disabilities; but in both cases, when the disability is once removed, the time begins to run.

[*63]

*Ashhurst, J. I also concur with my lord. Our decision is warranted by the uniform construction which has been put upon this statute; and a contrary determination would be productive of all those mischievous consequences which the different statutes of limitations intended to prevent. If the disability be once removed, the time must continue to run, notwithstanding any subsequent disability, either voluntary or involuntary; and even if there were any distinction between the two kinds of disability, the present is against the plaintiff; for the imprisonment for debt was in consequence of his own voluntary act.

Grose, J. agreed.

Mr. Justice Buller was sitting for the Lord Chancellor.

In Doe, on the demise of(a) Griggs and another, v. Shane, at the trial before Gould, J. the defendant set up a fine in order to bar the plaintiff's title. It appeared in evidence, that the person under whom the lessors of the plaintiff claimed, and to bar whom the fine was set up, was of sane mind when the fine was levied, but that he became insane about two years afterwards; and the question was, whether the time continued to run against him while he was in that state? for, it it did not, the lessors of the plaintiff had made their entry in time. A verdict was taken for the plaintiff, with liberty to the defendant to move to enter a nonsuit, in case the court should be of opinion that the party was barred. Erskine was to have shown cause against the rule for entering the non-snit; but he said, that the current of authori

ties, on looking into them, was so strong against him, [*64] that he would not pretend to argue the question. That though Brown and Saunders had said, in Plowd. 366. that in such a case the fine would not run, yet that all the au

(a) 4 T. R. 306-7.

thorities were the other way; and so was the determination even in that case in Plowd. The court said he was right in giving up the point, for that it was too plain to be disputed ; and they made the rule absolute. [1]

But if a man both of nor-sane memory, and out of the kingdom, comes into the kingdom, and then goes out of the kingdom, his non-sane memory continuing, it was said by Hard

[1] In the case of Crozier vs. Gano & Ux. (1 Bibb's Rep. 260,) TRIMBLE, J. delivering the Opinion of the Court, said; "The evident design of the replication is to shew that the plaintiff, Kezi"ah, from the time her cause of action first accrued, has at all "times (until within five years next before the commencement of "the suit,) labored under the disabilities of either infancy, cover"ture, or absence from the country, so as to bring her within the "savings of the Statute of Limitations. If the replication had "really shewn this, it would have been good; for although one "of them, as infancy, for example, had been removed, yet if anoth“ er of them occurred, as marriage, before the removal of that of "infancy, and so on in succession, so that all were not removed at "any one time, whereby the statute could attach and begin to run, it would have been a sufficient answer to the plea :-[of the "Statute of Limitations,] this the replication has not done."-& vide Eaton vs. Sanford, 2 Day's Rep. 523.

In the case of Cotterell vs. Dutton, (4 Taunt. Rep. 830,) CHAMBRE, J. said, "The ten years do not run at all while there is "a continuance of disabilities, but they run without intermission "from the time that the disabilities first cease."

But in the case of Bunce & Al. vs. Wolcott, (2 Conn. Rep. 27,) it was Held, That the saving of the Statute of Limitations regarding the right of entry into lands, (tit. 97. c. 3.) applies only to such disability as existed at the time the right of entry accrued, and not to any supervenient disability. & vide Thompson & Al. vs. Smith, 7 Serg. & R. Rep. 209.

"It is equally well settled that cumulative disabilities cannot "be allowed." Jackson ex dem. Swartwout & Ux. vs. Johnson, 5 Cow. Rep. 101. (per SAVAGE, Ch. J.) & vide Opinions of SUTHERLAND, J. & WOODWORTH, J. to the same point, pages 95 & 105, (same case.)

An infant has 4 years after coming of age, to commence an action of trover; but cannot connect, the disability of infancy with that of coverture, to gain a longer time. Fewel & Ux. vs. Collins, 1 Constit. Rep. So. Car. 202.

wicke, Lord Chan.(a) that his privilege, as to being out of the kingdom, is gone; and his privilege, as to non-sane, will begin from the time he returns to his senses.[2]

The word "death," in this section, refers to the death of the person to whom the right first accrued; therefore, where ancestor died seised, leaving a son and daughter infants, and a stran

(a) 2 Atk. 632.

[2] "It is perfectly well settled, that if several disabilities exist "when the right of action accrues, the Statute does not begin to "run, till the party has survived them all. (3 Johns. Ch. Rep. "138. 1 Plowd. 375.)" Jackson ex dem. Swartwout & Ux. vs. Johnson, 5 Cow. Rep. 101. (per SAVAGE. Ch. J.) & vide Opinions of WOODWORTH, J. page 105, & Opinion of SUTHERLAND, J. page 94, (same point.)

