditable under the treaty of
June 20, 1862. The commissioner found the evidence sufficient to
warrant their commitment for extradition. On the application of the
prisoners a writ of habeas corpus was issued by the United States Dis-
trict Judge, directed to the marshal of the district. The judge, after
hearing, decided that the offences charged were political offences, and
not extraditable, and ordered the prisoners discharged. From this
judgment the consul appealed to this court. Held, that as his gov-
ernment was the real party interested, the appeal was properly prose-
cuted by him; and as the construction of the treaty was drawn in
question, it was properly taken to this court. Ornelas v. Ruiz, 502.
9. In an appeal from a judgment of a territorial court, with no exceptions
to rulings of the court on the admission or rejection of testimony,
this court is limited in its review to a determination of the ques-
tion whether the facts found are sufficient to sustain the judgment
rendered. Gildersleeve v. New Mexico Mining Co., 573.
See JURISDICTION, B;
TAX AND TAXATION, 6.
B. JURISDICTION OF CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEAL.
The decrees and judgments of Circuit Courts of Appeal are made final
by section 6 of the Judiciary Act of March 3, 1891, where the juris-
diction of the Circuit Court over the intervenor's petition, the decree
on which is appealed from, was referable to its jurisdiction of an
equity suit which depended wholly upon diverse citizenship. Rouse
v. Hornsby, 588.
C. JURISDICTION OF CIRCUIT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES.
1. A Circuit Court of the United States has no jurisdiction of a bill to
enjoin the collection of separate county taxes by separate county
officers, in the State of Arkansas, against the Western Union Tele-
graph Company, (a corporation which has accepted the provisions of
the Statute now codified in the Revised Statutes as Section 5263 to
Section 5269,) on its line in each of said counties in that State, when
the amount of the tax in no one of the counties reaches the sum of
two thousand dollars; and this result is not affected by the fact that
if the county assessments were aggregated they would exceed two
thousand dollars, as the several county clerks or tax collectors cannot
be joined in a single suit in a Federal court, and the jurisdiction
sustained on the ground that the total amount involved exceeds the
jurisdictional limitation; nor by the fact that the railroad commis-
sioners of the State, who had already acted in the matter, were made
parties defendant to the suit. Fishback v. Western Union Telegraph
Co., 96.
2. A bill in equity by a corporation, or by the stockholders of a corpora-
tion, in a Circuit Court of the United States, to set aside a final
decree of that court against the corporation in a foreclosure suit, upon
the ground that the decree was obtained by collusion and fraud and
that the court had no jurisdiction to make it, is an ancillary suit and
a continuation of the main suit so far as the jurisdiction of the
Circuit Court as a court of the United States is concerned. Carey v.
Houston Central Texas Railway Co., 115.
D. JURISDICTION OF DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES.
Under the act of July 12, 1894, c. 132, enacting that "all criminal pro-
ceedings instituted for the trial of offences against the laws of the
United States arising in the District of Minnesota shall be brought,
had and prosecuted in the division of said district in which such
offences were committed," the court has no jurisdiction of an indict-
ment afterwards presented by the grand jury for the district in one
division, for an offence committed in another division before the
passage of the act, and for which no complaint has been made against
the defendant; although the witnesses whose names are endorsed
upon the indictment were summoned before the grand jury and were
in actual attendance upon the court before the passage of the act.
Post v. United States, 583.
|