Opinion of the Court. But the court was of opinion that the service stipulated for in the contract was a secret service; the information sought was to be obtained clandestinely, and was to be communicated privately; the employment and the service were to be equally concealed. And the court held that a secret service, with liability to publicity in a suit subsequently brought against the government, would be impossible; that, as such services. are sometimes indispensable to the government, its agents in those services must look for their compensation to the contingent fund of the department employing them, and to such allowance from it as those who dispense that fund may award; that the secrecy which such contracts impose precludes any action for their enforcement; that the publicity produced by an action would itself be a breach of a contract of that kind, and thus defeat a recovery. The counsel of the appellant do not impugn the doctrine of the Totten case, but they contend that the Court of Claims erred, in the present case, in treating the contract and services of Arnaud as being of a character that brings the case within such doctrine. It is denied that Arnaud's functions were those of a spy, but were those of a "military expert." If it were necessary for us to enter into the question thus suggested, it might be difficult for us to point out any substantial difference in character between the services rendered by Lloyd and those rendered by Arnaud; but the record discloses other defences so plainly applicable that we are relieved from considering whether the new-fangled term "military expert" is only old "spy," "writ large." On January 6, 1862, after the claimant had performed all the services described in his petition, he presented a claim to the War Department, in the following form: "No. 22. The United States to Charles de Arnaud, Dr. "JANUARY 6, 1862. "For special services rendered the United States government in traveling through the rebel parts of Kentucky, Tennessee, etc., and procuring information concerning the enemy's Opinion of the Court. movements, etc., which led to successful results, (as per cer tificate hereto appended,) $3600." On this claim the Quartermaster General, on January 9, 1862, endorsed the following: "In view of the certificate of General Grant of 30th Nov. and the more general certificate of Major-General Fremont, of 2d January, herewith, covering all Mr. Arnaud's services, the sum of thirty-six hundred dollars appears to me a not unreasonable compensation. I state this at Mr. Arnaud's earnest request. "M. C. MEIGS, Q. M. Gen'l." Thereafter, on January 14, 1862, the Secretary of War made the following endorsement on said claim : "I have considered this claim, and cannot bring my mind to the conclusion that the sum charged is not exorbitant. I am willing to allow $2000 in full of the claim, and the dis. clerk, War Depart. is authorized to pay Charles de Arnaud that sum. "SIMON CAMERON, Sec. War." The claimant was thereupon paid by said disbursing clerk of the War Department $2000, and gave the following receipt: "The United States to Charles de Arnaud, Dr. "JANUARY 14, 1862. "For services and expenses as special agent of the gov't, $2000. "Received, Washington, January 21, 1862, from John Potts, disbursing clerk for the War Department, two thousand doldars, in full, for the above account. CHAS. DE ARNAUD." In the absence of allegation and evidence that this receipt was given in ignorance of its purport, or in circumstances constituting duress, it must be regarded as an acquittance in bar of any further demand. Baker v. Nachtrieb, 19 How. 126; United States v. Childs, 12 Wall. 232, 243. Opinion of the Court. No further or other claim was made by the petitioner until 'September 4, 1886 a period of twenty-four years. Even, therefore, if the claimant was not effectually barred by his voluntary acquittance, his claim was assuredly barred by the statute of limitations, which provides that every claim against the United States, cognizable by the Court of Claims, shall be forever barred unless the petition, setting forth a statement thereof, is filed in the court, or transmitted to it by the Secretary of the Senate or the Clerk of the House of Representatives, as provided by law, within six years after the claim first accrues. Rev. Stat. § 1069. In Finn's case, in many respects resembling the present one, this court construed and applied that statute in the following terms: "In any view this claim belonged to the class which, under the express words of the act of 1863, Rev. Stat. § 1069, were 'forever barred,' so far, at least, as the claimant had the right to a judgment in that court against the United States. The duty of the court, under such circumstances, whether limitation was pleaded or not, was to dismiss the petition; for the statute, in our opinion, makes it a condition or qualification of the right to a judgment against the United States that except where the claimant labors under some one of the disabilities specified in the statute the claim must be put in suit by the voluntary action of the claimant, or be presented to