Tarkhan - koute.

was casting anchor.

"The invasion of the Crimea by the Allies

had then become imminent. Let us now see what, at such a moment, the commander of our forces by sea and land could undertake to resist the enemy, at a time when the approach of autumn was day by day confirming the conviction at Sebastopol that the Allies would attempt nothing decisive against the place during the year 1854."

The first question that arose was, whether it was possible or advisable to oppose the landing, and the Russian commander has been severely criticised for missing the opportunity. But Gen eral Todleben gives solid reasons for the tactics of his chief. To be able, he says, to oppose the disembarkation of the enemy, it was essential to be informed of the place where it was to be effected. But if it is difficult enough to fix precisely, in the case of a river, the spot where the enemy intends to pass, it is more difficult still to declare beforehand the point the enemy may propose to choose for his landing on a coast more or less accessible to invading troops on all its extent. At the degree of perfec tion to which steam transport has been brought, distances can be cleared with such celerity, that neither infantry nor cavalry disposed along the coast can ever keep pace with the steamers of their foes. Railroads alone can, to a certain extent, give means of remedying this disadvantage in land forces; but it is well known that in the Crimea there was a complete absence of railroads, and that in general all the means of communication existing at the time, with the solitary exception of the chaussée on the south, were little to be depended on and especially difficult to use in the rainy season. In such circumstances, he continues, "it became easy for the enemy

of the fortifications and the weakness of the garrison have got possession of the place without a battle. The General is further of opinion, that the covering fire of the English and French ships would have made it an extremely rash and perilous proceeding to oppose the landing, even had there existed no uncertainty as to the spot. The best course, he contends, was that actually pursued to take up a strong position as far as possible out of reach of the ships, and make a resolute stand there.

It is undeniable that the position of the Alma was well chosen for the purpose of enabling an inferior force to bar the passage of one nearly double its numbers; the Russian army consisting of 33,600 men of all arms, and 96 guns; whilst that of the Allied may be roughly computed at 60,000 men and about 150 guns. The Prince's superiority in cavalry prevented the English from attempting a turning movement over the open ground on his right, and he fancied himself, until undeceived by the Zouaves, equally protected by the steepness and ruggedness of the ground on his left.

General Todleben's plans of the field substantially agree with the English and the French; and he tells us little new touching the disposition of the troops. What strikes us most in his account of the battle is its similarity to that of M. de Bazancourt; a similarity extending even to the style. Indeed, it would seem from numerous examples-Thiers and Lamartine among the rest-that no battle could be described in French without the use of inflated terms or phrases which cannot be construed literally without causing confusion and inconsistency. It is difficult to understand how troops can gain a victory, or carry a position, without losing more than five per cent. of

their entire force in killed and wounded, after having been culbutées, écrasées, or décimées par un feu meurtrier. Unluckily, moreover, General Todleben's duty as commandant of the engineers, confined him strictly to the town and fortifications of Sebastopol; and he was obliged to depend on the reports of others for the details of the narrative of which we now propose to give an abstract or summary.

According to this history, then, the division of Bosquet was already on the march at six in the morning. At seven, when the French centre also began to move, Marshal St. Arnaud having been informed that the English army was not yet ready, suspended the march of Bosquet's division for a time, and the serious French attack consequently was not commenced till half-past eleven. Bosquet reached the right bank of the river about half-past twelve.* At the same time the steamers increased their fire, and threw shells on the Russian left wing, which, distant as they were, suffered considerable loss. Supported by this fire, the brigade D'Autemarre advanced to the ford of Alma-Tamack, which was immediately crossed by the Zouaves, who headed the brigade, and, dispersing as skirmishers, began to scale the heights. The brigade followed, and, with a battery of Bosquet's brigade, formed on the plateau across the road leading from Alma-Tamack to Hadjiboulet. About the same time, the brigade Bouet and the Turks were crossing the ford at the mouth of the river.

