property be "set apart," or payment be made at a future time, does not prevent the vesting of the estate at the time of the death of the testator. A devise in trust with direction to convey the fee to the beneficiary upon her marriage to a worthy person with the consent of the trustee, or at the discretion of the trustee when the beneficiary becomes of age or marries, does not raise a condition precedent to the vesting of the estate. 8 When the will fixes no time for a defeasible estate to become absolute, the date of the testator's death will usually be preferred by the courts to the time of the devisee's decease. But, of course, if there be an intermediate time to which it is apparent that the contingency refers, this time must be selected. When the expressions used in the will clearly import a contingency, they will be so construed, however absurd may be the consequences, and however inconsistent with what may be conjectured would have been the testator's actual meaning if his attention had been drawn to those consequences.10 246, 38 Atl. 103; Webb v. Webb, 92 Md. 101, 84 Am. St. Rep. 499, 48 Atl. 95; Clark v. Cammann, 160 N. Y. 315, 54 N. E. 709; Connelly v. O'Brien, 166 N. Y. 406, 60 N. E. 20; Snyder's Estate, 180 Pa. St. 70, 36 Atl. 420; Crew's Admr. v. Hatcher, 91 Va. 378, 381, 21 S. E. 811; Neilson v. Brett, 99 Va. 673, 40 S. E. 32. 6 Higgins v. Waller, 57 Ala. 396; Dale v. White, 33 Conn. 294. See, however, Tillman v. Sullivan, 63 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 355; Jones v. Massey, 9 S. C. 376. Compare: Chamberlain V. Young's Ex., 9 Ky. L. 270, 5 S. W. 380. 7 Brazill v. Toner, 67 Iowa 369, 56 Am. Rep. 346, 25 N. W. 287. 8 Weatherhead v. Stoddard, 58 Vt. 623, 5 Atl. 517. 9 Burton v. Conigland, 82 N. C. 99; Murchison's Exrs. v. Whitted, 87 N. C. 465; Price v. Johnson, 90 N. C. 592. 10 Madison v. Chapman, 4 Kay & J. 709; Lenox v. Lenox, 10 Sim. 400; Clarke v. Butler, 13 Sim. 401; Dicken v. Clarke, 2 You. & C. 572; Parsons v. Parsons, 5 Ves. Jun. 578; Shuldham v. Smith, 6 Dow. 22; Vick v. Sueter, 3 El. & B. 219; Wingrave v. Palgrave, 1 P. Wms 401; Radclyffe v. Bagshaw, 6 Term. Rep. 512. When the language of the will clearly indicates that the testator intended to defer the vesting of the gift, his intention must prevail, and it is unnecessary to search for the reasons governing his action.11 If holding the devise to be contingent would defeat the declared object of the testator, the courts will not adhere to the letter of the will.12 Where a testator in previous parts of his will seemed to consider the "vesting" of an estate as synonymous with enjoyment of "possession," and devised a parcel of land to a devisee for life, "and at her death the same to be vested in and belong to" another, the quoted clause will be considered to have been intended to denote the time when the devisee should take possession, and that the title vested upon the death of the testator.18 § 991. Where the Contingency Occurs During Lifetime of Testator. If an estate be limited upon an event which occurs before the death of the testator, the title thereto will vest immediately upon his decease, and the devisee will at the same time enter into enjoyment of the possession.11 As for example, where a testator directed his executors to 11 Blanchard v. Maynard, 103 Ill. 60; Biddle's Appeal, 99 Pa. St. 525; Barger's Appeal, 100 Pa. St. 239. 12 Bradford v. Foley, 1 Doug. 63; Quicke v. Leach, 13 Mees. & W. 218. See, also, Frank v. Frank, 3 Maule & S. 25. 13 Railey v. Milam, 9 Ky. L. 409, 5 S. W. 367. See, also, Poole v. Bott, 11 Hare 33; Walker v. Simpson, 1 Kay & J. 713; Armytage v. Wilkinson, 3 App. Cas. 355; Barnet v. Barnet, 29 Beav. 239; Taylor v. Frobisher, 5 De Gex & Sm. 191; Haughton v. Harrison, 2 Atk. 330; Berkeley V. Swinburne, 16 Sim. 275. 14 Brown v. Higgs, 4 Ves. Jun. 708, 717; Huber v. Mohn, 37 N. J. Eq. 432; Crozier v. Bray, 39 Hun (N. Y.) 121. Contra: Harris v. Davis, 1 Coll C. C. 416. See § 884. pay a certain sum of money to his son upon his coming of age, and did not die until after the minority of his son, the latter was entitled to the fund upon his father's death.15 And under a will directing that the bequest to a child should go to the testator's widow in the event of the child dying before her, where the child died during the lifetime of the testator, the widow took the bequest to the child upon the testator's death.16 So, also, property directed to be divided between the testator's children upon the death of his wife, must be so divided upon his own decease where she died during his life." Likewise, where property is left to a person in fee, and by a codicil a remainder is limited upon it, the title will vest in the remainderman upon the death of the testator, the first devisee having died before that time.18 8992. Contingency That Beneficiary Be Living at a Designated Time. Where the existence of a beneficiary at a designated time is a part of the contingency, and he dies before that time, the title in the estate can not descend to his representatives or heirs ;19 and if assigned by him, his assignee will take the title, subject to the contingency 15 Eisner v. Koehler, 1 Demarest (N. Y.) 277. 