Opinion of the Court. Oswego Township, ante, 56, decided at the present term of the court. It admits of no question that the primary liability, or the right to reach the fire insurance fund, had also to be worked out in favor of the complainants, and other marine insurance companies, through the liability of the railroad company upon its bills of lading. The suit could not have proceeded a step without the presence of the railroad company, and certainly it presents no separable controversy as between the compress company and the several fire insurance companies. It is further suggested, as to the right of removal, that each of the marine insurance companies had a distinct and separate cause of action against each of the fire insurance companies on their respective policies. This is a misapprehension, for the marine insurance companies had no right of action against the fire insurance companies. Their cause of action was against the railroad company under its bills of lading issued to the owners of the cotton, who were the assured in the marine companies, and whose loss had been paid by those companies. The right of those companies was directly against the railroad company, by way of subrogation, and to enforce its liability under its bills of lading. They could not have proceeded directly against the fire companies without the presence of the railroad company. The latter was an indispensable party to the relief sought, for it was only through this alleged liability that the fire insurance fund could be reached and subjected to the indemnity of the marine insurance companies. If each of these marine insurance companies had filed a separate bill for the same relief sought by their joint suit there could have still been no right of removal on the part of the fire insurance companies on the ground of a separable controversy, even if the fire insurance companies were not garnishees, as held by the Supreme Court of Tennessee, for the reason that the railroad company and the compress company would both have been indispensable parties, and could not have been arranged on the same side with the complainants, inasmuch as the liability of the railroad company to the marine insurance company was the primary question to be determined. Opinion of the Court. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Ide, 114 U. S. 52; Pirie v. Tvedt, 115 U. S. 41. The complainants had a right to join in enforcing the common liability of the railroad company upon its bills of lading, and, in the language of Chief Justice Marshall, in New Orleans v. Winter, 1 Wheat. 91, "having elected to sue jointly, the court is incapable of distinguishing their case, so far as respects jurisdiction, from one in which they were compelled to unite." This ruling has been approved in Peninsular Iron Co. v. Stone, 121 U. S. 631, 633. In the present case, as in Peninsular Iron Co. v. Stone, the rights of each of the complainants and of other marine insurance companies occupying the same position, depend, as against the petitioners for removal, on the alleged right of the marine companies to hold the railroad company liable, by way of subrogation, upon its bills of lading, and, as an incident to that liability, to collect the fire insurance fund to the extent of the railroad company's share therein. Although, as between themselves, they have separate and distinct interests, they joined in a suit to enforce an obligation which is common to all; and while all the complainants need not have joined in enforcing it, they have done so, and this, under the rule, in New Orleans v. Winter, 1 Wheat. 91, controls the jurisdiction." The voluntary joinder of the parties has the same effect for purposes of jurisdiction as if they had been compelled to unite. The right of removal must be determined by the pleadings at the time the petition is filed, Graves v. Corbin, 132 U. S. 571, 585, and testing the application made in the present case by this rule, we find no dispute or controversy set forth in the bill or in the petition for removal between the compress company and the fire insurance companies. On the contrary, these defendants are charged with confederating together for the purpose of relieving the fire insurance companies from liability on their policies. The bill seeks to charge the railroad company, and then to reach and subject its equitable rights and interests in the fire insurance fund, taken out by the compress company for its Opinion of the Court. benefit. There is not in the bill or in the cross-bills any suggestion or intimation that there is any controversy or dispute between the railroad company and the compress company; or between the compress company and the fire insurance companies. Under such circumstances there is manifestly no separable controversy made by the pleadings, such as entitles. the fire companies, or either of them, to remove the cause. There is, in fact, no controversy "which can be fully determined as between them," and as stated by this court in Torrence v. Shedd, 144 U. S. 527, 530,"by the settled construction of this section (referring to separable controversies) the whole subject-matter of the suit must be capable of being finally determined as between them, (the parties seeking removal,) and complete relief afforded as to the separate cause of action, without the presence of others originally made parties to the suit." It may be, under the Judiciary Act of March 3, 1887, c. 373, 24 Stat. 552, and August 13, 1888, c. 866, 25 Stat. 433, as under the act of March 3, 1875, c. 137, 18 Stat. 470, that the court may disregard the particular position of the parties as