ereign, and the Indians are mere occupants. A purchaser from them can acquire only the Indian title, and they may resume it, and make a different disposition of it. An occupant under an Indian grant, the Indians having afterwards resumed the title, and granted it to the Crown, was held to be a tenant at will of the King, whose occupancy no length of time could ripen into a title by adverse possession. Jackson ex dem. Sparkman vs. Porter, 1 Paine's Rep. 458. & Vide Cocke's Lessee vs. Dotson & Al. 1 Tenn. Rep. 169. Johnson vs. M'Intosh, 8 Wheat. Rep. 571,& Seq. Fletcher vs. Peck, 6 Cranch. Rep. 142. Jackson ex dem. Klock & Al. v. Hudson, 3 Johns. Rep. 384, 385.

Where one enters into land having title, his seisin is not bounded by his actual possession, but is co-extensive with his title. But where he enters without title, his seisin is confined to his possession by metes and bounds. Jackson ex dem. Sparkman, vs. Porter, 1 Paine's Rep. 458. & Vide Cluggage & Al. vs. Lessee of Duncan, 1 Serg. & R. Rep. 111. Davidson's Lessee vs. Beatty, 3 Har. & M Hen. Rep. 621.

"It is a principle of law, that he who has title to a tract of land, "and is in possession of part, is in possession of the whole. A person holding land cannot occupy and use every part of his land, nor can he have every part under fence.

"It is a principle of law, that if two persons are in possession "of the same land, the one by title, and the other by wrong, it is "his possession who has the right..

"These principles are not only established by the decisions of "the Courts, and acquiesced in, but are founded in justice and "general convenience, favour right, and resist wrong and oppression." (Per CHASE, Ch. J.) Hammond vs. Ridgeley's Lessee, 5 Harr. & Johns. Rep. 245. 264.

"Where two are in mixed possession of the same land, one by "title and the other by wrong, the law considers him having the "title as in possession to the extent of his right." (Per BUCHANAN, J. delivering the Opinion of the Court.) Cheney vs. Ringgold & Al., 2 Harr. & Johns. Rep. 87. 94.

"Where two persons are in posses sion the one by right, and "the other by wrong, it is the possession of him who is in by right." (Per CHASE, Ch. J. delivering the Opinion of the GENERAL COURT.) Hall vs. Gitting's Lessee, & Gitting's Lessee vs. Hall, 2 Harr. & Johns. Rep. 112. 115. This cause was carried to the COURT OF APPEALS, upon cross appeals by each party; and the COURT OF APPEALS, at December Term, 1807, affirmed the Opinion of THE GENERAL COURT, on both appeals, concurring in the Opinions pronounced in the several Bills of Exceptions. Ibid. 130.

Where surveys interfere, the Act of Limitations has no operation against him who has the best right, unless his opponent takes an adverse and exclusive possession. Where there is no interference, possession of part is possession of the whole. Burns vs. Swift & Al. 2 Serg. & R. Rep. 436.

Although there may be a concurrent possession, there cannot "be a concurrent seizin of lands and one only being seized, the "possession must be adjudged to be in him because he has the right." Langdon vs. Potter & Al. 3 Mass. Rep. 219. (Per PARSONS, Ch. J. delivering the Opinion of the Court.)

Where two persons are in possession of land, each claiming an exclusive right, the law adjudges the rightful possession to be in the one who has the right to the land. Mather vs. The Ministers of Trinity Church & Al., 3 Serg. & R. Rep. 509,

"Where two are in possession of a tract or a house, it is his "possession who has the right. (Per CHASE, Ch. J. delivering the Opinion of the Court.) Davidson's Lessee vs. Beatty, 3 Har. & M'Hen. Rep. 621.