The battalion which first opened fire on the Russian side was the second battalion of the infantry regiment of Minsk, which, from its position near the village of Aklese, did not become aware of the movement of the brigade D'Autemarre till the head of the French column emerged from the ravine and took up a position on the crest of the heights. The Zouaves had hardly succeeded in clearing the heights of the left bank of the Alma, than already this (the Minsk) battalion found itself very critically placed. De

A glance at a map will show that crossing the river opposite the French position was a very different operation from that which fell to the share of the English, who had to climb a rugged bank and face a hot fire of grape and musketry

at once.

cimated by a front and flank fire, and fearing to be harassed in its retreat, this battalion, after having exchanged fire with the French skirmishers, and checked their attack as much as possible, commenced its retreat towards the vil- 、 lage of Orta-Kissek. General Kiriakow also, who commanded at the extreme left, to avoid the fire of the ships, was withdrawing in the direction of the telegraph, when a battery of light artillery and the regiment of Moskow came up, and the retreat was temporarily suspended. But these reënforcements did not arrive till the French had crossed the river in force, and had extricated Bosquet from the risk to which he had been exposed of being outnumbered and cut off. Canrobert and Prince Napoleon with their divisions advanced to the right bank of the Alma at one o'clock. Their skirmishers engaged the Russian skirmishers in the gardens, whilst five of their batteries opened fire against the Russian centre. One battery was sent to rejoin Bosquet, and two other brigades with a battery were ordered up by St. Arnaud to support the French attack; so that on this part of the field, 6000 Russians had to make head against 7000 French, whose flank was covered by 7000 Turks. Despite their numerical inferiority, the Russians, on the arrival of the regiment of Minsk, made an effort to drive the French from the heights with the bayonet, but were met with such a sustained fire of grape and musketry, that they fell back and resumed the defensive. They had also the worst of it in the artillery_combat that ensued, their gunners being rapidly picked off by the French rifles. Despite of what is described as a desperate resistance, Bosquet, Canrobert, and Prince Napoleon, won their way forwards; although it was not until the regiments of Minsk and Moscow had lost 1500 men, and the majority of their officers, including their colonels, were killed or wounded, that they began to retreat towards the telegraph, stopping at intervals and opening a brisk fire. Two batteries of light artillery did the same. "At length"-here we translate literally-" the left wing, stopping at the telegraph, opposed a last resistance to the French; and it was not till after a furious conflict, that it was obliged to yield definitively to the enormous superi

ority of the enemy. The hill of the telegraph, the culminating point of the centre of our position, was occupied by the French, who planted their flag upon it." The whole French army was now advancing, and "thus it came to pass that whilst the right wing of our army was still engaged in a furious conflict, in which the efforts of the English were broken against the firmness and courage of our troops, the combat on the left wing was already terminated. The English have been described as reaching the right bank of the river at half-past one, and without attempting to cross, opening a warm fire of artillery and small arms, from which the Russians, particularly the artillery, suffered much. Here they remained till the whole of Prince Napoleon's division had crossed the river, on hearing which, about two o'clock, Lord Raglan ordered the advance." The order in which the English advance was made is correctly stated in the main, and its steadiness is acknowledged. We learn, also, that our artillery played with effect on the Russian skirmishers. But when the English had reached the bridge, two batteries occupying the heights of the two sides of the main road, received them with a violent fire of grape, and the riflemen of two regiments concentrated their fire on them. Codrington's brigade, assailed by cannon and musketry on its advance to the bridge, suffered considerable losses, its ranks were thrown into confusion, and it retired in great disorder behind Bourliouch. But the English skirmishers opened their fire behind the inclosures, and began to penetrate into the vineyards of the left bank. The accuracy of their aim caused terrible losses, and especially contributed to check the fire of two light batteries on the left of the road. The situation of these two batteries became still more critical when, after a certain time, two English guns succeeded in crossing the Alma at a ford lower down than Bourliouch, and after having cleared a rise in the hill, got into position and enfiladed them. Whilst this was going on, one of the Russian bat

The Light Division, including Codrington's brigade, crossed the river higher up than the

bridge, and sustained no check till they reached

the earthwork popularly called the Great Redoubt, which they carried by a rush.

| teries continued its crushing fire on the retreating troops of Codrington.

