equity, to prevent fraud, compels the beneficiary to fulfill the terms of the agreement. This obligation is imposed by law and is not affected either by the Statute of Frauds or the Statute of Wills.23 It is immaterial whether or not the devisee intended, at the time of his agreement with the testator, to commit a fraud, his final refusal to fulfill the agreement effects the fraud.24 And equity enforces the secret trust because otherwise a fraud would be committed.25 §1112. The Same Subject: Necessity of Promise by Beneficiary. The secret trust may be created by a person procuring an absolute testamentary gift to himself by promising the testator that he will either hold it for the benefit of some third person or transfer it to another, according as the testator may express his desire.26 The trust may be created by an implied agreement subsequent to the execution of the will, as where the testator writes to the beneficiary stating the terms of the trust upon which he has made the gift and defining how the trust shall be carried out. If the beneficiary gives his written acceptance to the terms of the trust and promises to fulfill them, he can not, thereafter, repudiate the agreement.27 There must, however, be some promise on the part of the beneficiary, for if he knew nothing of the testator's intentions 561, 88 Am. St. Rep. 620, 62 N. E. 666. 23 Trustees of Amherst College v. Ritch, 151 N. Y. 282, 37 L. R. A. 305, 45 N. E. 876. 24 Gilpatrick v. Glidden, 81 Me. 137, 151, 10 Am. St. Rep. 245, 2 L. R. A. 662, 16 Atl. 464. 25 McCormick v. Grogan, L. R. 4 H. L. 82; DeLaurencel v. DeBoom, 48 Cal. 581; Dowd v. Tucker, 41 Conn. 197. 26 Gilpatrick v. Glidden, 81 Me. 137, 10 Am. St. Rep. 245, 2 L. R. A. 662, 16 Atl. 464; Olliffe v. Wells, 130 Mass. 221. 27 DeLaurencel v. DeBoom, 48 Cal. 581. no trust is created.28 But silent acquiescence and encouragement are sufficient to make the beneficiary a trustee." If, however, the testamentary gift be absolute, without any understanding, express or implied, as to its use or appropriation, no secret trust is created.30 28 Wallgrave v. Tebbs, 2 Kay & J. 313; In re Crawshay, L. R. 43 Ch. Div. 615; McCormick v. Grogan, L. R. 4 H. L. 82; Schultz' Appeal, 80 Pa. St. 396. 29 Curdy v. Berton, 79 Cal. 420, 12 Am. St. Rep. 157, 5 L. R. A. 189, 21 Pac. 858; Brook v. Chappell, 34 Wis. 405. 30 O'Donnell v. Murphy, 17 Cal. App. 625, 627, 120 Pac. 1076. "While a testator may make a gift to a legatee solely for the purpose of enabling him, if he sees fit, to dispose of it in a particular way, still, if there is no promise by him, express or implied, to so dispose of it, and the matter is left wholly to his will and discretion, no secret trust is created, and he may, if he chooses, apply the legacy to his own use. When it clearly appears that no secret trust was intended, even if it is equally clear that the testator expected that the gift would be applied in accordance with his known wishes, the legatee, if he has made no promise, and none has been made in his behalf, takes an absolute title, and can do what he pleases with the gift. Whatever moral obligation there may be, no legal obligation rests upon him."-Trustees of Amherst College v. Ritch, 151 N. Y. 283, 323, 37 L. R. A. 305, 45 N. E. 876. See, also, Rowbotham v. Dunnett, 8 L. R. Ch. Div. 430; McCormick v. Grogan, 4 L. R. Eng. & Ir. App. 82. CHAPTER XL. CHARITABLE USES AND TRUSTS. § 1113. Charitable trusts distinguished from private trusts. § 1114. Doctrine of charitable uses and trusts only partially accepted in some states, and wholly rejected in others. § 1115. English statutes of mortmain and charitable uses. § 1116. Statute of Charitable Uses of 43 Eliz., ch. 4. § 1117. Restrictions on corporate holdings of land in the United States. § 1118. Statutory restrictions on gifts to charity, as to amount and time of execution. § 1119. The same subject: Purpose of statutes. § 1120. How value of estate is computed. § 1121. Charity, in a legal sense, defined. § 