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"There would appear to be no clearer principle of reason and "of justice, than this, that if the rightful owner is in the actual occupancy of a part of his tract by himself, or tenant, he is in "the constructive and legal possession, and seizin of the whole, "unless he is disseised by actual occupation and dispossession. "If this were not the law, the possessor by wrong, would be more "favoured than the rightful possessor. Here are two, each in ac"tual possession and occupation, of part of a surveyed tract, the owner, and an intruder. Who then is in possession of the part "not occupied by inclosure by either? The man who has no right but by disseisin of a part, or he, who is in the actual occupancy of a part, and the rightful owner of the whole? In this "kind of mixed constructive possession, the legal seisin is accord'ing to the title. Title draws possession to the owner. It re"mains until he is dispossessed, and then no further than actual "dispossession by a trespasser, who cannot acquire a constructive "possession, which always remains with the title." Hall & Al. vs. Powell, 4 Serg. & R. Rep. 465. (Per DUNCAN, J. delivering the Opinion of the Court.)

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"According to Lord Holt, (1 Salk. 246,) a bare entry on anoth"er, without an expulsion, makes such a seisin only, that the law will adjudge him in possession that has the right." Smith ex dem. Teller & Al. vs. Burtis & Al., 6 Johns. Rep. 218. (Per KENT, Ch. J. delivering the Opinion of the Court.) & Vide Codman & Al. vs. Winslow, 10 Mass. Rep. 151. Commonwealth vs. Dudley, Ibid. 408.

Where one conveyed lands in fee with general warranty, and a stranger at the same time was seized in fact of part of the same land by an elder and better title, the entry of the Grantee under his deed gives him seisin only of that part of which his grantor was seised;-but as to the stranger, the entry of the Grantee is a mere trespass. Cushman vs. Blanchard & Al. 3 Greenl. Rep. 266. .

An adverse possession for twenty years, is not a bar to a Rector or Vicar, except as against the same incumbent who submitted to such possession. Runcorn vs. Doe ex dem. Cooper, (In Error,) 5 Barnew. & Cress. Rep. 696.

Where a part of a tract of land is included in A's deed or patent, and the same part is also included in B.'s deed or patent, and each grantee is settled upon that part of the land comprised in his deed or patent, although not upon that included in both deeds, the possession of the part included in both conveyances, is in him whose deed or patent is the elder; but if one of them is actually settled for seven years together, upon the part comprehended in both deeds, the possession is his, and the other will be barred thereby. Doe ex dem. Orbison vs. Morrison, 1 Hawks Rep. 467.

The state by virtue of its prerogative is always seised of the lands to which it has title; and may therefore convey them by release, notwithstanding the intrusion of strangers upon them. Hill vs. Dyer, 3 Greenl. Rep. 441.

4th. "Where the possessor has acknowledged a title in the "claimant."

The Defendant went into possession of land under Gansevoort, whom he supposed to be the owner of the soil; but afterwards believing that Mrs. Clark was the owner, he applied to her to purchase the land after that application, Mrs. Clark conveyed the premises to Viely, who before bringing suit ordered the Defendant to leave the premises. Held, that the Defendant could not set up an adverse possession of twenty years; though he might shew that he made the application under a mistake, and prove a title out of the lessors of the Plaintiff. Jackson ex dem. Viely & Clark vs. Cuerden, 2 Johns. Cas. 353.

The declarations of a widow in possession of premises, that she held them for her life, and that after her death, they would go to the heirs of her husband, are admissible evidence to negative the fact of her having had twenty years adverse possession. Doe ex dem. Human vs. Pettett, 5 Barn. & Ald. Rep. 223.

And even where the predecessors of the Defendant, had acknowledged the title of the claimant, it was Held that the Defendant was equally precluded from setting up the defence of adverse possession Jackson ex dem. Van Schaick & others vs. Davis, 5 Cow. Rep. 129, 130.

And to the same purport, Vide Jackson ex dem. Griswold & Al. vs. Bard, 4 Johns. Rep. 230. Brandter ex dem. Fitch vs. Marshall, 1 Caines' Rep. 394. Rowletts vs. Daniel, 4 Munf. Rep. 473.

"It has been decided, and is the settled law of the Country, "that a tenant shall not resist the recovery of his Landlord, by vir"tue of an adverse title acquired during his lease." Lessee of Galloway vs. Ogle, 2 Binney's Rep. 472. & Vide Graham & Ål. vs. Moore & Al. 4 Serg. & R. Rep. 467.