complainants or defendants, assigned to them by the pleader, for the purpose of determining the right of removal, Harter v. Kernochan, 103 U. S. 562, and the matter in dispute may be ascertained by arranging the parties to the suit on opposite sides of the dispute, and if by such an arrangement it appears that those on one side are all citizens of different States from those on the other, the suit may be removed. Removal Cases, 100 U. S. 457; Ayers v. Chicago, 101 U. S. 184. The plaintiffs in error in the present cases seek to sustain the right of removal by the application of this rule; but it will not avail them, for if the parties are arranged on opposite sides of the primary and controlling matter in dispute, we shall have the three complainants, together with the Phenix Insurance Company, a corporation of the State of New York; the Union Marine Insurance Company, Limited, of London, England; the British and Foreign Insurance Company of Liverpool, England, and the Standard Marine Insurance Company, Limited, of England, on one side, and the railroad company, the compress company, and the fire insurance com VOL. CLI-25 Opinion of the Court. panies, together with the other defendants, as parties on the other side. Now, as thus arranged, we have two alien corporations on the side of the complainants, and two alien fire insurance companies (the Liverpool, London and Globe Insurance Company, and the Royal Insurance Company) on the side of the defendants. Under such position, the alien petitioners would not be entitled to removal; besides, it is settled by King v. Cornell, 106 U. S. 395, that subdivision two of section 639 of the Revised Statutes was repealed by the act of 1875, so that an alien sued with a citizen had no right of removal, and this subdivision two of that section was not restored by the act of March 3, 1887; hence, an alien, in the position of the alien petitioners, in the present case, would have no right to remove the cause on the ground of a separable controversy. Again, the parties being arranged, as above, according to the matter in dispute, we have the Phenix Insurance Company of New York in the position of plaintiff, with the Mutual Fire Insurance Company of New York, (No. 809,) the Continental Insurance Company, (No. 810,) and the Fire Association, (No. 811,) corporations of the same State, applying for the removal. It is too clear to require the citation of authorities that in this position of the New York corporations, those occupying the position of defendants had no right of removal. It is further shown by the pleadings that the Phenix Insurance Company in its cross-bill made a defendant of the Newport News and Mississippi Valley Company, a corporation organized under the laws of Connecticut, which was a carrier from Memphis to points east, and had a contract with the compress company like that of the Cairo, Vincennes and Chicago Railroad Company, to insure cotton to be carried over its line, under which arrangement it had issued bills of lading to various parties insured by the Phenix Insurance Company; and that company, after payment of the losses by its cross-bill, sought the same relief against the Newport News and Mississippi Valley Company which was sought against the Cairo, Vincennes and Chicago Railroad Company. So that to the cross-bill of the Phenix Company there were two Opinion of the Court. Connecticut defendants, viz., the National Fire Insurance Company, (No. 808,) and the Newport News and Mississippi Valley Company, and the relief sought made both of these corporations necessary and indispensable parties. The Connecticut corporations could not in this situation of the parties, if no other objection existed, be entitled to remove the cause. In respect to the two other plaintiffs in error, the Merchants' Cotton Press and Storage Company, (No. 807,) and the Mutual Fire Insurance Company, (No. 809,) it appears that neither of these parties made application to remove the cause from the chancery court of Shelby County. So that neither of them is in position to assign error as to the action of the court in denying the other parties the right of removal. In Rand v. Walker, 117 U. S. 340, 345, it was held that the right to take steps for the removal of a cause to the Circuit Court of the United States, on the ground of a separable controversy, was confined to the parties actually interested in such controversy. In that case the court said on this subject: "That neither of the parties to the controversy, if it be separable, a question which we do not decide, have petitioned for removal, and the right to remove a suit on the ground of a separable controversy is, by the statute, confined to the parties actually interested in such controversy." It is, therefore, we think, clear that whether the cause be looked at as a whole, or whether it be considered under any adjustment or arrangement of the parties on opposite sides of the matter in dispute, there was no right of removal on the part of the several plaintiffs in error, or either of them. The remaining assignment of error based upon the alleged allowance by the local agent of the railroad company of special rates, rebates, or drawbacks to Jones Brothers & Company which, it is claimed, rendered the bills of lading issued by the railroad company to the owners or consignees of the cotton void, so that the marine insurance companies, who had paid the losses, could have no right upon such bills of lading against the railroad company, or the fire insurance companies, needs but little consideration. The Supreme Court of the State disposed of this question as follows: "This fact of |