estate in personalty is as well settled as any other principle of our law.12

The principles governing the distinction between vested and contingent remainders are applicable to personal property as well as to realty.18

Any language which would create a life estate and a reversion or remainder in lands will create similar interests in personalty, guarding always against perpetuities,14 A remainder in personalty may be created by express words or by implication;15 and whenever it is

12 Smith v. Bell, 6 Peters (U. S.) 68, 8 L. Ed. 323; Langworthy v.. Chadwick, 13 Conn. 42; Thomas v. Castle, 76 Conn. 447, 56 Atl. 854; Lott v. Meacham, 4 Fla. 144; Thornton v. Burch, 20 Ga. 791; Trogdon v. Murphy, 85 Ill. 119; Dickinson v. Griggsville Nat. Bank, 209 III. 350, 70 N. E. 593; Stallcup v. Cronley's Trustee, 117 Ky. 547, 554, 78 S. W. 441; Cassilly v. Meyer, 4 Md. 1; Taft v. Taft, 130 Mass. 461; State v. Probate Court, 102 Minn. 268, 291, 294, 113 N. W. 888; State v. Welch, 175 Mo. App. 303, 162 S. W. 637; Ackerman's Admrs. v. Vreeland's Exr., 14 N. J. Eq. 23; Underhill v. Tripp, 24 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 51; Westcott v. Cady, 5 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 334; Smithwick v. Biggs, 23 N. C. 281; Cooper v. Cooper, 2 Brev. (S. C.) 355; Hughes v. Cannon, 2 Humph. (21 Tenn.) 589; Richardson v. Paige, 54 Vt. 373.

As to life estates in personalty, see 978-980.

A remainder may be created in money (Crawford v. Clark, 110 Ga.

729, 36 S. E. 404; State v. Welch, 175 Mo. App. 303, 162 S. W. 637); in money, notes, and accounts (Thornton v. Burch, 20 Ga. 791); in stocks (Trogdon v. Murphy, 85 Ill. 119); and in dividends of stock and interest on debts (Cassilly v. Meyer, 4 Md. 1).

It has been held in Missouri that where the residuary clause of a will gave all the testator's real and personal property, with the proviso that if the devisee should die without issue the estate should go to others, the limitation over was valid as to the realty only, and the personalty was taken absolutely.-State v. Tolson, 73 Mo.

320.

13 Voorhees v. Singer, 73 N. J. Eq. 532, 68 Atl. 217.

14 Stallcup v. Cronley's Trustee, 117 Ky. 547, 78 S. W. 441.

Any limitation over of personal property which contravenes the rule against perpetuities, is invalid. Ackerman's Admrs. V. Vreeland's Exr., 14 N. J. Eq. 23. 15 Evans v. Inglehart, 6 G. & J.

manifest from the will that a remainder was intended to be limited after a life estate in personalty, the court must sustain and give effect to such intention.1

§ 1002. Testamentary Disposition of Contingent and Executory Interests.

Both vested and contingent remainders are transmissible estates, the latter being transmissible when the takers are ascertained and the contingency relates only to the collateral event upon the happening of which the vesting of the estate depends.17

At common law contingent, remainders were mere interests or possibilities rather than estates, and for a long time were deemed inalienable.18 Finally, however, it was held that such interests were inheritable or devisable, and could be assigned in equity or released in law to the owner of the land in possession, or transferred to strangers by resort to the doctrine of equity.19

By statute in England the right of testamentary disposition extends to all contingent, executory, or other future interests in any real or personal estate, whether

(Md.) 171, 185; Cassilly v. Meyer, 4 Md. 1.

As to the creation of life estates by implication, see §§ 967-971.

16 Smith v. Bell, 6 Peters (U. S.) 68, 8 L. Ed. 323; Lott v. Meacham, 4 Fla. 144.

17 Wadsworth v. Murray, 29 App. Div. 191, 51 N. Y. Supp. 1038.

See § 243.

Where the remainder is contingent, the remainderman has only the possibility of an interest, and this is not subject to partition pro

ceedings.-Betz v. Farling, 274 Ill. 107, 113 N. E. 40.

Any interest in property which descends to the heirs or passes to the next of kin in the event of intestacy, may be disposed of by will, see §§ 241, 242.

18 Ortmayer v. Elcock, 225 Ill. 342, 80 N. E. 339; Godman v. Simmons, 113 Mo. 122, 20 S. W. 972.

19 Ortmayer v. Elcock, 225 Ill. 342, 80 N. E. 339; Shindler v. Rob. inson, 150 App. Div. 875, 135 N. Y. Supp. 1056.

See § 243.

the testator may or may not be ascertained as the person or one of the persons in whom the same respectively may become vested, and whether he may be entitled thereto under the instrument by which the same respectively were created or under any disposition thereof by deed or will.20 § 1003. Vested and Contingent Remainders Defined.