The troops of General Kiriakow, after their encounter with the French near the telegraph, did not stop again in their retreating movement till they reached the Katcha, and they were followed by the regiment of Borodino. The light battery, number two, was the last to quit the position. It was with great difficulty that it cleared the height in consequence of its loss in horses.

At this point the English are again brought upon the stage; and it is both curious and instructive to compare this description of their manœuvres with those hitherto received in England as best authenticated.

At length, it is stated, the divisions of the Duke of Cambridge and General Evans, having reached the river, began to cross; whilst Brown's division reached the left bank despite of the fire of the regiment of the Grand Duke Michel, and that of twelve guns placed behind a low earthwork on the right of the main road. Seeing this, Prince Gortschakow ordered two batteries of the same regiment, who had suffered less than the other, to charge with the bayonet; whereupon the English, drawing back towards the river and letting them approach to within a short distance, opened a deadly fire on them. After losing their colonel and several other officers, they retired towards the earthwork in such a manner as to prevent the batteries from covering their retreat. Close upon their heels followed an English regiment, the Twenty third, on whose approach the gunners in the earth work limbered up and hurried off, leaving two guns which they were unable to move; the one from want of horses, and the other from its disabled state. In another moment the English flag was seen floating from the earthwork. But the first and second battalions of the Wladimir regiment are at hand to retrieve the disaster. Reckless of the terrible fire of the English, they execute an impetuous bayonet-charge in a compact mass; the English are driven out of the breast work, having hardly time to fire a few shots; and it is occupied anew by the Russians, who, sheltered behind the parapet, open

* Epaulement--the Great Redoubt.

The cartridges of the Grand Duke's regiment being just now exhausted, the English, after getting beyond the reach of the smooth-bore muskets, had only to sustain the fire of a handful of Wladimir riflemen; so they halted at some paces from the river, and there having begun to re-form, they reopened their fire. Lord Raglan ordered up the divisions of the Duke of Cambridge and Lacy-Evans, who by this time had managed to cross the river, to support the shattered troops of Brown. They advanced again towards the earthwork, and the situation of the Russians became critical; the more especially because they had no longer any artillery at hand to disturb the English in their formation or advance, and the terrible riflemen had picked off a startling proportion of their officers. Nevertheless Prince Gortschakow and General Kvizinsky did not shrink from a fresh sacrifice to keep the position; they both commanded a bayonet charge, and led on in person the remains of the Wladimirs, who, excited by the example of their leaders, rushed forward with hurrahs, some over the breast work, some from its sides, and flung themselves on the foe. "At the sight of the decisive onslaught of this regiment, the first line of the English battalions became confused, broke, and began retiring towards the bridge. But in this supreme moment our (the Russian) troops were all of a sudden taken in flank by French artillery, and this unforeseen attack determined the success of the action in favor of the English."*

It is then explained that St. Arnaud, learning the obstinate resistance encountered by the English, had suspended for some instants the advance of his troops,

This statement, that the guns fired into the flank of the Wladimirs, is evidently copied from the Russian account, quoted and accounted for by Kinglake, vol. ii. p. 462, note (fourth edition). The guns in question were either Turner's bat tery on the knoll, or the guns of Evans' division.

had directed against the Russian right flank three French batteries and half an English battery. This artillery, comprising twenty-three guns, opened a deadly fire, and at the same moment the French troops resumed their onward march. Thus taken at disadvantage the Wladimir regiment first halted, then made a fresh charge with the bayonet, then took refuge behind the breast work, and stood at bay. The brigade Colin Campbell threatened to turn it on its right flank; the division of Prince Napoleon, advancing more to the left, hastened to cut it off from the road to Sebastopol; the French battery thundered on its flank, whilst the divisions of Brown, Lacy-Evans, and the Duke of Cambridge rained on it a shower of shells and musket bullets. But the regiment moved not; although it had lost its commander, three chiefs of battalion, fourteen captains, thirty officers, and about thirteen hundred soldiers, it stood firm.

