furnishes in itself a consideration, removes the objection of want of mutuality, and renders the promise binding upon the subscribers. lb. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 1. In an action whose gravamen is negligence, it is the duty of the plaintiff to show a case clear of contributory negligence. There must be shown a prima facie case resulting exclusively from the wrong of the defendant, before he can be called to answer. Waters v. Wing, 59 Penn. 2. The plaintiff's horse was killed by the shaft of the defendant's carriage running into him, both being on a public highway. The defendant asked the court to charge: "That the defendant had a right to be on the public highway, and if the jury believe that at the time of the alleged accident he was traveling in an ordinary manner, he is not liable for an injury resulting from such use of the public thoroughfare." Held, that the point should have been affirmed. Ib. CRIMINAL LAW. 1. Circumstantial evidence; instruction.-In a prosecution for larceny the court instructed the jury that the evidence to establish the facts necessary to convict the defendant might be direct or circumstantial, or partly direct and partly circumstantial; direct, as by persons who saw the act, or circumstantial, as by evidence of facts from which the jury might fairly presume the guilt of defendant. Held, that the instruction was not erroneous. The State v. Brady, 27 Iowa. 2. Larceny: possession of stolen property.-Where a large portion of stolen goods were found soon after the theft in defendant's house, which was of a disreputable character and at which disreputable persons visited, and a part of the goods were found in a bed-room occupied by the defendant, this possession, together with some other circumstances tending to show defendant's participation in the commission of the offense, were held sufficient to warrant his conviction. lb. 3. Larceny: proof of owner's non-consent.-The rule requiring in a prosecution for larceny the introduction of the owner of the property stolen in order to prove his non-consent to the taking, does not apply in cases where the property is stolen from a bailee or another holding the possession thereof, or where it is impossible to produce the evidence of the owner as in case of death or the like. In such cases the evidence of the bailee or persons holding possession is sufficient, and in case the owner cannot be produced the fact of his non-consent may be shown by proper secondary evidence. The State v. Osborne, 27 Iowa. 4. Drunkenness no excuse for crime.-Insanity produced by intoxication does not destroy responsibility for the commission of a crime, when the party who committed the crime when sane voluntarily made himself intoxicated. People v. Lewis, 36 Cal. 5. Evidence of drunkenness as excuse for guilt.-Drunkenness is no defense to the fact of guilt. Evidence of drunkenness can only be received and considered by the jury for the purpose of determining the degree of guilt, and for this purpose it should be received with great caution. Ib. ESTOPPEL. Positive acts.-Positive acts tending to mislead one ignorant of the truth, which do mislead him to his injury, are good ground of estoppel, and ignorance of title on the part of him. who is estopped will not excuse him. Chapman v. Chapman et al., 59 Penn. EVIDENCE. 1. Declarations of agent: res gesta.-To render the declarations of an agent admissible in evidence to bind his principal, they must have been within the scope of the agency and made during the continuance of it in respect to the transaction then depending. Subsequent declarations are not part of the res gestæ, and are not admissible. Sweatland v. Telegraph Co., 27 Iowa. 2. Testimony of attorney as to client's declarations.-The rule not permitting an attorney to testify to communications made to him by his client, as such, does not extend so far as to prohibit the attorney from stating by whom he was employed; neither does the rule prevent the attorney from testifying to communications made to him by his client, unless they are confidential communications made by the client in the course and for the purposes of the employment of the attorney. 36 Cal. 3. Testimony of defendant in criminal case.-If the defendant in a criminal case does not avail himself of his right given by the statute to testify in his own behalf, the District Attorney should not be allowed, in addressing the jury, to comment on his failure to testify as an evidence of guilt. People v. Tyler, 36 Cal. 4. Defendant need not testify in his own behalf.-A defendant in a criminal case is entitled to rest in silence and security upon his plea of not guilty, and no inference of guilt can properly be drawn against him from his failure to testify in his own behalf. Ib. EXECUTOR. 1. Liability of, to the estate.-The common law rule that a debtor who is made the executor of his creditor is thereby released from the debt, it not appearing that the assets of the estate are insufficient to meet the testator's debts, is not in force in this country, and the debt in the executor's hands is regarded as general assets of the estate for the benefit not only of creditors, but of legatees and all others interested. Castor v. Pierson, 27 Iowa. 2. Judgment against executor.