pay. It is true, that in the late case of Pittam v. Foster (a), this Court seems to have been of opinion, that the effect of the new promise is to give a new cause of action. The uniform course of pleading, however, is at variance with that doctrine; for the original cause of action, and not the new promise, is always declared on. They cited Green v. Cooke (b), Heylen v. Hastings (c), and Hickman v. Walker. (d) It is true, that in Bland v. Haselrig (e) it was decided, that the acknowledgment of one out of several who were jointly indebted, did not prevent the operation of the statute of limitations in favour of the others; but that case was overruled by the case of Whitcomb v. Whiting. (f) As to the plea of ne unques executor, the fact of Knight's being named in the will as executor, is sufficient evidence of his having been once executor, so as to entitle the plaintiff to a verdict on that issue; and he cited Wentworth, Executors, 184. (g) ABBOTT C. J. I think the rule for a new trial must be discharged. The plaintiffs have in one set of counts declared upon three promissory notes payable on demand, made by John Tredgold, in his lifetime, and the promise to pay is alleged to have been made by him. To those counts the defendants have pleaded, that John Tredgold did not promise within six years. It appeared in evidence that John Tredgold had died eleven years before the action was brought; and therefore no such promise could be made. Then there was another count, stating that John Tredgold was indebted upon the (a) 1 B. & C. 248. (c) 6 Mod. 309. (e) 2 Vent. 151. (b) 2 Ld. Raym. 1101. S.C. 6 Mod. 309. (ƒ) Doug. 651. (g) But see also Wentworth, p. 42., and the Year-book, 27 Hen. 8. pl. 26., and 9 Edw. 4. pl. 33., and Bac, Abr. tit. Executors, (E. 9.) 1823. ATKINS against TREDGOLD. note, 1823. ATKINS against TREDGOLD. notes, and died leaving the monies unpaid; and that (a) 1 B. & A. 463. plied promise by them all. Such a decision would introduce great difficulty in administering the affairs of testators. Suppose an executor to have waited six years, and then no claim having been made, to dispose of the assets in payment of legacies. He might, if the plaintiffs were to prevail, be subsequently rendered liable to the payment of demands to any amount, by the acknowledgment of a person originally joint debtor with the testator. The inconvenience and hardship arising from such a liability satisfies me that the principle of Whitcomb v. Whiting ought not to be extended to this case. For these reasons I think this rule must be discharged. BAYLEY J. My opinion in this case is founded, not upon the case of Pittam v. Foster, but upon independent grounds. The plaintiffs cannot take the case out of the statute, as to the first set of counts, because the testator had been dead ten years before the action was brought. But they seek to do that as to the other counts, by shewing an acknowledgment made by one of several who were liable; but that is not the legal effect of the payment made by Robert Tredgold. It is said, that a joint promiser having made a payment within six years, the executors of the other are liable; and the case of Whitcomb v. Whiting is relied upon. That is certainly a very strong case, and it may be questionable whether it does not go beyond proper legal limits. But that case is distinguishable from the present in two particulars. Here, the statute appears to have attached before the payment was made by Robert Tredgold; and therefore John Tredgold, being at that time protected, could not be subjected to any new obligation by the act of Robert. And, secondly, the parties sought to be charged in this 1823. ATKINS against TREDGOLD. 1823. ATKINS against TREDGOLD. action by means of an implied promise are not those originally liable, as was the case in Whitcomb v. Whiting. I entirely agree with my Lord Chief Justice, that we ought not to extend the doctrine of that case to exe cutors. HOLROYD J. I, also, am of opinion, that the circumstances of this case do not take it out of the statute of limitations. Whitcomb v. Whiting is the only case that can be relied on by the plaintiffs. That case has gone far enough; but it does not govern the present. There, the defendant Whiting was liable, upon a joint promise, at the time when the payment was made. The Court decided, that when one of two joint promisers pays a part, that was to be considered in law as a payment by both. But here, at the time when the payment was made by Robert Tredgold the joint contract had ceased to exist; for it was determined by the death of John Tredgold. The note then became the several note of the parties to it. To hold such a payment to raise an implied promise sufficient to bind the defendants, would be to decide, that, where the promises are several, a promise by one party would bind the rest. The plaintiffs cannot recover in this case, without proving a joint promise by the defendants, as executors ; and in order to do that, the executorship must be proved, although that is unnecessary where the demand is founded on promises made by the testator; for then the plea ne unques executor must be proved by the party pleading it. One of the defendants was not proved to have done any act as executor. But it has been argued, that being named as such in the will he is liable, upon these pleadings, although he has never accepted the office. 4 office. I much doubt that; but it is unnecessary to decide upon that ground (a), inasmuch as this case is distinguishable from Whitcomb v. Whiting, even if that be law. Here, at the time when the payment was made by Robert Tredgold, he was not connected in a joint contract either with John Tredgold or his executors. His separate character only remained. BEST J. The counts on promises by the testator are disposed of by Pittam v. Foster. Then, as to the others, it is sufficient to say, that the implied promise not having been made by Robert Tredgold in the character of executor, it does not prove the issue. The present case is therefore distinguishable from Whitcomb v. Whiting; beyond which I think the Court ought not to go. The rule must, therefore, be discharged. Rule discharged. (a) See Townson v. Tickell, 3 B. & A. 38., and Bonifaut v. Greenfield, 1 Leon. 60. Cro. Eliz. 80. 1823. ATKINS against TREDGOLD. Ex parte HAWKINS. THE prisoner was brought up on a writ of habeas corpus. The return set out a conviction in the following form: "Be it remembered, that on, &c. C. Hawkins hath been duly convicted before me, &c. of having been found and taken on board a certain vessel, subject and liable to forfeiture under the provisions of a certain act of parliament made and passed, &c.; for that the said vessel was on, &c. found hovering within the limits of a port of this kingdom, to wit, the port of Rye, in the county of Sussex, and then and there having been stated that the vessel was hovering without lawful excuse. should have been described as a British subject. Wednesday, Where a con- viction stated was convicted of having been found on board a vessel subject to forfeiture, for hovering within the limits of a port of this kingdom, hav certain contra band goods on board:" Held, that this was bad. First, for that it should have Secondly, for that C. H. on |