Opinion of the Court. gone further, and had given a construction to an act of Congress. So in Moreland v. Page, this court dismissed a writ of error to review the judgment of a state court upon a question of the proper boundary between two tracts of land, although the owner of each claimed under a grant from the United States; and Mr. Justice Grier in delivering judgment said: "It is a question of fact, depending on monuments to be found on the ground, documents in the land office, or the opinion of experts or surveyors appointed by the court or the parties. If the accident to the controversy that both parties claim title under the United States should be considered as sufficient to bring it within our jurisdiction, then every controversy involving the title to such lands, whether it involve the inheritance, partition, devise or sale of it, may, with equal propriety, be subject to the examination of this court in all time to come." 20 How. 522, 523. In Lytle v. Arkansas, in which the Supreme Court of Arkansas had decided against a preemptive right claimed under the laws of the United States, Mr. Justice Catron said: "It is not material whether the invalidity of the title was decreed in the Supreme Court of Arkansas upon a question of fact or of law. The fact that the title was rejected in that court authorizes this court to reëxamine the decree." 22 How. 193, 203. Those observations must be taken as applied to the case before the court, in which the decision of the question of fact depended on the legal effect of acts of officers of the United States regarding that title; and that it was not intended to enlarge the scope of the appellate jurisdiction of this court is evident from the cases there cited. See also Magwire v. Tyler, 1 Black, 195, 203. That this court, in an action at law, at least, has no jurisdiction to review the decision of the highest court of a State upon a pure question of fact, although a Federal question would or would not be presented according to the way in which the question of fact was decided, is clearly settled by a series of later decisions, some of them in cases very like the one now before us. Opinion of the Court. In Lewis v. Campau, (1865,) 3 Wall. 106, a decision of the state court as to the value of land conveyed by deed, upon which depended the requisite amount of stamps under the revenue law of the United States, was held not to be reviewable, although, if the value of the land had been admitted, a Federal question would have been presented. Hall v. Jordan, 15 Wall. 393. In Boggs v. Mining Co., (1865,) a right of possession for the purpose of extracting gold from quartz rock was claimed "by a license inferred from the general policy of the State or of the United States, in relation to mines of gold and silver and the lands containing them;" and a writ of error to review a decision of the Supreme Court of California against the claim was dismissed by this court, speaking by Chief Justice Chase, for the following reasons: "We doubt whether such a claim, even if made in the pleadings, would be such an allegation as would give jurisdiction to this court. However that may be, there was no decision of the court against the validity of such a license. The decision was, that no such license existed; and this was a finding by the court of a question of fact upon the submission of the whole case by the parties, rather than a judgment upon a question of law. It is the same case, in principle, as would be made by an allegation, in defence to an action of ejectment, of a patent from the United States, with an averment of its loss or destruction, and a finding by the jury that no such patent existed, and a consequent judgment for the defendant. Such a judgment would deny, not the validity, but the existence of the patent. And this court would have no jurisdiction to review it." 3 Wall. 304, 310. In Carpenter v. Williams, (1869,) it was held that this court had no jurisdiction where the decision of the state court turned upon the identity of the person to whom a recorder of land titles confirmed, or intended to confirm, a lot of ground; and Mr. Justice Miller in delivering judgment said: "It is a mistake to suppose that every suit for real estate, in which the parties claiming under the Federal government are at issue as to which of them is entitled to the benefit of that title, necessarily raises a question of Federal cognizance. If this were so, the title to all the vast domain, once vested in the United Opinion of the Court. States, could be brought from the state courts to this tribunal." 9 Wall. 785, 786. In Crary v. Devlin, (decided February 21, 1876,) in an action to recover the price of alcohol sold, the defendants contended that the sale was unlawful because of a violation of the internal revenue laws of the United States. The Court of Appeals of New York gave judgment for the plaintiff, because no such violation was proved; and this court dismissed the writ of error, upon the authority of Boggs v. Mining Co., above cited; Chief Justice Waite saying: "There could have been no decision of the Court of Appeals against the validity of any statute of the United States, because it was found that the facts upon which the defendants below relied to bring their case within the statute in question did not exist. The judg ment did not deny the validity of the statute, but the existence of the facts necessary to bring the case within its operation." 