CASES OVERRULED, DOUBTED AND DENIED. Anderson v. R. Co. (37 Wis. 321), denied; Knight v. West Jersey R. Co. (10€ Penn. St. 250), 201. Bartlett v. Western Un. Tel. Co. (62 Me. 218; 16 Am. Rep. 437), denied; Hart v. Western Un. Tel. Co. (66 Cal. 579), 122. Berry v. R. Co. (41 Md. 446), denied; Ex parte Wren (63 Miss. 512), 828. Bonner v. Home Ins. Co. (13 Wis. 677), overruled; Hiles v. Hanover Fire Ins Co. (65 Wis. 585), 639. Candee v. Western Un. Tel. Co. (34 Wis. 477; 17 Am. Rep. 452), denied; Hart v. Western Un. Tel. Co. (66 Cal. 579), 122. Carroll v. East St. Louis (67 Ill. 568), doubted; St. Clara Female Academy v. Sullivan (116 Ill. 375), 780. Cloughessey v. Waterbury (51 Conn. 405), denied; Grossenbach v. City of Milwaukee (65 Wis. 31), 615. Commonwealth v. White (110 Mass. 407), denied; Chapman v. State (78 Ala. 463), 44. Cortelyou v. Lansing (2 Cai. Cas. 200), denied; Cumnock v. Newburyport Sav. Inst. (142 Mass. 342), 680. Crawford v. Delaware (7 Ohio St. 459), denied; Reardon v. San Francisco (66 Cal. 492), 116. Daggett v. Hudson (43 Ohio St. 548; 54 Am. Rep. 832), denied; People v. Hoffman (116 Ill. 587), 798. Dustan v. Cowdry (23 Vt. 635), doubted; Fort Dearborn Lodge v. Klein (115 Ill. 177), 141. Fordyce v. Godman (20 Ohio St. 1), denied; Ex parte Wren (63 Miss. 512), 828. Gillam v. Taylor (L. R., 16 Eq. 581; 7 Eng. Rep. 595), denied; Kent v. Dun. ham (142 Mass. 216), 669. Goodsall v. Boldero (9 East, 72), denied; Scott v. Dickson (108 Penn, St. 6), 193. Harkins v. Standard Co. (122 Mass. 400), denied; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Conroy (63 Miss. 563), 837. Hull v. Miller (4 Neb. 503), denied; Ex parte Wren (63 Miss. 512), 828. In re Polling Lists (13 R. I. 729), denied; People v. Hoffman (116 Ill. 587), 799. Johnson v. City of Boston (118 Mass. 114), denied; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Conroy (63 Miss. 562), 837. Jones v. Hutchinson (43 Ala. 721), denied; Ex parte Wren (63 Miss. 512), 828. Judicial Opinions (35 N. H. 579; 52 N. H. 622), denied; Ex parte Wren (63 Miss. 512), 828. Keyes v. Little York (53 Cal. 724), overruled; People v. Gold Run Ditch and Mining Co. (66 Cal. 138), 85. Xxxvi CASES OVERRULED, DOUBTED AND DENIED. Legg v. Mayor (42 Md. 203), denied; Ex parte Wren (63 Miss. 512), 828. Osbourne v. Staley (5 W. Va. 85; 13 Am. Rep. 640), denied; Ex parte Wren (63 Miss. 512), 828. Page v. Du Puy (40 Ill. 506), doubted; Fort Dearborn Lodge v. Klein (115 Ill. 117), 141. Patterson v. Barlow (60 Penn. St. 54), denied; People v. Hoffman (116 III. 587), 799. Reeder v. Purdy (41 Ill. 282), doubted; Fort Dearborn Lodge v. Klein (115 Ill. 177), 141. Reg. v. St. George (9 C. & P. 483), denied; Chapman v. State (78 Ala. 463), 44. Richardson v. N. Y. Cent. R. Co. (98 Mass. 85), denied; Knight v. West Jersey R. Co. (108 Penn. St. 250), 201. Roberts, In re (5 Colo. 525), denied; Ex parte Wren (63 Miss. 512), 828. State v. Butts (31 Kans. 537), denied; People v. Hoffman (116 Ill. 587), 799. Supervisors v. Heenan (2 Minn. 330), denied; Ex parte Wren (63 Miss. 512), 828. Walter v. Griffith (70 Ala. 361), denied; Ex parte Wren (63 Miss. 512), 828. Weill v. Kenfield (54 Cal. 111), denied; Ex parte Wren (63 Miss. 512), 828. Wiggett v. Fox (11 Ex. 832), denied; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Conroy (63 Miss. 563), 837. Wilson v. General Ins. Co. (12 Cush. 360), denied; Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Moog (78 Ala. 284), 32. Wood v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. (59 Iowa, 196), overruled; Wood v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (68 Iowa, 491), 864. Worthen v. Badget (32 Ark. 496), denied; Ex parte Wren (63 Miss. 512), 828. ▲ railroad company, using a public street for a terminal yard, without having made compensation to the adjoining land-owners, and thereby causing a nuis ance to neighboring dwellings, may be restrained by injunction, although such use is authorized by the legislature and is necessary to the business. (See note, p. 6.) A CTION for nuisance. The opinion states the case. junction was granted below. P. L. Voorhees, for appellants. J. W. Wartman and J. J. Crandall, for respondents. The in DIXON, J. The complainants are owners and occupants of a dwelling-house on the southerly side of Bridge avenue, between Second and Third streets in the city of Camden. The defendant's tracks run through the central part of Bridge avenue in front of complainant's dwelling, across Second street, into its terminal yard, which extends from the westerly side of Second street to the Delaware river. VOL. LVI-1 Pennsylvania Railroad Company v. Angel. The bill avers that the defendant uses its tracks in front of the complainant's house for the purpose of distributing cars and making up trains in its freight and passenger business, and that it keeps