1122. Objects construed as not charitable. § 1123. Examples of charitable uses. § 1124. The same subject. § 1125. Superstitious uses and trusts: English rule. § 1126. Masses for repose of souls of the dead: American rule. § 1127. Religious and pious uses. § 1128. Churches. § 1129. Christian Science. § 1130. Christian associations for young men or women. § 1131. Home and foreign missions. § 1132. Cemeteries, churchyards, or burial grounds. § 1133. Hospitals. § 1134. Libraries. § 1135. Public purposes. § 1136. Prohibition and temperance. § 1137. Woman's suffrage. § 1138. Medals and prizes. § 1139. Benefit of animals. § 1140. Rule as to perpetuities as affecting charitable gifts. § 1141. The same subject: Where gift vests in the future. § 1142. Testamentary gifts to charity liberally construed. § 1143. Purpose of trust must not be so indefinite that chancery can not correct abuse. § 1144. Purpose of trust must be stated in will. § 1145. Uncertainty of objects of charitable trusts. § 1146. Corporations and voluntary associations as trustees. § 1147. Trust will not fail for lack of trustee. § 1148. Trustees may be vested with discretionary power of administration. § 1149. Chancery may compel trustee to account: Statute of Limitations. § 1150. Doctrine of cy pres: English and American chancery jurisdiction distinguished. § 1151. The same subject: General American rule stated. § 1152. The same subject. § 1153. Cy pres doctrine: English rule where object or purpose of trust fails. § 1154. The same subject. §1155. The same subject: American authorities. § 1113. Charitable Trusts Distinguished From Private Trusts. Charitable trusts differ from private trusts in that they do not come within the rule against perpetuities and may be made perpetual. They are for objects of permanent interest and for the benefit of the public, and therefore do not come under the rule that property devoted to a private use can not be made inalienable beyond the period prescribed by the rule as to perpetuities.1 Another distinguishing feature of charitable trusts is that the num ber of the beneficiaries is and must be indefinite,2 for a trust can not be charitable where the beneficiaries are definitely designated. And again, charitable trusts are further distinguished from private trusts in that the beneficiaries are uncertain. This uncertainty, however, refers to the particular individuals to be benefited by the gift, not to the class from which the beneficiaries shall come. And charitable trusts generally are not subject to the common law rule against accumulations." § 1114. Doctrine of Charitable Uses and Trusts Only Partially Accepted in Some States, and Wholly Rejected in Others. The foregoing rules are those applied in those jurisdictions which accept the English doctrine of uses and trusts as developed under the Statute of Charitable Uses of 43 Eliz., ch. 4. In the United States it is fully recog nized in some jurisdictions, partially in others, and in some not at all, active trusts created by statute only being allowed. Young v. St. Mark's Lutheran Church, 200 Pa. St. 332, 49 Atl. 887. See §§ 1142, 1143. As to doctrine of cy pres, see 88 1149-1154. 2 Russell v. Allen, 107 U. S. 163, 27 L. Ed. 397, 2 Sup. Ct. 327; Matter of Upham, 127 Cal. 90, 59 Pac. 315; Fay v. Howe, 136 Cal. 599, 69 Pac. 423; Grant v. Saunders, 121 Iowa 80, 100 Am. St. Rep. 310, 95 N. W. 411; Haynes v. Carr, 70 N. H. 463, 49 Atl. 638; Harrington v. Pier, 105 Wis. 485, 76 Am. St. Rep. 920, 50 L. R. A. 307, 82 N. W. 345. 3 Fontain v. Ravenel, 17 How. (U. S.) 369, 15 L. Ed. 80; Estate of Hinckley, 58 Cal. 457. See §§ 1143, 1144. 4 Beall v. Fox's Exrs., 4 Ga. 404; Santa Clara Female Academy v. Sullivan, 116 Ill. 375, 56 Am. Rep. 776, 6 N. E. 183; Rotch v. Emerson, 105 Mass. 431; Gidley v. Lovenberg, 35 Tex. Civ. 203, 79 S. W. 831. See §§ 1143, 1144. 5 People v. Cogswell, 113 Cal. 129, 35 L. R. A. 269, 45 Pac. 270; Paschal v. Acklin, 27 Tex. 173. See §§ 1143, 1144. 6 Odell v. Odell, 10 Allen (92 |