that fact; others omit it, and begin with the contract for sale; but the more usual practice, except when brevity is a material object, is (as in the present instance) to revert to the last purchase deed, which not only shows the seisin of the vendor, but the manner in which it arises; which, with respect to the covenants he enters into, we shall hereafter see is of consequence. The purpose therefore of this recital is only to show that the lands were conveyed to the vendor in fee. This has been the plan most frequently adopted in the ensuing sheets. It should, however, be noticed, on the other hand, that the doctrines of equity which govern modern conveyancing suggest, as a point of general expedience, the propriety of avoiding as much as possible the recital of instruments, in consequence of a recital of them being notice of them, and affecting the purchaser with a knowledge of their contents. And if, in addition to the vendor's being seised in fee, a brief but accurate allusion be made to the mode in which he acquired it, there will be as complete a demonstration of the correctness of the form which the conveyance assumes, as by a recital of the last purchase deed. Should the reader deem this observation just, he may commence with reciting thus :-"Whereas the said (vendor), being seised in absolute fee-simple by purchase, for a valuable consideration, of all the hereditaments hereinafter described, has contracted," &c. This is the mode which the author is inclined to recommend, as equally accurate, shorter, and (it may be) safer to the purchaser. To avoid the consequences of error in the recital of dates, it is usual to recite deeds as bearing date on or about, &c.; thus allowing the deed to be producible in evidence, though the date be mistaken. And where the recital is rendered material by the grant depending on it, this practice is important, as then a mis-recital may be fatal. Thus, if one having a lease dated 1st May should recite it as dated 2nd May, and then assign the lands demised by that indenture, the assignment would be void at law, though, in favour of a purchaser, equity would relieve. (Preston Shep. 77.) But when, as in most cases, the recital is merely demonstrative of the nature of the title, and not otherwise material (the validity of the conveyance being no way involved in the accuracy of the state ment), these words "on or about," and the following correlatives "expressed to be made," are of no utility. Habendum. The office of the habendum is only to limit the certainty of the estate granted. It follows that nothing can be granted in it; consequently the introduction of any new matter into the clause is void; hence the propriety of words of reference. A brief enumeration of the parcels is usual, but a general reference is sufficient. With respect to the limitation of estates, the following observations are submitted to the reader : 1. If the limitation in the premises creates an express estate, which the habendum is inconsistent with and in abridgment of, -as, if the premises limit a fee-simple or fee-tail, and the habendum an estate for life,—the habendum is void, and an estate of inheritance is effectively created; (Plow. 153;) for, as the habendum is not an essential part of the deed, its office may be anticipated and supplied by the premises. But if the premises limit a fee-simple, and the habendum an estate tail (8 Co. 154b,) or descendible freehold, (7 Jones, 4,) the latter is good because the habendum is not then inconsistent with, but in qualification of the premises. 2. But if the limitation of the habendum be more extensive than that in the premises, it is valid; for, as it is not in abridgment of the prior estate, its inconsistency is immaterial. If, therefore, lands be granted in the premises to A. for life, habendum to him in fee or in tail, the estate for life is instantly merged. (1 Inst. 229 a.) But if the antecedent estate be in tail, which does not admit of merger, (Plow. 296. 2 Co. 61 a,) and the limitation of the habendum be in fee, the grantee has both estates at once,—an estate tail, with a fee expectant thereon by way of remainder. (8 Co. 154 b. 1 Inst. 21 a.) 3. But if in a feoffment or bargain and sale enrolled (the only assurances by matter in pais which, to pass a freehold, require to be perfected by a ceremony) the habendum limit an estate for years, it countervails the premises, though they create an estate in fee in tail or for life by express terms, and to which therefore the estate in the habendum is repugnant; for the assurance is perfected instantaneously, as to the estate for years, by the mere delivery of the deed. (2 Co. 23. See also 2 Sand. U. 315-317.) 