-In an action by a receiver appointed to sue for and collect the choses in action belonging to an estate, against the executor upon a promissory note executed by him to the testator, judgment should be rendered against him in his individual capacity, and not as executor. Ib. HUSBAND. AND WIFE. Parties to action.-In an action for trespass committed by the cattle of a married woman, the husband need not be joined. Rowe v. Smith, 38 How. INJUNCTION. In actions to recover real property.-Where an action presents grounds for the equitable interference of the court, a preliminary injunction will be granted and a receiver appointed, if the condition of the subject of the controversy requires the aid of these provisional remedies. Thus, in an action to recover the possession of real property, on the ground that the proceedings to foreclose a lien under which the plaintiff was divested of title were fraudulent, and the court in which the proceedings were had without jurisdiction, and where it appeared that the defendants were irresponsible, that they were collecting rents, which they were unable to refund, and that the premises were supposed to go to ruin, an injunction and receiver were granted Rogers v. Marshall, 38 How. JUDGMENT. Correction of: Practice.-Judgment in an action on a note was ordered, and the clerk directed to assess the amount due thereon, which, by mistake, he made a much smaller amount than was actually due, and judgment was entered accordingly. The mis take was not discovered until after the period allowed by the statute to correct such errors on motion had expired, and until after the case had been appealed to the Supreme Court, where it was affirmed on motion of the plaintiff, the defendant having failed to perfect his appeal, and judgment rendered for the same amount as the judgment in the District Court. Held, notwithstanding the affirmance of the judgment in the Supreme Court, that the plaintiff, being without fault or negligence and without any remedy at law, was entitled by an equitable proceeding in the District Court to have the error in the amount of the judg ment corrected, the correction being in respect to a matter not passed upon by the Supreme Court. Partridge & Co. v. Harrow et al., 27 Iowa. MALICIOUS PROSECUTION. Probable cause.- In an action for malicious prosecution the jury may infer malice from want of probable cause, but they are not bound to make this inference. And if malice is deduced from want of probable cause it is as much malice in fact, within the meaning of the law, as though shown or deduced from any other fact or facts. Smith v. Howard, 27 Iowa. MANDAMUS. When allowed.-When the statute prescribes no remedy for the refusal to perform a duty made imperative thereby, or in case of doubt, whether there be another effectual remedy, the writ will be allowed. People v. Ottawa, 48 Ill. NEW TRIAL. 1. Jury.-There is no error in the action of the court in refusing a new trial on the ground that one of the jurors set in a previous trial of the case, when it is not shown that the attorneys of the applicant, as well as the applicant himself were ignorant of the fact until after the return of the verdict and the discharge of the jury; especially where it does not appear that any inquiries were made of the juror before he was empaneled and sworn. Hurtert v. Weines, 27 Iowa. 2. Newly discovered evidence. - Evidence discovered after the close of the evidence but before the completion of the trial and the ! submission of the case to the jury, is not newly discovered evidence, for which a new trial will be granted, where it appears that such evidence was at the time of discovery within reach of the party. In such a case the party should move before the termination of the trial for permission to introduce such evidence. Dodge v. N. Y. & Washington Steamship Co., 6 Abb., N. S. PARTNERSHIP. 1. Joint owners.-Where two farmers buy in common a threshing machine, which they use and operate together, and for which they execute to the vendor a note signed by both individually, they are to be treated as joint owners and not as partners. Ili v. Brazill, 27 Iowa. 2. Liability of partners for fraud.-In case of a debt fraudulently contracted by a partnership firm by one member alone, the others being ignorant of the fraud, while all the members will be bound in an action brought on the contract or to recover the property so fraudulently obtained, yet the liability to an action for the fraud, which is essentially different and involves moral turpitude, is limited to the partner committing the same, unless the others assented to the fraud or ratified it by adopting the act of the fraudulent partner, or retaining its fruits with knowledge of the fraud. 36 Cal. 3. Rights of Partners: When Lien from State Court Supersedes Proceedings in Bankruptcy.—After one of two partners had procured the appointment of a receiver of the partnership property the other partner attempted to defeat the proceedings by inducing an alleged creditor to apply under the bankruptcy law to have the firm declared bankrupt, and the U. S. Marshal had endeavored to take possession of the property, the court held, on an application to preserve the property, as follows: "Where a lien has been acquired by proceedings in a State Court, that lien is not divested nor the jurisdiction of the State Court superseded and ousted by subsequent proceedings in the Court of Bankruptcy. (Lowry v. Morrison, 11 Paige, 327; Matter of Allen, Law Rep. 362; Storm v. Waddell, 2 Sand. ch. 494; Stewart v. Isidore, 5 Abb., N. S. 70, and numerous authorities cited in 2 Sandford and 5 Abb.) In terms, the present bankrupt law preserves all existing liens on the debtor's property. The appointment of a receiver in an action in this Court operates as a lien on all the partnership property for the benefit of the plaintiff's partner and of the social creditors; and that lien cannot be disturbed or destroyed by the subsequent flat of a Bankruptcy Court in afterinstituted proceedings. N. Y. Super. Ct. Sp. T. Clark v. Bininger, N. R. 4. Bankruptcy.