At length, fearing that the retreat would be cut off, and seeing that all hope was over of restoring the battle in the centre and the left flank, Menschikow, about four in the afternoon, ordered Gortschakow to draw off the troops of the right flank on the chain of heights; and the retreat was effected in good order, with the loss of only two guns, those already mentioned as abandoned in the breast work. Indeed, the Russian artillery, far from being disabled as we supposed, now figures as a decisive check on the pursuit. How this opportune efficiency is to be reconciled with the prior story of its loss in men and horses, and how a single company of the Wladimir regiment, surrounded and out-numbered as it was, ever escaped to tell the tale, we confess ourselves unable to unravel. There is also a good deal of minor inconsistency and tautology in the narrative, mostly suppressed in our abridgment; and the General, if he is to be held responsible for it, is at variance with Russian officers of rank present at the engagement, whose published statements we have read. None of these mention an infantry fight at the telegraph, although this is just the event which they would have commemorated for the honor of their

squadrons that so much of them as escaped destruction would not have ventured to attack the powerful batteries of the port; and the allied army, unaided by the fleet, would not have been in a condition to render itself mas

Todleben attributes the loss of the battle mainly to the superior discipline and arms of the Allies. The smooth-bore musket, he says, was utterly unable to contend with the rifle, to which the close formation of the Russians gave marked advantages. He also thinks that the omission to fortify the heights was a blunder; and he censures the over-hasty retreat of Kiriakow from the telegraph heights.

Prince Menschikow having made good his retreat to Sebastopol, anxious consultations were held as to the best methods of defence. Todleben himself was immediately set to work to strengthen the fortifications; and orders were given to Admiral Kornilow to block up the entry of the roadstead by sinking a certain number of ships, whose crews were to be added to the garrison. Before executing this order, the admiral assembled a council of naval officers, and submitted to them that the enemy, after having occupied the northwest side of the roadstead, might force the Russian fleet to abandon its actual position, take possession of the north side, and burn, by the fire of their batteries, the ships moored in the great bay. Starting from these assumptions, the admiral resolved to attempt a very hazardous enterprise he proposed to sail out, and attack the allied fleet at anchor off Cape Loukoul. He had calculated that, if his plan succeeded, the fleet of the Black Sea could disperse the invading armada of trans ports, and thus deprive the allied army of reënforcements and means of subsistence. In case of the failure of the attack, Kornilow proposed to grapple with the enemy's vessels, and blow himself up along with them. This bold stroke, according to the brave admiral, would inevitably have so weakened the allied

Russian reënforcements, the Allies, so at least thought Admiral Kornilow, could not have failed of being definitively crushed by superior forces.

This project was rejected as too hazardous, first by the council, and secondly by Prince Menschikow; and no alternative was left but to sink the ships, seven in number, with a portion of their armament, which there was not time to disembark. The ceremony is described as solemn and melancholy in the extreme. "The sailors, their hearts swell-` ing with anguish, looked on in silence whilst the waves engulfed these noble vessels, to which, for the fleet of the Black Sea, were attached so many glorious recollections. But the emotion was at its height when the steamer ‘Gromonossitz' was ordered to fire into the Tri-Sviatitelia,' to hasten is submer sion. Tears restrained till then rolled down the cheeks of our brave sailors."

6

In the meantime, the allied armies had arrived (September 24th) near Belbeck; their bivouacs could be discerned from the North Fort. The insufficient garrison of this fort expected thenceforth from hour to hour to see its feeble intrenchments attacked by a powerful adversary; and its position seemed the more critical, insomuch as Prince Menschikow had quitted Sebastopol in the night to proceed with his army to Bakhtchisarai by the Mackenzie heights. After his departure, there remained in Sebastopol sixteen thousand five hundred and sixty-nine fighting men, including several battalions of sailors. On the 13th, the North Fort had twelve guns in position on the land side; and these were so placed as to be unable to concentrate their fire; whilst ships brought close to the shore could batter it with impunity. Works constructed under the direction of Todleben had materially strengthened it by the 25th, but it still offered a front of a verst and a half (about a mile), armed only with twenty-nine guns, and he gives it as his opinion, "that the insufficient garrison which was to defend