supported by evidence, that between forty and fifty years ago, the proprietor of the island of B. raised an embankment across a small bay, and had ever since asserted an exclusive right to the soil, without opposition: Held, that although the usage of forty years duration could not of itself establish such right, or destroy the rights of the public, yet, that it was evidence from which prior usage to the same effect might be presumed, and which, coupled with the general words contained in those grants served to establish such exclusive right. Chad v. Tilsed, H. 1 & 2 G. 4. Page 185 3. Under a power given by a marriage settlement to a tenant for life, to lease for years, determinable on three lives, reserving "such ancient and accustomed, or as great and beneficial rents, duties, and services, as had formerly been reserved, &c. :" and so as the lease contained "a power of re-entry for non-payment of the rent reserved, &c. :" evidence is admissible on the trial of an ejectment, to shew that the usual and accustomed form of leases by which the estate settled in the marriage settlement had been demised, as well before as after the date of the settlement, had contained a conditional proviso of re-entry, similar to that contained in a new lease, the validity of which was disputed at the trial. Smith v. Doe, d. Jersey, (Earl) E. 2 G. 4. 332 4. Where the lessees of a fishery, had publicly landed their nets on certain parts of the bank of a river, for more than twenty years, and had occasionally sloped and levelled such landing places; al VOL. V. WARRANT OF ATTORNEY. Where A. by deed, assigned all his effects at W. to trustees, for the benefit of certain creditors for four years, and the trustees were empowered to sell at the expiration of two years, or sooner, if A. should direct, and apply the proceeds of the sale in discharge of the debts of such creditors, who covenanted that A. might continue at home or abroad, and that they would not molest him for two years from the date of the deed-Held, that such assignment was valid, and not within the statute 13 Eliz. c. 5, and that the property was thereby protected against a judgment creditor, who had sued out execution against A. after the deed was executed. Goss v. Neale, M. 1 G. 4. EXECUTORS. See PLEADING, 1. 19 1. A deed inter partes is only available between those who are parties to it-Therefore, a deed between A. B. and the defen UU dant of the one part, and C. D. of the other, whereby the two former agreed with the latter, his executors and administrators, to pay him a certain annuity for twenty-one years, or, in case of his death within the term, to the use of his child or children, if any, but if not, to his then wife, if she should remain his widow, and C. D. died within the term, leaving one daughter, who also died within the term, intestate, and his wife died in his lifetime:-Held, that the administrator of the daughter could not maintain any action against the defendant on the deed, for nonpayment of the annuity, on the ground that she was no party to the deed, although she took a beneficial interest under it. But it seems, that the administrator of C. D. might sue, as, in case of a recovery by him, he might be considered as a trustee for such daughter. Barford v. Stuckey, M. 1 G. 4. Page 23 2. Where two makers of a promissory note gave it to a creditor of their testator, whereby 66 as executors, they severally and jointly promised to pay on demand with interest:"-Held, that they were personally liable. Childs v. Monins, H. 1 & 2 G. 4. 282 EXONERETUR. See BAIL, 3. EXTORTION. See AMENDMENT. SHERIFF, 1. FACTOR. FIERI FACIAS. FINE. See COVENANT, 1. If wood land be converted into arable, the Court will not allow a fine to be amended by increasing the quantity of the latter, as the land would pass under either description. Webber, Plaintiff; Grey, Deforciant, M. 1 G. 4. Page 94 FISHERY. See EVIDENCE, 4. FRAUD. See ASSUMPSIT, 1. FRAUDS, STATUTE OF. See WILL. FRAUDULENT CONVEY ANCE. See EXECUTION, FREIGHT. See INSURANCE, 1. 2. Where, by a bill of lading, goods were to be delivered " to the defendant, nett proceeds paid to the plaintiff, or to his assigns, he or they paying freight for the said goods as per charter-party:" Held, that the freight was to be paid by the defendant, and that the nett proceeds to be paid the plaintiff, were what remained after such freight and other charges had been satisfied. Thomson v. Adam, H. 1 & 2 G. 4. 280 GAVELKIND. See DISTRESS, 2. GRANT. See EVIDENCE, 2. 4. GROWING CORN. See DISTRESS, 1. HEIR LOOM. See DEVISE, 2. HIGHWAY RATE. See BANKRUPT, 2. INCEPTION OF RISK. See INSURANCE, 1. INDICTMENT. See BAIL, 2. INDORSEMENT. See SHERIFF, 1. 2. INFERIOR COURT. See COSTS, 3. INQUIRY, WRIT OF. INSPECTION AND PRODUCTION OF PAPERS. Where the plaintiff entered into a contract with an auctioneer for the purchase of land by auction, and made a deposit in part of the purchase money, and afterwards brought an action against the defendants (the vendors), for interest, for not completing the purchase according to the conditions of sale:-Held, that the latter must produce such contract for the purpose of the plaintiff's inspecting it, or getting it stamped. Gigner v. Bayly, M. 1 G. 4. Page 71 INSURANCE. 