« PreviousContinue »
for 14 years.
be made upon
bank note of the said governor and company; or if any person 1 G. 4. C. 92. or persons shall, from and after the passing of this act, without or having such such authority as aforesaid, knowingly have in his, her, or their plate in possescustody or possession, any such plate or instrument, or shall know, sion; or uttering ingly and wilfully utter, publish, or dispose of, or put away any any impression paper or other material containing any such word or words, figure or figures, character or characters, pattern or patterns, as aforesaid, or shall knowingly or willingly have in his, her, or their custody or possession, any paper or other material containing any such word or words, figure or figures, character or characters, pattern or patterns as aforesaid, (without lawful excuse, the proof whereof shall lie upon the person accused), every person so offending in any of the cases aforesaid, and being convicted thereof according to law, shall be adjudged a felon, and shall be transported for the Transportation term of fourteen years.
$ 3." And whereas it is expedient, that the name or names of Bank may cause the person or persons intrusted and authorized by the said governor an impression to and company to sign bank notes on behalf of the said
the notes by company, should be impressed by machinery upon bank notes of machinery in the description aforesaid, in such form as may from time to time be lieu of signatures. adopted by the said governor and company, instead of being subscribed in the hand-writing of such person or persons respectively: and whereas doubts may arise respecting the validity of such notes; be it therefore declared and enacted, that all bank notes of the said governor and company of the description aforesaid, whereon the name or names of any person or persons intrusted or authorized to sign such notes on behalf of the said governor and company, shall or may be impressed by machinery provided for that purpose by the said governor and company, and with the authority of the said
governor and company, shall be and be taken to be good and valid to all intents and purposes, as if such notes had been subscribed in the proper hand-writing of the person or persons intrusted or authorized by the said governor and company to sign the same respectively, and shall be deemed and taken to be bank notes within the meaning of all laws and statutes whatsoever, and shall and may be described as bank notes in all indictments and other criminal and civil proceedings whatsoever; any law, statute, or usage to the contrary notwithstanding."
Game (Setting Spring Guns, fc.)
Vide ante, page 499.
passer having knowledge that there are spring guns in a wood, although he may be ignorant of the particular spots where they are placed, cannot maintain an action for an injury received in consequence of his accidentally treading on the latent wire communicating with the gun, and thereby letting it off, is reported in 3 B. & A, 304.
Ante, page 531. It has recently been decided, that in an action against a gamekeeper for a penalty for using a gun to kill game, without being qualified, evidence of the real title to the manor is admissible, for the purpose
of negativing the existence of a colourable title in the person under whom the defendant claims to act. Entries in the books of the clerk of the peace of deputations formerly granted to gamekeepers by the real owner of the manor, are also evidence to. shew that manerial rights were publicly exercised by him, and that the
person whose title was set up by the defendant, knew that he had not any title whatever. Hunt v. Andrews, H. 60 G. 3. & 1 G. 4. 3 B. & A. 341.
See stat. 55 G. 3. c. 68. § 2. ante p. 702, 703. An order for
R. v. Sheppard, H. 60 G. 3. & 1 G. 4. 3 B. & A. 414. Two stopping up an
justices of the peace for the west riding of Yorkshire made the highway, under following order, dated 21st September 1818.
“ We whose names 55 G. 3. c. 68. are hereunto subscribed, being two of his majesty's justices of the § 2. must be peace acting in and for the said riding, having, upon view, this made at a special day found that two certain public footways, leading &c. are unnecessessions, and that
sary, do hereby order the same to be stopped up and discontinued fact must be made appear on
from the public use.” The sessions, on appeal, having confirmed the face of the the order, Russell in last Trinity term obtained a certiorari to reorder.