"A person may be under several of the disabilities specified, "at the time the title accrues; and in such case, the person so situ"ated may avail him or herself of either; and it will always be a "sufficient answer to an objector to such an election, to say, the "disability on which I rely is pointed out by the proviso; it ex"isted at the time my right or title accrued; I have prosecuted my claim within the time allowed after its discontinuance, and "come within both the letter and spirit of the law." Bunce & Al. vs. Wolcott, 2 Conn. Rep. 34, (per EDMOND, J.)

If a non-resident comes into the state temporarily, and returns to his dwelling without the state, the Statute of Limitations begins to run against him. Doc ex dem. Smith vs. Harrow, &c. 3 Bibb's Rep. 446. May's heirs vs. Slaughter, 3 Marsh. Rep. (Ky.) 505. 507. In this last cited case the Court said, (BOYLE, Ch. J. delivering the Opinion ;)"We have no doubt, assuming "the facts as true, that the Statute commenced running against "John May in his life time. At the separation of this State from "Virginia, we made the Statute of that State ours, by adoption, "and in its turns [terms] it then applied to the limits of this State, "which were the former limits of the district, and its expressions "were retrospective, as to all previous as well as subsequent en"tries upon land, so that by the separation of the two States, the "effect of the Statute did not cease. John May having been in "the limits of the district, after the adverse entry and possession "of the appellee, the Statute attached and took effect against "him, altho' his residence was not within the district, as was de"cided by this Court in the case of Smith vs. Hanon. [Harrow,] "3 Bibb 440." [446.]

ger entered, and the son went to sea, and was supposed to have died abroad, the daughter was not allowed twenty years to enter from the death of her brother, but only ten.[3]

Ejectment(a) for a house and a small parcel of land, tried before Rooke, J. at the Summer Assises, 1805, at Northampton; and the principal question was, whether the action was brought in time within the second clause of exceptions in the statute of limitations, 21 Jac. I. c. 16.? The person last seised of the premises, from whom the lessors of the plaintiff claimed, was

(a) 6 East, 50.

[3] There is no saving in the Statute of Limitations, for any disability in the heir supervenient to the disability of the person to whom the right of entry first accrued. Griswold vs. Butler & Ux. 3 Conn. Rep. 227. (per BRISTOL, CHAPMAN & BRAINARD, Js. Contra, HOSMER, Ch. J. & PETERS, J.)

Where an adverse possession has commenced in the lifetime of the ancestor, the operation of the Statute of Limitations is not prevented by the title descending to a person under legal disabili ty, as a feme covert, &c, Jackson ex dem. Livingston & Al. vs. Robins, 15 Johns. Rep. 169.

Where an adverse possession begins to run in the lifetime of the ancestor, and the land descends to an infant heir, the latter is not protected by his disability. Jackson ex dem. Colden & Al. vs. Moore, 13 Johns. Rep. 513.

"We have not forgotten that it has been decided by this Court, "that under our Statute, if a right of action accrues to one labor"ing under no disability, and by his death the right descends upon "his heir, who does labor under some disability, the right of the "latter will be saved until ten years after such disability is remo"ved; but we have never decided that one disability can be added "to another." &c. When, therefore, a right of action has once “'accrued, or come to a person labouring under a disability, "and that disability is removed, or the person so disabled has "died, it is obvious, that the Statute has provided for no other "or successive disability; and to permit such disability to cumu"late and save the right, would be adding to the Statute, and giv. ing to it an operation contrary to its import." Floyd's heirs vs. Johnson & Al, 2 Litt. Rep. 114. (per CURIAM.)

one Thomas Jesson, on whose death in the year 1777, [*65] David, his elder brother, took possession of them, and transmitted the possession to the defendant, his grandson. Thomas Jesson left a son John, and a daughter Frances, him surviving. John was baptized in 1767; and after the death of his father, being then about ten years of age, was put out apprentice to the sea service by the parish, and was seen by a witness on his return from his first voyage, about a year after the father's death: soon after which he went to sea again, and had not been heard of since, and was believed to be dead. Frances, the daughter, one of the lessors of the plaintiff, was baptized on the 21st of May, 1771, and afterwards married George, the other lessor.

It was contended at the trial, by the defendant's counsel, that the ejectment was out of time; for it was uncertain when John, the son of Thomas, the ancestor last seised, died; and that the twenty years given by the statute began to run immediately on the death of Thomas in 1777, and consequently expired in 1797; or that, if the statute favoured Frances the daughter till ten years after the disability of her infancy was removed, at any rate, as she was of full age in 1792, she ought to have brought her ejectment in 1802; and consequently this ejectment, brought in 1804, was too late.

On the other hand, it was contended by the plaintiff's counsel, that supposing John to have died abroad, the presumption of his death could not arise till seven years after he was last seen in England previous to his going to sea, which could not be till 1785 or 1786, till when the right of entry of the lessor Frances did not accrue; and that she had twenty [*66] years in which to bring her ejectment *after that time; the statute having never begun to run by reason of the continuing disability, and consequently that this action was well brought.

The learned judge left it to the jury to say when and where