locomotives and cars laden with live stock standing there, so that by reason of the stenches, noises, smoke, steam and dirt thereby occasioned, the comfort of the complainants' home is seriously impaired, and hence they pray an injunction to restrain the defendant from continuing in that course of conduct. The answer denies that the defendant uses its tracks in front of complainants' dwelling for the purpose of distributing cars and making up trains, and as a siding for cars loaded with live stock or otherwise, and generally alleges that said tracks are used only in such modes as the proper transaction of its business necessitates. The evidence is clear that the tracks mentioned are continually used in the manner set out in the bill. The defendant's trainmaster at Camden, testifying for the company, states that the company uses Bridge avenue above Second street considerably for the purpose of drilling, and that he could not transact the company's business without doing so; that he is not in the habit of permitting cars loaded with cattle, sheep and swine to remain upon the track between Second and Third streets longer than he must, before getting them down into the yard after they come into the street. These occurrences take place at various hours of the day and up to eleven o'clock at night; ordinarily, he says, not later than that time. The proofs presented by the complainants, and not controverted on behalf of the defendant, establish that the use of the tracks thus admitted results in the nuisances of which complaint is made. The fact that these nuisances are continuous, and materially diminish the comfort of complainants in their residence, makes the case one proper for an equitable remedy by injunction, unless the defendant can justify its conduct. Ross v. Butler, 19 N. J. Eq. 294, and cases there cited. The defendant's justification was rested at the argument, upon the ground that the legislature and the common council of Camden had authorized the defendant to use Bridge avenue for its business; that its business requires such use as the defendant has hitherto made, and therefore the use cannot be in a legal sense injurious. There are two sufficient answers to this claim. Pennsylvania Railroad Company v. Angel. The first is that neither the legislature nor the common council has attempted to grant so extensive a privilege as is here set up. The charter of the Camden and Amboy Railroad Company, passed February 4, 1830, authorized it to construct and operate a railroad with all necessary appendages, within limits embracing the locality now under consideration. In 1834, the Camden common council, by resolution, authorized that company to use Bridge avenue for the purposes of its roadway. In 1855, the legislature (P. L. of 1855, p. 118; Rev., p. 919, § 65) authorized railroad companies, whose incorporating acts limited the quantity of land which they might hold at their stations, to purchase and hold so much land as might be strictly necessary for most conveniently storing and working upon their engines, cars, fuel and materials to be used on their roads, and for receiving and delivering property transported on their roads to the best advantage, and for tracks, wagon roads, platforms, and all other strictly station and railroad purposes. In 1862, the city council, by "an ordinance to afford facilities to the Camden and Amboy Railroad Company for the running of their trains through the city of Camden," gave its consent and authority to the company to lay side tracks, running obliquely from a point on the railroad, along Bridge avenue between Second and Third streets, to and upon the company's depot property lying west of Second street. From these laws and regulations arise whatever rights the defendant, which is the lessee of the Camden and Amboy Railroad Company, appears to have in Bridge avenue in front of complainant's house. In our judgment, they indicate that those rights are such as pertain to the use of the avenue for the purposes of a way, not for the purposes of a station-yard. The primary privilege given is that of passage; this and its reasonable incidents cover the whole scope of the grant. The right of storing engines and cars, either for a longer or a shorter period, the right of making up or breaking up trains, are not embraced in such a concession. These are strictly station and terminal purposes, and by providing for station-yards the legislature has indicated its intention that business of that nature should be transacted there. We do not say that the company may not, under any circumstanees, do upon its roadway what ought commonly to be done in its yards; for no doubt unforeseen occurrences may sometime render such acts almost indispensable, and then other less urgent rights, of the public at least, must give way. But when in the ordinary |