move both orders, for the purpose of quashing them, on the ground that the first order was insufficient, it not being therein stated that it was made at a special sessions, and he cited Rex v. The Justices of Worcestershire. 2. B & A. 228.-Littledale and E. Alderson shewed
It is not requisite that an order for stopping up an unnecessary highway should be made at a special sessions. This power was a new one given for the first time by 55 G. 3. c. 68. § 2. And this is clear from the preamble, which recites, that it is expedient that his majesty's justices of the peace should have power, under certain regulations, to stop up such highways. Then it is to be supposed, that all the regulations will be found in that act : the words are these : “And also when it shall appear, upon the view of any two or more of the said justices, that any public highway, &c. is unnecessary, it shall and may be lawful, by order of such justices, or any two of them, to stop up and sell such unnecessary highway, &c. by such ways and means, and subject to such exceptions and conditions, as are mentioned in the 13 G. 3. c. 78.” Now, here nothing is said of a special sessions. Where the legislature mean it to be done at a special sessions they have said so; for, in the case of a diversion of a highway, the words are, that it shall be lawful, “ by order of such justices, at some special sessions," to do it. Here they have not only not mentioned it, but have added that it may be done by order of such justices, or any two of them, which could not be if the special sessions were composed of more than four; for in such a case it must be done by the majority present, and this distinguishes this case from Rex v. The Justices of Worcestershire. There the question arose on an order for diverting a Rex v.Sheppard. way which, beyond all doubt, must be made at a special sessions, and the court only decided, that in such a case, where the 55 G. 3. c. 68. gave no new power, but only regulated the exercise of that previously given by 13 G. 3. c. 78., the special sessions must be convened in the particular mode pointed out by the sixty-second section of that act. Here it is a new power, and if, therefore, it is required to be exercised at a special sessions, it is not also requisite that it must be at a special sessions so conyened. If not, then, inasmuch as every meeting of two justices, for a special purpose, is a special sessions, it is sufficiently apparent, on this order, that the act has been complied with. It may be contended, that the words " said justices" will incorporate the words“ special sessions,” but that is not so; for, by examining the 55 6. 3. c. 68. and the 13 G. 3. c. 78. together, it will clearly appear that this expression, which is used throughout both acts, in every clause, merely means justices of the limits within which the particular highways happen to lie; nor will the words “ by such ways and means," &c. do so, for these have only reference to the
ways and means, exceptions and conditions, of selling the highway when stopped up, and have no reference to the stopping it up; and these will be found detailed in the seventeenth section of the 13 G. 3. c. 78. Here the justices have followed literally the words of the act; and great inconvenience would follow, if, six months after a way has been stopped, after an appeal made, which has failed, after the land has been sold, and the money appropriated, a party, by certiorari, should be able to overturn all this, and that, more especially, in a case where, by the fourth section of the 55 G. 3. c. 68. it is declared, that, after the appeal shall have been deterniined, it shall be binding and conclusive on all persons whomsoever. If the 13 G. 3. c. 78. is to be incorporated with the 55 G. 3. c. 68., it should be so altogether, and then the certiorari is taken away. [Abbott C.J. There is no clause in the 55 G. 3. c. 68. which takes it away; and unless that be so, it lies by the common law.] Russell, contra. No satisfactory reason can be given why an order for diverting a highway should be made at a special sessions, and an order for stopping up an unnecessary highway should not. Indeed the latter case is a fortiori ; for there the public are wholly deprived of their antecedent rights, and in the other case their rights are only abridged. So that both cases are, to say the least, within the same mischief: and it is therefore fair to infér, that the intent of the legislature was, to include them within the same salutary regulations. Plowden, 366., is an authority to shew that this is the sound mode of construction of an act of parliament; and besides, there are the words “said justices," which refer to those next antecedent, viz. “ said justices at some special sessions." And if it be once established that this order must be made at a special sessions, Rex v. The Justices of Worcestershire has decided, that the special sessions must be specially convened by notice to all the justices residing within the limits. The order, therefore, should have appeared, on the face of it, to have been made at a special sessions ; and that not being so, it must be quashed for insufficiency. Abbott C. J. I have already expressed my opinion, that in this case the certio
Rex v. Shreppard. rari is not taken away; and then the only question remaining is,