-One partner cannot throw the firm into bankruptcy where it appears that the assets are greater than the liabilities. 16. SLANDER. 1. Words spoken while a witness.-A person is not liable for slander on account of words spoken by him as a witness, if in response to questions asked him, he spoke the words alleged without malice. The rule in such case is, that what was said pertinent to the matter in controversy, being privileged, the legal idea of malice is excluded; but if not pertinent and not uttered bona fide, but for the purpose of defaming plaintiff, protection cannot be claimed and the witness would be liable. Smith v. Howard, 27 Iowa. 2. Eridence. Where the only witness for the plaintiff in an action for slander to prove the slanderous words was a German unacquainted with the English language, the court refused to disturb a judgment for the plaintiff, upon the ground that it was not shown but that the words were spoken in English, which the witness did not understand, when it did not appear that the words were spoken in his presence alone, and he distinctly testified that he understood them himself. Hurtert v. Weines, 27 Iowa. TELEGRAPH COMPANIES. 1. Printed restrictions; statute.—It seems that it is competent for a telegraph company, notwithstanding section 1353 of the Revision which provides that a telegraph company is liable for all mistakes in transmitting messages made by any person in its employment, as well as for all damages resulting from a failure to perform any other duty required by law, to adopt reasonable rules, conditions, and regulations governing the transmission of messages, restricting its liability in cases where the message is not repeated. Sweatland v. Telegraph Company, 27 Iowa. 2. Extent of liability: negligence.-While a telegraph company may in the absence of any statutory regulation to the contrary, restrict by printed stipulations and conditions attached to the message, its liability in cases where the message is not repeated, it will notwithstanding such special printed conditions be liable for mistakes happening in consequence of its own fault, such as want of proper skill or ordinary care on the part of its operators or the use of defective instruments; but not for mistakes occasioned by uncontrollable causes, such as atmospheric electricity, provided these mistakes could not have been guarded against or prevented by the exercise of ordinary care and skill on the part of the operating agents of the company. Ib. 3. Can not exonerate from all liability.-Telegraph companies it would seem by general printed conditions can not relieve themselves from liability for the improper or negligent conduct of their servants. lb. 4. These companies, like railroad companies, owe important duties to the public. They must act in good faith towards it, and can not by general printed conditions demand unreasonable concessions from those proposing to send messages. Ib. 5. Ordinary care: gross negligence: onus probandi.-While they are liable for want of ordinary care and skill as weil as for gross negligence notwithstanding the condition restricting their liability in cases where the message is not repeated, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to show this want of ordinary care or fault on the part of the company; and where this condition as to repeating messages exists and is known to the party sending the message, or where he is bound to take notice of it, and a mistake occurs in an unrepeated message, the mere proof of such mistake without some other evidence of carlessness or negligence on the part of the company would not render them liable. Ib. 6. Rule applied.-It was held in the present case, that the plaintiff, in order to recover, must prove something more than the mistake in the message, and the damage resulting therefrom. He must show that this mistake was caused by the fault of the company, and that it might have been avoided if the company's instruments had been good ones and if its agents had possessed the requisite skill and exercised proper care and diligence in respect to the transmission and receipt of the message in question. Ib. Connecting lines.-Under a statute requiring connecting telegraph companies to receive and forward messages on each other's lines, a company which receives a message to be forwarded in part over such a connecting line is to be regarded as authorized to make contract respecting its transmission for such other line, and the receipt by it of an entire price is a sufficient consideration for the obligation of such connecting company. Baldwin v. U. S. Telegraph Co., 6 Abb. N. S. The contract made with the sender by the company receiving such message and within their apparent authority, is binding on the connecting company, notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary between the two companies, unknown to the sender. 