16 Wager v. Wager, 96 N. Y. 164. See, also, Clark v. Clark, 19 S. C. 345. 17 Bell v. Towell, 18 S. C. 94. 18 Crozier V. Bray, 39 Hun (N. Y.) 121. 19 Taylor v. Meador, 66 Ga. 230; White v. Rowland, 67 Ga. 546, 44 Am. Rep. 731; Winslow v. Goodwin, 7 Metc. (48 Mass.) 363; Colby v. Duncan, 139 Mass. 398, 1 N. E. 744; Robinson's Estate, 13 Phila. (Pa.) 299; Roundtree v. Roundtree, 26 S. C. 450, 2 S. E. 474. See, also, Cheney v. Teese, 108 Ill. 473. Where a bequest was made to a person for life, with remainder to his children, if any, but if none, then over to another, and the life tenant died after the testator without issue, it was held that an assignment in bankruptcy by the remainderman before the death of the life tenant conveyed no inter of the beneficiary dying before the specified time.20 Thus, under a devise to a woman for her life, and at her death to her children "who may be then living," no estate vests in a child dying before its mother.21 There is, however, a long line of cases in which the words "if," "when," "as soon as," and the like, have been held from the context not to import a contingency in the sense of a condition precedent to the vesting, but to mean a proviso or condition subsequent, operating as a defeasance of an estate vested.22 When followed by a est in the bequest to the assignees. Bristol v. Atwater, 50 Conn. 402. And under a devise to one of the testator's daughters for life, with remainder to her children, but if none, remainder to his other daughters, the latter did not take vested interests until the death of the former without children.Olmstead v. Dunn, 72 Ga. 850. If a remainder be made contingent upon the death of the particular tenant without issue surviving him, the estate in remainder does not vest at the death of the testator.-Leroy v. Charleston, 20 S. C. 71. Where there was a bequest to a person to be paid when he should marry, and the income to be paid him when he should renounce the Romish priesthood, with a provision that if he should die before marriage the property should go to another, and the original legatee by a sealed instrument, in which he declared his determination never to renounce the priest hood nor to marry, conveyed his interest to the second, the latter took an immediate right to the bequest, which would pass to his executors upon his decease.Kenyon v. See, 29 Hun (N. Y.) 212. 20 Dunn v. Sargent, 101 Mass. 336; Putnam v. Story, 132. Mass. 205. See, also, Dodd v. Winship, 144 Mass. 461, 11 N. E. 588. 21 White v. Rowland, 67 Ga. 546, 44 Am. Rep. 731; Teets v. Weise, 47 N. J. L. 154; Wilhelm v. Calder, 102 Iowa 342, 71 N. W. 214; Paget v. Melcher, 156 N. Y. 399, 51 N. E. 24; McBride v. Smyth, 54 Pa. St. 245; Delbert's Appeal, 83 Pa. St. 462. See, also, Davidson v. Koehler, 76 Ind. 398. 22 Andrew v. Andrew, 1 Ch. Div. 410. See, also, Chaworth v. Hooper, 1 Bro. C. C. 82; Green v. Pigot, 1 Bro. C. C. 103; Benyon v. Maddison, 2 Bro. C. C. 75, 78; Walcott v. Hall, 2 Bro C. C. 305; Kerlin's gift over in the event the beneficiary should die before the specified time, it is presumed that the testator intended thereby to make the gift become absolute when such period is reached, and in the meantime title vests in the beneficiary, possession only being postponed.23 This rule applies to legacies of personalty as well as to devises of realty.24 Thus, a devise to B in trust for C for life, remainder to C's children, or if C leaves none, then to D, vests a remainder in D on the testator's death, subject to the possibility of C's having a child, so that if C dies childless and D having died, D's heir takes. 25 A provision in favor of a woman, to become absolute in the event of her surviving her husband, but in case she does not survive him then to pass to her children, vests the remainder in the children subject to be divested by the death of the husband before that of the wife.26 And Lessee v. Bull, 1 Dall. (U. S.) 175, 463, 465; Piatt v. Sinton, 37 Ohio 1 L. Ed. 88; Doe v. Considine, 6 Wall. (U. S.) 458, 18 L. Ed. 869; Shattuck v. Stedman, 2 Pick. (19 Mass.) 468; Scott v. Price, 2 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 59, 7 Am. Dec. 629; O'Driscoll v. Koger, 2 Desaus. Eq. (S. C.) 295; Bunch v. Hurst, 3 Desaus. Eq. (S. C.) 273, 286, 5 Am. Dec. 551. 23 Smither v. Willock, 9 Ves. Jun. 233; Peyton v. Bury, 2 P. Wms. 626; Murkin v. Phillipson, 3 Myl. & K. 257; Edwards v. Hammond, 3 Lev. 132; Hunt v. Moore, 14 East 601; Roake v. Nowell, 1 Maule & S. 327; Pearson v. Dolman, L. R. 3 Eq. 315, 322; Hughes V. Hughes, 12 B. Mon. (51 Ky.) 117; In re Cogswell, 4 Demarest (N. Y.) 248; Roome v. Phillips, 24 N. Y. St. 353; McCall's Appeal, 86 Pa. See, also, Dewar v. Brooke, 14 Compare: Planner V. Scudamore, 2 Bos. & P. 289; Price v. Hall, L. R. 5 Eq. 399. 24 Carver v. Burgess, 18 Beav. 541, 551; Thomas v. Wilberforce, 31 Beav. 299; Whitter v. Bremridge, L. R. 2 Eq. 736; In re Baxter's Trusts, 10 Jur. N. S. 845. 25 Vandewalker v. Rollins, 63 N. H. 460, 3 Atl. 625. 26 Security Co. v. Hardenburgh, 53 Conn. 169, 2 Atl. 391. Where a testatrix left separate |