Remainders are either vested or contingent. A vested remainder is a present right to property to be enjoyed in the future, so that the estate is immediately fixed in a determinate person upon the termination of the particular estate.21

A contingent remainder is one where the estate is limited either to an uncertain person or upon the happening of an uncertain event,22 so that the particular estate may never be determined and the remainder never take effect.23 A remainder is contingent which is so limited as

20 Statute of 1 Victoria, ch. 26, § 3.

21 Croxall v. Shererd, 5 Wall. (U. S.) 268, 288, 18 L. Ed. 572; Pingrey v. Rulon, 246 Ill. 109, 92 N. E. 592; Bunting v. Speek, 41 Kan. 424, 3 L. R. A. 690, 21 Pac. 288.

A remainder is vested only when the remainderman has the right to immediate possession whenever

and however the preceding estate determines.-Kountz's Estate, 213 Pa. St. 390, 5 Ann. Cas. 427, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 639, 62 Atl. 1103.

22 Doe V. Considine, 6 Wall. (U. S.) 458, 18 L. Ed. 869; City Council of Augusta v. Radcliffe, 66 Ga. 469; Brownback v. Keister, 220 III. 544, 77 N. E. 75; Owen v.

Eaton, 56 Mo. App. 563; Hennessy v. Patterson, 85 N. Y. 91.

If a contingent remainder is contemplated, words of contingency such as would naturally constitute a condition precedent would be expected to be found in the instrument creating the estate.Linscott v. Trowbridge, 224 Mass. 108, 112 N. E. 956.

23 Phinizy v. Foster, 90 Ala. 262, 7 So. 836; Throop v. Williams, 5 Conn. 98; Marvin v. Ledwith, 111 Ill. 144; Bunting v. Speek, 41 Kan. 424, 3 L. R. A. 690, 21 Pac. 288.

Where the testator devised property to his daughter Mary during her natural life and also to the heirs of her body, but on failure of such on her death to his

to depend upon an event or condition which may never happen or be performed, or which may not happen or be performed until after the termination of the preceding estate;24 or which is limited to a person not in being or not ascertained.25 Thus the contingency may result from the uncertainty of some event upon the happening of which the estate is limited, or from the uncertainty of the person who is to take the remainder. 26

§ 1004. Vested and Contingent Remainders Distinguished.

With a vested remainder the right to the estate is vested and certain, although possession or enjoyment is deferred to some future period; while with contingent remainders the right to the estate as well as the right of possession or enjoyment is not only deferred to a future period, but is dependent upon some future contingency.27 The feat

son, the court construed that the estate devised to the son was a contingent remainder depending upon the determination of the estate of Mary by her death without issue.-Bird v. Gilliam, 121 N. C. 326, 28 S. E. 489. And see, also, Northern Trust Co. V. Wheaton, 249 Ill. 606, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1150, 94 N. E. 980.

24 Griswold v. Greer, 18 Ga. 545; Newton v. Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, 115 Ky. 414, 74 S. W. 180; Den v. Crawford, 8 N. J. L. 90; Haywood v. Shreve, 44 N. J. L. 94; Richardson v. Richardson, 152 N. C. 705, 68 S. E. 217; Wallace v. Minor, 86 Va. 550, 10 S. E. 423.

25 Woodman v. Woodman, 89 Me. 128, 35 Atl. 1037; Thomson v. Ludington, 104 Mass. 193; Schuy

ler v. Hanna, 31 Neb. 307, 11 L. R. A. 321, 47 N. W. 932; Williamson v. Field's Exrs., 2 Sandf. Ch. (N. Y.) 533.

26 Shannon v. Bonham, 27 Ind. App. 369, 60 N. E. 951; Woodman v. Woodman, 89 Me. 123, 35 Atl. 1037; Robinson v. Palmer, 90 Me. 246, 38 Atl. 103.

27 Faber v. Police, 10 S. C. 376, 387; Walker v. Alverson, 87 S. C. 55, 59, 30 L. R. A. (N. S.) 115, 68 S. E. 966.

"The distinction between a vested and a contingent remainder is often shadowy and difficult to ascertain." Lingo v. Smith, (Iowa) 156 N. W. 402.

Chipman, P. J., in In re Washburn's Estate, 11 Cal. App. 735, 106 Pac. 415, says: "There is no subiect of law more abstruse, or

ure which distinguishes a vested from a contingent remainder is that as to the former there is the present capacity of taking effect in possession or enjoyment should the preceding estate terminate before the estate limited in remainder determines.28 A vested remainder is one so limited to a person in being and ascertained that the estate is capable of taking effect in possession or enjoyment at the termination of the particular estate without requiring the concurrence of any collateral contingency. The uncertainty of the remainderman ever enjoy