16. "THE BEST IS THE CHEAPEST, AND THE CHEAPEST WILL BE FOUND UPON "CLINTON & WAIT'S DIGEST," CONTAINING A DIGEST OF ALL THE REPORTED DECISIONS AT LAW AND IN EQUITY, OF THE COURTS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, FROM ITS ORGANIZATION TO THE YEAR 1870. Acknowledged by the most able members of the Bench and Bar of this Country to be the most comprehensive, accurate and complete Digest of New York Reports in the market. Notwithstanding the great expense incurred in this publication, it is the cheapest work in the market. In this respect, the publishers merely ask the profession to examine all the different digests, and then purchase that which their judgment decides to be the most extensive, accurate, convenient and economical.-CLINTON'S DIGEST, 4 Vols., containing about 4000 pages. The 1st Volume WAITS DIGEST, now just issued, embracing the Letters from A to H inclusive, 850 pages. Volumes 2 and 3 completing the set, are in press, and will be issued the earliest possible moment. To complete this work, the most extensive table of cases ever published in a similar work will be given at the end of the volumes. It will include all the cases decided and reported in this State, and will show the value of each case, as an authority, and whether it has been affirmed, reversed, overruled, modified, criticised, or approved, by later decisions. In numerous instances references will be made to the decisions of the other States of the Union, thus showing the state of the decisions in their courts, as well as that of our own courts. Price for CLINTON & WAIT, 7 Vols., $36 for the set. For WAIT'S DIGEST, separately, $7.50 a Volume. This work will be delivered free of charge in any part of the United States, on receipt of the price. Remittance can be made by Post Office orders. WILLIAM GOULD & SON, LAW BOOKSELLERS AND PUBLISHERS, No. 68 STATE ST., ALBANY, N. Y. VAN SANTWOORD'S PLEADINGS. In press, and will soon be published, a new edition of Van Santvoord's Pleadings. Independent of the fact that the first edition of a work, by even the best author, can be very much improved by revision, many questions which were in doubt at the time of publication of the first edition have since been definitely settled by the Courts, and many much elucidated. Determined to furnish the profession with a valuable work, we have secured the services of Mr. N. C. Moak, of this city, a gentleman well known to the profession as a lawyer in active practice, and conversant with the decisions and practice in all our Courts. We desire now simply to ask an examination, by the profession, of the new work, which will be issued within a few months, before purchasing any upon the subject. JOHN D. PARSONS, JR., Law Book Publisher, ALBANY, N. Y. BINGHAM ON DESCENTS. This is a treatise on the Laws of Descent, by Anson Bingham, author of "Treatise on Real Estate." It presents the laws, and the principles which distinguish them, from their origin to the present time. It is destined to make the student familiar, not only with the general rules, but with the principles upon which they are founded. All the different subjects incidental to descents are fully presented. The work is not only well calculated to instruct the student in first principles, but to aid the lawyer in his practice. The leading cases of the different States of this country, as well as those of England, upon every branch of the subject, are so far stated and commented upon as to enable the reader to understand them without reading the cases themselves. The work is now ready for delivery. JOHN D. PARSONS, JR., Law Book Publisher, ALBANY, N. Y. THE undersigned will commence, on the eighth day of January, 1870, the publication of a Law Journal, to be issued weekly, with the above title. It is not the intention to make the Journal a "Law Report" merely, but a medium of conveying to the profession of the country the latest intelligence of interest on all subjects pertaining to the law. Each number will contain valuable and original articles on subjects of general legal interest; discussions on Law Reform; reviews of important decisions; a Digest of the latest decisions of the courts of this and other States, and of the United States courts; also of the English decisions of interest in this country; a collection of the general legal news of the week, and carefully prepared reviews of new works on legal subjects. Arrangements have been made with many of the ablest judges and lawyers of the country for contributions on current legal topics. By arrangements that we are perfecting with the judges and reporters of this and the other States, we shall be able to give a syllabus of the decisions of the courts directly after they are rendered, and months before they will appear in the Reports, thus enabling the practitioner to know the gist of the very latest decisions, and to procure copies of them, when desired, before the regular issue of the Reports. Every decision of the Court of Appeals of this State will be noted. Particular attention will be given to the collection of the general legal intelligence of this country and Great Britain, and to the presentation and discussion of all measures before the State Legislatures or Congress pertaining to the jurisprudence of the State or country. Brief contributions on legal topics, notes of decisions, and items of general legal news, are respectfully solicited. All communications should be addressed "Editors of the Albany Law Journal," care of the Publishers. The Albany Law Journal will be published weekly, will comprise twenty-four royal octavo double column pages, and will contain annually a third more reading matter than any other legal periodical published in this country. Subscription price, payable in advance, $5 per annum. WEED, PARSONS & CO., Publishers, Albany, N. Y. All communications intended for publication in the LAW JOURNAL should be addressed "Editor Law Journal, Albany, N. Y.:" and the name of the writer should be given, though not necessarily for publication. Communications on business subjects should be ad-. dressed "WEED, PARSONS & Co., Albany, N. Y." The Albany Law Journal. ALBANY, JANUARY 15, 1870. LAW AND LAWYERS IN LITERATURE. II. MASSINGER. Massinger's drama, "The Old Law," derives its title from the edict "that every man living to fourscore years, and woman to three score, shall then be cut off as fruitless to the republic, and law shall finish what nature lingers at." The justice of this enactment is gravely discussed by the lawyers in the piece, described as first and second. Cleanthes insists that the law is unjust, because it kills innocents. Number one replies that he understands conscience, but not law; and when asked if there is any "main difference," answers that the inquirer "will never be good lawyer if he understands not that." Besides, he argues that it does not take the lives of the innocent, because people cannot live to such an age and be innocent. Cleanthes evidently was a woman's rights advocate, for he comments on the unjust discrimination between the sexes, and infers that "there was no woman in this senate, certain." Cleanthes then fees number one for advice as to some plan to evade the law, and the counsellor is delivered of this sage opinion: "We say, man is not at age, Till he be one and twenty; before it's infancy, The client, not regarding the jest as a good one, demands the fee, but is told "there is no law for the restitution of fees." Through the enforcement of this law arise many touching scenes of filial affection and many horrible instances of filial ingratitude and marital infidelity. But it turns out that the law was only a trick to test the morals of the young people of the realm; nobody was put to death, and the supposed victims are produced at the close to confront their putative unkind survivors. The bad sons are deprived of their inheritance, and the incontinent women are forbidden to marry for ten years. The faithful are suitably rewarded. There seems no defect of strict poetic justice save some punishment on the counsellors for their bad law. Perhaps the poet considered the sarcasm of making them defend such an unjust enactment a sufficient retribution. The piece winds up with: "The good needs fear no law, It is his safety, and the bad man's awe." JONSON. In Jonson's best drama, "The Fox," Voltore, an advocate, is made a most unenviable character. Volpone, the Fox, is a sensual old miser, who has accu mulated a large fortune by presents from persons whom he promises to make his heirs, and among whom is the advocate. Voltore also serves the Fox in a disgraceful legal proceeding, instituted by Volpone against a woman who refuses to gratify his lust. The advocate's character is aptly described by one who says of him, "his soul moves in his fee;" "this fellow, for six sols more, would plead against his Maker." The advocate's argument in court is described by the Fox's factotum, Mosca, to his master: "Had you heard him first Draw it to certain heads, then aggravate, The Fox feigns death, and wills all his property to Mosca, who says when the plan is suggested, "Your advocate will turn stark dull upon it;" and the Fox replies, "It will take off his oratory's edge." When the lawyer reads the pretended will there is a scene. Mosca, in a passage of exquisite irony, says: 46 1 "Marry, my joy is that you need it not; You have a gift, sir, (thank your education,) Will never let you want, while there are men, And malice, to breed causes. Would I had But half the like for all my fortune, sir! If I have any suits, as I do hope, Things being so easy and direct, I shall not, I will make bold with your obstreperous aid, Conceive me,- for your fee, sir. In meantime, You that have so much law, I know have the conscience Not to be covetous of what is mine." Afterward the lawyer meeting Mosca in the street, rails at him, and the latter expostulates: "Good advocate, Pray thee not rail nor threaten out of place thus." But the lawyer turns the tables on the Fox by exposing to the court the false accusation against Celia : "It is not passion in me, reverend fathers, But only conscience, conscience my good sires, That makes me now tell truth." However, at the last pinch, the Fox, in disguise and unknown to the lawyer, whispers him that Mosca, "the parasite, Will'd me to tell you that his master lives; Whereupon the lawyer falls down in court, and goes through various affected spasms to appear bewitched, and on recovering takes back all he had said against Volpone. "It is to the praise of Jonson," says Gifford, "that he lets slip no opportunity of showing his contempt for the popular opinions on this head"— of witchcraft. Some other complications ensue which it is not necessary in this connection to unravel, but in the end Volpone's possessions are confiscated, and he is sent to prison; Mosca