1. Where the owner of a vessel had entered into a contract with the East India Company at Madras, through the medium of a correspondence with their agents, for freight, and the passage of invalids, and the ship had been surveyed by their officer, and represented to be fit for the purpose, after certain alterations had been made, and goods had been shipped, water taken in for the invalids, and the projected alterations commenced, but the completion prevented by the perils of the sea-Held, in an action on a policy on freight and passage money, that there was an inception of the risk, and that the plaintiff was entitled to recover for passage money as well as freight-Held also, that a contract for such a purpose need not be by charter-party, nor precise or definite in its terms. Truscott v. Christie, M. 1 G. 4. Page 33 2. An abandonment to the underwriters on ship, transfers freight earned subsequently to such abandonment, as incident to the ship-Therefore, where there had been two separate insurances on a general seeking ship, the one on ship and the other on freight, and the ship and freight were abandoned to the respective underwriters, who each paid a total loss, and the vessel was captured and re-captured, and ultimately performed her voyage and earned freight:-Held, that the underwriters on ship, under the abandonment of ship to them, were entitled to such freight. Davidson v. Case (in Error), M. 1 G. 4. 116 INTERLINEATION. See WILL. receive on board at London, goods to be sent alongside her there by the freighter, and deliver them from alongside, at Newfoundland, to the agents of the freighter, according to bills of lading, and such cargo having been discharged there, to receive other goods in like manner, and deliver them at Demerara; and having discharged the same, should receive other goods there, and deliver them at London, agreeably to bills of lading. The owner also agreed, that the ship's boats should assist in unloading and loading the cargoes, when required by the freighter, provided no impediment was thereby to be made in carrying on the exclusive duties of the ship-In consideration whereof, the freighter covenanted to send and take the goods from alongside, and to pay for the freight and hire of the vessel for the voyage, 2600l. with primage, &c.-one quarter part thereof, on delivery of the cargo at Newfoundland, by good bills at sixty days sight on London, and the remainder by good bills at two months date, from the day of the ship's report inwards at the port of London. The voyage was performed, and goods of third persons brought from Demerara, under bills of lading, deliverable to the consignees on payment of certain specified freight therein mentioned, which freight the owner received. Bills of exchange for one quarter's freight were drawn on the freighter at Newfoundland, which were afterwards accepted and dishonoured by him; and no sum, nor bill for the remaining three quarter's freight per charter-party were given or tendered to him on the return of the ship:-Held, first, that taking the whole of the charter-party into consideration, the possession of the ship did not pass to the freighter, but remained in the owner, notwithstanding the words of grant used in its commencement, and that the mere circumstance of his having entered into an agreement with the charterer, as to the mode by which he should be paid for freight, did not divest him of his lien on the cargo for freight, and that it made no difference that he had delivered the homeward cargo to the consignees, and received the freight due upon the bills of lading, which was different from that due upon the charter-party. Secondly, that the owner had a lien on the goods of the consignees of the homeward cargo, mentioned in the bills of lading, to the extent of the freight stipulated for therein, as a security for his freight due upon the charter-party. Christie v. Lewis, H. 1 & 2 G. 4. Page 211 LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF. See CONSTABLE. Where the plaintiff, in a declaration of assumpsit, stated, that in consideration that he would employ the defendant (an annuity broker), to invest and lay out the plaintiff's money in the purchase of an annuity, the defendant undertook to invest it on good and valid security; and assigned for breach, that he laid it out on a bad, invalid, and fraudulent security; and the defendant pleaded non assumpsit infra sex annos, and actio non accrevit infra sex annos, on which issue was joined, and it was proved that the consideration money was paid over to the grantor, and the annuity paid by the hands of the defendant to the plaintiff for six years afterwards, when the grantor became bankrupt, and the security failed; subsequently to which, the defendants' managing clerk promised that the plaintiff should be paid, which promise the defendant afterwards recognized:Held, that the undertaking stated in the declaration, being as to the validity of the security, the subsequent promise could not apply, although it might have given a new right of action on a declaration specially framed for that purpose. Whitehead v. Howard, M. 1 G. 4. Page 105 MAGISTRATE. See CONSTABLE. MARRIAGE SETTLEMENT. See EVIDENCE, 3. POWER, 1. MEMORIAL. See ANNUITY. MISNOMER. See ARREST. MONEY HAD AND RECEIVED. See AGENT, 2. ASSUMPSIT, 1, 2. MONEY PAID. See BANKRUPt, 3. MORTGAGE. See BANKRUPt, 3. BOND. DEVISE, 2. |