whether this order is, on the face of it, bad, it not being stated to have been made at a special sessions. I think that it is bad on that ground. It seems to me, that an order like this must, under the 55 G. 3. c. 68. § 2. be made at a special sessions. It is admitted, that an order for diverting a road must be so made, and no reason can be assigned for such a provision in that case, which will not apply, with equal or greater force, to the present. I think there are words in this clause sufficient to show this to be the intention of the legislature. After enacting, that the justices, at some special sessions, shall have power to divert highways, it proceeds to state, “ And also, when it shall appear, upon the view of any two or more of the said justices, that a highway is unnecessary, it shall and may be lawful, by order of such justices, or any two of them, to stop it up.” Now the words“ said justices" may, as it seems to me, refer to the previous words,“ such justices at some special sessions :" if so, it will carry the plain intent of the legislature into effect, and avoid the incongruity which would otherwise arise. I am of opinion, therefore, that this order, and the order of sessions confirming it, must be quashed. Bayley J. I am of the same opinion. It was determined in Rex v. The Justices of Worcestershire, that, in order to constitute a special sessions properly, all the justices acting and residing within the limits must be convened; and this is a salutary regulation to prevent an improper exercise of such a power as the present. "It seems to me hat in the 55 G. 3. c. 68. 5 2. the words“ special sessions” have been by some accident omitted. But I think we may take the words“ said justices” as referring to the justices immediately antecedent, who are justices at some special sessions. This will supply the accidental omission, and carry into effect the intention of the legislature. This order is therefore bad. —Holroyd J. I have had great doubts in the course of this argument, whether it was necessary, under the particular words of this clause, that such an order as the present should be made at a special sessions. But, considering the words altogether, and the intent of the legislature, and the incongruity which would arise if we were to hold different regulations applicable to the present case, and the case where a highway is diverted, I am now satisfied that it is requisite that the order should be made at a special sessions. My doubt arose from not being clearly of opinion that the words " said justices” referred to the words “said justices at some special sessions” used in the previous part of the clause. However, considering that the general intention of the act was manifestly to give the public the benefit of such a regulation, I think that in this case the order is bad. Best J. The object of this act was plainly, as appears from the preamble, to protect the rights of the public. It ought, therefore, to receive a liberal construction. The object was to give every possible degree of publicity to orders like the present; and we should entirely defeat this if we were to give the construction to it which is contended for by those who argue in support of this order. For it would follow, that, even after a special sessions, consisting of many magistrates, had refused to make such an order, two justices might afterwards do so. That would be an absurd consequence,
which the legislature never could have intended. The public incon- Rex v.Sheppard, venience which would arise from permitting such an order as this to be made not at a special sessions, seems to me to be greater than that arising in the case where a way is diverted. I think, therefore, that this order must be made at a special sessions. It is argued, that the legislature have not said so. But the words “ said justices" seem to me to refer to the justices at some special sessions ; and, even without these words, I should be of opinion that the words “ special sessions' must, from the manifest intent of the legislature, over-ride the whole clause. I therefore fully concur in the opinion that both these orders ought to be quashed.-Both orders quashed.
bighways (Turnpike Returns.) By stat. 16. 4. c. 95. Returns are required, under certain penalties, 1 G. 4.c.95. from turnpike road trusts, of the amount of their revenues, and expence of maintaining the same.
As the act will probably have effected its lication of this work, the editor considers himself justified in giving
purpose before the pubmerely this slight notice of it.
homicide (at Sea, Murder, Trial, 8c.) STAT: 188.8.131.52: 90. 91. enacts, that when
any person or persons GAC 2017 shall be tried for any capital crime or offence committed upon Persons tried for sea, out of the body of any county of this realm, and within the murther or man · jurisdiction of the admiralty, by virtue of any commission directed mitted at sen, under stat. 28 H. 8. c. 15. and shall be found guilty of any crime or shall receive the offence which, if committed in or upon the land, would be clergy- benefit of clergy able, such person or persons shall be entitled to receive the benefit as if committed
on land. of clergy in respect of such crime or offence, in like manner, and shall be subject to the same punishment for such clergyable crime or offence, as if he, she, or they had committed such clergyable crime or offence in or upon the land.
By stat. 59 G. 3. c. 44. § 1., after reciting stat. 57 G. 3. c. 53., (a) (a) Ante, p. 796. and that whereas doubts have arisen whether in the said settlements in the bay of Honduras, there be a fort or factory to which a commission may issue for the trial of offences under stat. 46 G. 3. c. 54.: And whereas by reason of such doubts, and the great delay and difficulty of removing offenders in Honduras for trial to England, or to any of his majesty's islands, plantations, colonies, dominions, forts, or factories, such crimes do oftentimes escape unpunished; for remedy thereof, it is enacted, that all murders, manslaughters, Certain offences rapes, robberies, and burglaries committed, or that shall be com- committed on mitted on land, at the said settlement in the bay of Honduras, land in the bay may be inquired of, tried, heard, determined, and adjudged, within of Honduras, to the said settlement in the bay of Honduras, under or by virtue of commission the king's commission or commissions, under the great seal of Great under the great Britain, to be directed to any such four or more discreet persons, as seal. the lord chancellor of Great Britain, lord keeper, or commissioners for the custody of the great seal of Great Britain, for the time being,