is condemned to the galleys; and "Thou Voltore, to take away the scandal Thou hast given all worthy men of thy profession, Art banished from their fellowship, and our state." Jonson's treatment of the subject of witchcraft is shown in "The Devil is an Ass," in which Sir Paul Eitherside, a superstitious and unfeeling lawyer and justice, explains the dumb show of certain pretended demoniacs brought before him. Among other qualities that Sir Paul attributes to the devil, is that of being "the master of players and poets too." The justice is solemn, sententious and uninteresting, but as to his belief in witchcraft, no more credulous than Bacon and Matthew Hale. In the Magnetic Lady, the character of Practice, the lawyer, is described by Compass with some irreverent fun at our gown and wig: "A man so dedicate to his profession, And the preferments go along with it, As scarce the thundering bruit of an invasion So much he loves that night-cap! the bench-gown, To which Practice answers: "Which you but think the crafty impositions When asked if "Practice will be of counsel against us?" Compass says: "He is a lawyer and must speak for his fee, Against his father and mother, all his kindred, Jonson seems to think it necessary to explain that in this character he meant no disrespect to our profession, for in one of the interlocutory passages, the Boy, in answer to Master Dampley, who inquires whom the poet means by certain characters of the drama, replies: "You might as well ask me what eminent lawyer by the ridiculous master Practice, who hath rather his name invented for laughter, than any offense or injury it can stick on the reverend professors of the law; and so the wise ones will think." To Sir Diaphanous Silkworm, who has been assaulted, Practice recommends a resort to law: "That will give you damages: practice of the law, has gotten, in less than half a jubilee, thirty thousand ducats a year." But it has been accumulated by hard work, as now-a-days. Here the clerk's rehearsal of these toils: "All the time of your collectionship To rise so early and sit up so late; You made yourself half ready, in a dream, Or being out from the matter." By "ruddocks" we understand red gold coin; "half ready" means half dressed; "night-caps" is sarcastic for wigs. Sanitonella is a practical rogue; he insists "that no proctor in the term-time be tolerated to go to the tavern above six times i' th' forenoon; it makes their clients overtaken, and become friends sooner than they would be." The master himself has an eye to the main chance, and deems nothing "like the pleasure In taking clients' fees, and piling them Ariosto, an advocate, in Crispiano's opinion, is "the very miracle of a lawyer; One that persuades men to peace, and compounds quarrels Among his neighbors, without going to law." "Yes, and will counsel In honest causes gratis; never in his life Five thousand pounds for a finger I have known Given in court; and let me pack your jury." Further on, Practice says he is "a bencher, and now double reader;" a reference to the days when readings in the Inns of Court were kept up; after seven years the lawyer was in turn to read the second time, and was then called a "double reader." Practice is evidently of authority, for the clerk issues to him a,then than now. marriage license in blank. To Compass, who asks him how to recover his wife's portion, Practice advises: "Sue him at common law: Arrest him on an action of choke-bail, Five hundred thousand pounds; it will affright him Of this peculiar action Sir Diaphanous says: "It is a terrible action; more indeed Than many a man is worth: and is call'd frightball." Practice gives an opinion on another point of law, namely, the crime of infanticide: "The law is plain; if it were heard to cry WEBSTER. "The Devil's Law Case," by Webster, as may be inferred from the title, is very rich in law and lawyers. The action is conveyed in a word: "Oh, jealousy, How violent, especially in women! How often has it rais'd the devil up in form of a law case!" The first scene in point is between Crispiano, a civil lawyer, and Sanitonella, his clerk. The latter gives us a good idea of the lucrativeness of law practice in Spain, by telling us that his master, "by his mere We infer from this that judicial salaries were larger Romelio has a poor opinion of our profession. He tells Ariosto: "Of all men living, You lawyers I account the only men Sanitonella introduces to his master, Leonora, as a client, the nature of whose business is shadowed forth in the first line: "Take her into your office, sir; she has that in her belly Will dry up your ink, I can tell you. This is the man that is your learned counsel, A fellow that will trowl it off with tongue; He never goes without restorative powder Of the lungs of fox in's pocket, and Malaga raisins To make him long-winded." And hands him a brief. Ariosto asks: "Do you call this a brief? Here's, as I weigh them, some fourscore sheets of paper." But Sanitonella replies: "We call this but a brief in our office; The scope of the business lies in the margin." But Ariosto likes not the odor of the suit, and Sanitonella employs Contilupo, a spruce lawyer, who, Ariosto having in anger torn up the brief, is still able to read the "foul copy " by the aid of "twenty double ducats;" inquiring, "Is not this vivire honeste?" is writing itself without recourse to parol proof. Jackson 7. Birner, 48 Ill. |