Where the tenant of land for a year, held over, and after the expiration of his term paid rent to a stranger, and refused to quit the premises, being called upon by the agent of the lessor for that purpose; this was Held to be no disseisin of the lessor, not even at his election, nor such as would prevent the operation of a deed from the lessor to a third person. Porter vs. Hammond, 3 Greenl. Rep. 188.

Where A.'s tenant from year to year, takes a lease from B. the Act is void, and cannot work an adverse possession against A. Jackson ex dem. Williams & Al. vs. Miller, 6 Cow. Rep. 751.

"The repeated acts of the defendant, recognising the plaintiff's "title by applications to purchase from him both before and after "he entered into possession of the premises, afforded the strong"est reason to presume that the defendant was in possession un"der David Russell [one of the lessors of the plaintiff] We are "accordingly of opinion that the plaintiff ought to have judg"ment." Jackson ex dem. D. Russell & Al. vs. Croy, 12 Johns. Rep. 430. (Per YATES, J. delivering the Opinion of the Court.) & Vide Jackson ex dem. Brown & Al. vs. Ayers, 14 Johns. Rep. 224.

If a stranger is in possession under or acknowledging the title of the devisee or remainder man it is equivalent to an actual entry. Wells vs. Prince, 4 Mass. Rep. 64.

A purchaser at a Sheriff's sale becomes quasi tenant, and it is not to be presumed that he holds adversely. Jackson ex dem. Klein vs. Graham, 3 Caines' Rep. 189. & Vide Waring vs. Jackson ex dem. Eden & Al. 1 Peters Rep. (Sup. Ct. U. S.) 570.

The possession of a defendant after a sale under an execution is not deemed adverse, for he becomes quasi a tenant at will to

Cas. 153.

the purchaser. Jackson ex dem. Kanes vs. Sternbergh, 1 Johns. Russell vs. Doty, Sheriff, &c. 4 Cow. Rep. 576. & Vide Langdon vs. Potter & Al., 3 Mass. Rep. 128.

One claiming under a deed from a judgment debtor has not such an adverse possession as will avoid a conveyance executed by a purchaser under an execution upon the judgment. Jackson ex dem. Scofield vs. Collins, 3 Cow. Rep. 89.

(But in M'Raa vs. Smith, [2 Bay's Rep. 339.] It was Held; That possession of land five years, under a sale from defendant, who has a judgment against him, will be a good bar against a judgment creditor or those claiming under him, who has lain by that time without reviving his judgment, or bringing suit against such possessor.)

In ejectment brought by Duval and Younghusband against Bibb for a tract of land, the jury found a verdict for the plaintiffs subject to the Opinion of the Court on a case which stated, that Robert Bibb, by deed dated the 13th of December, 1788, and recorded on the 16th of the same month, conveyed the land to Graves. That Bibb, was, at that time, in actual possession, and had been so for upwards of twenty years. That Graves on the 28th of November, 1793, conveyed to Duval and Younghusband. That there was no proof "that Graves was ever in actual possession, or ever entered upon the premises for the purpose of executing the last mentioned deed; but that the defendant now, and always hath had adverse possession of the premises against the said Graves and all holding by or under him, except as to the operation of the deeds aforesaid."

PENDLETON, President, delivered the Opinion of the Court; he said;

"As to the twenty years possession in Robert, [Bibb,] prior "to his conveyance to Graves, it only proves that he had a good "title in ejectment, and a right to make that conveyance, and "cannot operate as a bar by the Act of Limitation to the plaintiffs "claiming under Graves, whose right of entry accrued only eight "years before suit brought."

"The third and principal question is, whether the bargain and "sale of Graves, (then out of possession) to the plaintiffs, passed "his title to them? As an objection to its passing the title, the "Statute and Act of Assembly against buying pretensed titles, "were relied on, as having in addition to the severe penalty on the buyer and seller of the land, made the conveyance void. "It is unnecessary to consider whether those laws produced the effect contended for, since we are all of opinion that the purchase of the plaintiffs is not within the Act of Assembly, which "has this exception: "Unless the person conveying, or those un

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