23 Lawyers C. P. Co.'s Rep. 510, 511. In Republican River Bridge Co. v. Kansas Pacific Railway, (decided a week later,) in an action at law concerning the title to real estate, in which each party claimed under a grant from Congress, a district court of the State of Kansas, to which the case had been submitted without the intervention of a jury, made findings of fact, upon which it declared the law to be for the defendant; its judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State, and the plaintiff sued out a writ of error from this court. Mr. Justice Miller, in delivering the opinion, said: "The finding by the district court was received by the Supreme Court of the State as conclusive as to all facts in issue, and it is equally conclusive upon us. Where a right is set up under an act of Congress in a state court, any matter of law found in the record, decided by the highest court of the State, bearing on the right so set up under the act of Congress, can be reëxamined here. In chancery cases, or in any other class of cases where all the evidence becomes part of the record in the highest court of the State, the same record being brought here, this court can review the decision of that court on both the law and the fact, so far as may be necessary to determine the validity of the right set up under Opinion of the Court. the act of Congress. But in cases where the facts are submitted to a jury, and are passed upon by the verdict, in a common law action, this court has the same inability to review those facts in a case coming from a state court that it has in a case coming from a Circuit Court of the United States. This conclusiveness of the facts found extends to the finding by a state court to whom they have been submitted by waiving a jury, or to a referee, where they are so held by state laws, as well as to the verdict of a jury." And Boggs v. Mining Co., and Crary v. Devlin, above cited, were referred to as supporting this conclusion. 92 U. S. 315-317; 23 Lawyers C. P. Co.'s Rep. 515, 516. Whether the suggestion in that opinion, as to the power of this court in chancery cases to review the decision of a state court on both the law and the fact, is to be limited to cases in which the decree of that court is general upon the whole record, without specifically passing upon any question of fact; and whether the suggestion, especially if more broadly construed, can be reconciled with the earlier opinions of this court, already cited, upon writs of error to the Circuit Court of the United States in admiralty cases, or in cases tried according to the law of Louisiana; need not now be considered. In Martin v. Marks, (1877,) upon a writ of error to the Supreme Court of Louisiana in an action in the nature of ejectment, Mr. Justice Miller, speaking for this court, said that the question whether a selection of swamp lands had in fact been filed by the surveyor general of Louisiana in the General Land Office was "not of that Federal character which authorizes us to review the decision of the Supreme Court of Louisiana upon it." 97 U. S. 345, 348. In Kenney, trustee, v. Effinger, (1885,) this court dismissed a writ of error to the Supreme Court of Appeals of the State of Virginia, for reasons stated in the opinion delivered by Mr. Justice Field as follows: "The writ of error brought by the trustee raises no Federal question which we can consider. Whether the bond of Effinger was or was not executed with reference to Confederate notes is a question of fact for the state court, and not one of law for this court." 115 U. S. 577. Opinion of the Court. In Quimby v. Boyd, (1888,) in which various errors were assigned in a judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado between two adverse claimants of a lode, this court, speaking by the present Chief Justice, dismissed the writ of error for want of jurisdiction, because some of the objections made in this court had not been taken below, and "the other alleged errors involved questions, either of fact, or of state and not of Federal law." 128 U. S. 488, 489. In California Powder Works v. Davis, ante, 389, in which each party to a suit to quiet title claimed under a patent from the United States confirming a Mexican grant, and the judgment of the Supreme Court of California rested on the proposition of fact that the grant under which the plaintiff in error deraigned title was simulated and fraudulent, this court dismissed the writ of error for want of jurisdiction. The case now before us is an action of ejectment, which was submitted to the Supreme Court of the same State, according to the local practice, upon findings of fact and a statement of evidence by an inferior court of the State. From the foregoing reasons and authorities, it follows that this court cannot review the decision of the state court upon the question of fact whether the ledge, at the time when the town-site patent took effect, was known to be valuable for mining purposes; and the only question of Federal law in the case having been rightly decided by that court, its judgment is Affirmed. MR. JUSTICE HARLAN concurred in the judgment of affirmance, but not in all the reasoning of the opinion. |