the proper department for settlement, within six years after suit could be commenced thereon against the government. Under the appellant's theory of the case the Second Comptroller could open the case twenty years hence, and upon the claim being transmitted by the Secretary of the Treasury to the Court of Claims, that court could give judgment upon it against the United States. We do not assent to any such interpretation of the statute defining the powers of that court. "The general rule that limitation does not operate by its own force as a bar, but is a defence, and that the party making such a defence must plead the statute if he wishes the benefit of its provisions, has no application to suits in the Court of Claims against the United States. An individual may waive Syllabus. such a defence, either expressly or by failing to plead the statute, but the government has not expressly or by implication conferred authority upon any of its officers to waive the limitation imposed by the statute upon suits against the United States in the Court of Claims." Finn v. United States, 123 U. S. 227, 232, 233. The claimant cannot avail himself of the saving clause in the statute suspending its operation in favor of idiots, lunatics, insane persons, and persons beyond the seas, because such suspension is only in favor of those laboring under the specified disabilities at the time the claim accrued; and it is conceded that plaintiff's mental incapacity did not begin until after his claim had accrued. Nor can it be successfully claimed that a disability subsequently arising would suspend the operation of the statute. See Bauserman v. Blunt, 147 U. S. 647, and cases therein cited. In no view that we can take of this case can we find any just foundation for a claim against the government, and the judgment of the court below, dismissing the claimant's petition, is accordingly Affirmed. GALVESTON, HARRISBURG AND SAN ANTONIO RAILWAY COMPANY v. GONZALES. ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS. No. 158. Argued December 11, 1893. - Decided January 29, 1894. A domestic corporation, incorporated under the laws of Texas, a State divided into more than one Federal district, is, under the State law, and the Federal laws as to the bringing of suits and actions in Federal courts, a citizen and inhabitant of that district in the State within which the general business of the corporation is done, and where it has its headquarters and general offices. A railway company, incorporated under the laws of Texas in which there is more than one Federal district, and having its headquarters and prin Statement of the Case. cipal offices in one of those districts, is an inhabitant of that district, and cannot be said to be an inhabitant of the other Federal district in the State, although it operates its line of railroad through it, and maintains freight and ticket offices and stations in it. If an alien desires to commence an action or bring a suit against a citizen of the United States, he must resort to the domicil of the defendant in order to bring it. In re Hohorst, 150 U. S. 653, distinguished from this case. Southern Pacific Company v. Denton, 146 U. S. 202, and Mexican Central Railway v. Pinkney, 149 U. S. 194, followed in holding that a statute of a State which makes an appearance in behalf of a defendant, although in terms limited to the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court, a waiver of immunity from jurisdiction by reason of non-residence, is not applicable, under Rev. Stat. § 914, to actions in a Circuit Court of the United States held within the State. THIS was an action at law instituted in the Circuit Court for the Western District of Texas at El Paso by the defendant in error, Victor Gonzales, alleged to be "a citizen of the State of Chihuahua, in the Republic of Mexico," against the Galveston, Harrisburg and San Antonio Railway Company, to recover damages to the amount of $4999 for personal injuries. The petition alleged the plaintiff to be "a citizen of the State of Chihuahua, in the Republic of Mexico, and that the defendant is a corporation duly incorporated under the laws of the State of Texas and is a citizen thereof, operating and running cars on the Galveston, Harrisburg and San Antonio railway track from the city of Houston to the city of El Paso in the State of Texas, and is a common carrier of freight and passengers for hire, and has and keeps an office and an agent in the said city of El Paso, Texas, for the transaction of its business, with W. E. Jesup as its local agent in said El Paso." The petition further alleged that "on and prior to the 29th day of July, 1889, and ever since that time, the defendant has been engaged in propelling trains and cars on said railway track for the transportation of freight and passengers for hire, as aforesaid, from the city of Houston, in the State of Texas, into and through the county of Jeff Davis, in said State, and through the county of El Paso into the city of El Paso, Texas." The petition further alleged as the cause of plaintiff's action that after having paid his fare to an agent VOL. CLI-32 |