4. If the estate created in the premises be a freehold by implication of law, and the habendum limit an express estate for years or at will, the latter will prevail, on the principle that expressio facit cessare tacitum. (1 Inst. 83 a. 2 Co. 55 a.) And as the only estate which arises by construction of law is when lands are given generally in a deed, and the instrument possesses the requisitions to a transfer of freeholds when an estate for life is implied, it follows that such an implied estate in the premises will yield to an express limitation of a larger estate in the habendum. But this proposition may be referred to another and stronger ground; for, as we have seen, the habendum will extinguish a minor estate in the premises, even when created by express terms. (Supra, 2.) 5. If lands be granted generally, and the habendum create a freehold in futuro, the conveyance will be void; for, as the habendum would prevail over the premises if the habendum had legally limited an express estate, it must have a similar effect when the limitation in it is void. (2 Co. 55. Cro. Eliz. 254.) But (by parity of reasoning) if the premises create an express estate, though without mentioning the period of its commencement, and the habendum limit it from a future time, the latter will be void, and by consequence the estate in the premises well created. (3 Lev. 339. Hob. 171. Moor, 881, pl. 1236. Goodtitle v. Gibbs, 5 B. & C. 709.) As, however, in bargains and sales, and covenants to stand seised, the habendum is itself the future limitation of a use, and as uses may, under certain restrictions, be limited in futuro, it follows that, when the grant in the premises is general, the habendum is effectual, and the estate which it creates, valid. And as the doctrine established in the case of Carter v. Madgwick, (5 B. & C. 718,) does not seem in any way founded on the principle res magis valeat quam pereat, but on that which has been mentioned, we must treat the habendum in a bargain and sale, or covenant to stand seised, as void when it creates an estate in futuro, in contravention of an express estate in the premises, granted so as to take effect immediately. It need hardly be added, that these remarks on bargains and sales, and covenants to stand seised, are inapplicable to any conveyance which passes the seisin, whether uses are declared thereon or not; for the seisin, though of an evanescent nature, and (as it has been termed) conduit pipe to uses, is the common-law estate, and possessed of its original qualities. Hence the inference which has been stated does not extend to a bargain and sale in execution of a statutable or common law authority, but only to those which derive their existence as conveyances from the statute of uses. Parties to Deeds. Principles for arranging parties to deeds.] The general principle is, that the parties are to stand in the order in which they are to act in the deed. From this principle the following specific rules, which have been observed in this Precedent, have been drawn:Place, 1. The grantors before the grantees. 2. Persons having legal estates according to their priority. 3. Persons having legal estates before those having only equitable interests. 4. Those who have freehold estates before those who have terms for years. 5. Vendors after all whose estates they take subject to. 6. Those having estates in part of the land after those having estates in the whole property. 7. The purchaser before his trustees. 8. Such of his trustees as take freehold estates before those who only take terms of years. 9. The term trustees according to the priority of the terms. To these may be added the following rules, to meet particular cases: 1. A person standing in two or more capacities should be introduced in them at distinct parts; [although a person may sustain several characters, and his name be repeated of as many parts, it is, of course, only necessary that he should once sign and seal the deed, the repetition of his name amongst the parties being solely a conveyancing arrangement.] 2. Where several classes of persons convey, one class should be disposed of before the others are described. 3. A person conveying at the request, or by the direction of another, should stand before him. 4. Joint-tenants and co-parceners (having a unity of interest) should be of the same part; tenants in common, or others having distinct interests, of separate parts. But tenants in common may sometimes, without impropriety, be of only one part. PRECEDENT II. CONVEYANCE IN FEE BY [GRANT AND] RELEASE Parties. Dower trustee need not be a party. THIS INDENTURE, made this day of in the year 185 (1) The precedent is a conveyance to uses in its most simple form, and has never fewer than the present parties. When, however, as in the present instance, a common-law estate is conveyed to the purchaser, there is no necessity for making |